Even before German parties went into campaign mode, the 2019 European Elections were portrayed as a “choice of destiny” (Schicksalswahl). Much of what German citizens took for granted seemed at stake: After decades of enlargement and ever closer cooperation, Brexit clearly demonstrated that there are concrete dangers of European disintegration. Growing antagonism between the EU and the USA on trade matters, tariffs and military expenses, as well as the spill over effects of the trade war between the USA and China revealed EU’s vulnerability to external influences.
For voters who share the overall pro-European consensus in Germany, the rise of parties and governments who challenge the rule of law in the EU appears as a threat. An opinion poll ahead of the elections found that 88 per cent of respondents agree that voting is crucial in order to contain right-wing populists’ influence in the European Parliament. Fear of EU disintegration had a mobilising effect on most centrist voters. On the other hand, a small, but growing segment of Eurosceptic voters feel threatened by the idea of supranational governance and associate the EU with uncontrolled immigration.
The biggest winner of the 2019 European elections are the German Greens, Die Grünen, who managed to improve their result by 9.8 per cent compared to 2014 and are on a record high of 20.5 per cent. As the Social Democrats (SPD) suffered from an unprecedented loss of 11.4 per cent and obtained only 15.8 per cent of the vote, Die Grünen came in second place after CDU/CSU. This is the first time that SPD comes third, after Die Grünen, in a national election. CDU/CSU (28.9 per cent) still sends the largest delegation to the European parliament, albeit with substantial losses, especially among young voters. In comparison to the 2014 European Election, the Eurosceptic AfD (11 per cent) could improve its result by 3.9 per cent, but fared worse than in the more recent federal elections (12.6). The liberal FDP managed to increase their result by 2.1 per cent (5.4) and is close to the far-left party Die Linke (5.5), which lost 1.9 per cent compared to 2014.
Increasing Polarisation, Limited Fragmentation
The election results in Germany suggest increasing polarisation on the cultural dimension, as relative gains for Die Grünen (socially progressive, pro-EU) and AfD (authoritarian, anti-EU) show. Substantial loss of votes for the two major catch-all parties (Volksparteien) SPD and CDU/CSU, especially among voters aged 60 or younger, show that Germany is moving towards a multipolar party system with more complex options for governing coalitions.
Unlike for federal elections, there is no threshold for European elections in Germany. Despite high gains for smaller parties (the vote share of parties not represented in the Bundestag rose by 4.1 per cent to 12.9 per cent in total, compared to 2014), there is little evidence for a long term fragmentation of the German party system – as is the case in the Netherlands - in the near future.
Increasing Interest in European Politics
The turnout in Germany (61.4 per cent) was much higher than the average turnout in the European Union (50.6) and is the highest in a European election in Germany after the country’s reunification in 1990. For decades, European elections were considered second-order elections (Nebenwahlen) of less importance than federal elections and an opportunity for protest voting. However, there is evidence that the European elections 2019 could reverse this trend.
When asked if their vote in the European election is influenced rather by politics on the federal level or on the European level, German voters would usually see the federal level as more important. In 2019, for the first time, a majority of 57 per cent considered the European level as more important for their vote. As of today, the vast majority of voters see decisions of the European Parliament as important - 71 per cent as compared to 56 per cent in 2014 (according to Forschungsgruppe Wahlen).
The Political Situation and Debates Prior to the Election
On the federal level, the political situation ahead of the European elections was characterised by difficult and unusually long coalition negotiations after the 2017 federal elections and the instability of the governing coalition. After coalition negotiations between the conservative CDU/CSU, Die Grünen and the liberal FDP failed, a new government could only be formed under a second consecutive Grand coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD - 171 days after Election Day.
Since its formation in March 2018, the Grand coalition was under significant pressure, as the Social Democrats (and to a lesser extent the Bavarian CSU) see the threat of losing their own distinctive profile and voter support in this arrangement with CDU. Before entering the Grand coalition, the Social Democrats had called for a referendum among their members, two thirds of whom supported the decision to enter a coalition led by CDU/CSU. Nonetheless, there remains a substantial proportion of SPD members who urge the party leaders to walk out of the coalition.
Climate Protection Ranks High on Voters’ List of Priorities
From January to May 2019, voters’ top priority shifted from the issue of immigration to climate change. When asked to name problems that Germany is facing, “immigration” continuously came in the first place since 2016. This was still the case in January 2019, when the issue was seen as a major problem by 39 per cent of respondents. But by beginning of May 2019, the importance of “environment and energy” had grown and was identified as the biggest problem (by 30 per cent of respondents) that Germany is facing (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen).
In a context of consistent protests by the Friday for Future movement, extensive media debates on Diesel emissions and debates on the end of coal production, climate policies rose to the top in voters’ priorities. Ten days ahead of the election, almost half of the voters (48 per cent) identified climate protection as a salient issue that would determine their voting decision, followed by social security (43 per cent), preserving peace (35 per cent), immigration (25 per cent) and economic growth (19 per cent) (Infratest dimap). Rents and the housing market also appeared as a salient issue, as they were identified as a major problem by 17 per cent of respondents in April and 11 per cent in May 2019 (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen).
Success and Failure Factors Regarding the Parties’ Electoral Performance
The increased prominence of environmentalist and energy issues was beneficial for Die Grünen, since voters clearly associate the party with these matters. Moreover, the environmentalist party is believed to have the highest competency in the field of climate protection (according to 59 per cent of respondents), with CDU/CSU on a distant second place (10 per cent).
The fact that CDU/CSU is seen as the most competent party in major policy areas such as the economy (37 per cent), European politics (Europapolitik, 28 per cent), refugees and migration (27 per cent) did not translate into improved election results. The SPD ranks second in most areas of competence and first in the area of social justice (24), but only 4 per cent see SPD as the most competent in climate protection. As social justice is identified as an issue dealt with on the federal level, SPD is not likely to make gains thanks to its competence on the issue in a European election.
As the heat maps of SPD show (see below), the Social Democrats still have a large field of sympathisers but failed to mobilise them. Centrist voters saw more credible options among CDU/CSU, FDP and Die Grünen, while left-progressive voters opted for Die Grünen as a ticket for change on the European level. SPD could not lift social justice-related issues to the top of the agenda on the European level. Whereas the party leadership was not successful in shifting the debate towards social justice, voices within the SPD youth organisation in favour of expropriating larger companies, e.g. in the real estate sector, were covered extensively in the media but did not resonate well with centrist voters.
Die Grünen, on the other hand, could attract votes from both economically left- and right-leaning voters, as the large variation of voters’ positions on the left/right axis shows. Part of their success is that Die Grünen appeared united with no major conflict between the traditional left (Fundis) and right wing (Realos) of the party. Subsequently, the party was identified by 52 per cent of voters as a choice for a “modern civic policy” (Infratest dimap). The prospect of a coalition between CDU/CSU and Die Grünen currently enjoys the highest public support in years.
The Eurosceptic AfD found it difficult to navigate between systemic opposition towards the EU and appealing to more moderate Eurosceptic voters. Still, AfD enjoys lasting support by voters who see immigration and the spread of political Islam as salient issues. AfD has successfully reached out to voters who do not stand in line with their policy proposals but cast their vote as a sign of protest.
Traditionally, Die Linke finds it hard to compete in European elections. Even though, internally, the party could find a compromise and campaigned in favour of the EU, rather than against it, it was not perceived as a convincing option to pro-European left voters. With regard to Eurosceptic voters with economically left preferences, die Linke is competing with AfD, especially in Eastern Germany.
The liberal FDP attempted to build on their image of an advocate for civil rights and innovation on the European level. Whereas some voters applauded FDP’s opposition towards the introduction of “upload filters” on social media platforms, they did not fare as well among pro-European voters as Die Grünen did. There is after all only a small proportion of voters who support FDP’s staunch pro-market position.