German and Polish migration policy: A comparison

In recent months, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Warsaw has explored key social and political issues affecting German–Polish relations – both today and in the future. From the new publication series "German–Polish interests and their interplay” („Im Kräftefeld deutsch-polnischer Interessen“)

When it comes to migration policy, Poland and Germany have taken fundamentally different paths. For decades, Poland was primarily an emigration country, while Germany quickly became one of Europe’s main destinations for immigrants. These very different starting points continue to shape the national debate in both countries today. It is also important to note that, for a long time, immigration patterns differed markedly between West and East Germany. This analysis therefore focuses on the west German federal states where – unlike in the east – migration became a key social phenomenon after 1945. 

In Poland, on the other hand, two critical junctures stand out. The first came in 1989, when the collapse of the communist system lifted the political barriers that had restricted emigration. The second occurred in 2004, when Poland joined the European Union, gaining freedom of movement within Europe. Driven by economic development and demographic trends, Poland gradually shifted from a traditional emigration country to an increasingly attractive destination for immigrants.

Migration structure

Even in terms of the scale and structure of migration, the differences between Germany and Poland are striking.In Germany, people with what is known as “migration background” make up 25.6 percent of the population (21.2 million individuals), while foreign nationals account for 17 percent. The percentage of foreigners in Poland, on the other hand, is far smaller – estimated at around 7 percent of the employed and 3–4 percent of the total population. Immigration to Poland is also highly homogenous, with Ukrainians making up the dominant group (two thirds of all foreign nationals), followed by Belarusians, with smaller groups from Asia and Africa.

The two countries show a similar asymmetry in terms of refugee migration.After a high number of refugee arrivals in 2024 (with around 251,000 asylum applications), the number of initial applications in Germany fell sharply in 2025, reaching around half of the previous year’s figure. Poland, on the other hand, has only granted refugee status to a few tens of thousands of people, although temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees has been provided on a mass scale (reaching around 955,000 by the end of 2023). This contrast in refugee flows has translated into very different political challenges for Germany and Poland. In Germany, the main issue is how to manage a multiethnic population of permanent residents with experience of migration, while in Poland the focus is largely on integrating a large but relatively homogenous group that arrived within a short period of time. 

For a long time, the debate in Poland looked very different – as a country of emigration, migration was not a key political issue. This all changed with what was dubbed the “refugee crisis” – and the subsequent EU debate on how asylum seekers could be distributed across the Union. Later, immigration from Ukraine (since 2014) and the crisis on the Belarusian border (since 2021) were added to the agenda. Parties that are part of the broader left (including Razem and Nowa Lewica – formerly the SLD) are the only political forces consistently emphasizing the right to asylum, opposing pushbacks and focusing on integration.

The role of social democracy and potential for cooperation

In Germany, it was the SPD – especially in coalition with the Greens from 1998 to 2005 – that overcame the long-held notion that “Germany was not a country of immigration”. The party vigorously promoted the Immigration Act, passed in 2004, which laid the foundations for a policy of systematic integration of foreign nationals. During the years when the SPD was part of a CDU/CSU-led cabinet, it helped shape the compromises of the grand coalitions and continued to advocate for a gradual liberalisation of migration policy. In 2015, the SPD publicly supported Angela Merkel’s approach to the refugee crisis. Today, the party is more focused on maintaining order and enforcing regulations – with more restrictions and tighter controls. 

Some of the most important areas for potential German–Polish cooperation on migration policy could include protecting the EU’s external borders and combatting human trafficking. Another  area requiring urgent coordination is ending the ad hoc border controls that have long been conducted at German-Polish border crossings. Cooperation could also help improve refugee integration, for example through a shared catalogue of good practices that highlights the factors behind effective integration policies and identifies common pitfalls. 

Two issues are likely to dominate the European debate moving forward: the legal status of Ukrainian refugees and control of irregular migration. In practice, the first issue will mainly concern the extension of residency for Ukrainian nationals – both Poland and Germany have an interest in ensuring that Ukrainian refugees remain in the country and that they continue to participate in the national labour market. The second key pillar of the European migration debate will be the implementation of the Pact on Migration and Asylum, which also involves strengthening the protection of the EU’s external borders. This will also include cooperation with neighbouring states such as Türkiye and Libya as well as with transit countries (e.g. Niger).  

In this context, social-democratic forces should prioritise integration, especially education (from language training and teacher support to broader systemic solutions), as well as integrating migrants into the labour market. Beyond education, one of the most pressing issues – in both Germany and Poland – is housing, specifically availability and price development on the property market. At the same time, clear communication with the electorate is crucial to avoid giving the impression that new arrivals are treated better than nationals. Such a view can create frustration and a sense of injustice, driving parts of the electorate towards extremist parties. Social-democratic parties in Poland and Germany could also develop a functional platform for cooperation between similar forces – as Denmark has done – aimed at facilitating the exchange of experience and improving coordination within the EU.

Kamil Frymark is an analyst of German domestic politics at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. For many years, he also focused on German foreign policy. Kamil has worked on a number of international research projects, including Think Visegrad, and has completed several research stays, including at the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig.