Summaries:
Amitai
Etzioni
How to Build a Good Global Society Maxime
Lefebvre
Is European Political Unity Still Possible? Mario
E. Carranza
Leaving the Backyard: Latin America's European Option Dieter
Nohlen
Democracy Without Trust: a Challenge for Latin
American Civil Society
Amitai Etzioni How to Build
a Good Global Society Are we really approaching the "end of history", as
Francis Fukuyama has put it? According to him the whole world is in the process
of embracing Western values such as personal dignity and individual liberty. However,
what this view neglects is that the "East", where Islamic, Asian, or Judaic belief
systems hold sway, brings several key values of its own to the global dialogue.
While the Western position is centred on the individual, the focus of the Eastern
cultures tends to be a strongly ordered community. The East's core tenets are
not individual rights, but social obligations; not liberty, but submission to
a higher purpose or authority. The East is often accused of lacking respect for
rights and liberty, but the West is criticized likewise for its materialistic
societies which have lost social cohesion. Thus, the East too has something in
great abundance which the West lacks, and not merely the other way around. A new
normative synthesis is needed if we are to develop better international relations
and a good international society. In communitarian terms a good society is marked
by an enduring balance of autonomy and social order. On the one hand, its members'
individual rights, liberties, and preferences are respected, and on the other
hand, members must live up to their obligations to one another and to the common
good. These duties, however, are not enforced by state power but are based on
moral persuasion and informal controls. In a good society the members have internalized
what is expected of them. An imbalanced society, on the other hand, either tends
to generate anti-social behavior if norms and roles are lacking, or is susceptible
to forms of authoritarian suppression if autonomy is neglected. This communitarian
idea of a good society implies a global dimension. Even if nations vary significantly
in their interpretations of its nature, a global model of a good society will
continue to evolve gradually, and one that many nations will favor. A good global
society must combine respect for individual rights with a commitment to the common
good, political democracy, and law and order. Currently, while the West is "exporting"
a model that reflects its community and authority deficits, the Eastern model
suffers from a severe autonomy deficit. Both West and East tend to hand on only
one half of what could make a good society if the two elements were synthesized.
In order to develop a normative synthesis both sides should adopt a "service learning"
approach. This concept centralizes recognition of the Other in intercultural contacts.
It calls on public leaders and elected officials to approach the world with a
deep conviction that they, their nation, and their ideology do not have a monopoly
on what is good.
Maxime Lefebvre Is European Political
Unity Still Possible? Never in its history has Europe been able to
achieve political unity, whether by means of the imperial idea, a common external
threat, or the concept of collective security. Only economic integration through
the progressive sharing of sovereignties since the Second World War has made European
unification possible. As the Iraq crisis showed once again, the European Union
is politically divided and little able to assert itself against the American "hyperpower".
It would be neither realistic nor desirable for Europe to develop into a political
and strategic power independent of the USA. Nevertheless, Europeans can attempt
to make the transatlantic partnership more balanced and to build up a European
capacity to act. However, this requires that Europe first become capable of united
action. To this end a number of models suggest themselves. In relation to foreign
and security policy any deepening of European integration on the political level
will be brought up short by the democratic and political realities of the nation-state,
which are difficult to overcome. The long-debated notion of a "core Europe" can
scarcely be reconciled with what the European Union has achieved so far. Even
"enhanced cooperation" offers no solution because it leads unavoidably to broad-based
participation. The "structured cooperation" on European defense policy envisaged
in the draft Constitution will probably also develop along these lines. As a consequence,
a political Europe - in the sense of one capable of action and not only a Europe
at peace - must be generated by the political will of the largest European countries.
Although this has been criticized by the smaller countries the creation of an
"action center" involving the three, four or six largest European states could
act as a driving force. A stronger German-French axis would be one possible variant.
If EU foreign policy can obtain no impetus from the political will of the large
EU states the latter's remaining influence will seep away in consensual impotence.
Mario E. Carranza Leaving
the Backyard: Latin America's European Option European-Latin American
relations must be put in a triangular perspective, due to the central role played
by the United States in the foreign relations of both regions. US policy toward
Latin America has consistently pursued two objectives: (i) to exclude extra-continental
powers from the Western Hemisphere and (ii) to secure and maintain a dominant
politico-economic presence in the region. In the 1990s, negotiations on the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) seemed to mark the end of the hegemonic presumption
and US "benign neglect" toward the region. Yet the FTAA talks have so far failed
to deliver a fair and balanced hemispheric trade agreement. The United States
has been unable to impose a NAFTA-style FTAA on Latin America and slowly but surely
the South American countries are taking charge of their own future. The Bush administration's
neglect of the region in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks has drawn
Europe and Latin America closer. The increasing alienation between the United
States and Latin America in the late 1990s, despite a common agenda of promoting
democracy and free trade, has been paralleled by an unprecedented rapprochement
between the European Union (EU) and Latin America, especially between the EU and
the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur). After September 11 and the Iraq war,
three scenarios for trilateral relations can be envisaged. First, a balanced US-EU-Latin
American relationship could develop, with the EU and Latin America assuming more
responsibility for achieving common economic, political, and security goals. However,
US hegemonic aspirations, the neo-mercantilist competition between the US and
Europe regarding Latin American Markets and the disappearance of Communism as
a common threat are obstacles which render this scenario unlikely. In a second
scenario, instead of actively working to reduce the asymmetries in economic development,
the United States and Western Europe would strengthen a "North-North" axis of
economic, political, and military cooperation in order to "manage" Latin American
problems, narrowly defined as "security" problems. However, Europe's identity
as a civilian power, recent political differences between the US and Europe, and
the new assertiveness of Latin America make this scenario implausible. Third,
successful conclusion of an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement might lead to a strategic
partnership between the two trading blocs, or between the EU and a projected South
American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, the highly indebted countries of Latin
America still have to rely on US support. Furthermore, the EU-Mercosur free trade
agreement is hampered by the row over agricultural subsidies. Ultimately, a Mercosur-EU
strategic partnership will depend on the political determination of both sides,
as well as US actions (such as unilateral military intervention) that might draw
the EU and Mercosur closer together. The creation of an EU-Mercosur trade pact
before the completion of the FTAA would challenge US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere
and allow the European Union, Mercosur and other Latin American countries to balance
US influence. In addition, a strategic partnership between Europe and Latin America
may build on 500 years of common history and strong cultural ties. The shared
commitment to multilateralism, the United Nations, and respect for international
law provide a further basis for intensified cooperation.
Dieter Nohlen Democracy Without Trust: a Challenge
for Latin American Civil Society Never before has Latin America been
more democratic. This deserves far greater recognition, bearing in mind the sharp
social inequalities in the region. However, consolidation of democracy has not
been achieved. One indicator of the state of democracy in Latin America is the
subjective views and value systems of the people. Analysis of public opinion data
sheds light on the political-cultural deficits relevant to the consolidation problem
in particular. In recent years, public support for democracy and trust in its
institutions has been decreasing continuously, as Latin American surveys show.
A large proportion of Latin Americans are not content with the way democracy is
functioning. Also, social capital, understood as trust in the generalized Other,
is much lower than in Europe. However, social capital in a "Bourdieuian" sense
- that is, individual capital based on group membership, networks and friendships
- is fairly well developed, generating a political culture of nepotism, courtesy,
and ever present corruption. These trends have not led to the dissolution of democracy
as a political system but have fostered the rise of autocratic and populist political
leaders. At the root of a political culture which circumnavigates the institutions
of representative democracy lies the danger of an authoritarian populism in democratic
disguise. Modernisation in Latin America thus shows an ambivalent face: while
the political and economic transitions have been achieved (even if the results
are controversial), the aim of modernizing the relationship between state and
society has obviously been missed. Here, the political role of a civil society
is crucial in Latin America. Its stand in relation to representative democracy
will be decisive for democratic consolidation. Historical experience with oppressive
governments means that the Latin American civil society has always rightly demanded
more transparency, control, and accountability from its administrations. In some
parts of civil society, however, we also find a continuing deep mistrust of political
institutions and parties crisis. Segments of civil society seem to have turned
away from the democratic state which they helped to bring forth. However, a strategy
which builds on the weaknesses of democracy is ultimately doomed to fail. Only
functioning democratic institutions will be able to represent pluralistic interests
equally and democratically and ensure that an active and influential civil society
can flourish.
Keith
Nurse Diaspora, Migration and Development in the Americas International
migration is a defining feature of the history of Latin America and the Caribbean.
In the last five decades, the region has become a net exporter of labor, mainly
to the core economies of the Western hemisphere, the USA and Canada. Two reasons
account for this: (i) the widening income gap and the divergence in quality of
living conditions and (ii) demographic polarization, with the relative ageing
of the population in the North. The growth of the diaspora has had a tremendous
impact on the flow of financial capital from the new host societies to Latin America
and the Caribbean. The increase of remittances has sparked enthusiasm in the development
establishment that this could contribute to reducing poverty and fostering economic
development. However, the case of the Caribbean, the subregion in the Americas
with the highest level of migration after Mexico, points toward a more modest
assessment. On the one hand, remittances have outstripped foreign direct investment
and official development assistance, and are a major source of income for many
lower-income households in the region; diasporic exports and tourism have also
become a vital asset for many labor exporting countries in the Caribbean. On the
other hand, remittances increase external dependency and contribute to a culture
of migration; also, they are private flows that do not directly contribute to
government revenue. This is particularly problematic in the Caribbean where migrants
tend to be highly skilled and educated. It is questionable whether remittances
can compensate for the loss of public investment in education and the reduction
of productivity in specific sectors caused by the brain drain. Besides the economic
effects, the "feminization of migration", caused by the shift in labor markets
towards services, impacts on family structures and networks in the labor-exporting
countries. Furthermore, contemporary migration may produce new security threats.
The US policy of deporting criminals is claimed to be a major source of increased
violence in the Caribbean. Migration also contributes to the spread of the HIV
virus in the Americas: adult prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean is second
only to that of sub-Saharan Africa. Taken altogether, the growth of a diaspora
economy carries enormous challenges, but also opportunities. If migration is to
contribute to national and regional development, a strategic approach on the part
of labor-exporting countries is needed. One key strategy would be to enlarge training
facilities to meet the expanding demand for skilled labor, both at home and in
the labor-importing countries, with the latter covering part of the investment.
Second, the rights of migrants must be secured. However, even such a strategic
approach on the part of the labor-exporting countries will not prevent migration
from further peripheralizing regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean as
long as the fundamental structures and workings of their economies remain unchanged.
Julio
Godio The "Argentine Anomaly": From Wealth through Collapse to Neo-Developmentalism
The roots of the Argentine collapse of 2001/2002 are deeply embedded
in the past. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina was a prosperous
country. Together with Canada and Australia, Argentina was an anomaly in that
these underdeveloped countries profited from the first wave of globalization as
manufacturers of commodities. However, while the other two countries managed to
build up modern industrial economies, Argentina's "ranching society" consolidated
an "agrarian-rentier" culture. After the political crisis of 1930, which led to
the establishment of a right-wing civilian-military dictatorship, and particularly
after the Second World War, the country started to fall into an economic stagnation
that developed into the present crisis. Two maladies, caused by bad political
decisions, can be singled out as ultimate causes of the economic collapse. The
first malady developed between 1955 and 1973: the failure of the Peronist model
of industrial autarchy. As a result, commodity exports deteriorated and the country
lacked the capital to maintain the industrialization process. At the same time,
Peronism eliminated the democratic, pluralist system provided by the Constitution.
Two antagonistic blocs, Peronism and anti-Peronism, developed which undermined
any possibility of a democracy based on societal consensus and laid the ground
for the civilian-military dictatorships that followed. The second malady set in
with the second wave of globalization in the 1970s. The ruling elites embraced
the neoliberal model, but at the same time the worst elements of the rentier culture
survived. Thus, instead of building a true market economy, a "market society"
evolved which combined deregulation, privatization, and increasing foreign debt
with systematic corruption. This system survived after political democracy was
reestablished in 1983. Thus Argentina's decline continued until 2002 and - in
a country that had once been prosperous - left more than half the population impoverished.
In the exceptional circumstances of a "global crisis" new President Kirchner,
who took office in 2003, has initiated a revolution "from above." The economic
policy of conservative neoliberalism has been replaced by a neo-developmentalist
economic program. The revolution "from above" is an attractive proposition to
Argentine society but requires a sound material foundation. Sustained growth can
be achieved only if the new government manages to found a new economic logic,
eliminate rentier structures, and build a "working society."
Gerhard Drekonja-Kornat Columbia: Micro-Wars
and Islands of Peace It is difficult to say whether history will give
Colombia a second chance. During the last one hundred years, the country has become
accustomed to a high level of "violencia." Nevertheless, there has also been economic
growth and quite successful modernization. However, during the 1990s the level
of violence became intolerable. Colombia is not afflicted by civil war, but by
a system of "micro-guerras" involving multiple actors, including the USA which
has targeted Colombia in its war on drugs. US intervention has helped the guerrillas
to win supporters among coca producers and to present themselves as a political
alternative, resisting American "imperialism." What has developed is a kind of
"war economy," based on "taxes" on drug deals, kidnapping, blackmail, and so on,
by which the guerrilla groups finance their activities. Many guerrilla leaders
have become warlords unencumbered by ideological or political objectives. It is
unlikely that the complex situation in Colombia will be disentangled without external
help. However, other Latin American countries are keeping their distance, while
UN involvement is confined to protecting human rights. EU initiatives, in cooperation
with the Latin American Rio Group, are promising, but have been limited so far.
This leaves the USA as the main hegemonic power in Colombia. Washington strongly
supports current President Uribe who is building up Colombia's security forces
to defeat the guerrillas militarily. This tough line may incite new cycles of
violence, but it also raises the stakes for all the actors involved and might
even lead to the collapse of the "war economy," opening a door to peace. A second
way of ending the wars is based on the initiatives of Colombia's strong civil-society
organizations which have demonstrated actively in favor of peace. An important
symbol of the new political culture is the "miracle of Bogotá". Independent mayors
on the democratic left have managed to improve quality of life for all segments
of society, thus instigating an "urban revolution." "Miracles" like these, rather
than the tough military line adopted by Uribe, might bring about a second chance
for Colombia.
H. C. F. Mansilla
Manipulated Modernization: The Case of Bolivia The
Latin American democratization process (roughly 1980-2000) was not completely
successful. In recent years it has increasingly been superseded by economic setbacks,
cultural disenchantment, and political unrest. One important expression of this
development was the collapse of the Bolivian neoliberal government (under President
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada) in October 2003, due to a popular uprising with a strong
ethnic component. This government did not lack democratic legitimacy, and yet
it was perceived as elitist and foreign-dominated. The Bolivian case shows disillusionment
with the modest results of both democratization and modernization processes. The
democratic order established in Bolivia in 1982 did not alter (i) long-established
political-institutional patterns of behavior and (ii) the dominance of the ruling
political elites. As a result, it was unable to fulfill the expectations generated
in the first decade of democratization. There was no effective expansion of political
participation, no integration of the large Indian groups, no improvement in the
oversight of government actions, no modernization of public administration, no
reduction in corruption, and no progress in relation to living standards. This
state of affairs may be elucidated in terms of developments in the administration
of justice and the environmental authorities. Despite comprehensive reforms sponsored
by the World Bank and other international organizations, Bolivia's justice and
environmental institutions have not been able to cope with conventional corruption
and inefficiency. The establishment of a Ministry for Sustainable Development
and the Environment signals a new urgency concerning environmental issues. However,
the Ministry principally serves economic interests and has not halted the destruction
of the rainforest. Regarding the justice system, despite the new institutions
and statutes, protracted proceedings and bribery remain. Bolivia's social and
economic elites have embraced Western development goals and "talk the [modernization]
talk," but persist in premodern behavioral patterns, including an authoritarian
political culture and corruption. |
