President Mubarak’s announcement of constitutional reform in February 2005 attracted national and international attention. After being in power for 24 years, the president promised »free elections« allowing the people to choose the president from a list of candidates. Not surprisingly, the candidate already in office won the election with 88 percent of the vote, leaving behind his most prominent challenger, Ayman Nour of the El Ghad party. In the subsequent parliamentary elections, overshadowed by fraud and violence, the President’s ruling National Democratic Party secured its two-thirds majority. While the results of the election did not meet initial expectations, the President’s reform initiative was a crucial step towards meeting domestic and international pressures.

Egypt’s recent electoral reform is an example of how authoritarian regimes adjust to growing foreign pressures to democratize. They express their commitment to democratic principles like free elections, pluralism, and transparency without giving up control over society. The widespread rhetoric of democratization is used in apparent compliance with the demands of the international community, but in practice reform measures are crafted for the domestic institutional setting. By creating obstacles for the regime’s challengers the ndp stays in control of the election process.

The US reaction to Mubarak’s reform initiative illustrates that the promotion of democracy in a »friendly state« like Egypt takes place within a framework of cooperation. Democracy is not imposed but subject to negotiation. The US State Department called the presidential elections an important step towards democratization. It was directly involved in the preparations for the elections, but did not pay much attention to the regime’s authoritarian adjustments. Its follow up of the elections focused on principles rather than on outcomes and the need for continuing political dialog.

Social reforms like Egypt’s current higher education reform effort exemplify how the regime adjusts to the international democratization agenda and turns external pressures into an advantage. By integrating stakeholders in the decisionmaking process it applies the principle of »participatory governance« to a small degree and complies with the World Bank’s conditions. But instead of empowering civil society, the government strengthens its links with the multilateral donor to push through unpopular reform measures.

The international democratization agenda demands a commitment to political reform, free elections, and good governance from authoritarian regimes. But the search for stability still limits the scope of reform and leaves room for adjustment. Within the framework of close cooperation between donor and client, democratic principles are watered down to please both parties. In this regard, the consequences of foreign pressure for democracy are limited if not counterproductive. They contribute to the dissemination of a common vocabulary and a permanent cycle of reform that produces high uncertainty for the challengers of authoritarian rulers. Social and political reforms pirouette around the promise of democratization
without touching the centre of power.