This time it’s different – maybe

The 7th AU–EU Summit, marking 25 years of formal cooperation between the two unions, offered an explicit attempt to reposition mobility and migration within the partnership. While the final declaration covers a wide policy spectrum, migration—long one of the most politically sensitive areas in AU–EU relations—was among the most prominent themes. Does the Luanda Summit represent a genuine shift in the direction of AU–EU migration governance, or does it reiterate long-standing rhetoric without substantial realignment?

A lesson from the past: don't expect anything

Migration has been featured in every AU–EU summit since Lisbon (2007), but the framing has evolved alongside EU political dynamics. Earlier summits were dominated by European concerns over irregular arrivals and security, resulting in a policy agenda anchored in border control, return, and externalisation of migration management to African partners. Even when cooperation instruments such as the Rabat and Khartoum Processes or the 2015 Valletta Action Plan broadened the conversation, the operational focus remained narrow: restrictive visa regimes persisted, legal mobility channels remained limited, and African priorities—especially support for intra-African mobility and the AU Free Movement Protocol—consistently underemphasised.

This history matters because it shapes expectations today. African actors have repeatedly called for a more balanced approach that recognises mobility as a development and skills-building opportunity rather than a risk. Yet previous summits struggled to reconcile this with the EU’s internal political pressures.

A call for a “balanced approach” to migration

The 7th Summit marks an attempt to broaden the mobility agenda, even though the priorities remain largely aspirational. The Summit outcome restates earlier commitments of the Joint Vision for 2030 but adds more details and a rebalanced approach. The declaration emphasises expanding legal pathways through education, research, and skills-based mobility. This renewed focus on youth and talent partnerships directly responds to Africa’s demographic profile and echoes long-standing AU demands for opportunities that match the continent’s growing skills base. The summit also recognises the African diaspora as an actor in innovation and investment—an important shift from earlier cycles of cooperation, which tended to treat mobility narrowly. Finally, the call for a “balanced approach” to migration pairs legal pathways with return and reintegration. Compared to earlier summits—where migration was largely securitised—the tone is more forward-looking and development-oriented. However, discursive change does not yet equal policy change.

These openings are tempered by persistent gaps that have characterised AU-EU migration cooperation for more than a decade. For Luanda to be a turning point, the structural elements would need to be addressed. Despite the rhetorical commitment to expanding mobility, the Summit again stops short of offering operational mechanisms: there are no concrete schemes, quotas, timelines, or reforms to Schengen visa procedures—issues that are central to the vision of meaningful mobility. At the same time, return and readmission remain disproportionately prominent. Without parallel commitments to labour mobility, recognition of qualifications, or streamlined student/work visa regimes, the “balanced approach” risks replicating familiar patterns where return receives more political investment than mobility.

No decisive break, but a potential inflexion point

The declaration offers only a limited acknowledgement of intra-African mobility. The AU Free Movement Protocol – foundational to the AU’s own migration strategy – remains peripheral in the Summit’s framing. This omission reflects a deeper structural asymmetry: cooperation continues to rely on voluntary, non-binding mechanisms whose implementation depends almost entirely on EU member states. Despite long-standing continental frameworks governing Europe-Africa migration, recent EU initiatives have already shifted towards more bilateral, transactional arrangements. Partnerships with key transit and origin countries such as Tunisia, Egypt or Mauritania have increasingly become the primary vehicles of external migration policy, which effectively weakens the reliability of regional diplomacy and the Summit’s outcomes. 

Thus, Luanda is best understood not as a decisive break, but as a potential inflexion point—a summit that opens political space for a more balanced mobility agenda, yet stops short of embedding that agenda in binding and operational commitments. The real test will come with the forthcoming Joint Implementation Plan and whether it translates political language into tangible policy tools. Until then, the 7^th AU-EU Summit remains an important – yet still ambiguous – moment in AU-EU migration relations: promising in tone, cautious in substance, and dependent on follow-through to fulfil its potential. 

Dr Sara Bojarczuk is a Research Assistant Professor at the Centre of Migration Research at the University of Warsaw. She is also a member of the Progressive Working Group on Migration initiated by FES Brussels, the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and the FES African Migration Policy Center. Sara holds a PhD in Sociology from Trinity College Dublin and an MRes in Social Policy from the University of Bath. Key areas of her research include labor migration, return and readmission cooperation and the integration of labor migrants. Her research approaches migration from a family studies, women’s social support and employment perspectives.