| | |
Germany’s relations with Russia continue to be established on a broad foundation
of bilateral integration at state, economic, and civil society level. Bilateralism
does not have priority for Germany: in fact, relations are firmly rooted in EU–Russian relations. Within this framework Germany understands itself as initiator
and motor of policy in Brussels – with a broad consensus among all the parties
represented in the Bundestag. The coalition agreement contains a commitment to
continue the strategic partnership with Russia and to contribute to that country’s
modernization on the basis of European values. Europe needs an open, strong
and capable Russia in order to be able to manage common challenges in a global
world, according to Foreign Minister Steinmeier.
In this context, in the meantime, one aspect remains contentious among the
partners: should relations be limited to a partnership of interests or do they have
to include also a partnership of common values if they are to be lasting? Are we
witnessing a traditional Russian »special path« under the rubric of constructing a
self-determined »sovereign democracy« or is it a matter of a detour through Putin’s
centralizing system in order to help basic European values to make a breakthrough
in Russia after full stabilization? Will the energy-rich and so more self-assured
Russia seek a greater distance from Europe or will the links be strengthened?
The answer to these questions will fundamentally decide the prospects of the
four common pan-European spaces as envisaged in 2003 within the framework of
the EU Russia partnership agreement which came into force in 1997 and which are
to be analysed in view of Germany’s special interests: (i) the economic space, including
energy partnership; (ii) the space of freedom, security and justice with its
important aspects of freedom of travel; (iii) the space of external security, taking
into consideration the future of the buffer zone of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,
as well as the »frozen conflicts« in Moldova and Georgia; and (iv) the space of
science, education, and culture, in respect of which German–Russian relations are
particularly close, although constricted by Moscow’s restrictive NGO legislation.
The EU presidency in the first six months of 2007 gives Germany both obligations
and opportunities, after overcoming the Polish blockade, to help shape a
new version of the expiring partnership agreement with Russia both critically and constructively and to introduce its concept of convergence through integration.
European basic values should remain the basis of lasting partnership, not least
with reference to Russia’s own commitments within the framework of OSCE, the
European Council and the partnership agreement itself. At the same time, its inadequate
implementation does not represent a fundamental obstacle to the realization
of common interests, such as those which found expression in the successful
settlement of the bitter conflict in Ukraine.
|