International Politics and Society

Politik und Gesellschaft Online
International Politics and Society 2/2002

Hanns W.Maull
Containing Entropy, Rebuilding the State: Challenges to International Order in the Age of Globalization

Andreas Wittkowsky
Kosovo – a Model?
UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates

Jochen Müller
The Islamic Argument
Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies

Michael Dauderstädt
The Need to Adjust and the Loss of Legitimation: the European Dilemma

Arne Heise
The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy

Hans Platzer
Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the EU

Rebecca Harding
Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling Markets

Hanns W.Maull

Containing Entropy, Rebuilding the State: Challenges to International Order in the Age of Globalization

A policy on international order requires a consistent concept of how this order should be structured. On the one hand, the concept must be oriented towards the dominant Western values of democracy and the global market economy; on the other, it must also find acceptance outside the Western world. These requirements might be fulfilled by a vision of international order which aims at a systematic civilizing of conflict management and at the rule of law for international relations. This implies a model of an order in which the differences between democratic domestic policy and world order policy are gradually reduced and ultimately removed. The realization of such a concept is currently, and for the foreseeable future, endangered more by the inability of world order politics to guide developments and by the immanent dynamism of globalization processes than by opponents with differing concepts of world order. The risks deriving from Islamic fundamentalism are ultimately only the consequences of an overarching tendency towards political entropy. In order to overcome the problems, international order policy needs to start from efficient states. The modern, democratic nation state has generally managed to civilize conflict management within its own borders, but many non-Western countries have incomplete or no institutions of modern statehood. The international community is called on here to intervene and build up statehood. At the same time, the nation state in the West is also coming under pressure from processes of globalization: it can only regain lost control of events via intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. In the construction of a world order fit to tackle the problems, cooperation between the USA and the European Union plays a key role. For the time being, profound American reservations about the very concept of such an order and the EU's underdeveloped capability of policy and strategy block the realization of this vision.

Andreas Wittkowsky

Kosovo – a Model?
UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates

The international public is again taking an interest in the possibilities to intervene in regions which are affected by lasting conflicts and the disintegration of state structures. The UN interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) is regarded as a possible model. UNMIK can indeed point to an impressive record of success and has created opportunities for peaceful conflict management (which now need to be utilized by the local political forces). UNMIK was particularly successful where specific supplies and services were needed quickly (e.g. emergency aid) or where international experts could assume responsibility for administrative action without much difficulty. It comes as little surprise that there are greater problems in the establishment of those institutions which rely on changed attitudes and a basic acceptance by society. Even in the most positive case, these can only be anchored over the longer term. Also, important sections of society are resisting some of these institutions. Particular problems are resulting from the fact that the future status of Kosovo under international law is being deliberately kept open. The central political problem is the longer-term acceptance of the mandate by the Kosovars and the implementation of corresponding policies. Doubts about whether this model can simply be repeated elsewhere derive from the insight that the success story so far is based on several fortunate environmental factors. These include in particular the presence of the security agencies throughout the territory, close economic, family and cultural contacts between the Kosovars and the European Union, a high degree of individual initiative and – due to the Kosovar social structure – a considerable level of internal stability. Future international mandates must take a robust but realistic approach. The robustness can derive from a linking of civilian and military intelligence and police functions, an early establishment of international judicial authorities and strong political public relations work. High priority must be given to the handling of disputatious property issues, which may be a major reason for continuing conflicts. One way to make the construction of the mandate realistic may be to hand political responsibility to the local elites at an early stage in order to create corresponding “ownership”. However, the resolution of the central social challenge – to build a modern nation and to legitimize state powers – cannot come from outside.

Jochen Müller

The Islamic Argument
Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies

In the attempts to explain the attacks of 11 September, one approach was based on a still “unenlightened” Islam, whilst others tried to regard the Islamicist terror as a consequence of globalization. However, neither of these perspectives took much account of the history and current situation of the various strands of political Islam. Yet a glance at the recent past shows how, even back in the 19th century, an Islamic debate emerged in the Middle East as a response to colonialism and subjection. Even today, the assertion that there is an ongoing threat to and humiliation of “Moslems” by “the West” is a major driving force behind a collective Islamic identity in many countries in the region. This widespread sense of an outside threat is utilized both by the authoritarian regimes in the region and by the various strands of political Islam: they promote conspiracy theories like anti-Semitism and detract attention from any emancipatory criticism of the social contradictions in their societies. In contrast to moderate “mainstream Islamicism”, which adapts itself to the political systems in the region, e.g. in the form of the Moslem Brotherhood, the groupings of radical Islam justify their militant struggle with appeals to the “colonial legacy”, a concept rooted deep in the collective consciousness. They claim to be defenders of the Moslem collective. They see their ideology confirmed in the war of the anti-terror alliance against the Taliban and in other Western interventionist plans. However, the terror of the radicals has so far been directed almost exclusively against their own national regimes, which they brand “unIslamic”. Radical Islam has been greatly weakened at this national level in recent years. Jihad Islam, which operates internationally – represented mainly by Al Qaida – is a special case in the spectrum of radical Islam.

Michael Dauderstädt

The Need to Adjust and the Loss of Legitimation: the European Dilemma

The EU is simultaneously deepening and enlarging. The measures to deepen the Union, in the form of market liberalization and policy harmonization, have continually leveled the playing field in Europe on which people, companies, regions and countries fight for their opportunities to gain prosperity. This changes the nature of the conflicts over distribution of wealth and of the processes of adjustment, which assume a European as well as a national aspect. On top of this, there is the enlargement of the Union, which is bringing clearly more heterogeneous, but particularly poorer players onto the leveled playing field. Their interest in growing their economies to catch up with the richer members is at risk of being frustrated due to an inefficient regional policy and a stability-fixated monetary policy. The competition from the numerous poorer regions is encountering welfare societies whose own regimes are already being subjected to massive pressures to adjust (demography, globalization) for various reasons. There is a risk of increasing unemployment and inequality, and this often means that national governments are unable to implement the necessary painful reforms. Instead, they tend to shift the blame onto Brussels. The adjustment of the (national) distribution of opportunities for income and wealth is always a highly political process – especially in the European democracies. If traditional patterns of adjustment become ineffective or unacceptable, the result is always an exacerbation of domestic and international conflicts over distribution of wealth, and calls for new national strategies conducive to integration or for better supranational policies. Whilst the European “supra-state”, with its inadequate democratic legitimation, changes the conditions of national policy-making, the latter’s less socially acceptable results undermine the legitimacy of European integration and possibly even of (national) democracy. More subsidiarity, differentiation and flexibility of integration, as well as the democratization of the institutions of the Union, could open up European policy-making more for the relevant interests in society and thus help it to be handled in a socially acceptable manner. But the principle of the Common Market places restrictions on the independence which the EU can grant to the national governments to influence their national economies.

Arne Heise

The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy

Since the Amsterdam revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has accepted its responsibility for the development of employment. A three-pillar concept for European employment policy was then elaborated at various EU summits, focusing on labor-market policy (Luxembourg Process), goods market and financial market reform (Cardiff Process) and co-ordination of the macroeconomic fields of monetary, fiscal and wage policy (Cologne Process). Virtually unnoticed by the academic world and the public, a process was set in motion at the Cologne EU summit in 1999 that aims to provide a policy mix which favors economic growth – and thus employment. This is rooted in the understanding that the European Central Bank, the Ecofin council and the social partners need to co-ordinate their actions in order to create a market situation within which the European employment problems can be solved. However, it quickly became clear that this understanding was not able to engender any lasting efforts to co-operate. It would seem that the Cologne Process was born out of a situation in which, following the election of Chancellor Schröder and Finance Minister Lafontaine, EU policy was taking a different direction for a brief period. The general ineffectiveness of the EU macroeconomic dialogue is due (a) to its systematic incompatibility with the other policy processes of European economic policy, and particularly the Stability and Growth Pact, (b) to the lack of an institutional anchor for co-operation, and (c) to the opportunism of politicians who do not wish to take a stand against the economic policy zeitgeist.

Hans Platzer

Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the EU

Since the mid-1990s, new supranational structures of labor relations have been forming in the EU as a result of changes in the EU regulatory system in the field of labor and social policy. The European trade unions and employers’ associations now have the option of independent collective negotiations at European level. Also, they can reach agreements on social and labor issues in certain areas which then become part of EU social legislation by virtue of a decision by the Council of Ministers. In several respects, the European works councils are by far the most dynamic element of the Europeanization of labor relations. The directive of September 1994 regarding their establishment created an institution of collective labor law at European level for the first time. Because it is not a binding “model”, it forces managements and employees’ representatives, employers’ associations and trade unions, to work through this “project” themselves. This places fresh demands on communication, co-ordination of actions and the preparation of negotiations by the players involved. The question of whether the European Works Councils will come to form the germ of a transnational trade unionism embracing an entire company group remains open. With regard to the hard core of labor relations, i.e. the collective negotiations on wages, working hours, etc., effective Europeanization is impeded both by the trade unions’ lack of organizational resources and by the employers’ lack of interest. The latter have no interest in pan-European agreements which restrict competition between the national labor forces – competition which is particularly effective against the background of high unemployment in large parts of the EU. And the unions themselves are prevented from forming pan-European combat fronts by their involvement in national “modernization pacts”. Also, the EU has not established a European set of rules for collective bargaining. The institution of the “social dialogue” has remained correspondingly “toothless”.

Rebecca Harding

Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling Markets

Modell Deutschland has drawn much criticism in recent years. It has been roundly condemned as, at best, top heavy and inflexible and, at worst, defunct in an economic era characterised by dynamic, market-based operations and radical innovation. It is inflexibility, especially in labour markets, that has damned Germany in the eyes of “Anglo-Saxon” policy makers during the 1990s and into the 21st century. However, there is evidence to suggest that prophecies of doom are somewhat premature, particularly in some of the fast growing technological areas that generate science-based entrepreneurship. In order to understand the processes that are at work, commentators and analysts should look at the inter-relationship between policy and institutional adaptiveness that creates sustainable change in the innovation system. The complex set of connections between the various institutions of the German system are enabled through policy. Competitiveness stems from the capacity of enabling policy to stimulate effective institutional adaptation and create mechanisms to facilitate and widen participation in key markets (such as that for science-based entrepreneurship). Government intervention is key in creating bridges between individuals and the market as the need arises. Policy makers have built up an institutional culture of competition and collaboration in the system which creates a very real market-based dynamism alongside a networked structure that is key in maximising the innovative potential of an economy. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the institutional structures of the innovation system are actually driving the economy towards higher innovation-based productivity and entrepreneurially led growth.


		Politik und Gesellschaft Online International Politics and Society 2/2002
		Hanns W.Maull Containing Entropy, Rebuilding the State: Challenges to International Order in the Age of Globalization Andreas Wittkowsky Kosovo – a Model? UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates Jochen Müller The Islamic Argument Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies Michael Dauderstädt The Need to Adjust and the Loss of Legitimation: the European Dilemma Arne Heise The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy Hans Platzer Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the EU Rebecca Harding Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling Markets Hanns W.Maull Containing Entropy, Rebuilding the State: Challenges to International Order in the Age of Globalization A policy on international order requires a consistent concept of how this order should be structured. On the one hand, the concept must be oriented towards the dominant Western values of democracy and the global market economy; on the other, it must also find acceptance outside the Western world. These requirements might be fulfilled by a vision of international order which aims at a systematic civilizing of conflict management and at the rule of law for international relations. This implies a model of an order in which the differences between democratic domestic policy and world order policy are gradually reduced and ultimately removed. The realization of such a concept is currently, and for the foreseeable future, endangered more by the inability of world order politics to guide developments and by the immanent dynamism of globalization processes than by opponents with differing concepts of world order. The risks deriving from Islamic fundamentalism are ultimately only the consequences of an overarching tendency towards political entropy. In order to overcome the problems, international order policy needs to start from efficient states. The modern, democratic nation state has generally managed to civilize conflict management within its own borders, but many non-Western countries have incomplete or no institutions of modern statehood. The international community is called on here to intervene and build up statehood. At the same time, the nation state in the West is also coming under pressure from processes of globalization: it can only regain lost control of events via intergovernmental and supranational cooperation. In the construction of a world order fit to tackle the problems, cooperation between the USA and the European Union plays a key role. For the time being, profound American reservations about the very concept of such an order and the EU's underdeveloped capability of policy and strategy block the realization of this vision. Andreas Wittkowsky Kosovo – a Model? UNMIK and the Architecture of Future International Mandates The international public is again taking an interest in the possibilities to intervene in regions which are affected by lasting conflicts and the disintegration of state structures. The UN interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) is regarded as a possible model. UNMIK can indeed point to an impressive record of success and has created opportunities for peaceful conflict management (which now need to be utilized by the local political forces). UNMIK was particularly successful where specific supplies and services were needed quickly (e.g. emergency aid) or where international experts could assume responsibility for administrative action without much difficulty. It comes as little surprise that there are greater problems in the establishment of those institutions which rely on changed attitudes and a basic acceptance by society. Even in the most positive case, these can only be anchored over the longer term. Also, important sections of society are resisting some of these institutions. Particular problems are resulting from the fact that the future status of Kosovo under international law is being deliberately kept open. The central political problem is the longer-term acceptance of the mandate by the Kosovars and the implementation of corresponding policies. Doubts about whether this model can simply be repeated elsewhere derive from the insight that the success story so far is based on several fortunate environmental factors. These include in particular the presence of the security agencies throughout the territory, close economic, family and cultural contacts between the Kosovars and the European Union, a high degree of individual initiative and – due to the Kosovar social structure – a considerable level of internal stability. Future international mandates must take a robust but realistic approach. The robustness can derive from a linking of civilian and military intelligence and police functions, an early establishment of international judicial authorities and strong political public relations work. High priority must be given to the handling of disputatious property issues, which may be a major reason for continuing conflicts. One way to make the construction of the mandate realistic may be to hand political responsibility to the local elites at an early stage in order to create corresponding “ownership”. However, the resolution of the central social challenge – to build a modern nation and to legitimize state powers – cannot come from outside. Jochen Müller The Islamic Argument Why So Many Arabs Feel Surrounded by Enemies In the attempts to explain the attacks of 11 September, one approach was based on a still “unenlightened” Islam, whilst others tried to regard the Islamicist terror as a consequence of globalization. However, neither of these perspectives took much account of the history and current situation of the various strands of political Islam. Yet a glance at the recent past shows how, even back in the 19th century, an Islamic debate emerged in the Middle East as a response to colonialism and subjection. Even today, the assertion that there is an ongoing threat to and humiliation of “Moslems” by “the West” is a major driving force behind a collective Islamic identity in many countries in the region. This widespread sense of an outside threat is utilized both by the authoritarian regimes in the region and by the various strands of political Islam: they promote conspiracy theories like anti-Semitism and detract attention from any emancipatory criticism of the social contradictions in their societies. In contrast to moderate “mainstream Islamicism”, which adapts itself to the political systems in the region, e.g. in the form of the Moslem Brotherhood, the groupings of radical Islam justify their militant struggle with appeals to the “colonial legacy”, a concept rooted deep in the collective consciousness. They claim to be defenders of the Moslem collective. They see their ideology confirmed in the war of the anti-terror alliance against the Taliban and in other Western interventionist plans. However, the terror of the radicals has so far been directed almost exclusively against their own national regimes, which they brand “unIslamic”. Radical Islam has been greatly weakened at this national level in recent years. Jihad Islam, which operates internationally – represented mainly by Al Qaida – is a special case in the spectrum of radical Islam. Michael Dauderstädt The Need to Adjust and the Loss of Legitimation: the European Dilemma The EU is simultaneously deepening and enlarging. The measures to deepen the Union, in the form of market liberalization and policy harmonization, have continually leveled the playing field in Europe on which people, companies, regions and countries fight for their opportunities to gain prosperity. This changes the nature of the conflicts over distribution of wealth and of the processes of adjustment, which assume a European as well as a national aspect. On top of this, there is the enlargement of the Union, which is bringing clearly more heterogeneous, but particularly poorer players onto the leveled playing field. Their interest in growing their economies to catch up with the richer members is at risk of being frustrated due to an inefficient regional policy and a stability-fixated monetary policy. The competition from the numerous poorer regions is encountering welfare societies whose own regimes are already being subjected to massive pressures to adjust (demography, globalization) for various reasons. There is a risk of increasing unemployment and inequality, and this often means that national governments are unable to implement the necessary painful reforms. Instead, they tend to shift the blame onto Brussels. The adjustment of the (national) distribution of opportunities for income and wealth is always a highly political process – especially in the European democracies. If traditional patterns of adjustment become ineffective or unacceptable, the result is always an exacerbation of domestic and international conflicts over distribution of wealth, and calls for new national strategies conducive to integration or for better supranational policies. Whilst the European “supra-state”, with its inadequate democratic legitimation, changes the conditions of national policy-making, the latter’s less socially acceptable results undermine the legitimacy of European integration and possibly even of (national) democracy. More subsidiarity, differentiation and flexibility of integration, as well as the democratization of the institutions of the Union, could open up European policy-making more for the relevant interests in society and thus help it to be handled in a socially acceptable manner. But the principle of the Common Market places restrictions on the independence which the EU can grant to the national governments to influence their national economies. Arne Heise The Cologne Process: a Neglected Aspect of European Employment Policy Since the Amsterdam revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union has accepted its responsibility for the development of employment. A three-pillar concept for European employment policy was then elaborated at various EU summits, focusing on labor-market policy (Luxembourg Process), goods market and financial market reform (Cardiff Process) and co-ordination of the macroeconomic fields of monetary, fiscal and wage policy (Cologne Process). Virtually unnoticed by the academic world and the public, a process was set in motion at the Cologne EU summit in 1999 that aims to provide a policy mix which favors economic growth – and thus employment. This is rooted in the understanding that the European Central Bank, the Ecofin council and the social partners need to co-ordinate their actions in order to create a market situation within which the European employment problems can be solved. However, it quickly became clear that this understanding was not able to engender any lasting efforts to co-operate. It would seem that the Cologne Process was born out of a situation in which, following the election of Chancellor Schröder and Finance Minister Lafontaine, EU policy was taking a different direction for a brief period. The general ineffectiveness of the EU macroeconomic dialogue is due (a) to its systematic incompatibility with the other policy processes of European economic policy, and particularly the Stability and Growth Pact, (b) to the lack of an institutional anchor for co-operation, and (c) to the opportunism of politicians who do not wish to take a stand against the economic policy zeitgeist. Hans Platzer Europeanization and Transnationalization of Labor Relations in the EU Since the mid-1990s, new supranational structures of labor relations have been forming in the EU as a result of changes in the EU regulatory system in the field of labor and social policy. The European trade unions and employers’ associations now have the option of independent collective negotiations at European level. Also, they can reach agreements on social and labor issues in certain areas which then become part of EU social legislation by virtue of a decision by the Council of Ministers. In several respects, the European works councils are by far the most dynamic element of the Europeanization of labor relations. The directive of September 1994 regarding their establishment created an institution of collective labor law at European level for the first time. Because it is not a binding “model”, it forces managements and employees’ representatives, employers’ associations and trade unions, to work through this “project” themselves. This places fresh demands on communication, co-ordination of actions and the preparation of negotiations by the players involved. The question of whether the European Works Councils will come to form the germ of a transnational trade unionism embracing an entire company group remains open. With regard to the hard core of labor relations, i.e. the collective negotiations on wages, working hours, etc., effective Europeanization is impeded both by the trade unions’ lack of organizational resources and by the employers’ lack of interest. The latter have no interest in pan-European agreements which restrict competition between the national labor forces – competition which is particularly effective against the background of high unemployment in large parts of the EU. And the unions themselves are prevented from forming pan-European combat fronts by their involvement in national “modernization pacts”. Also, the EU has not established a European set of rules for collective bargaining. The institution of the “social dialogue” has remained correspondingly “toothless”. Rebecca Harding Dynamic Germany. The Role of Policy in Enabling Markets Modell Deutschland has drawn much criticism in recent years. It has been roundly condemned as, at best, top heavy and inflexible and, at worst, defunct in an economic era characterised by dynamic, market-based operations and radical innovation. It is inflexibility, especially in labour markets, that has damned Germany in the eyes of “Anglo-Saxon” policy makers during the 1990s and into the 21st century. However, there is evidence to suggest that prophecies of doom are somewhat premature, particularly in some of the fast growing technological areas that generate science-based entrepreneurship. In order to understand the processes that are at work, commentators and analysts should look at the inter-relationship between policy and institutional adaptiveness that creates sustainable change in the innovation system. The complex set of connections between the various institutions of the German system are enabled through policy. Competitiveness stems from the capacity of enabling policy to stimulate effective institutional adaptation and create mechanisms to facilitate and widen participation in key markets (such as that for science-based entrepreneurship). Government intervention is key in creating bridges between individuals and the market as the need arises. Policy makers have built up an institutional culture of competition and collaboration in the system which creates a very real market-based dynamism alongside a networked structure that is key in maximising the innovative potential of an economy. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the institutional structures of the innovation system are actually driving the economy towards higher innovation-based productivity and entrepreneurially led growth.
		© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung \| net edition malte.michel \| 2/2002