Europe places its own values in jeopardy

In 2023, the EU agreed on a migration partnership with Tunisia. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalising the partnership was hailed as a milestone and a “blueprint for the future”. Two years later, however, the agreement is once again under fire, following the EU’s decision in April 2025 to classify Tunisia as a “safe third country”, despite ongoing human rights concerns. This controversial classification risks further exposing the shortcomings of the EU-Tunisia deal, leaving the new Commission facing a pivotal policy decision on how to proceed.

Values vs realpolitik

For years now, the EU has vacillated between its commitment to human rights and the pursuit of pragmatic realpolitik. Itself a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, the European Union has pledged to uphold binding treaties such as the Geneva Refugee Convention, which safeguards human rights and the rule of law.  

Since the 2015 “refugee crisis”, the EU has, driven by a fear of uncontrolled immigration, adopted a course of containment that includes reforms to asylum law, partnerships with neighbouring countries, and now the classification of safe third countries of origin. And this is where principles and reality collide – classifying Tunisia as safe is at odds with the reports of violence, intimidation and arbitrary arrests of refugees and activists.

The “migrant deal” and new third-country approach

Although the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Tunisia is built around five thematic pillars, migration is such a dominant feature of the EU discourse that it has been succinctly dubbed the “migrant deal”.

Framing the agreement as a blueprint for further partnerships carries significant risks. Under the principle of conditionality, the EU leverages funding to exert pressure, deepening power imbalances and hindering negotiations on equal terms. At the same time, the agreement, which was only published in the form of a press release, remains non-binding and opaque. This informality serves as a smokescreen, allowing the EU to outsource responsibility and deflect accountability, while in the legal grey areas that result, human rights violations such as pushbacks and the obstruction of sea rescues can occur with near impunity.

The EU’s safe third country label will facilitate not only the deportation of Tunisian nationals, but also asylum seekers from other countries to Tunisia – effectively shifting the EU’s duty of protection to a partner that is failing to fulfil these obligations – a clear step backwards in the enforcement of international refugee standards.

The dangers of a “safe” Tunisia

Since February 2023, Tunisian President Kais Saied has been engaged in a witch-hunt against migrants and those assisting them. There are reports of arbitrary detention of activists and journalists, lengthy sentences without charge, criminal proceedings under the pretext of “endangering national security” as well as targeted intimidation and defamation campaigns. Migrants themselves have reported extensive pushbacks at the Libyan and Algerian borders, being abandoned in desert regions, maltreated in unofficial detention centres and denied access to medical care. This systematic repression suggests that Tunisia cannot be considered safe – neither for those seeking protection nor for those helping them. Yet, by designating the country as a safe third state, the EU is legitimising deportations to precisely such dangerous settings and undermining its own protection mechanisms.

Time for safe and legal migration routes

The new Commission appears to be persisting with its containment strategy, as shown by its guidelines and their focus on an integrated approach to external border management and the EU’s “decisive stance” on migration – including through strategic partnerships. The categorisation of Tunisia as a safe third country underscores this trajectory. If the EU is to live up to its reputation for being a guardian of human rights, a radical change of course is needed.

Improving internal EU cooperation

Migration policy cooperation among European governments has effectively stalled – not least because of the shift to the right in many member states and within the European Parliament. Italy’s Giorgia Meloni exemplifies this hard-line approach, fuelling racist narratives such as the “great replacement” theory. However, this resentment is not unfounded: the outdated Dublin system forces Mediterranean states like Italy in particular to take on the initial reception of refugees, with no fair distribution across the member states. Fair distribution could deprive right-wing forces of the breeding ground for their racist narratives and at the same time reduce political pressure to outsource responsibility to “safe” third countries, enhancing protections for migrants.

Strengthening legal pathways and integration

Given the growing shortage of skilled workers and its potential for social tensions, the EU would be well advised to promote the legal migration of skilled workers instead of pursuing a blanket containment strategy. Better integration of the new EU Talent Pool in the Tunisian partnership could open up real opportunities for qualified migrants in Europe.

At the same time, the EU must also provide more support to people from less educated backgrounds, for example by investing in local civil society organisations and development agencies. With the EU asylum reform not expected to take effect until 2026, integration centres could be set up in Tunisia in the interim to complement reintegration efforts. These could provide potential migrants with information about the limited legal pathways to the EU, the asylum process and the realistic chances of a successful asylum application before they decide to migrate, thus facilitating more informed migration decisions.

Increased formality and transparency

The most urgent reform needed is the formalisation of cooperation, including monitoring and sanction mechanisms. As long as the agreement remains informal, Brussels can continue to shift responsibility for human rights violations while advancing rapid migration policy initiatives. Against the background of the third-country approach, the EU’s recent announcement of their attempt to make payments to Tunisia contingent on human rights compliance in future risks appearing cynical. Only by operationalising human rights standards and ensuring consistent, publicly accessible reporting can genuine transparency be achieved. Such measures would also generate the political pressure needed for the EU to uphold its human rights obligations.

Whether or not the Commission will revise its current course is unclear. One thing is certain, however: the classification of Tunisia as a safe third country has significantly undermined the EU’s credibility as a guardian of human rights.