From May 23rd to May 26th 2019, European citizens went to the polls to vote in the European parliamentary elections after five years. How did political movements position themselves in the debates leading up to the elections? How do they react to changes in the society and which topics to they choose to campaign on in order to distinguish themselves fro political competitors?
This overview of political strategy debates among political parties in selected European countries offer an in-depth political analyses - not in text form, but rather graphically and pointedly. We hope for this project to contribute towards a constructive debate on the European elections, their results as well as the way forward.
In May 2019, the United Kingdom (UK) elected 73 MEPs to the European Parliament by a proportional representation (PR) system, as a single constituency. Should the UK leave the EU on 31 October 2019, the current European parliament seat count of 751 will drop to 705. 27 of the 73 seats will be distributed to 14 other countries, including France, Spain, Italy, Poland and Romania. The remaining 46 available seats will be reserved for possible future EU enlargement.
Much of UK politics over the last 3+ years has been dominated by the decision to leave or remain in the European Union. However, at these European Parliament elections, Brexit as a topic reached its apex -- this really was a very one-note contest. Continuing a recent trend, Brexit was the most salient factor in making voting decisions for the electorate; parties, well aware of this, tried to capitalise on the opportunity. Some achieved this goal better than others.
Labour had the most diverse manifesto in terms of policy themes. The reason for this is twofold: the party is trying to establish itself as a credible force ready to form a government at the next general election; it does not have a coherent stance on Brexit and so must campaign on other topics. This latter reason stems from the seemingly irreconcilable wings of the party, whose members and MPs are a cross-section of pro-EU, Eurosceptics and moderates. Some feel very strongly that there should be a second referendum, others think that is a terrible idea and want to get the EU exit over swiftly. To say the party is having a hard time keeping everybody happy is something of an understatement. The topics covered in the Labour manifesto had the recurring theme of party credibility and spanned typically left-wing topics such as workers’ rights and environmental policy, with the additions of centrist notions of economic competition and policing. In the media, Labour spokespeople failed to have a coherent message on Brexit, which is ultimately a large contributor to their reduced performance at the polls.
Clear messaging and unity is a problem also plaguing the Conservative Party, yet with slightly different dynamics. Here, the Anti-EU camp is particularly forceful and not just about leaving - they have a clear vision of how this exit should look. There are Eurosceptics who wish for complete withdrawal at all costs, known as 'no deal' Brexit, and who are angry at the EU side of negotiations thus far. Others, however, see Brexit as disruption for business and the economy -- the party's usual chief concerns -- and wish to minimise this by continuing trade agreements with the EU and its member states. All this from a party who campaigned to Remain at the 2016 referendum, then pledged to Leave in the 2017 general election, but have not delivered on this yet. It did not want this EP election and actively tried not to participate in it, including failing to release a manifesto. The discourse largely centred upon current party in-fighting, culminating in the triggering of a leadership election for the party due to take place after the European contest.
The results seen for the two main parties reflect the confusion and lack of a clear Brexit stance. They lost over a quarter of their vote share and much of this was redistributed to parties which did make their Brexit position clear. These winners of the contest undoubtedly were the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats. Combined, they won over half of the vote share and the Liberal Democrats performed twice as well as in the 2014 EP contest. The Brexit Party replaced UKIP as the principal anti-EU force, gaining an additional 6 per cent of the vote share, compared to the party Nigel Farage led in 2014. Whereas UKIP was the pre-Brexit party, calling for a referendum on the issue of EU membership, The Brexit Party has emerged due to Britain not leaving the EU yet. Its messaging was extremely clear, even without a manifesto and only one leaflet as their campaign literature; their whole movement calls for complete EU withdrawal and vocalises frustrations with the institutions which have not actualised this. Equally clear but in comprehensive opposition, the Liberal Democrat message was a continuation of their ‘Bollocks to Brexit’ slogan. The party’s manifesto and media campaign consistently stressed its view of the benefits of EU membership, both in practical and ideological terms. Combined with their recent local election victories, the LibDems positioned themselves as the dependable left-wing voice, which certainly paid off. Recent research suggests that for 13 per cent of the UK population, however, the environment is the biggest issue faced by the country and not Brexit. For these people, the Green Party is a first choice in any EP election, particularly the 2019 one. The environmentalist party’s manifesto proposed green solutions to many identified problems, somewhat more radical than the LibDems, also making it a good option for anti-main party protest votes. This worked well for it, finishing ahead of the governing Conservative Party (which ended up fifth, in its worst ever performance in a nationwide election since its genesis) and gaining in vote share.
Turnout across the UK was 37 per cent. This may sound like a low figure, but for a European election with no local or national election happening concurrently, it is a higher turnout rate than might be expected. In fact, most regions saw an increase in turnout to the previous 2014 election which did indeed hold local polls at the same time. This indicates that people who are not normally mobilised were motivated to vote at this contest. That said, in comparison to the 72 per cent 2016 Referendum turnout, the rate shows that the electorate did not see this as a second Brexit vote. Yet this did not stop the post-election analysis being framed this way. Even pre-election, parties were classified as Remain or Leave dependent upon their Brexit discourse. This has been characterised in different ways, but the most comprehensive analysis groups as follows: The Brexit Party and UKIP as ‘Pro-/Hard Brexit’; the LibDems, Greens, Plaid Cymru and SNP as ‘Anti-Brexit’; Labour and Conservatives as ‘Soft/Compromised Brexit’. When broken down by EP regions, it is evident that areas who voted in the majority for Leave are still backing anti-EU parties; likewise for Remain areas and pro-EU parties, on aggregate. It could be easily determined that voters cast ballots that were disapproving of the two main parties and used them to indicate which way the nation would like to be led in future – 34.6 per cent voted Remain and Left wing, 33.7 per cent voted Leave and Right wing, 31.7 per cent voted somewhere in the middle. It is the Referendum result all over again, but this time with a three-way tie. This, however, is perhaps too simple an analysis. Whilst the discourse was dominated by Brexit, it is part of a growing frustration in Britain that other important issues are not being dealt with due to a preoccupation with the EU withdrawal. Voters repeatedly express concerns over strained public services such as the NHS and schools; established parties are losing credibility due to in-fighting and perceived poor leadership; the cost of living, job and housing markets are matters of dissatisfaction in the electorate. A more accurate consideration of this contest may well be that an amalgamation of issues, coupled with the proportional representation election, caused the continued fragmentation of the party system that is evident. Nevertheless, one would not necessarily be able to discern this argument from the discourse, which remains fixated with Brexit.
The Conservative Party aims to deliver a strong economy that prioritises free trade and deregulation. Moreover, its current chief concern is Britain’s exit from the EU. The many wings of the party, thus far irreconcilable under Theresa May’s premiership, are choosing a new leader to enact this vision; some candidates are hard-line Eurosceptics, others are moderately pro-EU, and the rest somewhere in between. Much of the policy discussion is about Brexit: whether to continue extending Article 50 until a deal has been negotiated; whether to leave in October with or without a deal; how any new negotiations are to be approached. The party is pulled to the Right and toward the Anti-EU axis by those advocating ‘No Deal Brexit’, but other wings want to keep a customs union with the EU and pull the party in the opposite direction. Outside of this, taxation policies are being proposed by candidates, including lowering thresholds for higher earners, and reorganising finances to invest more in the NHS.
The Conservative Party and its core voters occupy the same spatial position, which is centre- to mid-Right and rather Eurosceptic, but with a very small area of concentration in the centre. Most voters are spread out ideologically, pulling in the directions of the wings of the party that range from moderately pro-EU to staunchly anti-EU. Still, they hold similar principles of a reduced welfare state and deregulation of industries, whilst delivering a strong economy and public services such as the NHS. Most Conservative voters want a ‘pragmatic’ Brexit that the UK benefits from and keeps their party in government; some are Remainers that are loyal to the party; others want a hard Brexit at all costs. Sympathisers occupy a similar space but with a greater area of central concentration. These are likely to be people who usually vote Conservative in a general election, but who opted for the Brexit Party or the Liberal Democrats in this contest. Due to this, party strategy may not change very much, as they are not planning to participate in any more European elections. However, it does signal that the Conservatives need to achieve an EU withdrawal so as to not lose their voters to the Brexit Party in any national election. In terms of explaining their failure, it is evident that the Conservative party was unable to retain even their core voters in this contest, who split and voted for parties who were united on their Brexit stance, in whichever way the voter leans.
Similar conflicting wings are found within the Labour Party, but with a greater pro- and anti-Brexit divide: significant groups in the party, especially in the Executive Committee, wish to leave the EU for reasons of economic independence, innate to socialist parties; more Centrist branches feel that the Leave result of the referendum should be respected, but the UK should continue to have a customs union with the EU. Outside of Brexit, the party’s aims are social equity and investment in public services. Policies include the immediate end of economic austerity, in favour of injections of investments that also incorporate green technology. The Labour Party aims to protect the rights of all citizens, introducing extended workers’ rights and proposing to continue supporting asylum seekers and refugees. Ultimately, the party is suffering due to the lack of unity on Brexit and the perceived poor leadership as the opposition party in government; voters feel that Labour could be doing more to either help or hinder Brexit, depending on the voter’s EU stance, and bring more attention to other issues facing the country.
Labour voters’ spatial position is wider than it is tall and sits largely in the pro-EU space. This placement is in line with the party’s position, yet there is a very small area of central concentration. Moreover, there are not nearly as many voters pulling in a Eurosceptic direction as there are members or representatives of the party, however there are some sympathisers that draw toward that direction and these people are more concentrated in their positioning. Labour voters strive for social equity, principally by ending economic austerity and expanding or maintaining the welfare state with increased investment. Most of Labour’s voters and sympathisers are pro-EU and wish to Remain in the Union, yet there are also many who hold that the result of the Referendum should still be honoured. Party sympathisers are likely to have voted Liberal Democrat in this contest, and to a lesser extent some votes would have been lost to the Brexit Party and the Greens. This is in part due to the proportional representation system used for European contests, and partly due to Labour’s unclear stance on Brexit. A good party strategy in response to this would be to back a People’s Vote to regain lost voters from the Liberal Democrats but then promise to deliver the result of a second referendum, no matter which side were to win.
The Liberal Democrats are also having a leadership contest, but both candidates aim to secure a second referendum on Brexit, dubbed a ‘People’s Vote’. This is the chief campaign concern for the party, along with vocalising their ideals of the benefits of EU membership. The LibDems critique the current establishment and its handling of Brexit and say that due to many errors and inconsistencies, the democratic option is to have a second referendum. They have had success with this message, recently achieving good results in local elections. They are unified in terms of policy direction, which includes anti-populist and anti-corruption measures, gender and sexual equality measures, and investment in public services.
Liberal Democrat voters are not as staunchly pro-EU as the party. They are predominantly left leaning but with a large spread that covers lots of the centre ground. This makes sense due to the overall liberal values that these voters hold, including citizen rights and opposition to populism, and that as the ‘third party’ in Britain the Liberal Democrats appeal to centre ground supporters of both the Conservatives and Labour; many of these voters could have been moderate Labour or progressive Conservative voters in previous contests. These factors also explain the spatial positioning of the party’s sympathisers. Those in the Conservative’s ideological space will either be people who voted Remain or those who sometimes tactically vote Liberal Democrat to prevent a Labour candidate from winning in national or local contests. The appeal that the party has to a broad ideological spectrum of voters, along with their clear Brexit message, is indicative of their success in this election. An efficacious strategy going forward would be to continue building credibility and broadening their policy scope to really win over the electorate who consider them favourable.
A People’s Vote, along with tackling climate change, is also the aim of the Green Party which is equally united in its support for “Remain”. As expected, the Greens’ chief concern is creating a more environmentalist UK and EU with strict green regulations. These measures include becoming completely ‘Carbon Neutral’ by 2030 and incorporates anti-corruption sentiments, with the aim of high taxation for the biggest earners and large companies. The Greens also aim to end economic austerity, extend workers’ and human rights, and pursue disarmament. They appeal to the worry that not enough is being done about climate change and that democracy is under threat without a second referendum on EU withdrawal. They are very Pro-EU but feel that Europe should be doing more to build a greener economy.
The Green Party is more radically Left-wing than their voters and sympathisers. However, these people are pro-EU, liberal and have the environment as one of their principle concerns, covering most of the Left quarter. The Greens are regarded as the Left-wing anti-establishment party so their voters are also likely to oppose the current world economic order, corruption and war. Their sympathisers are of a similar ideological spread, including some in an anti-EU space; these are possibly anti-establishment voters or Conservatives who prioritise climate change as an issue. The party was successful in its appeal to a broad spectrum of voters, offering an alternative for those who are frustrated with current international politics. This, nevertheless, is due to the proportional representation system used for European elections; the Greens can perform similarly well in terms of vote share in a British national contest, but this will not be translated into seat share. Therefore, the best strategy for the party would be to continue building legitimacy and effecting European politics by ensuring that the United Kingdom remains in the European Union.
Almost the sole aim of the Brexit Party is complete withdrawal from the EU without a second referendum. However, as a new party it is only just drawing up a manifesto, so more issues may evolve soon. In media discussions, the party leader Nigel Farage emphasised his view of a weakening democracy due to not having achieved Brexit since the 52 per cent majority for the Leave vote in 2016. The party speaks of the strain on UK public services due to immigration rates, and that values of free speech are under threat. It suggests that the cost of living will improve once the UK leaves the EU and advocates for the introduction of greater deregulation of industries. In this regard, it is extremely Anti-EU and mostly economically right-wing.
Brexit Party voters hold the values of industry deregulation, tackling the cost of living and protecting their version of free speech, but their principle concern is achieving Brexit; this means that they also appeal to some moderates who feel the result of the 2016 Referendum should be honoured. Nevertheless, most Brexit party voters are not as radical in their positioning as the party. Brexit Party sympathisers are spatially closer to the party than their voters, but they are fewer in number because most people who favoured the party voted for them. Still, there are a few voters and supporters who occupy the pro-EU, Left quarter due to the anti-establishment nature of the party and the favourability of its leader Nigel Farage. The party’s’ success at this election was due to this leader, its broad ideological appeal and its extremely unified Brexit stance. Strategically, it could transfer this success to national elections by extending their policy reach, as they already are by producing a manifesto, and building credibility to retain voters.
UKIP also seeks to exit from the EU, in particular for immigration-related reasons, but it is suffering from poor leadership and unfavourable party members. Their previous leader, Nigel Farage, is now head of the Brexit Party and those who have replaced him are not liked by the electorate to the same extent. UKIP also speaks of a threat to democracy and free speech, showing to be against gender and sexual equality measures in interviews. Its short manifesto describes the party’s patriotism and focus on the UK armed forces; it also aims for reciprocal rights for EU and UK citizens after Brexit. It is Anti-EU and mostly Right-wing, strongly opposed to a second referendum.
UKIP did not manage to retain many voters at this election, largely due to losing its previous leader to the Brexit Party. Nevertheless, the few that did cast a ballot for UKIP were not as radical as the party and span the anti-EU, Right-wing quarter. They oppose a People’s Vote and feel that democracy is under threat due to not having withdrawn from the EU yet. The party’s sympathisers are greater in number and likely to be ex-UKIP voters who opted for the Brexit Party this time. Ultimately, the party’s failure was not due to ideological placement but poor leadership and unfavourable candidates, especially in comparison to the very similar but more appealing Brexit Party. The best strategy for UKIP would be to join forces with its current rivals as means of achieving common policy goals.
The graphs show the position of political parties in Europe in a two-dimensional political space, based on stances on 30 salient policy issues in the contemporary public debate. The most salient issues were selected by a team of academics and experts, based on a close examination of the parties' platforms and media discourse. Each issue statement is framed in such a manner that it relates to the economic left-right dimension or the cultural libertarian versus authoritarian dichotomy. The horizontal axis represents the economic dimension, differentiating political parties on policy issues related to state intervention in the economy, redistribution, taxation policy and the welfare state. The vertical axis addresses the post-materialist cleavages that juxtapose libertarian/progressive versus authoritarian/conservative positions. Here, typical issues are multiculturalism, immigration, national identity, gender equality and environmentalism. Parties were positioned on the issues with a 5-point scale ranging from “completely disagree”, “disagree”, “neutral”, “agree” to “completely agree”. They were positioned in accordance with their official stances on the issues, as expressed in their party manifesto, website and other campaign material, including reports in the media. All major parties were also asked to position themselves and provide excerpts from their party manifesto or other formal documentation. Discrepancies were communicated to parties over several rounds until there was full clarity and authorisation of their final issue positions. However, in case no consensus was reached (for example, if the party’s justification was not convincing) the expert team reserved their right to make a final placement decision.
The spatial map is constructed on the basis of the aggregate positions of the parties on the two dimensions (the left-right dimension and the libertarian-authoritarian dimension). The precise party position is located in the centre of the ellipses. The ellipses represent the standard deviations of the party answers to all statements used to construct each axis. Thus, parties in favour of both left- and right-wing policy proposals have a wider ellipse on the left-right axis; parties in favour of both libertarian and authoritarian policy proposals have a lengthier ellipse on the libertarian-libertarian axis. More specifically, the broadness of an ellipsis refers to the spread on the left and right dimension whereas the height is the result of variation on the post material axis.
Texts and Mappings:
Hannah Willis - Postgraduate Researcher at the University of Exeter
Yordan Kutyski - Analyst - Kieskompas BV
Vanelly Ellis - Analyst - Kieskompas BV
Ognjan Denkovski - Analyst - Kieskompas BV
Project Coordination:
Oliver Philipp - Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Berlin)
Christopher Gatz - Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Berlin)
Die deutsche Version der Strategiedebatten Vereinigtes Königreich zur Europwahl 2019 finden Sie hier.
The International Policy Analysis Department is working on key issues of European and international politics, economy and society. The aim is to develop policy recommendations and scenarios from a perspective of social democracy.
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