In the last 15 years the EU has become an important actor in domestic and judicial policy. Tasks which can no longer be handled adequately at national level, such as combating terrorism and dealing with illegal immigration, give rise to specific expectations in relation to European policy on the part of the citizens. One characteristic of this increase in significance of European policy is questionable, however: despite the clear objective of the European treaties to establish a common space of freedom, security and law, European judicial and domestic policy remains above all security-policy oriented. The important task of weighing up the compatibility with fundamental rights and the proportionality of envisaged measures on combating crime too often recedes into the background.

Against this background the question arises of how the German presidency can lend its support to an effective policy of internal security and immigration control which at the same time is compatible with the protection of fundamental rights and basic democratic standards, as well as wider societal interests. The opening up of the legislative process, hitherto dominated by actors from interior ministries, the police, and criminal justice, to the participation of actors from the Parliament, the law, the data protection authorities and non-governmental organizations is of the highest importance if a balanced domestic and judicial policy is to be achieved.

The analysis of dossiers in the fight against terrorism and criminality – the pending reform and further development of Europol and the extension of data exchange between national criminal prosecution authorities – brings to light two central points for which the German presidency must do what it can in order to promote the creation of a »balanced« space of freedom, security, and law: the ever more intensive exchange and processing of personal data between national security authorities, between the EU and third states, and within the framework of Europol should be offset by a more comprehensive, uniform protection of personal data at European level. In addition, the Council presidency should pursue two priorities in the current debate on institutional reform of European cooperation on internal security: on the one hand, the supervisory and participatory rights of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice must be expanded; on the other hand, the presidency must counteract the danger of further fragmentation and de-democratization of this policy area by means of the transposition of extra-Treaty cooperation projects such as the Prüm Treaty (Schengen III) to the framework of EU law.

Such efforts to combat terrorism indisputably constitute a core area of internal security policy, so that the balance to be found in the relevant European policies is largely one-dimensional – namely between freedom and security. In this regard, European migration policy is more problematic: although migration has clear implications for the member states’ internal security, it also affects priorities arising from social, economic, and foreign policy. The balance to be found in European migration policy therefore has two dimensions: firstly between freedom and security, and secondly between security and a broader set of interests drawn from other policy areas. Various opportunities arise under the German Presidency to reintroduce social-, economic-, and foreign-policy concerns into policy-making without compromising previous efforts to regulate the security threats arising from cross-border human movements. It is also open to the German Presidency to push for policies that increase states’ control of migration without necessarily restricting individuals’ freedoms. Efforts to improve the processing of asylum claims in the member states or to relieve migratory pressures through interventions in third countries are, for example, in the mutual interests of the member states, third countries, and (prospective) immigrants.

Nevertheless, the German government’s room to maneuver is limited. Besides the usual structural and temporal limitations, as well as those arising from European program planning, to which all Presidencies are exposed, the German government has declared against premature »cherry-picking« from the Constitutional Treaty – and so against giving priority to institutional reforms foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty in the areas of police cooperation and migration policy. Such changes would be beneficial for the promotion of a balanced policy, as well as an open political process, however. In addition, the distinct national interests of German ministries work against an active stance on the part of the German government in the areas of economic migration and police cooperation.