Germany Reputation Radar 2026

Among the countries compared, Germany is the most popular in the Global South. The Federal Republic is perceived as both competent and congenial, a combination that no other country can match. Only China is regarded as more competent, but it is considerably less well liked.

Germany’s reputation has a strong economic and technological basis: some 91.4 per cent regard it as economically strong, 88.8 per cent as a leader in science and technology. With regard to the foreign policy debate this means that Germany’s international capital still depends to a large extent on economic performance.

While Germans continue to fret about their own decline, in the countries under investigation the Federal Republic is overwhelmingly regarded as a rising star. Only China’s future is viewed more optimistically.

Respondents clearly want closer cooperation with Germany and more German involvement for peace, diplomacy and a multipolar world. The contrast with the domestic mood is stark: as the FES Security Radar shows, many Germans would themselves prefer Germany to play a smaller leadership role in European policy – not less international involvement overall, but no stronger leadership within the EU either – while partners in the Global South by contrast want more German initiative. Politically, this raises the question of whether Germany is both willing and, domestically, in a position to adopt the role that has been allotted to it from outside.

However, more German involvement does not mean merely foreign-policy business as usual, according to many respondents. What they would prefer is a more autonomous Germany in a multipolar world, at more of a distance from the United States, more cooperation with China and recognition of Palestine. What is particularly striking here is that these positions in part chime more with those of the German population than with the foreign policy actually being pursued by Germany. The key discrepancy therefore lies not so much between Germany and the Global South as between the expectations of their respective populations and the German Government’s foreign policy.

Germany’s good reputation does not automatically underpin its foreign policy. There is no majority support for German policy on either Ukraine or the Middle East. There is a particularly strong desire for a correction in relation to the Middle East conflict: two thirds of people want Germany to take Palestinian interests more strongly into account. With regard to Ukraine the picture is more nuanced: 59.5 per cent are in favour of taking Ukrainian interests more strongly into account, 49.9 per cent Russian interests – a balance in favour of Ukraine, but respondents cannot be divided simply into camps. According to the FES Security Radar, Germans themselves would prefer to end the war quickly, even at the expense of Ukrainian territory. German public opinion on these issues is thus closer to the expectations of the Global South.

What often matters is less whether Germany takes a position than how it communicates it: if Germany favours one side over the other, it does so at the expense of a visible loss of trust, especially in Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco. If it credibly commits itself to a two-state solution, however, its image remains positive. Gaza has thus not damaged Germany’s reputation across the board, but selectively at a regional level.

The strongest social link in the study is proximity to Germany: respondents with several points of contact rate Germany as much more congenial and competent and also exhibit more sympathy with German foreign policy than those without such contacts. This demonstrates the relational capital bound up with Germany’s personal and institutional presence. Overall, Germany’s reputation has survived the Gaza war, and there is no evidence of a general loss of trust. Its basic reputation remains robust, but not invulnerable: how people look at Germany depends strongly on the particular national and political context.