With the introduction of the so-called Peace Facility for Africa (PF) in April 2004 the European Union for the first time put at the disposal of the African Union (AU) – within the framework of a special instrument – financial means for carrying out peace missions and building an African security architecture. The Peace Facility for Africa impressively confirms that the further development of the EU’s Africa policy in particular, and EU foreign policy in general, has entered a new phase: the debate on the principles of conflict prevention policy in EU external relations was officially concluded in December 2003 with the European Security Strategy, and only a few months later, in May 2004, an instrument was implemented, in the form of PF, which, through its problem-oriented approach beyond the classical policy-field limits, makes clear that the implementation phase of systematic conflict prevention has commenced, but also that it has problems. In accordance with the ownership principle PF relies completely on the AU and its Peace and Security Council (PSC). The question therefore arises of what may be expected of an organization like the AU which is predominantly based on states which often themselves do not demonstrate internal stability, which appears necessary, however, in order to implement this kind of progressive foreign policy of peace keeping or even enforcement over the long term and consistently. To what extent can PF respond adequately to the problems confronting the PSC? In view of the multifariousness of the AU’s problems, which are caused not only by the lack of financial resources, but above all by the lack of civil-military capacities and, not least, different political interests, the reach of PF would appear to be scarcely sufficient; above all it now turns out to be underfinanced. The EU must ultimately ask itself whether its policy is adequate to ensure effective crisis management in Africa or whether it needs an extended Ownership-plus approach which manages this better by means of institutionalized financial, civil-military and political support. Beyond PF the EU has de facto long been moving in the direction of such an approach in relation to its civil-military engagement in the Congo and Sudan. The “vehicle” of the AU here offers the EU the opportunity to realize the more effective implementation of the goal of conflict prevention, which it has in common with the AU, by means of “direct–indirect” political intervention. Of course, the EU must further develop the Ownership-plus approach, not only in relation to the concentration of its own capacities but also in relation to coordination with the AU and other players on the continent. Looked at in this way PF is a necessary and pathbreaking, but still inadequate instrument. Therefore a crisis-managing Ownership-plus approach should in future bundle and focus indirect and direct civil-military elements of PF, GASP/ESVP and EZ – as proposed by Commission President Barroso – in an EU–AU pact, that is, in a new Partnership for Peace in Africa which, in accordance with the model of effective multilateralism, also designates interfaces with the UN and NATO.