The US government’s intention to lift the nuclear embargo on India, which has been in place for 30 years, runs counter to global efforts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The acceptance of India into the circle of recognized nuclear weapon states would prove that universal and generally binding principles no longer form the basis of global non-proliferation efforts and that Western countries are increasingly deciding between good and bad proliferation.

The planned softening of atomic controls could only be in German and European interests if the benefits which arose from the agreement outweighed the harm done to arms control. The dangers are immense, however. Recognition of India’s nuclear weapon status would damage the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, weaken the multilateral export control regime, heighten the nuclear arms race in Asia, and hamper a peaceful solution to the conflict with Iran.

India refuses to limit its own nuclear program or to take on other responsibilities of members of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. New Delhi has conceded no comprehensive inspection rights to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It cannot be ruled out that nuclear technology supplied to India within the framework of the nuclear deal could be diverted to military purposes. If India was able to import uranium again this would provide the conditions for India’s accelerated nuclear armament.

It has still not been decided whether the us government will go through with its plan to lift nuclear sanctions. There is opposition to the nuclear deal in both Washington and New Delhi. Any agreement would also have to overcome difficult obstacles at the international level. As a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and a major European power Germany could have an influence on the nuclear deal. So far the German government has remained silent, however, and appears to want to sit this one out. In this way it is passing up an opportunity to have a say in the conditions under which nuclear sanctions might be lifted. Between unconditional assent and total rejection of the nuclear deal there is room to maneuver which could be used to bind India more closely into the network of multilateral arms control responsibilities without damaging transatlantic or German-Indian relations.

Germany should insist that, in return for the lifting of nuclear sanctions, India sign the nuclear test ban treaty, cease the production of weapons-grade fissile material, come clean about its nuclear weapons policy, and separate civil and military nuclear fuel cycles clearly, permanently, and verifiably. These measures would contribute to bringing India closer to the global non-proliferation regime and minimize the damage which the deal might give rise to.