The Future of NATO

NATO is returning to its original mission of collective defence. What is not yet clear, however, is how the Alliance can function with the US playing a much more marginal role, or indeed withdrawing altogether. Before 2022, the debate centred around NATO’s mission – now the focus has shifted to how it will be implemented.

The strengthening of conventional defence capabilities is something almost all countries deem necessary. Yet three critical weaknesses persist: the slow pace when it comes to strengthening military capabilities, heavy reliance on US forces in Europe and the growing risk of escalation in the event of a military conflict with Russia. 

Donald Trump has plunged NATO into a deep crisis. His attacks on the Alliance and calling into question of shared values have shaken the very foundations of the transatlantic partnership. Although a scenario in which the US formally leaves NATO is considered unlikely, trust in the Alliance is fragile. Yet, many states – especially in Northern and Eastern Europe – continue to demonstrate their commitment to America’s leadership role in the hope that the Alliance will remain politically stable until the next US elections.

Whether NATO survives as an alliance hinges largely on the role of the United States. Three conceivable models/scenarios dominate the current debate:  

• The US continues to be involved but Europe takes on more responsibility (“Transatlantic NATO minus”)
• The US withdraws, Europe manages its own security (“European defence union”)
• The US remains part of NATO but without a leadership role (“NATO as toolbox”)

Proximity to Russia has a major impact on strategic perspectives. States such as Lithuania, Poland or Finland see Russia as a permanent threat – countries in southwest Europe, on the other hand, see things differently. These disparities influence national debates on defence spending, nuclear weapons and Ukraine policy.

Turkey plays a distinctive role. It mainly sees NATO as a kind of insurance policy, rather than a central pillar for its security. Its position often diverges markedly from the stance of the rest of the Alliance. Ankara is deliberately pursuing a foreign and security policy that keeps multiple options open.

France is approaching the debate on a US withdrawal with strategic composure. Unlike many other NATO member states, Paris does not view its national security as primarily dependent on Washington. France’s foreign and security policy has long been characterised by a quest for European autonomy.

For many countries, whether or not Ukraine should become part of NATO depends on how they perceive the Russian threat. States that view Russia as a permanent threat advocate for NATO membership, while those who see the conflict as limited, caution that Ukraine membership could provoke further escalation.

The closer a country’s geographical proximity to Russia, the greater its support for nuclear deterrence. At the same time, the majority of experts and think tanks agree that neither national nor purely European nuclear capabilities are a realistic alternative to the US nuclear umbrella.

There are fundamental doubts as to whether NATO, as a consensus-based organisation, is best suited to conduct what are often contentious counter-terrorism operations. In cases like this, “coalitions of the willing” may very well be a better option. And NATO would be well advised to support these efforts by providing training and facilitating information exchange. At the same time, the Alliance must maintain its crisis intervention capabilities for future deployments.

Issues such as energy security, climate protection, equality and diversity, which were once priorities for NATO, are now taking a back seat. The return to collective defence and political blockades – especially on the part of the US – have pushed these issues down the NATO agenda. When it comes to new challenges such as hybrid threats, NATO’s role remains limited. The majority of states recognise that the responsibility for tackling disinformation and providing basic cybersecurity lies with national authorities. NATO only intervenes if there is a clear military dimension or a risk of massive damage. 

Most of the countries covered by this study see China as a “systemic rival” and an increasing security challenge. The majority favour greater resilience and targeted de-risking. Only the US and Lithuania go further, advocating for deterrence and economic decoupling. Turkey plays a distinctive role – it is the only NATO member in the study calling for increased political cooperation with China.

Direct NATO involvement in the Indo-Pacific – for instance as a compensation for the US engagement in Europe – is not considered advisable at the present time. Against the backdrop of Trump’s unpredictable behaviour, concerns are growing about being drawn into conflicts unwittingly. The security challenges posed by China should, according to various think tanks, be addressed primarily within an EU framework.