Summary — Issue 02 / 2004
Mario E. Carranza: Leaving the Backyard: Latin America's European Option
         
    European-Latin American relations must be put in a triangular perspective, due to the central role played by the United States in the foreign relations of both regions.
US policy toward Latin America has consistently pursued two objectives:
  1. to exclude extra-continental powers from the Western Hemisphere and
  2. to secure and maintain a dominant politico-economic presence in the region.
In the 1990s, negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) seemed to mark the end of the hegemonic presumption and US "benign neglect" toward the region. Yet the FTAA talks have so far failed to deliver a fair and balanced hemispheric trade agreement. The United States has been unable to impose a NAFTA-style FTAA on Latin America and slowly but surely the South American countries are taking charge of their own future. The Bush administration's neglect of the region in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks has drawn Europe and Latin America closer. The increasing alienation between the United States and Latin America in the late 1990s, despite a common agenda of promoting democracy and free trade, has been paralleled by an unprecedented rapprochement between the European Union (EU) and Latin America, especially between the EU and the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur). After September 11 and the Iraq war, three scenarios for trilateral relations can be envisaged. First, a balanced US-EU-Latin American relationship could develop, with the EU and Latin America assuming more responsibility for achieving common economic, political, and security goals. However, US hegemonic aspirations, the neo-mercantilist competition between the US and Europe regarding Latin American Markets and the disappearance of Communism as a common threat are obstacles which render this scenario unlikely.
In a second scenario, instead of actively working to reduce the asymmetries in economic development, the United States and Western Europe would strengthen a "North-North" axis of economic, political, and military cooperation in order to "manage" Latin American problems, narrowly defined as "security" problems.
However, Europe's identity as a civilian power, recent political differences between the US and Europe, and the new assertiveness of Latin America make this scenario implausible.
Third, successful conclusion of an EU-Mercosur free trade agreement might lead to a strategic partnership between the two trading blocs, or between the EU and a projected South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). However, the highly indebted countries of Latin America still have to rely on US support. Furthermore, the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement is hampered by the row over agricultural subsidies. Ultimately, a Mercosur-EU strategic partnership will depend on the political determination of both sides, as well as US actions (such as unilateral military intervention) that might draw the EU and Mercosur closer together. The creation of an EU-Mercosur trade pact before the completion of the FTAA would challenge US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and allow the European Union, Mercosur and other Latin American countries to balance US influence. In addition, a strategic partnership between Europe and Latin America may build on 500 years of common history and strong cultural ties. The shared commitment to multilateralism, the United Nations, and respect for international law provide a further basis for intensified cooperation.
         
 
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© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung   net edition: malte.michel | 06/2004   Top