Global responsibility and national isolationism

Over six years after its adoption, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is still far from fully implemented. The Compact’s 23 objectives cover a wide range of issues, from data collection and regulations for return and readmission to strengthening cooperation with diasporas and facilitating remittances. When it comes to meeting these objectives, however, progress has been slow.

And the UN Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of the Global Migration Compact, published on 5 December 2024, confirms this. Although the report highlights a few positive developments – such as the adoption of the Declaration on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Family Members in Crisis Situations by ASEAN member states in May 2023, or the Rabat Declaration signed by 49 states in June 2023 to improve migrant and refugee health – these glimmers of hope are few and far between.

The fact is, political developments in the destination countries have contributed to the slow progress in implementing the GCM in recent years. According to the report, for example, even regular migration pathways often allow for only temporary residence permits with limited access to labour markets and basic services. At the same time, in many destination countries there is a growing trend to externalise migration governance and strengthen border controls. Coupled with increasing securitisation and deterrence measures, this exposes migrants to far higher risks of human rights violations, including pushbacks at borders, arbitrary detention and discrimination.  

Trump has no interest in safe, orderly and regular migration

Nowhere is this more evident than in the United States, where the current administration pays no heed whatsoever to the GCM. Indeed, on 20 January 2025, the very day of his inauguration, Donald Trump signed ten executive orders related to immigration and naturalisation. These orders reintroduced 27 policy instruments from his first term and added seven new ones. One of the direct consequences of this is that the over half a million migrants from Cuba, Haiti and Nicaragua, who had entered the US under a Biden-era initiative beginning in 2022, are now at risk of losing their temporary legal status – and potentially facing deportation. On top of this, Trump has already forcibly deported 261 Venezuelan nationals, transferring them to a prison in El Salvador, primarily invoking the 1798 Alien Enemies Act.

On the global scale, the announcement that all USAID programmes were to be subject to an immediate 90-day suspension, effective from 20 January 2025, received widespread media coverage. It has since come to light that 83 percent of USAID programmes were to be cut and the agency’s staff reduced to just 15positions required by law. Going forward, the small number of projects that remained would be administered by the State Department. While discussions are ongoing as to whether Trump possesses the authority to make this decision unilaterally, there are already early reports on preventable deaths linked to these cuts, including in South Sudan, where local health facilities have been forced to shut down.

How seriously does Germany take the GCM?

In Germany, too, the GCM has not gone unchallenged. The far-right AfD (and the left-wing populist BSW) regularly expressly distance themselves from the Pact and although this stance does not explicitly feature in the rhetoric of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, the latter’s motions clearly reveal their position on safe and regular migration. One example is a non-binding motion submitted by the CDU/CSU and, with the help of (votes from) the AfD, passed by the parliament on 29 January, which called for “immediate and comprehensive measures to curb illegal immigration”. The party’s subsequent immigration bill, which was rejected on 31 January, aimed to reinstate provisions in Germany’s Residence Act that limit immigration, while also extending the powers of the federal police.

Despite the defeat of the bill, the new coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD contains language strikingly similar to the rejected legislation. The agreement states, among other things, that the “aim of limiting immigration” should be pursued, family reunification suspended, a repatriation offensive launched and incentives for migration reduced. This suggests that legal migration pathways are likely to be further restricted in the coming years. In light of all this, it is hardly surprising that the Migration Pact and its objectives are absent from the coalition agreement.

Germany had, in recent years, already adopted more of an international approach in its dealings with the GCM, placing greater emphasis on financial and development policy commitment by channelling funds into the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, for instance, or by supporting projects financed by Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. This approach is also reflected in the new coalition agreement, where development cooperation is described as a “key lever for migration management”. To what extent the incoming government will continue to pursue the voluntary pledges already made to advance the GCM implementation remains to be seen.

For future reports, there are now clear indicators for each of the 23 GCM objectives which can be used to measure success (or the absence thereof). These indicators were developed in response to one of the main demands of the last International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in 2022 and were presented alongside the most recent report by the UN Secretary-General. Ultimately, however, both the use of these indicators and the implementation of the GCM objectives remain legally non-binding, meaning current trends could well continue. By the time the international community reconvenes for the next IMRF in mid-2026, we may finally have some answers.