Analysis of the Bundestag Elections 2025

The 2025 federal election has drastically changed the political balance of power compared to 2021. While the desire for political change swept through the country in 2021 after 16 years of Angela Merkel, 3.5 years later we have experienced a turnaround. After the premature end of the government, the coalition parties were punished with an overall drop of almost 20 percentage points. Although the CDU/CSU won the elections as the strongest party, it fell short of expectations, failing to reach 30 per cent. The AfD, considered to be far-right in some quarters, doubled its share of the vote, making it the second strongest party in the Bundestag. After a nail-biting night, it is clear that the FDP and BSW will not be part of the 21st Bundestag. This reduces the number of parties from seven to five. The next few months will show whether this reduction in size will lead to more stability or even greater polarisation.
 

As in the last Bundestag elections, there are clear differences in voting behaviour in the eastern and the western states. The SPD suffered a significant loss of 12 percentage points, particularly in the east of the country, and now has only 12 per cent of the vote there. In the west it still has 18 per cent. Compared with the last election, the loss of direct mandates is particularly noticeable in both regions, reducing the parliamentary group as a whole from 206 to 120 MPs. Of these 120 MPs, 37 per cent won a direct mandate. The CDU/CSU and the AfD achieved an almost mirror image result in west and east. While the CDU/CSU improved its result in the west to 31 per cent (+5 percentage points), it remained very close to its 2021 result with 19 per cent (+1 percentage point). The AfD again reached 18 per cent (+10 points) in the west and as much as 32 per cent (+13 points) in the east, making it the strongest force in the eastern federal states.
 

Significant changes in voting behaviour within occupational groups

Voting behaviour also differs significantly when looking at the population by employment status. There are particularly large differences among blue-collar workers, among whom the AfD gained 17 percentage points and is now well ahead of the CDU/CSU with 38 and 22 per cent, respectively. The SPD has lost 14 percentage points from its former first place among this group and now stands at 12 per cent. Among pensioners, the CDU/CSU (39 per cent) and the SPD (24 per cent) are in the lead. The biggest shift has taken place among the unemployed. Here only the AfD still dominates with 34 per cent (+17 percentage points), while all other parties lag far behind. Voters in the white-collar worker group tend to vote along similar lines. Although the CDU/CSU (26 per cent) and the AfD (21 per cent) are also in first place here, the gap with the SPD (15 per cent) and the Greens (13 per cent) is less pronounced. There has also been a particularly dramatic shift among those who rate their own economic situation as poor or bad. Here the AfD has gained 20 percentage points and now stands at 39 per cent. The SPD, on the other hand, has lost 15 percentage points among this group. The other coalition parties also lost a significant 5 percentage points here, while the CDU/CSU remained at 17 per cent.
 

Hot campaign, but little movement in the polls

Looking at the averaged poll results since the break-up of the traffic-light government on 6 November 2024, the first thing that catches the eye is the uniformity of the lines. There have been no major leaps up or down; only slight movements are discernible. The biggest percentage gains in the polls in the short winter election campaign were recorded by Die Linke, the AfD and the Greens, each with almost 3 percentage points. On the losing side, however, were the CDU/CSU, which fell to just under 30 per cent and was unable to capitalise on the premature end of the government, and the BSW, which failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold. The SPD and FDP, on the other hand, stagnated in the pre-election polls.

It would be premature to conclude that the election campaign was uneventful on the basis of the minimal developments in the polls. On the contrary, it was marked by decisive events. However, no party was able to drive the campaign with its own issues; instead, it seemed to be driven by events.

Taking the headlines from January onwards as the only indicator of the issues determining the election, one might conclude that party positions on refugee and asylum policy were the all-important election motive. This is wrong, however. Although the issue ranks at the top of people’s perceptions of the problem (42 per cent Politbarometer Forschungsgruppe Wahlen KW7), it is overtaken (slightly) by the problematic economic situation (43 per cent). When voters are asked what the most important issues are for their own voting decision, different issues come to the fore. Here, peace and security (45 per cent) and improving the economic situation (44 per cent) rank top. Social justice follows with 39 per cent and refugee and asylum policy is mentioned only in fourth place, with a clear gap at 26 per cent. There is clearly a considerable discrepancy between the media-dominated agenda and what is actually important to people.
 

Lack of a candidate effect

Never before have there been so many candidates for the chancellorship as in this election and never before has the entire field of candidates been so unpopular. No one won the hearts of the voters. On the contrary, both the old and the new candidates had to contend with strong popular reservations. This may also explain why almost a third of eligible voters were still undecided about who to vote for shortly before election day.

The challenger Friedrich Merz leads the candidates for chancellor with 34 per cent. However, comparing these figures with previous conservative candidates for chancellor, it appears that no one has ever been as unpopular as Merz. Chancellor Scholz and Vice-Chancellor Habeck are not far behind with approval ratings of 26 and 25 per cent respectively, but are also well behind the ratings from the last federal elections. Alice Weidel brings up the rear with 19 per cent, which on one hand, underlines her personal unpopularity, but on the other indicates that the AfD is now no longer merely a protest vote but voted for out of conviction, despite a weak candidate.
 

It's about something: highest turnout since reunification

One of the positive surprises of the early elections was the sharp rise in voter turnout: 82.5 per cent of eligible voters, almost 50 million German citizens, exercised their right to vote. This is the highest turnout since reunification. As in the last Bundestag elections, voter turnout in 2025 was slightly lower in the east (80.3 per cent) than in the west (83.1 per cent). However, the figures are gradually levelling off, with turnout in eastern Germany increasing by 7.4 percentage points, slightly more than in the west (+5.9 percentage points). The lowest turnout was recorded in the federal states of Saxony-Anhalt (77.7%) and Bremen (77.8%). The highest turnout was recorded in Bavaria (84.5%).

Voter migration

The question of which party gave or gained votes to which other camp is generally of great interest. However, it is methodologically very difficult to ascertain and its validity is disputed. Our analysis is based on the post-election survey (exit poll) conducted by Infratest Dimap in selected polling stations and constituencies. The charts show the number of votes gained or lost by each party. In addition to the competing parties, there are also the groups of non-voters and first-time voters/deceased voters. These are extrapolated figures, so the proportions and general trends are of much more interest than the numbers themselves.

The SPD's historic defeat and heavy losses can also be seen in the voter migration model. The SPD still received just under 8,150,000 second votes, a loss of just over 3,750,000 votes. By far the largest loss of votes was in the direction of the CDU/CSU (1,760,000). This was followed by the AfD (720,000) and first-time voters/deceased voters (630,000). However, substantial votes were also lost to Die Linke (560,000) and the BSW (440,000). The smallest losses were measured in the direction of the Greens (100,000). The SPD, on the other hand, recorded its strongest gains from the group of non-voters (250,000), followed by former FDP voters (120,000) and other parties (60,000).
 

Decline in marginal constituencies

The party system in Germany has changed significantly in recent years, with more parties represented in the Bundestag and greater competition between the parties, with the logical consequence that constituencies are often won with only a comparatively small number of votes. If we look at constituencies in which the difference between the first and second place direct candidates was less than 5 per cent, there were 64 marginal constituencies in the 2017 Bundestag election. Four years later, there were already 100 marginal constituencies. This means that in the 2021 federal election, every third constituency was won with a difference of less than 5 per cent in the first votes. In the 2025 federal election, on the other hand, there are only 65 constituencies with a narrow margin between the direct candidates. This means that the level of the 2017 federal election has almost been reached again. Nevertheless, it is clear that there were often very close races, especially in urban constituencies and university towns. In the Stuttgart I constituency, for example, the Green Party candidate was just 16 first votes ahead of her CDU rival according to the provisional final result. It was also very close in the Berlin-Tempelhof-Schöneberg, Goslar-Northeim-Göttingen II and Cologne III constituencies. While the SPD was able to hold its own most often in close constituencies in 2021, this time the CDU/CSU came out on top, winning 29 marginals.
 

Comparing the maps of marginal constituencies in the 2021 and 2025 federal elections, several developments stand out. First, the number of close constituencies in eastern Germany has decreased, with a few exceptions. This is because of the strong performance of the AfD, which won almost all direct mandates in the eastern part of the country. Secondly, small but densely populated urban constituencies remain particularly contested. Increasingly, even smaller parties can win a direct mandate there. Third, safe first-vote strongholds continue to exist. Nevertheless, the pattern also changes dynamically over time: formerly tight constituencies can be won comfortably again, depending on the situation, while in some regions strongholds crumble and election victory can be secured only by a narrow margin.

The new government formation is characterised by a two-party alliance. After the demise of the traffic-light coalition, the first three-party coalition at federal level is seen as a failed experiment. With three parties hovering around the 5 per cent threshold, the election campaign was marked by uncertainty about whether this wish could be fulfilled. Now the election results have shown that the FDP and the BSW have failed to enter the Bundestag, making the formation of a two-party coalition at least mathematically possible. This applies to CDU/CSU alliances with both the SPD and the AfD.
 

Even if Friedrich Merz has not succeeded in bringing the CDU/CSU back above 30 per cent, the task of forming a government is now in his hands, as Olaf Scholz announced in the Willy-Brandt-Haus immediately after the election results. Since Merz has ruled out a coalition with the AfD, the only mathematically possible two-party alliance is a coalition with the SPD. The difficult balancing act for the upcoming negotiations therefore involves reconciling the wish to assert social democratic demands and the political responsibility of supporting the only politically possible alliance option between two democratic parties. The negotiations will certainly not be easy, especially after the last weeks of the election campaign and the rifts that have opened up.
 

1. Positions have hardened between the CDU/CSU and the centre-left parties following the debate on the crumbling of the firewall after the CDU/CSU got in bed with the AfD. Nevertheless, a different tone must be found quickly so as not to stand in the way of constructive government formation. While right-wing populists despise compromise as a political tool, it should be all the more important for the parties within the democratic spectrum to value it as a central asset of liberal democracy. Even if finding a compromise does not seem easy after the events and discussions of the last phase of the election campaign, this goal must be quickly attained in the interests of all parties involved.

2. The AfD has doubled its vote from the last federal election. At 20.8 per cent, it will be the largest opposition party and will certainly pursue this role even more loudly than before. It is precisely against this backdrop that a stable government is needed quickly in order to counter the propaganda and an opposition that will do everything in its power to delegitimise and destabilise the government's work. In the best-case scenario, this can create positive pressure that contributes to the rapid achievement of unity.

3. The exclusion of the AfD and Die Linke as coalition partners severely limits the coalition options for the CDU/CSU. This strengthens the SPD's negotiating position, as the CDU/CSU cannot afford for the coalition negotiations to fail without the risk of a new election. A clear division of roles between negotiator and junior partner is thus becoming blurred. This does not necessarily simplify the situation. German citizens have a right to be governed well. And in view of the global political situation, a united federal government that speaks with a strong voice in and for Europe is crucial in order to survive the geopolitical upheavals.