COP28 President Sultan al-Jaber praised the closing declaration – the United Arab Emirates Consensus – immediately following its hurried adoption as an historic breakthrough.

Not everyone shares that view. In the name of the 38 members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Samoa pointed out that the COP resolutions were adopted before members of the alliance had even returned to the plenary hall. Samoa also emphasised that the adoption of the declaration, which falls far short of the necessary measures, will be seen as a lost opportunity. It means that the last chance of achieving the central demand of the island nations has been missed: limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius, or at least keeping that goal within reach.
 

Once again, the COP produces a rhetorical compromise

The applause for Samoa shows that a majority of the delegates hold similar views and are dissatisfied with the rhetorical compromises reached in the final declaration. Nevertheless, almost all those who have commented on the results have sought to interpret and sugarcoat the results to their advantage – including German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock. While it is true that for the first time, the COP declaration considers the “transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems” and calls for the reduction and production of fossil fuels in “a just, orderly and equitable manner,” the formulation is far from a binding resolution. Instead, as a first point of criticism, it reads more like an appeal.

Second, it is then followed by passages that are full of relativising statements that further water down the initial objective. Third and most important, however, the text lacks binding targets for the critical years to come, such as an agreement on a concrete point in time (such as 2025) by which emissions or the use of fossil fuels in energy systems must begin sinking globally.
 

It’s not just the others who are to blame

The fact that it was once again not possible to agree on concrete and implementation-oriented targets for the coming years, and that more toothless resolutions were established for the distant future – the implementation of which none of those involved in Dubai will ever have to answer for – is nothing less than a collective failure. The OPEC states have made abundantly clear that they would never agree to a rapid end to their profitable business model. The COP presidency proved unable to establish trust in their own motives and lead the negotiations in such a way as to achieve a result that is even close to what would have been necessary to put the 1.5-degree target within reach.

And once again, the industrialised nations have failed to put together a robust package of technical, political and financial measures of the kind necessary to reassure the countries of the Global South and engender the necessary confidence for them to take on the financial and economic risks inherent in a more rapid transformation.

When it comes to financing, it is urgently necessary that we finally act honestly, as this could set a new dynamic in motion. Even if donor countries were to increase their contributions to international climate financing and the wealthy oil-producing states were to finally make their overdue payments earmarked for developing countries, it would only cover a portion of the trillions of dollars that will be needed each year in the coming decades to pay for the transition. We must recognise this fact, because in the international climate negotiations, the expectation remains prevalent, even among non-governmental organisations, that the industrialised countries will ultimately foot the bill.

Nevertheless, the sooner we arrive at a realistic position on this issue, the more rapidly we can focus on what really matters: namely the speedy mobilisation of far more private investments for the restructuring of the Global South and the production of new, sustainable value creation chains there. Such investments are badly needed, but most investors are continuing to avoid them out of concern for the risks they entail.
 

A Marshall Plan to combat the climate crisis

It is thus the responsibility of the International Monetary Fund and the development banks, including the KfW Development Bank in Germany, to invest the initial trillions in the transformation of the Global South in the form of special drawing rights, venture capital, guarantees and low-interest loans. Doing so would substantially reduce investment risks, lower capital costs and encourage private investors to also do their part. This could develop into a global Marshall Plan to combat climate change of the kind the world badly needs to accelerate the transformation to the necessary speed.

Such an approach would mark a real watershed moment in climate policy, one which should be augmented with levies on greenhouse gas emissions and the elimination of subsidies that harm the climate. It would unlock funds that could be used to promote a socially just transformation through a global climate fund and other measures.

The UAE Consensus, as the package of resolutions produced at COP28 is called, is relatively meagre and primarily includes agreements pertaining to the Global Stocktake, the Global Goal on Adaptation, the continuation of the work programmes on mitigating the effects of climate change, the establishment of the Work Programme on Just Transition Pathways and procedural agreements, such as the establishment of the new target for the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). It also includes the establishment of a climate loss and damage fund. Germany and the United Arab Emirates provided the necessary financial backing for the latter fund on the first day of the conference, which sent a positive signal right at the start.

The progress made on climate financing was primarily limited to procedural aspects, and the results from the two work programmes, on climate protection and on just transition, were extremely modest. Furthermore, in its current form, the Global Goal on Adaptation remains too vague and requires the additional elaboration of indicators, for which a two-year work programme was established, along with significantly increased financial support. But the most glaring shortcoming – and here is the real reason this COP was a failure – is that the Global Stocktake didn’t set any binding new targets to significantly increase the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that must be submitted to COP30 in Belem in 2025. As such, the Stocktake failed to fulfil its fundamental function as the most important instrument for boosting national ambitions within the framework of the Paris Climate Agreement.

There is, in other words, still much to be done – both inside and outside the multilateral climate process caravan.