Analysis of the 2024 European Elections in Germany

As in the 2019 European elections, CDU/CSU emerged as the strongest force in Germany with 30 per cent and showed a slight gain (of 1.2 percentage points). In contrast, all three of the ‘traffic light’ parties forming the governing coalition lost ground: At 14 per cent, the SPD became the third-strongest party and lost almost two percentage points compared to the last European elections. The Greens sustained heavy losses. They fell from a record high of over 20 per cent in 2019 to just under 12 per cent, and are the main victims of an abating pro-European wave. The FDP also lost some ground compared to the last European elections, but managed to hold on to five per cent. Another loser is Die Linke, which dropped to 2.7 per cent – half its 2019 share of the vote. The AfD managed to gain just under five percentage points. The party emerged as the second-strongest force at almost 16 per cent. It is the strongest party in eastern Germany with almost 27 per cent, ahead of the Union. The other winners of the election evening are the ‘other’ parties. Small parties traditionally do well in the European elections because they do not have to pass the five per cent threshold that applies to national elections in Germany. In total, they garnered over 20 per cent of the vote. Particularly noteworthy is Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, which won 6.2 per cent of the vote.

At just under 65 per cent, turnout was at around the same high level as in the first EP elections in 1979. Voter turnout was relatively evenly distributed across the country. Only in Bremen was it slightly down (by six percentage points); everywhere else it showed a slight increase. All Länder with above-average voter turnout had local elections at the same time. The only exception is Bavaria, which generally has a high turnout in national-level elections. Saxony-Anhalt is near the bottom of the table, despite concurrent local elections, but still shows a 7.5 percentage point increase in voter turnout. Brandenburg recorded the highest increase, of eight percentage points. BSW, the AfD and minor parties have benefited most from local elections being held at the same time.

Looking at the results for eastern and western Germany separately, major differences across almost all parties can be observed. The biggest difference, of 15 percentage points, is seen for the AfD. The party reached 28 per cent in eastern Germany but only 13 per cent in western Germany. The picture is reversed for the CDU/CSU, which shows a difference of 11 percentage points between east and west. In western Germany, 32 per cent of the electorate voted for the CDU/CSU, while the figure in eastern Germany was only 21 per cent. The Greens and the SPD also performed better in the west, albeit with differences of only six and five percentage points respectively. The difference is slightly greater for BSW, which took 12 per cent in eastern Germany but only five per cent in western Germany.

In eastern Germany, then, the AfD, BSW and Die Linke performed above average, while in western Germany the Union, the SPD, the Greens, the FDP, Freie Wähler and Volt achieved significantly better results. The parties of the ‘traffic light’ coalition together totalled 20 per cent, behind the figures achieved by either the AfD or the CDU/CSU on its own. In western Germany, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP collectively have 34 per cent.

With the voting age lowered to 16, the youngest group of voters are now the 16-to-24 age group. This group stands out for a tendency to vote for small parties. A third of them voted for parties that would have failed to pass the five per cent threshold in Bundestag elections. However, the CDU/CSU and the AfD also gained among the youngest age group, increasing by five and 11 percentage points to totals of 17 and 16 per cent respectively. The Greens suffered the biggest losses among young voters with a steep 23 percentage point fall to just 11 per cent of the 16-24 age group. They are followed by the SPD with nine per cent and Volt with seven per cent of the youngest voters.

The parties also show clear age profiles. The CDU/CSU and the SPD clearly perform best among the 60-plus age group. They did about twice as well with the oldest age group as they did with voters under 35. The AfD achieved its best result among 35-44 year-olds, at 20 per cent, while it only managed 12 per cent among the over-60s. There is hardly any age profile to be seen at BSW, with results between five and six per cent in all age groups. As in the last Bundestag elections, the FDP achieved its best result among young men under 25, with nine per cent.

As is to be expected based on the results by age group, the CDU/CSU won 41 per cent of the pensioner vote. The SPD came second here with 21 per cent. Only 11 per cent of pensioners voted AfD, followed by the Greens with eight per cent and BSW with seven per cent.

Among the working population, the CDU/CSU is in first place among employees, civil servants and the self-employed. The party achieved its best result among civil servants, 34 per cent of whom voted for the CDU/CSU, with the Greens in second place at 20 per cent followed by the SPD at 13 per cent. Among the self-employed and employees, the AfD came in second place with 17 and 15 per cent respectively. The Greens were close behind (15 and 13 per cent).

A third of respondents who stated their occupation as ‘Arbeiter’ (blue collar worker) voted AfD. Second place is taken by the CDU/CSU at 24 per cent. The SPD trails in third place here with just 12 per cent. The AfD was also the most popular choice among the unemployed (25 per cent), followed by the SPD (13 per cent) and the CDU/CSU (12 per cent). The comparatively low percentages here can be explained by the fact that almost a third of the unemployed vote went to small and very small parties.

It can also be confirmed for Germany that this year's European elections are a secondary election, i.e. an election that is not so much about European policy issues as it is about evaluating the current national governments. While the relevance of federal and European politics was roughly balanced in 2019, we can speak of a slight trend reversal this year. The main motivation for voting in this European election was federal politics for the majority of citizens. For example, 55 per cent of voters said that federal policy issues were decisive for their vote, compared to 38 per cent who said that European policy issues were decisive. The result can therefore also be seen as a criticism of the national government. 

The geopolitical shifts since the 2019 European elections are reflected in the issues rated as most relevant to the European elections. While climate change and the environment were undisputedly the top election issues in 2019, this year they are securing peace and social security. The Russian war against Ukraine and its knock-on costs in the form of inflation and energy prices dominate this year’s agenda. A look at issue preferences by party affiliation reveals a less uniform and more nuanced picture. For Greens supporters, the environment and climate change remain the most important issue (52 per cent), while social security is most important for SPD supporters (35 per cent), closely followed by securing peace (32 per cent). Securing peace is the decisive issue both for BSW voters (37 per cent) and CDU/CSU voters (28 per cent), while for Greens supporters it has second place. The fact that war and peace rank as such an important issue does not mean, however, that voters share the same opinion on how peace can be brought about. On the contrary, there are pronounced party-political differences on questions of arms exports and preconditions for peace negotiations. Only for AfD supporters is immigration the undisputed top issue, with 46 per cent rating it as the most relevant. Immigration is the second most important issue for BSW supporters, but only the fourth most important for CDU/CSU supporters.

How voters assess their own economic situation also influences how they vote, as it reflects their concerns and aspirations with regard to their own lives. A third of those who rated their own economic situation as very good or good in a post-election survey voted for the CDU/CSU. That is twice as many as for all other parties. The opposite picture is seen for those who are dissatisfied with their economic situation. Almost a third of AfD voters rate their own situation as less good or as bad. Even if the AfD is now being voted for more out of conviction than disillusionment, there is still a deep dissatisfaction among the party’s electorate that is expressed at the ballot box.

The voter migration analysis shows that many voters took the opportunity of voting for smaller or new parties. As there is no percentage threshold in European Parliament elections, there was little risk in trying an alternative. The three governing coalition parties lost particularly heavily to the ‘other parties’ category. The largest outflow towards small parties was experienced by the Greens (-860,000), followed by the SPD (-640,000) and the FDP (-500,000).

The SPD, which was successful in the Bundestag elections, is the main source of votes for most other parties. Most alarmingly for the social democrats, however, is the fact that the SPD lost most votes to the nonvoter camp (-2.490.000). Out of the competitor parties, the CDU/CSU snatched the biggest share of the vote from the SPD (‑1,450,000). This was followed by the ‘other’ parties (‑640,000), BSW (‑580,000) and only then the AfD (‑570,000). A similar number was accounted for by deceased voters (‑510,000 votes).

In the run-up to the election, there was much speculation about which other parties the new BSW would take votes from. According to the infratest dimap model, 580,000 votes that went to the SPD in the 2021 Bundestag elections were won by BSW. In second place is the influx of former voters from Die Linke (+470,000), followed by the Union (+260,000) and the FDP (+230,000). Only then came the AfD (+160,000), which had previously been widely touted as a potential main source of votes. Similar inflows were calculated to have come from the Greens (+150,000) and nonvoters (+140,000).

The composition of the European Parliament, to the extent foreseeable as of 10 June, is as follows: The European People's Party is by far the strongest parliamentary group. The social democratic S&D Group remains the second largest force. The liberal Renew will most likely remain a close third. On the right-wing of the parliament, the ECR and ID groups have made gains, as have a number of parties that are not (yet) affiliated with a parliamentary group. The Greens and the Left have lost votes and form smaller parliamentary groups.

The figures should be treated with caution. Firstly, there are many previously group-non-affiliated MEPs– among them Germany’s BSW. Negotiations on their affiliation will gather pace in the coming days. Secondly, there will be further changes primarily on the right-wing fringe after the AfD’s ejection from the ID group. It is quite possible that there will be yet more changes here.

The election of the Commission President

The EPP's lead candidate, Ursula von der Leyen, expects that a second term in office is possible for her. There is a good chance of this happening. Von der Leyen is likely to be nominated in the Council, as this is where qualified majority voting takes place. 

In the European Parliament, the vote is somewhat more difficult, as group discipline is not as pronounced as in national parliaments. That makes it even harder to reckon with a safe majority. This is because the political groups on whose support von der Leyen has been able to rely to date – the EPP, the S&D and the liberal Renew – have just 39 votes more than the required majority. This could be enough to guarantee her appointment, but carries the risk of the EPP cooperating with the right-wing parties.

Therefore, the S&D and Renew groups should clearly signal in advance how they will deal with any such collaborations between the EPP and the right-wing groups. The current, relatively loose models of cooperation in the European Parliament are not capable of preventing a drift to the right. More explicit agreements and clear courses of action are needed to prevent the EPP from drifting ever closer to the groups to its right. The social-democratic group in the European Parliament should make this the fundamental condition for its renewed support for Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President.