What society needs is a countermovement to the radical right

Why are right-wing groups, who are known for placing their country front and centre, now cooperating with other countries? 

Thomas Greven: The very thing that divides the radical right – their nationalism (“our country first!”) – is also what unites them. This shared position has led to the development of a shared political agenda. Cross-border networking has become an integral part of the radical right’s strategy. They have come to recognise that the supposed hegemony of the “global liberal elites” – which they reject – also has to be countered globally. It has to be replaced, at the national, regional and global level, with, at the very least, an illiberal order, perhaps even an authoritarian one, based on greater national sovereignty. At the same time, the cohesion of the global movement of “reactionary revolutionaries” must not be overestimated.

What role do social media and digital platforms play in helping to spread the radical right’s ideas?

The internet certainly plays an important part in the radical right’s international networking. The movement’s “polarisation entrepreneurs”, who seek to divide society, essentially benefit from the hardening and personalisation of the political debate and, more importantly, the emotionalised communication that takes place in social media. Digital platforms support the radical right’s communication strategies, thus facilitating the dissemination of conspiracy narratives and hate speech, etc. These diffusion and networking processes have triggered a transnational “hyperpolitical” radicalisation spiral. An emotionalised policy of fear and anger – what is being referred to as affective polarisation – is easier to communicate than solution-driven proposals. Lastly, the internet provides a wealth of opportunities for disinformation campaigns managed or financed from abroad to exert influence.

Why are so many people in Europe and around the world disenchanted with democracy and how is the radical right using this for its own ends? 

In today’s “polycrisis”, we are seeing crises constantly overlap. States and their people seem permanently overwhelmed by developments and problems such as global refugee movements, the climate crisis, military conflicts, and the threat of the next pandemic – with no clear solutions in sight. To use the words of last year’s winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Daron Acemoğlu: “The simple explanation for the crisis of democracy all over the industrialised world is that the system has not kept its promises.” Today, the forces of the radical right are virtually the sole beneficiaries of this loss of trust in the state and representative multiparty democracy. They are managing to “embody the fundamental ‘no’ to politics”, as sociologist Nils C. Kumkar puts it. As a result, some people are seriously considering alternatives to the established pluralist party democracy, such as notion of the “illiberal democracy”, which Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has propagated worldwide by way of an extensive network. 

The “illiberal democracy” referred to by the radical right – what is this and how does it differ from the democracy we are familiar with? 

The radical right claim that they are not enemies of democracy, but, given the so-called “representation deficits” and failures on the part of the state, are in fact trying to restore true democracy. Orbán, for instance, considers himself a defender of the “true Europe”. In light of recent election results, this assertion cannot merely be dismissed based on the idea that these parties are “undemocratic”. If we look more closely, however, it becomes clear that the radical right are using a very specific definition of democracy, namely a hyper-majoritarian democracy with autocratic tendencies. In this kind of democracy, governance and decision-making structures no longer constrain the elected majority and its representatives. They are not to be hindered by the parliamentary rights of the opposition, the defence mechanisms of the rule of law, an independent judiciary (especially constitutional courts), international agreements, a non-partisan, professional state apparatus, free media, or an active civil society. In this democracy, the checks and balances provided by liberal democratic constitutions and pluralistic societies make way for the supposedly homogeneous “true will of the people”, effectively for a “tyranny of the majority”.

Could the EU really be taken over by the radical right or is this more of a rhetorical strategy?

Since Britain’s sobering experience in the wake of Brexit, the majority of the parties on the European radical right have turned towards the mission of “conquering Brussels”. Indeed, the global radical right are pursuing a counter-hegemonial strategy that seeks to topple the rule-based liberal order (and its institutional embodiments such as the EU), replacing it with an order based on greater national sovereignty. In particular, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán explicitly wants to be seen as the defender of Europe and guardian of “true” Western values. In the struggle against “globalism” and “wokeism”, a Europe of (sovereign) nations would function, on the one hand, as “Fortress Europe”, keeping out migrants. On the other, a self-constructed cultural ideological European identity (sometimes explicitly Christian, usually traditionalist and heterosexual) would be protected against cultural change. Whether or not this counter-hegemonial project pursued by the radical right is ultimately successful will be decided in the political debate. 

What specific steps should governments and civil society take to strengthen democracy and counter the radical right?

The radical right rarely offer viable solutions to (and indeed benefits from) the representation deficits among the established parties. On the contrary, the movement in fact tends to pursue policies that aggravate problems instead. For example, the restrictions on immigration it seeks to achieve, as well as the increased protectionism, could lead to welfare losses among the radical right’s electoral base. It is therefore vital that we identify sustainable and fair political solutions to the population’s grievances, placing economic and social issues front and centre. After all, if people feel economically secure, it is that much easier to find compromise on tough social issues. In this context, the positive, optimistic narrative of an open, modern (multiethnic, multireligious) society and a pluralistic, representative democracy appears more appealing. However, such a positive narrative necessarily extends beyond the nation-state (and also beyond Europe). A progressive post-neoliberal globalisation policy requires supranational efforts to regulate global competition and, to be effective, this regulation has to take place at an international, multilateral level. 

Even if radical right-wing parties achieve election successes or become part of governments, change can still be achieved at the ballot box by the voters – as long as elections continue to be independent and fair. In order to ensure that this remains the case, democracies and progressive actors must become more resilient. To date, progressive international forums and networks serving to mobilise the people and develop shared strategies have been few and far between. If our democracy is to be defended, a social movement and effective international networking that will overcome the not insignificant motivational gap between the defenders of democracy and what are known as “reactionary revolutionaries” is crucial.

Lastly, it is important to recognise that the radical right do not play by the established rules and that the rule of law alone will not be enough to save democracy. In the end, it all boils down to political motivation – albeit under new, tougher conditions. The American adage: “Don’t bring a knife to a gunfight” is a truism we have to take on board in this context, too. And then give as good as we get.

Translation from German by Carla Welch

The opinions and statements of the guest author expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the position of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.