The European Union’s next budget and the future of EU – Africa migration cooperation

Every seven years, the European Union (EU) negotiates its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) which contributes to shaping Africa – EU relations more than most summits combined. The 2028-2034 MFF, now under negotiation, will fund the functioning of the EU including the EU's external action, development cooperation and, increasingly, migration governance. This MFF marks a geopolitical turn in EU external action. While the negotiations are an internal process for the EU and its members states, the effects of implementing the MFF are far reaching beyond the EU and to its external partners. For African governments, the stakes are high. Emerging proposals tie development financing more tightly to migration cooperation, including border management and returns. 

What's actually changing

The European Commission proposes a new Global Europe Instrument worth €200.3 billion, up from the current €110 billion. This increase partly reflects merging separate funds, including humanitarian aid and Ukraine support, into one architecture. So, the real increase is smaller than it looks. Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa's share of external funding is projected to fall from 30% to 22%, as Ukraine and the neighbourhood’s share increases. Also proposed is the reliance on loans and blended finance, which could disadvantage lower-income and fragile states, who are least able to absorb financial risk. 

Migration control is the fastest-growing line

Thematically, migration, borders, internal security and Home Affairs spending, is set to roughly triple to about EUR 81 billion. Frontex's budget would double to EUR 11.9 billion and the EU Asylum Agency's is envisaged to rise by 80 percent. Negotiators are also discussing migration conditionalities for external funding, though the exact wording is still open. EU funding to other countries to control migration is increasingly framed as security and geopolitics, not development.

The conditionality dilemma, return hubs and continued externalisation

The most contested proposal is migration conditionality: linking development funding to cooperation on returns, readmission and border control. This offers the EU more predictable cooperation, but risks reducing African partner countries to instruments of EU border policy rather than genuine partners. PMG experts, meeting in Addis Ababa in May 2026, warned that a singular focus on deterrence is neither effective nor sustainable, and that current EU-Africa cooperation still lacks a genuine, comprehensive migration policy grounded in rights and labour mobility.

The EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum entered into force in June 2026, alongside a Return Regulation letting states detain rejected asylum seekers up to 24 months and transfer them to "return hubs" in third countries. African states, including Uganda, Rwanda and Mauritania, feature among roughly a dozen potential host countries. Implementing the Pact, and funding these arrangements, is envisaged as part of the Home Affairs envelope under the MFF. For EU-AU relations, the question is whether hosting return hubs and readmission deals are negotiated as genuine partnerships backed by development financing, or imposed as conditions attached to aid.

Lessons from the ground

Discussions among PMG experts underscored a paradox: labour migration from Africa to Europe is growing, yet legal pathways remain scarce and fragmented, with roughly 300 different legal pathways across the 27 EU Member States. Meanwhile, the removal of specific labour mobility targets from the draft MFF has created uncertainty about future EU commitment.

Toward a balanced partnership worth defending

Key insights for African policymakers:

• While the MFF negotiations remain a purely EU internal process, African governments have a narrow window, roughly 12 to 18 months, before the MFF's architecture is locked in and legislation follows in 2027 for implementation from January 2028. Engaging EU member state capitals and the European Parliament, not only Brussels institutions, is essential during the negotiation window.

• A coordinated African response, focused on predictability, ownership and rights-based cooperation, can still keep this partnership grounded in development rather than short-term migration control. This coordinated African response, led preferably by the African Union and regional communities, carries more weight than fragmented national engagement. 

• More concretely, this response should emphasise: 

• Predictability and grant-based financing matter more to fragile states than headline budget increases.

• Migration cooperation should expand legal pathways and skills partnerships, not just the focus on returns and border management.

The 2028-2034 MFF will define Africa-EU relations for the next decade. Whether it entrenches a transactional, security-driven model or supports a genuine development partnership depends on choices being made now, while the budget is still being negotiated.

Amanda Bisong (PhD) is a policy analyst and researcher with over fiften years of experience in policy implementation and research. Her expertise lies in migration, trade, development, and international law. Dr. Bisong has a background in Law, with a PhD (Distinction) from VU Amsterdam (Netherlands) and master’s degrees in International Law and Economics (World Trade Institute, Switzerland) and International Trade Policy and Trade Law (Lund University, Sweden). Her research and policy work concentrate on migration governance, labour mobility, and the links between trade and migration in Africa. She has authored several articles and op-eds on these themes. A fellow at the European University Institute, Italy and the University of Freiburg, Germany, Amanda is affiliated with several migration research networks.