Dead Ends of Transition is a collection of papers presented at two international expert seminars on »Transforming Authoritarian Rentier Economies and Protectorates « in September and October 2005. The edited volume brings together a range of scholars and practitioners who analyze the difficulties of transitions to economic market orders and democracy in various authoritarian states and in international protectorates (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan). The central aim of the book is to show that international protectorates are comparable in nature to authoritarian rentier economies in their reliance on rents – in the case of rentier economies on rents from natural resources, and in the case of protectorates on rents derived from foreign development aid – and that therefore similar lessons on how to bring about transitions to democracy and national reconstruction can be learnt by practitioners.

The book is a welcome and timely contribution to the academic discussion in three related areas. The first contribution concerns the comparability of rentier states and international protectorates. In his opening contribution Michael Dauderstädt lays out the rentier character of protectorates. He stresses their external dependence on revenues, the authoritarian nature of their politics, and their vulnerabilities in times of fiscal crises. The rentier character of protectorates is confirmed by Barnett R. Rubin, who also highlights a number of specific characteristics of protectorates, such as the way aid is distributed and the existence of dual sovereignty (local government and international administrators) and hence two public sectors.

The second contribution relates to debates on the role of natural resources in political developments. Here the various contributions engage in a debate about whether oil wealth should be seen as conducive to political stability (that is, the longevity of authoritarian rulers) or as contributing to instability (resource curse). Among those arguing for the longevity of authoritarian rule are Oliver Schlumberger and Benjamin Smith. Supporting the resource curse perspective is Richard Auty, who links prolonged fiscal crises and delay in structural reform to the emergence of predatory states (p. 41); Indra de Soysa, who stresses the indirect effects of resource wealth on corruption, openness of trade, and investment (p. 50); and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, who claim a direct link between resource wealth and the likelihood and duration of civil war. Given that this last and crude version of the resource curse might be empirically called into question by the fact that most authoritarian states do not descend into civil war, the need for nuanced analyses of individual case studies, and especially of their societal and institutional history, becomes clear. The contribution by Ricardo Soares de Oliveira on the states in the Gulf of Guinea, in which he stresses the disadvantageous oil context (p. 72) and the importance of prolonged fiscal crises – an observation that resonates with an earlier point made by Richard Auty – best exemplifies such historically sensitive analysis. Other authors add to this the need to analyze the kind of institutions created in the period of state-formation and the policies implemented thereafter.

The third area, of particular importance to practitioners, is prospects for reform. Here the contributors engage in a debate about whether reform prospects should emanate from the international side – stressing demands for transparency, the responsibilities of multinational corporations, and policy tools such as oil funds and verification schemes – or whether reform efforts are better applied at the domestic level. Generally, the authors see more likelihood of change in domestic reform efforts. These range from reducing broad-based wealth creation (Richard Auty), through fostering economic diversification and creating effective tax administrations (Thorvaldur Gylfason), to increasing productivity outside the oil sector. In view of the political logic of economic reforms in many states, the key challenge for transition consists ultimately in breaking vested political interests and fully implementing structural adjustment programs in order to create better revenue management, transparency, and accountability.

Dead Ends to Transition is a very useful contribution to current debates in world politics. A plausible case is made that protectorates share many common features with rentier economies. A few critical points may nevertheless be made: at times it is hard to discern a common thread, and the authors’ differing uses of concepts and attempts to explain different things (lack of democracy, lack of economic growth, difficult reconstruction efforts in post-conflict situations) sometimes make it hard to read. This in itself is not, of course, a valid critique of a collective volume. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning here in order to highlight desiderata for future research and the way ahead, namely how to link the issue of Srentierism and the resource curse to the question of statehood. Rentier economies are naturally part of rentier states and we must hence pose the question of how to view such states. How can they be reformed? How are they to be maintained? And, in the rare cases of post-conflict peace building, how are they to be reconstructed or rebuilt?

One way forward seems to be a focus on the core functions of states and to measure statehood and governance against fulfillment of the following: internal and external security, welfare and wealth, and a level of representation. Using such an approach, scholars can analyze functional state failure, civil wars (and the often accompanying institutional state collapse), lack of reform in rentier states, and even conceive of policy responses to humanitarian interventions (when to intervene?) and international efforts at post-conflict peacebuilding (what to rebuild?). This promising approach seems implicit in the structure of Dead Ends of Transition (the first section on war and peace, the second section on economic aspects of the resource curse and welfare issues, and the third section on societal aspects and representation). What would have been desirable from our point of view, however, is explicit reference to the core functions of states and the division of the various contributions into the fields of security, welfare, and representation.

Despite the few critical points raised above, the fact remains that Dead Ends of Transition is an important publication, and its editors and authors should be thanked for their contribution to what is most certainly a subject of acute interest to the international community.

Rolf S. Schwarz,
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva