

HANS-JOCHEN LUHMANN

On the Way to a Post-Fossil Fuel Industrial Society.

The Multi-Dimensional Approach in the Policy of the USA and the EU

The starting point is the observation that the USA and the EU, in a similar fashion, are going beyond climate policy in the narrow sense, understood as the policy of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. Instead of limiting themselves to this one dimension, both are pursuing their policies in other dimensions – and are reproached with inefficiency by academic economists for doing so. The author, in contrast, tries to describe the de facto multiple dimensions of policy as appropriate and to understand the additional dimensions of activity, at the same time, as a deliberate choice.

He describes the policy of the two old industrial great powers as »preparing the way for the post-fossil fuel industrial society« instead of as a (one-dimensional) »climate policy.« Two of the other dimensions of activity are emphasized. First, the policy of boosting the proportion of end-user energy from renewable sources (EE policy), which represents the positive complement of the »stop using greenhouse gases« approach. And second, the policy of improving the »greenhouse quality« of fuels – that is, improving an indicator which is calculated along the whole process chain of fuel production. The »greenhouse quality« approach coincides with EE policy to the extent that the latter is also a policy for the gradual but constant improvement of the »process« quality of end-user energy sources. The »process« quality approach is particularly striking: it could transcend the hitherto customary limitation of (climate) policy to respective territories and may contribute to an interterritorial dynamic. All in all, the author's aim is to outline a (de facto) policy model which is not slavishly subject to the pressure for consensus characteristic of UN bodies.

REGINA FREY

Gender Budgeting as Gender-Policy Strategy

Gender Budgeting was developed in the context of an international movement which criticized the World Bank and the IMF for their structural adjustment

policies in the Global South. From the 1980s onwards, these policies led to impoverishment and had negative effects on gender equality. Currently, this strategy is increasingly being described as an »instrument« which is occasionally used in processes of administrative modernization. In this way, Gender Mainstreaming is often perceived as an umbrella for Gender Budgeting. However, to speak of Gender Budgeting merely as an instrument (of Gender Mainstreaming) is misleading: first, due to the earlier emergence of Gender Budgeting; second, because Gender Budgeting furnishes its own instruments. In contrast to Gender Mainstreaming, Gender Budgeting is more concerned with political questions. Issues such as the democratization of financial decision-making processes and greater transparency of the public budget have always been part of the development of Gender Budgeting. Referring to Gender Budgeting as an instrument is therefore inappropriate. Furthermore, it implies a weakening of the critical impetus of Gender Budgeting. Gender Budgeting is a strategy in its own right. It could and should be used to politicize budget decision-making processes at the local and federal levels. It is also an appropriate means of assessing the impact on gender equality of government policies and programs in any political field.

ELISABETH KLATZER / MARGIT SCHRATZENSTALLER / BIRGIT BUCHINGER / NICOLE SCHAFFER

Gender Budgeting in the Constitution – A Look at Formal and Real Conditions in Austria

In this article the authors provide an overview of gender budgeting activities in Austria and, based on selected examples – in particular, at the federal level and in the state of Upper Austria – examine their implementation in more detail.

They found that, at the federal level in Austria, there are solid legal foundations which provide for binding gender budgeting and also link it to the »outcome-oriented budget management« introduced within the framework of budgetary reform. To date, activities related to gender budgeting at federal level have been confined to pilot projects of varying degrees of ambition and to attempts to define gender-specific outcomes. The not insignificant challenges now on the agenda include targeted strategic management of activities on the basis of experiences so far, the linking of gender budgeting and an outcome-orientation, and a gradual extension of the pilot projects to all important parts of the budget.

The »Länder« (federal states) and municipalities present a mixed picture. While in individual states – in particular, Vienna and Upper Austria – efforts have been made for a number of years to apply gender budgeting systematically, other states and the bulk of towns and municipalities are rather behindhand.

All in all, there has so far really been no concrete establishment and institutionalization of gender budgeting as a central gender equality initiative in the

budget process. To date, analyses have concentrated mainly on particular sections of budgets. Furthermore, a key weakness of all activities in this area is that they do not progress from the phase of analysis: changes needed to enhance equality identified so far have not led to structural changes with regard to budget-policy measures at any level.

The successful realization and implementation of gender budgeting requires a series of specifications and framework conditions which have so far been lacking: in particular, uniform, generally accepted quality standards for carrying out gender budgeting, as well as measures to increase participation and the establishment of a public sphere. The issues of political and administrative obligations and accountability also remain to be clarified. Moreover, the independent »involvement« of academia and civil society is also required.

The financial and economic crisis and the expected consolidation measures (budget cutbacks) serve only to enhance the importance of the topic of gender-oriented budget processes.

ROLF MÜTZENICH

Security with or against Russia?

On the Russian Proposal for a »European Security Treaty«

Russia put forward a proposal for a new pan-European security architecture back in June 2008. It calls for a treaty that is binding under international law to be signed by all countries from »Vancouver to Vladivostok«. In view of the continent's unsolved security issues, there is certainly a need to discuss possible ways to improve the European security architecture.

What exactly is Medvedev proposing? What issues would be worth discussing and where are the stumbling blocks? And what are Russia's motives in putting forward its proposal? The Russian President justifies his proposal by saying that the existing European security architecture has not managed to implement the goal of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, namely of creating a united, free and secure Europe. In order to do that, he suggests holding a pan-European summit with all countries from »Vancouver to Vladivostok«. The goal would be to prepare and adopt a security treaty that would be binding under international law.

Medvedev's »Helsinki II« idea should not be the only basis for discussion concerning a cooperative security order in Europe. It is more important that European countries develop their own suggestions and demands, so as to be able to test Moscow's willingness to cooperate. There is therefore indeed a need to discuss the gaps in the European security system. The idea of holding a pan-European summit conference to that end also seems sensible. The suggestion that a binding security treaty could be agreed at that summit can also hardly be criticized per se. The content of such a treaty would be decisive, however. Principles

and rules require institutions that help with their implementation. Which institutions should take on that task in Europe? Along with reviving security policy in the OSCE, stronger institutionalized cooperation between Moscow and Brussels would be of great benefit to European security.

SERGEJ KORTUNOW

The New European Security System

Relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation have barely evolved over the 20 years since the Cold War ended. Of course, there have been some positive developments and arrangements between the two actors, but from a distance, Russia still seems like the friend nobody wants to play with. However, global developments and challenges, such as security, energy, and climate change, demand good relations between the EU and Russia, not only on paper but also in reality. The solution of many global conflicts and challenges depends on Russia, but Russia, in turn, also needs the EU for its own economic and political development. The initiative of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev concerning a treaty on a new European security system, first presented on June 5, 2008, reflects this interdependency and was considered to constitute a first step towards a full-fledged discussion on future relations between the two actors.

This Russian initiative must be seen as a response to the advance of NATO and the developing European security and defense policy, which appears to exclude Russia and its legitimate interests. This approach is not an appropriate answer to the pressing questions of global politics. The gap between Russia and the EU is not closing but widening. The world has changed and has become less secure, while the EU's position is constantly declining. Simultaneously, Russia's potential and current power are not sufficiently acknowledged and valued by the European Union and the USA: Russia is constantly underestimated. The Russian perception is that Europe is in deep crisis. In the context of solving this European political issue, reflecting and correcting the real power ratio between Russia, the EU and the USA, and, finally, dealing with global problems, Dmitri Medvedev's initiative must be understood as an attempt to fashion a common European solution. This could be the right moment to establish a new and deeper security system, going beyond previous limited thinking. The fears and interests of the Central and Eastern European EU member states with regard to Russia must be addressed. Russia has already defined itself and its national identity in relation to and in favor of the West. With the offer and vision of President Medvedev, Russia has shown that it is ready for a new era of European partnership. It is now up to the West to respond accordingly.

PETER W. SCHULZE

Toward a Collective Security Policy in Europe: Options and Opportunities

For a few years after the Cold War had ended, the prospects of cooperative security seemed favorable. Despite this, a rather strange disparity or asymmetry evolved. While socioeconomic goals of transformation were mooted everywhere and sometimes fulfilled, the idea of a European peace order vanished from the agenda. During the 1990s, a new power constellation materialized in the international system, with Russia pushed to the sidelines. The two rounds of eastward enlargement of NATO created an illusion of Western dominance and ability to project stability. This came to a halt once the Alliance started to extend its influence in »Europe in-between,« that is, the sphere between the European Union and post-Soviet Russia.

The first decade of the new millennium saw fundamental changes in the international power constellation: the hegemony of the USA proved to be temporary, Russia returned as an international power, other growth centers emerged in the world economy, and even the European Union was pushed into a geopolitical role, a responsibility it accepted unwillingly and without a coherent foreign or security concept.

Russia initiated a debate on a security system for the whole of Europe and slowly the relevant institutions and powers started to move. It seems clear that the old formula, according to which there cannot be any peace in Europe without or against Russia, needs to be amended. Likewise, there will be no change in the security map of Europe without NATO or against the USA. The question remains: what will be the role and position of the European Union in the new security equation?

IGOR JURGENS / EWGENIJ GONTMACHER

Russia in the Twenty-First Century: Model of a Desirable Future

Russia needs change. At least, that is the conclusion one is likely to come to after observing the discussion among Russian experts, politicians, and the general public about the future of Russia. There is a deep sense within the country that Russia is not prepared for the future, which is only vaguely perceived, and that it is necessary to start a new and honest process of self-reflection in pursuit of a new national identity. This paper traces a critical trajectory of Russian insecurity based on a lack of self-confidence, neglected or false political and economic developments, and the struggle concerning Russia's future path. The Russian elite and leaders lack vision, fail to provide guidance and the public is disoriented. It is clear that Russia is standing at a crossroads. Hence, it is time to open a discussion to create a vision of the Russia of the future. This article offers one possible vision of what Russia could and should become and how this might be realized.

The large-scale focus on a mono-structural resource economy and society, based on gas and oil, held together by an authoritarian state, in which democracy and personal development and freedom are lacking, has failed. It is time for fundamental political, societal, and economic modernization, reshaping and defining the political system and the legal framework on the basis of strict but transparent laws and rules based on democracy. The state needs criticism, feedback, and debate in society, on the one hand, to correct false developments and, on the other hand, to encourage a public debate on a new democratic culture. The market, which should be established in accordance with liberal standards, requires clarity of jurisdiction and political decision-making, with a defined and limited role for the state. The transformation and reform of the armed forces should continue and a new, more coherent Russian foreign policy is needed, based on prospective membership of the European Union and a new proactive role for Russia in the world. Adherence to these somewhat broad principles would ensure Russia's place among the leading architects of a new world order as an integrated and positive actor. However, time is short. There is a window of opportunity over the next two years to create a basis for this modernization process. Modernization itself will take much longer and success is uncertain. But there is no alternative.