In China fierce societal debates have been going on for years. This is taking place increasingly publicly, although almost unnoticed in the West. These debates are characterized by a great openness to controversy. The Chinese leadership has reacted inconsistently, with both extensive liberalization and tough censorship in which they do not appear to have been acting on the contents of the discussions. In order to understand this inconsistency two patterns of explanation are generally brought forward: (i) it is the public character of the discussion which is the disturbing factor; (ii) certain persons or groups of people are unwelcome as discussants. Neither of these patterns of explanation are convincing, however. The Chinese leadership still has the decisive influence over which discussions are permitted or even promoted and which are not. There are, however, a number of examples – the public discussion about the SARS epidemic, the debate on state and nation ignited by the “schoolbook controversy,” and the handling of the possibilities of the Internet – which make it clear that the Chinese leadership is no longer in a position to completely dominate public discourse. The attempt by the leadership to counter its own loss of power by all means is becoming equally clear, resorting to both draconian reprisals and generally making the community of discussants feel insecure. The inconsistency in the reaction of the Chinese leadership is therefore not necessarily an expression of its lack of orientation but can be regarded as an important element of a consciously pursued strategy.