In recent months it has become clear that in post-Saddam Iraq not only one war is being fought. The situation is more appropriately described as an overlapping of three conflicts: (i) resistance to the us presence; (ii) internal antagonism between different ethnic and confessional factions (»civil war«); and (iii) a regional struggle. These three conflicts overlap to a considerable degree. With regard to this confused situation it is clear that a monolithic conflict strategy is not exactly promising. What is needed is an overall political strategy which operates at all three levels of conflict and involves international and regional, as well as Iraqi actors.

Politically it seems necessary to halt speculation on an immediate withdrawal of coalition forces, to involve all regional actors in a political process, and wholeheartedly to support the political processes within Iraq. An immediate troop withdrawal would be unwise, as the presence of coalition troops can at least stem a further regionalization of the conflict for the time being. Concerning the regional dimension the decisive question in the coming weeks will be to what extent the actual regionalization of the conflict will be accompanied by a political process. This is important in view of the fact that the possibility of regional actors agreeing on a common denominator is less improbable than is often believed. Ultimately, all regional actors are interested in an Iraq no longer occupied by us forces remaining as an integrated state; preventing a completely independent Kurdistan; an Iraq that in future represents no threat to its neighbors; the stemming of the exodus of refugees; and also the economic development of the region no longer being hindered by continuing instability. These are starting points for a political strategy.

To facilitate a sustainable Iraqi federal state it must be guaranteed in relation to the three largest factions that (i) the Kurds remain within the federal state, (ii) the Sunnis receive an adequate share of resources and power via the current constitutional review process and the debate on the new oil law, and finally (iii) internationally coordinated pressure on Al Maliki’s government brings to a halt the Shi’ites’ current reckless clientism.
In order to be able to implement such an approach successfully, first of all the political reality must be accepted in all its complexity. It is particularly important to put aside ideological blinkers and to begin a long-term and continuing political process with all the actors involved, which will ultimately include the establishment or reactivation of diplomatic relations between the United States and Syria, as well as Iran. The first meetings of us representatives with Iranian and Syrian envoys in spring 2007 should now be followed up. However, these endeavors at dialogue are likely to be successful only to the extent that the us at least modifies its policy of uncompromising containment of Iran. Without acceptance of a certain amount of Iranian power in the region dialogue will be merely a diplomatic sham.
What is important in the current situation, last but not least, is not to regard Iraq as a hopeless case. It should rather be clear that the current situation is rooted in political problems which can – and must – be addressed politically.