Germany takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union for the twelfth time in 2007. The presidency will find that its tasks largely consist in the preliminary and ongoing work of the EU bodies and will not be able to choose for itself.

On the example of the conflict about the future of the European Constitutional Treaty it is clear that the presidency will be shaped by a dependency on paths which are already being pursued. But because path dependency plays so great a role in an institution as large and complex as the EU, with its 27 members, it is a matter of using every opportunity to shape existing paths and follow new ones.

The central problem of the debate which has revived since the beginning of 2006 consists at first glance in dissent concerning how to respond to the stalemate over the Constitutional Treaty and the crisis of the European integration project which lies at the bottom of it. The reason for this lack of purpose and the fact that the various proposals for a remedy are barely systematized or properly considered in relation to one another lies deeper: in the ongoing discussion about the future of the EU none of the protagonists has laid down the political objective of each proposed development path. As a result, a common and graspable measure is lacking on the basis of which the potential for solving the problems and the chances of realizing the various proposals could be measured.

At least three criteria present themselves to the German presidency for such a measure: (i) Should an attempt be made to realize the Constitutional Treaty by the agreed time of 2009? If so, it must be asked whether proposals serve the end of concluding the Treaty by the European elections of June 2009 and the beginning of the next term of office of the European Commission. In any case, the heads of state and government are committed to this by the signing of the Treaty. (ii) Should the reasons why the citizens rejected the Treaty and integration in general be addressed? On this basis it must be assessed to what extent reform proposals respond to the concerns of those who rejected the Treaty in France and the Netherlands or who could reject the Treaty in countries in which ratification is still to come. (iii) Finally, should an attempt be made to achieve the reform goals laid down in the Treaty? In accordance with the mandate of the Constitutional Convention and the intergovern-mental conference laid down in the Nice Treaty and more in detail at the European Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001 all reform proposals can be assessed on the basis of how far they meet the requirements of this mandate. The mandate encompassed an adaptation of the EU to enlargement – which took place in May 2005 – a delimitation of competences between the EU and the member states, clarification of the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a definition of the role of national parliaments in the EU and simplification of the Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty can be regarded as fulfilling this mandate. As a result, evaluation in accordance with this third measure can bring the various reform proposals face to face with the existing answers of the Constitutional Treaty.

These test measures allow a transparent evaluation of possible reform paths. Above all in the political debate of an in-creasingly complex community like the EU the actors should make their goals and standards transparent in order to enable their fellow actors to see what problems they want to solve and what conceptual prerogatives and political interests they conceal.

The German government wishes to rescue the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. If one defines this substance as the sum of all innovations in the text of the Treaty in comparison with the existing treaties Germany will have to give priority to the options of amending or abridging the Treaty in preference to complete renegotiation. The options must be unambiguously evaluated in the first half of 2007 in order to establish action strategies for the Portuguese and Slovenian presidencies.