Benjamin Ziemann

A Quantum of Solace?
European Peace Movements during the Cold War and their Elective Affinities

Peace movements can be defined as social movements that aim to protest against the perceived dangers of political decision-making about armaments.¹ During the Cold War, the foremost aim of peace protests was to ban atomic weapons and to alert the public about the dangers of these new powerful means of destruction. These antinuclear protests during the Cold War could be seen as the embodiment of a contemporary history of Europe. Who, if not the participants in antinuclear protests, rallied for their non-violent marches and manifestations against the bomb, could be better representatives for the reinvention of Europe as a peaceful and civilised continent after the horror and devastation caused by total and genocidal warfare since 1939? There is a tendency among historians of twentieth-century Europe to contrast the »dark continent« of the period up till 1945 with the peaceful and increasingly affluent heaven of the post-war decades. The progressive activism and civilian moral certitude of the antinuclear protesters could be seen as a potentially important part of this historiographical narrative. The civil activism of peace movement mobilization could also serve to correct a bias in some of the recent accounts of European integration in the post-war period, as they tend to offer a top-down approach, focused on the workings of the bureaucratic machinery in Brussels and in the capital cities, and tend to downplay the significance of a bottom-up dynamics of interaction across Europe and of the popular attitudes towards integration.² Peace movements during the Cold War, with their grassroots activism, their attempts to connect across national borders and even across the Iron Curtain, seem to encapsulate the notion of a European civil society, a notion which has gained currency after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, when East Europeans challenged the ossification of a societal system that was characterised by a preponderance of organizational structures and organized forms of sociability.³ But while it is not surprising that peace movements have been amongst the most active trans-

¹ For a conceptual discussion, see Benjamin Ziemann, Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War. Introduction, in: idem (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War, Essen 2007, pp. 11–38. – For his helpful feedback on a draft version of this piece and many stimulating discussions I would like to thank Holger Nehring. For their unwavering support and for helpful discussions, I am also indebted to Øyvind Ekelund, Eva Fetscher, Mike Foley, Anne C. Kjelling, Helge Pharo and Conny Schneider. My thanks also go to the editors of the Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, for their support and their patience. An invitation as a Visiting Scholar to the SFB 640 »Repräsentationen sozialer Ordnung im Wandel« at the Humboldt-Universität allowed me to finish the article. My thanks go to Jörg Baberowski for this invitation.


national actors», the transnational and European dimension of their endeavours is »far from straightforward«, as historian Holger Nehring has observed.\(^5\) In this article, I will make an attempt to analyse the European dimension of antinuclear peace activism during the Cold War. Protests against the Vietnam war provided a crucial link between the peace movement mobilization in the early 1960s and in the late 1970s, particularly with regard to anti-Americanism as a frame.\(^6\) They are, however, not covered here, as the focus of this article is on atomic weapons, which were in many respects at the heart of the bloc confrontation during the Cold War. I will develop my argument in three steps. First, I will scrutinise the transnational encounters and endeavours of peace movements in the different mobilization cycles in the post-war period, focusing on the period until 1963 (I.) and then on the campaign against the Euromissiles in the early 1980s (II.). While movement activists established contacts across national borders, they also positioned their endeavours both in their domestic national context and in the wider international arena. In a second step (III.), I will analyse the framing of antinuclear protest movements.\(^7\) As other constructivist approaches to the study of protest movements, the concept of framings assumes that shared coherent interpretations of the societal and political reality are a crucial prerequisite for the transformation from latent objective structures which could foster protests (such as the existence of nuclear weapons in the context of a system of nuclear deterrence) to actual manifest protest performances. Every collective protest is the result of specific perceptions which are shared and communicated among the protesters, and might differ fundamentally from the perceptions of those who are addressed by the protesters.\(^8\) This perspective matters for an assessment of the European dimension of peace movements. Even if they engaged in transnational encounters with other movements across Europe, their protests might have been framed by collective perceptions of national identity, or by negative frames such as anti-Americanism which posited Europe as the other of an aggressive US policy. In the third and final step (IV.), I will consider gender as a factor for the mobilization of peace protests during the Cold War. Drawing mainly on British examples from the early 1980s, I will try to decipher the logic of women’s campaigning for nuclear disarmament and to understand how they fit into the bigger picture of European peace mobilization.

Every effort to write the history of peace protests as a contribution to a contemporary history of Europe must be sketchy and incomplete, due to the limits of linguistic expertise, but also due to the uneven advancement of historical research in this field in different European countries.\(^9\) In the following, I have heavily relied on the magisterial comparative


\(^9\) See the reports on various European countries in Benjamin Ziemann (ed.), Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and USA since 1945: Historiographical Reviews and Theoretical Per-

While here is not the place for lengthy historiographical reflections, two unconvincing ways to write the history of antinuclear protests shall be addressed briefly. The protests against the Euromissiles in the late 1970s and 1980s were not, to make that sure, the result of a concerted »Soviet offensive« which tried to manipulate public opinion in Western European countries and in the Federal Republic in particular. While individual Communists had a visible presence in the coordination committees of the broad variety of independent peace groups and initiatives, they were certainly not able to set the agenda of these protests, as per definition no single individual could become »the centre of […] peace action« in a campaign that brought hundreds of thousands people to the streets.\footnote{See the unconvincing article by Gerhard Wettig, The last Soviet Offensive in the Cold War. Emergence and Development of the Campaign against NATO Euromissiles, 1979–1983, in: Cold War History 9, 2009, pp. 79–110, quote p. 92. Wettig makes uncritical use of literature based on Stasi-files which aims to show that the peace movement was remote controlled by the Stasi. He is also citing unspecified and unreferenced information from intelligence services (p. 107, fn 120), a clear indication that his argument is not historical but a political accusation.}

A more sympathetic account can be found in Hartmut Kaelble’s impressive book about European social history in the post-war period. Kaelble characterises the peace movement as a »new social movement« which »emerged in the early 1980s«, building on a »long established European tradition«.\footnote{Hartmut Kaelble, Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Munich 2007, p. 314. For a substantial critique of Kaelble’s approach in this book see the review by Holger Nehring in: Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London XXX, 2008, pp. 123–129.} This is a problematic formulation not only as it downgrades some of the most impressive and widespread peace protests in European history from the 1950s and early 1960s to a mere »shadowy existence«. It also identifies »changing values« as a key factor for the emergence of these »new« social movements.\footnote{Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics, Princeton 1977.} This approach is thus based on the notion of a value change from materialist to postmaterialist values, which has been developed by the political scientist Ronald Inglehart in his book on the »silent revolution« in Western Europe.\footnote{Anselm Doering-Manteuffel/Lutz Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte seit 1970, Göttingen 2008, pp. 61–66.} Almost immediately upon its publication this book has become an important part of the sociological self-description of Western societies, and has hence also had a huge impact on the narratives of social history.\footnote{Lawrence S. Wittner, What’s Left? Popular Political Participation in Postwar Europe, in: AHR 113, 2008, pp. 363–390.} As an analytical tool to conceptualise the dynamics of collective protest, and peace protest in particular, however, this approach is hardly convincing. There is reason to believe that the value change-hypothesis is one of the many examples where an unre
flected application of survey methods has created artificial social artefacts. In his coding of the materialist/postmaterialist divide, Inglehart used the formulation »Making sure that this country has strong defence forces« as one of the preferential options to model the materialist value syndrome. Such a formulation, however, presented to peace movement activists or sympathisers, must inevitably fail to grasp and address their refusal to see the military as the sole or preferential guarantor for material safety in the age of mutually assured nuclear destruction. Quite contrary to Inglehart’s assumption, peace movements were driven by a deep concern about the material wellbeing and safety of citizens in Western democracies, a concern which cannot simply be subsumed under the notion of a post-materialist interest in self-realization.

I. TRANSNATIONAL ENDEAVOURS AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES UNTIL 1963

August 1945, when the atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, came as a shocking surprise to European peace activists. Many of them reacted quickly to articulate their fears and concerns, to condemn the use of nuclear weapons and to demand their universal abolition. Amidst the emerging bloc confrontation and the concomitant rise of public anxiety about the expansionist politics of the Soviet Union, nuclear pacifists were swimming against the tide of public opinion in many Western European countries, which supported the bombings and the deployment of nuclear weapons in order to contain Communist aggression. Nonetheless, the established umbrella organizations of peace activists were quick to reassert themselves and to re-establish their network of transnational contacts. The »War Resisters International« (WRI), founded in 1921 as an international network of anarchist and socialist pacifists, continued to lobby for the legal acknowledgement of the right to conscientious objection and for an abolition of compulsory military service. The radicalism of this approach appealed for instance to a student of philosophy and sociology at the University of Oslo, who joined the Norwegian section of the WRI, *Folkereisning mot krig*. Johan Galtung, born in 1930, was even ready to face six months of imprisonment in 1949 for his total refusal to serve in the army as a conscript. Captivated and motivated by the power of the non-violent principles of Mohandas K. Gandhi, he published in 1955, together with his academic teacher, the philosopher Arne Næss, a book about Gandhi’s political ethics, alongside his practical commitment to the anti-militarist ideas of the WRI.

The agenda of the WRI, however, gradually changed during this period. After the death of Herbert Runham Brown (1879–1949), who had served as the secretary for the international network of the WRI since 1923, a generational change in the leadership of the association also allowed to broaden the scope of its pacifist work. Since its triennial general conference in Braunschweig (Federal Republic) in 1951, the fight against nuclear

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armaments was added to the traditional agenda of the WRI. Henceforth, the struggle against the bomb accompanied the struggle against conscription. Other transnational pacifist associations which resumed their agitation since 1945 included the »International Fellowship of Reconciliation«, founded in 1919, a network of (Protestant) Christians who had committed themselves to absolute non-violence and were trying to implement Christian principles in society. Equally, the »Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom« held its first major post-war international congress in Copenhagen in 1949.

Since the late 1950s, a new form of peace movement activism came to the fore in various European countries. Although characterised by a wide variety of possible forms of political engagement and of cultural and political backgrounds, many of these new departures were based on a broad coalition of independent socialist groups and individuals, Protestant Christians and other non-Communist oppositional groups. In one way or another, these groups challenged the post-war political consensus in Western Europe and its foundations, a strict control of participatory impulses through a focus on leadership by parliamentary elites and a liberal-conservative anti-Communism as the quasi-official state ideology. These non-aligned antinuclear movements of the late 1950s and early 1960s were embedded in a dense network of transnational contacts and exchanges. They also shared their most important form of non-violent political action, a protest march that would bring together the diverse coalition of supporters of an abolition of nuclear weapons. Movements in many Western European countries followed the trailblazing example of the British »Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament« (CND). Founded in early 1958, CND had organised a protest march from London to the atomic weapons facility in Aldermaston (Berkshire) over the Easter Weekend of the same year. Mostly motivated through direct encounters with the British example by foreign activists who had participated, the Aldermaston march (since 1959 leading in the opposite direction, from Aldermaston to Trafalgar Square) was copied and emulated by protesters in many other countries, including the Federal Republic, Denmark, Norway, France, Italy, Greece and the Netherlands.

In their rhetoric, the activists of CND were setting the tone for the internationalist appeal of these non-aligned antinuclear campaigns. They claimed to represent the »Family of Man«, as the title of a popular CND-song put it. This global form of kinship, »the biggest on earth«, connected »the miner in Rhondda, the collie in Peking, men across the World who reap and plough and spin«. People all over the world were united in this family, »whatever the creed, or the colour of the skin«, and they would join ranks in their anger and moral revulsion against atomic weapons and against »the men of war who want to kill«. Written in 1962, the lines of this song encapsulated the vision of a peaceful world society that was bound together and unified by the elementary solidarity of the labouring people, a vision that transcended boundaries of class, race and religious denomination. The horizon of a global connectedness, however, was paradoxically expressed with a metaphor that invoked notions of intimacy and of face-to-face interaction: »The whole wide world is dad and mother to me.« But the transnational, global rhetoric of CND...
was only one important element of its public appeal. At the same time, the campaigners presented their quest for a unilateral nuclear disarmament as an attempt to restore, after the demise of the colonial Empire, the moral authority and political leadership of Britain in the world. A renewed »greatness in the moral sense« would be the result of unilateral nuclear disarmament, as an Anglican bishop and supporter of CND formulated in 1965.27

British CND is not the only example for antinuclear campaigns during the late 1950s and 1960s where an internationalist rhetoric was inextricably linked with the sense of a peculiar historical mission of the respective nation to foster non-violent foreign policies in Europe and the world. While all non-aligned antinuclear movements were to some degree embedded in a network of transnational links and contacts, they were also tapping into notions of national identity and were reaffirming the nation-state as an »identity space«.28 Two examples from countries at the periphery of Western Europe may suffice to illustrate this point. In Norway, antinuclear disarmament was mainly promoted by the members of the Fredens forkjempere i Norge, a group which was organised by the Norwegian Communist Party and which was never able to mobilize public opinion beyond the very small constituency of the party.29 Attempts to broaden the appeal of antinuclear campaigning received a boost after Danish activists had launched the Kampagnen mod Atomvåben and staged a large rally in Copenhagen in October 1960. About one hundred Norwegian peace activists, many of them members of the WRI, had joined the march from Holbæk, where Nike-missiles were deployed, to the Danish capital. They then used the momentum to develop a similar campaign at home. Former members of the Communist Party were able to draw up a list of »the 13«, a group of 13 men and women who represented a broad social and political cross-section of Norwegian society and could thus lend an air of respectability to the campaign. Thousands of people marched on the streets of Oslo and Bergen on 19 March 1961. No less than 223,000 Norwegians, out of a population of less than 3.6 million people, signed an appeal against nuclear arms and against weapons tests which was presented by the campaign to the parliament Storting in June of the same year.30

Nonetheless, the campaign of »the 13« faltered quickly, and the attempts of various peace groups who launched a new campaign Kampagnen mot Atomvåben in late 1962 achieved only very limited positive resonance.31 Antinuclear activism in Norway during the early years of the Cold War was hampered by a combination of contradictory historical experiences. The experience of German occupation from 1940 to 1945 had largely undermined the credibility of radical pacifist tenets among the Norwegian electorate. It was a direct consequence of these experiences that Norway gave up its traditional neutrality and joined NATO in 1949. Even at the peak of the first mobilization wave in 1961/62, Norwegian antinuclear activists where hence very careful not to object against
the national consensus and demand Norway’s exit from NATO. But while the scope of the antinuclear campaign in Norway was limited by its geo-strategic position as a small country at the Northern fringe of Europe, dependent on protection in a larger defence framework, this very position also fostered and strengthened the peculiar sense of mission and of national identity among Norwegian peace activists. Ever since the peaceful severing of the union with Sweden in 1905, in fact the only example of non-violent nation-building in Europe from 1830 until 1945, the intellectual and political elites in Norway had stressed the specific ‘peaceability’ of their nation. This construction of a peculiar national identity rested on the perception that Norwegians had amply demonstrated their calling for peace-work: through the activities of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo; through the restless internationalist networking of Christian Lange, who had served since 1909 as the Secretary-General of the Interparliamentary Union and was thus a crucial organiser and facilitator of transnational contacts, achievements which were recognised when he was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1921; and through the relief work of the explorer Fridtjof Nansen for refugees after the First World War.

Already in the interwar period, Norwegian peace activists had tapped into this notion that their country had a peculiar mission to facilitate and achieve peace in the international arena. The painter and radical pacifist Henrik Sørensen had encapsulated this idea in a diary entry written in 1938:

»As Hellas, that little Greece, accomplished Hellenism, for the whole of humanity, as Palestine created Christendom, as Italy, in its time, created the Renaissance, and Holland the new art of painting, thus shall the North create the positive peace movement, the new world-will, liberated from hatred and from greed for profit.«

Lyset fra Norden, the »light from the North« was the telling credo of Sørensen’s peace work. Norwegian antinuclear pacifists during the 1950s and early 1960s continued to conceptualise their activism in terms of the nation as a particularly peaceful identity-space. Their internal correspondence contains numerous references to the idealised image of the peculiar Norwegian peace tradition. In 1962, Norwegian activists from the group »Women’s International Strike for Peace« (WISP) wrote to Halvard Lange (1902–1970), who had served as a Foreign Minister since 1946 and who was, as a prominent member of the Labour Party and also as a son of the pacifist Christian Lange, a crucial figure in Norwegian post-war politics. In their letter, the peace activists tried to strengthen the legitimacy of the arguments by stating: »We can also point to the inheritance Fridtjof Nansen has given to us«, and were thus tapping into the peculiar Norwegian »calling« to facilitate peace.

Even in the 1970s and 1980s, the transnational contacts of antinuclear activists in Norway did not effortlessly translate into a European political orientation. As an immediate response to the NATO dual-track decision in 1979, a variety of non-aligned peace protesters launched Nei til Atomvåpen (No to Nuclear Weapons) in January 1980 and demanded a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic countries. Nei til Atomvåpen, however, repre-
sented to some extent a continuation of the popular grassroots movement against the decision of the Storting to apply for membership in the European Economic Community in 1969. The »no«-campaign, founded in August 1970, secured a popular vote of 53.5% against a Norwegian EEC membership in the referendum held in September 1972. Both in the semantics of putting the »no« centre stage, and in direct personal continuities represented by some leading activists, Nei til Atomvåpen tapped into the strong anti-European sentiments among the Norwegian population in the early 1970s.38

Greece is another good example for the connectedness of the transnational endeavours of antinuclear protesters and their national identities. The Marathon peace marches in Greek since 1963 are perfect examples of a transnational entanglement. In 1963, Grigoris Lambrakis, a physician and parliamentary deputy, was the only one who could actually complete the march due to repressive measures taken by the police, before he was killed by members of a right-wing paramilitary group a couple of weeks later. Lambrakis was inspired by the example of CND and had participated in the 1963 Aldermaston march. He had marched all the way from Aldermaston carrying a banner »Hellas«, and upon arrival in London »she was laying a wreath on the statue of Byron«, as Lord Byron »was for him the symbol of British support for Greek independence«.39 This was truly an encounter between »national internationalists«.40 Back in Greece, Lambrakis had the support of the Bertrand Russell Youth Committee for Nuclear Disarmament, a non-aligned student peace group which had also taken, as the very name indicates, CND as a role-model. Half a million people took part in Lambrakis' funeral procession, and at least 250,000 turned up for the second, this time legal instalment of the Marathon march in 1964, making it both in relative and in absolute terms by far the largest peace rally in European history before the anti-Euromissile demonstrations in 1982/83. And this unprecedented level of mobilization was achieved in despite of the apparent »weakness of the pacifist and non-aligned traditions in Greece«.41

For a full explanation, we need to take the question of Cyprus into account, one of the most complicated political problems of post-war European history. The island had been since 1923 under British sovereignty, and both the Greek majority population on the island as well the Greeks in mainland had aimed for Enosis, a unification with Greece since 1950. But the settlement that was found in 1959/60, with an independent Cyprus, a constitutional setting that prohibited Enosis and aimed to establish a joint government and administration by Greeks and Turks under the presidency of the Archbishop Makarios, was not only a reaction to the agitation and armed attacks by the Turkish Cypriots since 1958. It also bowed to the overriding security interests of NATO and the USA. Both Greece and Turkey had joined NATO in 1952, and the creation of an independent Cypriot state did reflect the general interest to pacify the south-eastern flank of the alliance. Although the conservative Greek government under Constantine Karamanlis paid lip service to the idea of Enosis, it was clear that it had given up the pursuit of unification in favour of a settlement that included financial and military support by NATO members.42

40 See Nehring, National Internationalists.
41 Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp. 238–240, quote p. 239.
In this situation it was the United Greek Left (EDA), the legal representation of the Communists and their allies, and the affiliated peace association Greek Committee for International Détenê and Peace (EEDYE), who could exploit the popular longing for Enosis and could present themselves as the true patriotic alternative. The mass mobilization of the Greek peace movement in 1963/64 occurred in the context of recurring violent confrontations between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. And it rested in particular on the fact that EEDYE and the organizers of the Marathon march demanded self-determination for the Cypriot people (which in fact meant Enosis), rejected NATO-intervention in the question of Cyprus and agitated against American military bases in Greece, thus both channeling and stirring up further the widespread anti-Americanism in the Greek population.43 Whereas the Marathon march was on the surface an example for a transnational entanglement, it was in substance a powerful and highly popular claim for and reaffirmation of Greek national identity vis-à-vis Turkey, the USA and NATO.

During the first major wave of mobilization against nuclear weapons from the early 1950s to 1963, many Western European activists were engaged in transnational encounters with antinuclear movements in other countries. They discussed possible strategies, participated in demonstrations, observed the respective symbols and forms of protest and thus contributed to a cross-fertilization of performative protest actions.44 These exchanges, however, did not add up to a coherent European civil society. Their ability to transform short-lived encounters into a more durable network of transnational exchanges was not only hampered by the persistence of national identities and orientations among the activists. Another limiting factor was the diversity of the social contexts and strata in which the movements were situated, and not least also linguistic problems. As a genuinely transnational project, »Pax Christi« is a good example to illustrate this point. The movement emerged in November 1944 as an initiative for a »prayer crusade for a conversion of Germany« among a group of laypersons in southern France, organised by the schoolteacher Marthe-Marie Dortel-Caudot. As an attempt to convert Germany to Roman Catholicism, the movement was a manifestation of French Catholic intransigence, but also an attempt to address and fill the spiritual vacuum which emerged after the collapse of the Nazi regime. Pierre Marie Théas, bishop of Montauban and later of Lourdes, supported the lay initiative and served as president of Pax Christi until 1950, based on his own interest in a reconciliation between France and Germany.45 Already in March 1945, 40 French bishops supported an appeal for a »crusade for reconciliation between France and Germany«, which was shortly afterwards broadened to a more general »crusade for peace«. Quickly, the Catholic peace movement of Pax Christi branched out in other countries. Already in 1950, eleven fully organised national sections were counted, including those in Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Based on an initiative of laypersons from the diocese of Aachen, who had managed to participate in a pilgrimage to Lourdes in 1947, a German section was founded at an international congress in Kevelaer in April 1948 in the presence of bishop Théas.46

44 For some vivid examples see the recollections of West German activists in: Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie (ed.), Geschichten aus der Friedensbewegung. Persönliches und Politisches, Cologne 2005.
In line with the principles for Catholic lay associations before the Second Vatican Council, Pax Christi was organised under strict hierarchical control by the bishops, and largely rested on the activism of a small elite of laypersons. Its initial focus on French-German reconciliation and a spiritual renewal after the physical and moral devastation through the Second World War soon had to give way to more overtly political issues. After the Stockholm Peace Appeal of the Communist Partisans of Peace, issued in March 1950, the anti-communist agenda of Pax Christi came to the fore. The French section in particular, confronted with the increasing popularity of the Communist Mouvement de la paix (MVP), had to adapt its public rhetoric and its analysis of the dangers emanating from the Cold War. This was a difficult task, as already the use of the term «peace» and the discussion of the dangers of the H-bomb seemed to implicate a leaning towards Communist ideas and was hence observed with strong suspicion by the Holy See, as was the internationalist structure of Pax Christi. Since 1950, the members of Pax Christi began to discuss the significance of nuclear weapons. An article in the journal of the movement, published in January 1954, still insisted that an atomic bomb would equal a certain number of traditional bombs and explosives in its destructive effects. But the article also noted that the impact of this new weapon in a period of peace was different, as the nuclear bomb, through its sheer presence, would foster «la peur dans l’esprit des hommes, et la méfiance entre les Etats.» In December 1954, the national council of Pax Christi in France issued its first official statement on the production of French atomic weapons. Based on the Christian principles of Pax Christi, and on the insights of French atomic scientists, it stated that a turn from the civilian to the military use of atomic energy by France would be «une douloureuse méconnaissance de sa mission dans le monde».

Thus, like Catholic peace initiatives in other countries, notably in Italy, the French section of Pax Christi was increasingly able to address political topics and to overcome the perception that «peace» as an issue was only the result of Communist propaganda. But this incremental politicisation did not directly translate into a different quality of the transnational encounters which were organised by the movement. In late July 1951, Pax Christi had already organised the fourth international pilgrimage to Lourdes. Over a period of four days, 25,000 pilgrims from no less than 20 countries attended a series of talks, masses and public exchanges under the heading of the creation of an «international conscience». But for Robert Bosc, one of the organisers of the various rallies, the quality of these personal contacts remained insufficient and did not properly reflect the transnational aspirations of the movement:

»La cause en est évidemment que Pax Christi étant un mouvement de masse, les pèlerins de Lourdes pour la plupart gens très simples, paysans bavarois et hollandais, employés de Liverpool et de Rotterdam, métallos de Milan et de Lille, ne peuvent en trois jours vaincre leur timidité naturelle

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48 Mabille, Les catholiques, pp. 153 f.

49 Ibid., pp. 205, 207.


51 Mabille, Les catholiques, p. 120; Pfister, Pax Christi, p. 50.
face à l’étranger et, le voudraient-ils, ils seraient freinés dans leur élan par la diversité des langues. Le seul moyen qui leur est donné de communier aux mêmes sentiments et d’emporter de Lourdes une impression inoubliable de catholicié, c’est la participation aux mêmes prières, aux mêmes chants, aux mêmes cérémonies.»

The highly formalised Catholic ritualism of prayers, chants and ceremonies was, according to this observer, the major unifying bond which helped to enact the Europeanism of Pax Christi in the early 1950s. When Europeans from very diverse social and national backgrounds met at Lourdes, they did not share a joint understanding of security policies or of the inherent dangers of the Cold War system of deterrence, but their catholicity. The Catholic pacifism of Pax Christi had ambivalent results, though. On the one hand, the Catholic faith integrated activists across Europe. On the other hand, it fragmented the antinuclear campaign along denominational lines, as only very few Catholics, usually coming from the left and anti-hierarchical fringe of the Church, would join campaigns such as CND or the Easter March movement. This did only change during the 1980s, when Catholic activists were an integral part of the antinuclear campaigns in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Belgium and other countries.

II. THE EUROPEANISM OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST CRUISE MISSILES AND ITS LIMITS

On 12 December 1979, the NATO council decided to modernize the Intermediate Nuclear Forces of the Atlantic Alliance. Provided that negotiations with the Soviet Union about an abolition or reduction of their SS–20 missiles failed, the alliance would deploy 464 Cruise Missiles and 108 Pershing II missiles in five Western European countries. This was a momentous decision not only as it highlighted the crisis of détente and ushered into a new hardening of the bloc confrontation in what was to become the final decade of the Cold War. Inadvertently, the NATO dual track decision also created new opportunities for peace protests and unleashed a wave of citizen’s activism across Europe. Measured both in terms of movement activists, in the number of protest events and in the number of people participating in demonstrations and other protest events, the campaign against the Euromissiles by far dwarfed the first cycle of antinuclear protests until 1963. From all Western European countries during the 1980s, France was the only country with a very low level of activism. According to opinion polls conducted in 1986, only 0.1% of all French described themselves as peace movements activists, compared with 2.7% in the Federal Republic, the highest percentage in five Western European countries. Public

52 Cited in Mabille, Les catholiques, p. 121.
54 See the examples in section II., and as an overview Marc Reuver, Christians as Peace Makers. Peace Movements in Europe and the USA, Geneva 1988, pp. 19–53.
56 Dieter Rucht, Peace Movements in Context: A Sociological Perspective, in: Ziemann, Peace Movements during the Cold War, pp. 267–279, here: pp. 272–277; for the exponential increase of British CND-members in the 1980s, compared with the level of affiliation in the 1960s – formal membership was only introduced in 1967 – see Rochon, Mobilizing, p. 12. For an explanation of the low degree of mobilization in France compare fn 191 below.
concern and unrest about nuclear armaments grew also in those countries which were not directly affected by the deployment of the missiles. While it is correct that the new peace movement mobilization of the 1980s was [...] a more self-consciously transnational movement that its predecessor in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the extent to which the movement was able to formulate all-European policies must be questioned.57 As I will argue in this section and in the following, some strands of the 1980s campaign were inextricably linked to specific national experiences and expectations rather than to a widely shared set of active and positive European policies with regard to fostering peace in a nuclear age.

The first example for this trend is drawn from the antinuclear mobilization in the Federal Republic. As in other Western European countries, notably the Netherlands, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, initiatives by both Protestant ministers and the laity played a crucial role for the organizational and conceptual shape of the West German peace movement. While many grassroots-activists worked in the context of local parish initiatives and structures, prominent theologians gave a public face and voice to the movement and created the image of the Protestant churches of the EKD (Evangelische Kirche Deutschlands), which comprised Lutheran and Reformed Churches and a ›Union‹ of both on the former Prussian territories) as a »peace church«, which was devoted to disarmament and reconciliation.58 One of the many regional initiatives was a group working in Swabia in the south-west of Germany, called ›Living without Armament« (Ohne Rüstung Leben). It has been called one of the »pioneers« for the new peace movement in Germany during the 1980s.59 This assertion seems not only fully justified as the group had commenced its work already in 1976 and thus before the dual-track decision. The initiative taken by this group originated from the 1975 Nairobi congress of the World Ecu- menical Movement, which had made a commitment to work for a world without arms. This had prompted a group Pro Ökumene, which worked in Württemberg to explore ecumenical contacts across borders, to put disarmament on its agenda.60 Another defining and trailblazing feature of »Living without Armament« was the rather unusual approach to mobilization. Whereas peace movements usually mobilize by protesting against the decisions taken by politicians, the accent was here on the readiness of individuals to live without the »protection« of arms. This objective was based on the Protestant notion that »the obstacle on the way to peace are we ourselves«, as human beings who need to be self-conscious about their »aggressions and prejudices« and their »mistrustfulness«.61 The movement did not stage mass rallies or lobbied parliamentarians, but rather asked citizens, going public in April 1978, to sign a pledge that they were ready to live without arms. This approach had a strong element of individual conversion, which suited the context of the movement, the Protestant church in Württemberg with its strong Pietist underpinnings. Conversion was not, as the organizers of the movement were at pains to clarify, meant in the sense of conservative Evangelicals who were keen to denounce the

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61 Werner Dierlamm, Was heißt Frieden?, 4.2.1982, BfZ, Ohne Rüstung Leben, file 42.
sinful nature of human beings. It rather implied a radical break with the rationale for »Real-politik« in defence policies and its reliance on nuclear deterrence.62 Ohne Rüstung Leben collected about 25,000 of these pledges until the autumn of 1983. As a group of activists, it was well connected and made its voice heard in the consultation circles of the peace movement during the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s.63

Ohne Rüstung Leben saw some degree of professionalisation when it hired full-time staff to run an office in 1980.64 But its core consisted of a circle of friends and acquaintances from the Württemberg church. The founding figure and driving force of the group was Werner Dierlamm, born in 1927, who had worked as a parish pastor since 1954, serving from 1975 until his retirement in 1990 in Fellbach, a small town close to Stuttgart.65 In a typewritten text from 1987, entitled »Biographical information on our action Ohne Rüstung Leben«, Dierlamm related his activism in the peace movement to recollections of the Second World War. He relays how initially he had to fight against his enthusiasm for war, which changed when his oldest brother had to serve at the Eastern front in 1942 and died within weeks, leaving his mother breaking into tears. He goes on to write about his stint as an air force-auxiliary since late 1944, when he had to service a Flak-cannon and to watch how »enemy bomb squadrons« bombed the town of Heilbronn, where his parents and siblings lived. Back in Heilbronn on 7 December 1944 while on leave, he watched the corpses lined up for collection on the pavements. »When I read passages in the bible such as Amos 8,3 (‘There will be dead bodies everywhere . . .’), I always have this image in my mind’s eye.« At the end of the war, he was the only surviving member of his stem family, and from this statement the text moves on to mention the campaign against a re-militarisation of the Federal Republic in the 1950s, in which he participated as a young vicar, »but we could not achieve anything against this«.66

This text does not only shed light on the underlying biographical continuity in the West German peace movement from the early 1950s to the 1980s, which is often overlooked as the focus for the 1980s campaign is on the thousands of rank-and-file activists from a younger generation, born in the 1950s and early 1960s. It is also revealing in its sense of prolonged victimisation and powerlessness which bridged and levelled the caesura of 1945. While Dierlamm could only watch the devastation caused by Allied bombing aircraft, also his later attempts to prevent re-militarisation from happening were in vain, and the subsequent campaign »Fight against Atomic Death«, in which he took part in 1957/58, again »fell apart« after a short time.67 It was only with »Living without Armament« that Dierlamm finally regained a sense of agency, and for Dierlamm one crucial point of the campaign was to inject as many other people as possible with this awareness of both the need and possibility for immediate action for the right cause. Dierlamm summed up this

62 See Werner Dierlamm to Hermann Schäufele and Gerhard Schubert, 8.10.1979, BfZ, Ohne Rüstung Leben, file 42.
64 See the material in BfZ, Ohne Rüstung Leben, file 24.
idea at the end of his autobiographical sketch with a reference to the prophet Jeremiah, in a passage where the LORD said to the people of Judah (Jer. 21, 8): »Listen! I, the LORD, am giving you a choice between the way that leads to life and the way that leads to death«.68

The personal recollections of the founding figure of Ohne Rüstung Leben are only one of many examples for the ways in which the protests against the dual-track solution in the Federal Republic were bound up with symbols of the Allied bombing campaign and thus with reminiscences to the victimisation of Germans towards the end of the Second World War. Posters issued by the peace movement provide other examples for the symbolism of the bombing war.69 This focus on the specific trajectory of German experiences of victimisation coincided with a certain perplexity with regard to the conceptual underpinnings for a specific European approach to the politics of peaceful conflict resolution among key actors in the Protestant churches. Even amidst an ecumenical initiative to formulate substantial ideas on world peace and to flag the significance of non-violence – which also formed the backdrop for Ohne Rüstung Leben –, Protestant debates on the theological connotations of peace in West Germany since the mid-1970s »kept their unmistakable national signature«.70 While Protestants held many debates on the need for a European perspective on security and foreign policies, and had the best intentions to europeanize their approach, the results were meagre. Erwin Wilkens, a high-ranking official in the EKD, noted with some exasperation in a letter in 1977: »In ecclesiastical and theological terms, nothing with regard to Europe comes to my mind.«71

While Protestant peace activists in the Federal Republic during 1970s and 1980s were preoccupied with the specific trajectory of German history in the twentieth century, Christians in the Netherlands were trailblazers in their attempts to formulate a coherent European approach to the politics of peace and disarmament. Many of these ideas and initiatives were formulated by the Interchurch Peace Council (Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad, IKV), which emerged as a key player and »leading force« in attempts to overcome the bloc confrontation through »détente from below«.72 Based on an initiative by the Dutch section of Pax Christi, the IKV had been founded in 1966 as a steering committee and think-tank that should advise the churches on issues of peace and war. While initially supported by the Catholic church and the two major reformed, Calvinist churches, the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk and the Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland, six smaller Protestant denominations quickly joined the IKV. While the council was the decision-making body of the IKV and could alone represent it authoritatively in public, many local and parish level groups supported the work with discussions and initiatives. Shortly after the campaign against the neutron bomb had started in 1977, about 300 local groups worked in the framework of the IKV.73

71 Cited ibid., p. 279.
72 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 140.
From the beginning, the ecumenical work of the IKV began to reflect on the European dimension of reconciliation and security and envisaged a form of peace work that should transcend the Iron Curtain. Consequently, the IKV had welcomed the Ostpolitik announced by the incoming government of Willy Brandt in 1969, and had condemned the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968. Already in 1972, the IKV had published a report on »The Future of Europe«, which criticised the bipolar system of nuclear deterrence and called upon governments in East and West to respect human rights and to overcome the division of Europe. In its campaign against the Euromissiles from 1979 onward, the IKV continued to insist on the inextricable link between disarmament and human rights and to speak out on behalf of dissidents in Czechoslovakia, Poland and the GDR. During the rally in Amsterdam on 21 November 1981, for instance, which brought together 400,000 people in protest against the dual-track solution, Mient Jan Faber, one of the key strategists of the IKV, read out and supported a declaration by the Czechoslovakian dissidents of Charter 77. A couple of weeks later, after the declaration of martial law in Poland and the suppression of the Solidarność movement, Faber drew a parallel between the development of the peace movement in Western Europe and the struggle for democracy in the East. Under the heading »Europe for Europeans«, IKV-activists continued to connect with independent peace movements in Eastern Europe.

When the dual-track decision triggered a new wave of peace mobilization in Western Europe, the Dutch activists had already had a considerable advantage in the organization of protest events and the formulation of statements. Since 1967, for instance, the IKV had organised an annual »peace week« in the third week of September, which served as a platform for different opinions and initiatives. In the aftermath of the NATO-decision, the IKV head office was flooded with queries and invitations from West German activists to give papers and visit local groups in the Federal Republic. Since January 1980, the IKV employed a German secretary to coordinate these contacts. Volkmar Deile, the Protestant minister in charge of the West German group »Action Symbol for Atonement/Peace Services« (Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste, ASF), described the infrastructure and influence of the IKV as a »dreamlike idea«. Following a visit in spring 1980, ASF began to emulate both the example of the »peace week« and the peace newspaper issued by the IKV.

Not only the top-level IKV strategists were attempting to establish a network of cross-European contacts. Also the local IKV-branches and initiatives, many of which were based at the parish level, were since 1978 involved in a growing network of contacts with Protestant Christians in the GDR. In 1977, the Dutch protests against the Neutron Bomb, which had included a group close to the Dutch Communist Party, »Christians against the

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75 Wecke/Schennink, Friedensbewegung, p. 288.

76 Cf. de Graaf, Über die Mauer, p. 120; »Action Reconciliation« is partly incorrect and too weak as a translation for the name of ASF, as used by Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 23. ASF meant to give a »symbol« (Zeichen) for reconciliation, but it was based on the fundamental need for an »atonement« (Sühne) of the special German guilt with regard to the Holocaust. For this reason, ASF was during the 1980s not only involved in antinuclear campaigning, but also continued to organise its traditional tours to Auschwitz and other sites of former Nazi concentration camps in Poland and the Soviet Union and to Israel. See Jonathan Huener, Antifascist Pilgrimage and Rehabilitation at Auschwitz: The Political Tourism of Aktion Sühnezeichen and Sozialistische Jugend, in: German Studies Review 24, 2001, pp. 513–532, here: p. 521.
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Bomb», had led to contacts with officials from the »League of Protestant Churches« in the GDR (Bund Evangelischer Kirchen, BEK). In the following years, the two reformed churches in the Netherlands intensified these contacts with the GDR. Facilitated by talks with church officials, the number of direct contacts between parish communities in the two countries grew from 20 in 1978 to 140 in 1984. While only very few representatives of the BEK could travel to the Netherlands, Dutch Protestants repeatedly visited their counterparts at the local level. During these contacts, members of local IKV-groups did not mince words about the shared responsibility of both superpowers for the nuclear arms race. They also promoted their proposals for unilateral disarmament and thus worked like a Trojan horse in the GDR. In theological terms, these contacts were based on a shared feeling of guilt for the reliance on nuclear weapons for international security. But also the German guilt due to complicity with the Nazi-regime played a crucial role for both sides. While East German church members referred positively to the Darmstädtter Wort from 1947, which had acknowledged the guilt of Protestants vis-à-vis the Nazi regime, and in particular their mistake to see socialism as a key enemy, the Dutch Protestants compared the dangers emanating from nuclear armaments with those posed by the Nazi-regime. These contacts across the Iron Curtain were not only facilitated by a shared rejection of the lunacy of the nuclear arms race and a Protestant guilt consciousness. Protestants from the Netherlands and the GDR were also driven to develop a détente from below as they lived in the two most secularised societies in Europe. Their shared interest in peace work was also a search for encouragement and new orientation for Christians in a secular society.

The contacts between the Dutch activists of the IKV and East German Protestants are a substantial example for bi-lateral transnational peace movement connections during the campaign against the Euromissiles. There were, however, also coordinated attempts to connect activists across the continent in order to canvass support for nuclear disarmament. »European Nuclear Disarmament« (END), the key platform for these attempts, emerged out of debates in the British New Left and the left wing of the Labour Party. Dorothy and E. P. Thompson, two of the founding members, had been key figures of the New Left since their split with the Communist Party after the crushing of the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. Ken Coates, who developed the idea for END in conversations with E. P. Thompson, was a miner who had turned himself into a sociology lecturer. He had run defence campaigns for East European dissidents and was a leading figure in the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Drawing in a number of mainly British veteran activists such as Bruce Kent, since 1979 general secretary of CND, and long-time campaigner Peggy Duff, the group discussed Thompson’s draft of the END-appeal. The final appeal was launched simultaneously in London, Berlin, Oslo, Paris and Lisbon on 28 April 1980.

Although substantially changed and altered by many hands during the draft process, the END-appeal breathed the highflying political idealism and the unrepentant belief in the collective agency of the ordinary people which its main author, the historian E. P. Thompson, had displayed at the core of both his political and his scholarly work for decades. The END-appeal offered a fundamental critique of the Cold War, which had led to the division of Europe and had curtailed civil liberties on both sides. Adopting non-alignment as its principal attitude, the appeal laid the blame for the nuclear arms race on the shoulders of political and military elites in both East and West. Analyzing the increased likelihood and imminence of a nuclear war as a consequence of the arms race and the development of tailor-made weapons for a European theatre of war, the appeal followed Thompson’s reflections on the economic and military logic of «exterminism». As a solution, the appeal envisaged to turn Europe from Poland to Portugal in a nuclear-weapons free zone. As a first step, it demanded to halt the production of SS-20 missiles and the deployment of Cruise Missiles. It called upon the citizens in East and West to «engage in every kind of exchange» in the pursuit of these aims, and urged them to anticipate the shared citizenship and the unified polity this endeavour could entail:

»We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to «East» or «West», but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.«

In the pursuit of these aims, the British END-activists who formed the core of the movement followed a three-pronged strategy. Firstly, they tried to influence their core constituency, the British CND, and hoped it would incorporate key ideas of the END-appeal into its campaigning against nuclear arms. Secondly, they tried to establish closer links with non-aligned peace groups in Western Europe. Thirdly, they were hoping to build a cross-continental «détente from below» through contacts with independent peace groups and dissidents in Eastern Europe, or, in other words, to foster a pan-European civil society. Ambitious and truly European as these aims were, they were neither uncontested within END nor could they, measured against the own aspirations of the activists, implemented with even only basic success. On the first count, British END and CND were «intertwined» particularly in the years from 1981 to 1983, when many local CND-groups merged with END groups. But the commitment to the aims of END was largely a symbolic one, mainly represented through E. P. Thompson himself, who was one of the most popular speakers on CND-meetings and rallies in the early 1980s. In political terms, however, campaigning against Soviet nuclear weapons, which was a crucial implication of the approach taken by END, proved to be utterly divisive within CND and was never

80 Michael Bess, E. P. Thompson: The Historian as Activist, in: AHR 98, 1993, pp. 18–38; idem, Realism, Utopia and the Mushroom Cloud. Four Activist Intellectuals and Their Strategies for Peace, Chicago/London 1993, pp. 91–154. Thompson’s Europeanism, however, had older roots than the New Left. It emerged during the Second World War as a form of popular communism which should unite Europeans against Fascism. It was based on exchanges with his older brother Frank, who fought in the Royal Artillery with Bulgarian partisans and shared his vision of the «splendid Europe we shall build» in letters with his brother. See ibid., pp. 96 f.
84 Burke, European Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 28 f., 208.
adopted by it. This was a clear «victory» for the «pro-Soviet lobby» in CND, which continued to insist on unilateral British disarmament, and a sign for the substantial «lack of influence» any internationalist and Europeanist ideas had in CND. When END-activists, frustrated by these setbacks and desperate to disentangle themselves from CND, decided in 1985 to turn END into a membership organization, no more than 600 people signed up.86

The main vehicle for the second strand of activities, a network of non-aligned groups, was the series of annual conventions organised by END, starting in Brussels in 1982, followed by meetings in Berlin in 1983, Perugia in 1984 and Amsterdam in 1985. The largest of these «bazaars» for the representation of initiatives in many different West European countries, the convention in Berlin, attracted 2,500 participants, while the others comprised between 700 and 1,000 people. Thematic workshops and discussions in «affinity» groups, i.e. among scientists, physicians and women for peace, allowed activists for the first time to have a broad-ranging exchange of ideas and steps toward co-operation across Europe, and were hence deemed to be a success. Ambivalences and practical problems, however, persisted. One problem was to strike a balance between the need to have easily recognised «big names» and experts on nuclear armaments as speakers, and the danger «to induce passivity» among the grassroots activists who had to listen to their statements.87 Like every form of face-to-face encounters, these meetings were also prone to be irritated by distractions. During the convention in Brussels in 1982, many activists were more interested in the games of the Football World Championship in Spain, which were shown on a number of television sets across the conference rooms, than in the complex issues of nuclear missiles.88

As for the third strand of END, a «detente from below» with independent activists across the Iron Curtain, it faced principled objections and caused controversies when it came to putting these ideas into practice. CND, for instance, met up with and supported groups such as Charter 77 and «Freedom and Peace» in Poland on several occasions during the early 1980s. Nonetheless, a preference for meetings with official representatives from organizations affiliated with the World Peace Council persisted.89 In the END-convention process, activists at Perugia in 1984 inaugurated a European Network for East-West Dialogue, which prioritised contacts with unofficial groups in Eastern Europe. This initiative, however, was opposed by E. P. Thompson, who perceived it to be focused on a rather limited number of contact groups. He preferred a wider dialogue with new groups such as «Swords into Ploughshares» in the GDR or the «Moscow Trust Group», which were less focused on attention in the Western media than other dissidents. As a consequence, the British END-group never joined the network. These conflicts also laid bare tensions within the END convention process, where some activists felt that contacts with independent groups in Eastern Europe would challenge the legitimacy of the Warsaw Pact regimes and were thus potentially destabilizing.85

86 Burke, European Nuclear Disarmament, p. 72.
88 See de Graaf, Über die Mauer, p. 174.
89 Burke, European Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 112 ff.
It should also be noted that the advances made by Western European peace activists were met with anything but unanimous approval by their counterparts behind the Iron Curtain. Not all reactions were as hostile as the open letter by the Czech dissident Václav Racek – his real name was Miroslav Bednář – to E.P. Thompson, published in 1981. Racek, who was not a signatory of Charter 77, accused Thompson of naïveté in his pursuit of a nuclear-weapons free zone, and compared END with those who had – without success, in this reading of the events – tried to appease National Socialism in the 1930s.91 Other Czechoslovakian dissidents rejected Racek’s direct support of NATO-armaments as a guarantee for Western liberties, and developed a wide array of diverse ideas about a “third way” and about possibilities for cooperation with Western peace activists during the early 1980s.92 The prevalent tone, however, remained one of benevolent scepticism.

It was, as far as the Czechoslovakian dissidents are concerned, comprehensively summed up in the »Anatomy of Reticence«, a text Václav Havel, himself one of the signatories of the 1980 END-appeal, had produced for the END-convention in Amsterdam in 1985 which he could not attend due to visa restrictions.93 In his analysis of the »mutual« reticence between non-aligned peace activists in East and West, Havel pointed to some of the more obvious reasons for the lack of trust in and commitment to European peace activism among the small number of dissidents in his country. While the activists in the West could flag up »peace« in order to unmask the hypocrisy of the arms race, the term had »been drained of all content« after decades of official Communist peace rhetoric in the East.94 In a stark contrast to subsequent, post-1990 Western appraisals of the »agency« of civil society, Havel stressed that the citizens in totalitarian regimes »can do nothing« and could hence not share the activism of the »peace fighters in the West«. He also repeated the specific problems Czechs would have with a »policy of appeasement«.95 In the end, Havel did not fail to identify a possible »common denominator« of peace movements in the East and West, based on a radically altered defence policy on both sides of the Iron Curtain and a respect for human rights in »free and independent nations«.96 But his overall stance was highly critical. Not only did Havel stress the »Central European scepticism about utopianism of all colors«, he also criticised the »enthusiastic« and »histrionic«, theatrical posturing of Western peace activists, which was simply too much detached from the more down-to-earth problems people in Eastern Europe faced.97 To sum up: many Eastern European oppositionists before 1989 »kept Europe at arm’s length«. Also, the encounters between peace activists from East and West did not take place in

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96 Havel, Anatomy, pp. 314 f.
97 Ibid., pp. 304, 208. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 355, glosses over these differences.
the idealised sphere of a civil society, but rather through the most basic form of sociability, personal encounters across »kitchen tables in Eastern Europe«.98

As a whole, thus, the END-process indicated a remarkable and fresh departure, a deliberate attempt to conceptualise pan-European approaches to nuclear peace activism and to translate these into a network of contacts across the Iron Curtain. The conceptual innovation represented by END should not, however, lead to exaggerated claims with regard to the resonance of this approach in both Eastern and Western Europe. END was certainly not »the mass base and the central rallying point« of the protests against the Euromissiles, nor was it, for »the millions of West Europeans who participated in the demonstrations and other activities of its constituent groups, […] the very heart and soul of the massive European antinuclear campaign« in the 1980s.99 The various national campaigns were, as even the example of CND with its high degree of interaction with END makes very clear, not simply »constituent groups« of END. And there is no reliable evidence to suggest that more than a tiny fraction of the participants in demonstrations in the Federal Republic, Italy, the Netherlands or Belgium, to name only the other four countries which were directly affected by the dual-track decision, had ever heard of END at all.100 With regard to the public resonance of END in Great Britain it seems justified to follow the historian Martin Ceadel, who stated in 1985 that, despite the »often high quality of its literature«, END »lacks the broad appeal of CND.«101

In many ways the protest campaign against the Euromissiles was one of the biggest popular mass movements in modern European history. In terms of the number of people it brought to the streets and the degree of unrest it expressed and channelled it is perhaps only comparable with the revolutionary movements in 1848/49. And as during the »spring of peoples« in 1848, activists from many European countries were able to connect across national boundaries, and even across the Iron Curtain, the most heavily secured border in history. But while it is hard to overestimate the transnational dimension of these antinuclear protests, the European dimension is less clearly defined. Many activists from different countries came together as a result of »elective affinities« (J. W. Goethe), for instance Dutch and German Protestants, Catholics under the banner of Pax Christi102, or physicians, scientists and other professionals from various countries in the »affinity groups« during the END-conventions. Attempts »to formulate all European-policies«,

98 Padraic Kenney, A Carnival of Revolution. Central Europe 1989, Princeton/Oxford 2002, pp. 93, 104. While the independent pacifists appreciated the publicity and the concomitant security contacts with well known Western antinuclear activists provided, they were sometimes disappointed about the substance of these encounters with regard to the issues at stake. See the frustrated remarks by a member of the Independent Peace Movement in the GDR in 1986, reflecting on the »neo-colonialism« and the »polit-safari«-attitude displayed by many members of the Green Party from West-Berlin during their visits; cited in Klein, Frieden und Gerechtigkeit, pp. 182 f.


100 This can, for instance, be gleaned ex negativo from the fact that not a single one of the many leaflets and documents from the broader peace campaign in West-Berlin during the early 1980s mentions END or refers explicitly to its ideas. See the substantial collection of documents in: Fritz Teppich (ed.), Flugblätter und Dokumente der Westberliner Friedensbewegung 1980–1985, Berlin 1985.

101 Ceadel, Britain’s Nuclear Disarmers, p. 236.

however, were confined to a small minority of intellectuals and peace researchers, and their ideas found only very limited resonance among the rank-and-file of the vast grassroots movements.\textsuperscript{103} It would, however, show a grave lack of perspective and proper historical judgement if this limited resonance of blueprints for a non-nuclear, peaceful Europe would considered to be a failure of the movement. Such an assessment would overlook the unintended side-effects with regard to an Europeanization of protest movements, which were partly a consequence of the sheer scale and scope of mobilization across Europe. The anti-Euromissiles campaign led to a political realignment, opened up a new political space in many European polities and thus also reoriented protest movement actors to issues which were beyond the traditional remit of their activities, both in spatial terms and with regard to the issues they addressed.

Excellent examples for this realignment are Switzerland and Austria. As neutral countries they were not directly involved in or affected by the decision to deploy Cruise Missiles in neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, the repercussions of the dual-track decision stirred up the traditional aims, orientations and patterns of peace activism in these countries. In Switzerland, the »Swiss Peace Council« (Schweizerischer Friedensrat, SFR) had since 1945 functioned as an umbrella organization for a wide variety of non-communist, non-aligned peace initiatives. The traditional focus of his interventions had been the domestic scene, with demands for a proper civilian service as an alternative to conscription, the abolition of the court-martial system and a curb on Swiss weapons exports. Over the years, various referenda on these issues had been held in the Swiss system of direct democracy, but they had always ended with an overwhelming defeat for the peace movement.\textsuperscript{104}

In the wake of the dual-track solution, this began to change, as the »Swiss Peace Movement« (Schweizerische Friedensbewegung, SFB), an affiliate of the Communist-led World Peace Council, but also a number of independent groups made headway and seized the initiative. These groups not only introduced new, performative forms of protest actions which were new to the Swiss domestic scene, such as »Fasting for Peace«, Menschenleppiche (Human Carpets) and a military tax boycott. They also started to connect Swiss security policies with the wider European situation and argued that despite its armed neutrality, Switzerland was severely endangered by a possible nuclear war. This was a frontal assault on the national consensus built around the legitimacy of the army in the system of armed neutrality. The mobilization of these groups, which reached a peak in 1983/84, was hampered by the weak integration and political tensions between the various initiatives. But as a result of the anti-Euromissiles campaign, peace activists had for the first time fundamentally challenged the post-war consensus of the Swiss nation and its reliance on a military defence system, a critique which was neatly summed up in the name of the action committee »We don’t want to be defended to death« (WIWONITO), founded in 1981.\textsuperscript{105}

A similar development can be observed in Austria. In October 1983, on the peak of the campaign against the dual-track solution, more than 100,000 demonstrators gathered on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{103} Quote: \textit{Carter}, Peace Movements, p. 117.
\end{itemize}
the streets of Vienna, and the antinuclear campaign, organised by a steering committee, had gained widespread support by the SPÖ, the governing Socialist Party, but also by trade union activists, Communists and by the Greens. Already in 1985, however, this collective effervescence had come to an end. Activists of established peace groups such as the Austrian branch of the »International Fellowship of Reconciliation« (IFOR) had been sceptical from the start about this short-lived wave of antinuclear activism, and rather continued their traditional, value-driven educational work. The mobilization wave had a more substantial and long-lasting impact among members of the Unabhängigen Friedensinitiativen (Independent Peace Initiatives, UFI), mostly undogmatic socialists and activists in the alternative milieu. They had not only envisaged to work on the ›big‹, political issues when they embarked on their peace-work, but had also had a strong interest in the ›small‹, ›human‹ issues. Many of them were simply keen to meet people in other countries, and not only started to travel in Italy, Greece, Hungary and Slovenia, but also took the effort to learn the languages of these countries. This was, however, not only a European cosmopolitanism based on the experience of touristic ›leisure time communication‹ abroad. It also had direct political consequences, as exemplified by Werner Wintersteiner, who not only learned Italian and met many people while travelling abroad. He also initiated the »Villach proposal« in 1984, a sustained attempt to connect peace activists in Northern Italy, Austria and Slovenia and to turn this region into a nuclear-weapons free zone.

III. THE TWO AMERICAS: AMBIVALENCES OF FRAMING

Antinuclear protests in post-war Europe were facilitated by frames, shared perceptions of the reality of a society which had apparently, at least seen from the perspective of those who shared this frame, led to the unmanageable dangers of nuclear armaments, both with regard to the risk of war and with regard to the perceived devastating effects of military expenditure on social inequality and poverty. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the most important frame for antinuclear protests in Western Europe was an idealist rhetoric of humanism. There were many different versions and implications of this rhetoric. Some German pacifists such as Fritz von Unruh, a former cavalry officer in the Imperial German Army, invoked Beethoven’s ›Ode to Joy‹ and its expectation that ›All men will be brothers‹ to suggest a specifically European, Christian humanism as the basis for world peace. Against the historical backdrop of National Socialism, the protesters of the West German Easter March movement were driven by a guilt conscience, and thus framed their protest against the bomb as ›a commitment to human rights‹, which should henceforth define German national identity. Their counterparts in British CND, on the other hand, tapped into the rhetoric of non-conformist Protestantism to describe the bomb as the symbol of the break-up of community into alienated human beings, and thus aimed

106 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 166.
110 Oppenheimer, West German Pacifism, p. 49.
111 Nehring, National Internationalists, p. 567.
to rebuild British morality as a contribution to global humanism. In a poem written in 1962 by CND-activist Pat Arrowsmith, »This is your death«, the humanist frame was expressed as a revulsion against the system of role differentiation in society, which could bring people to believe that the role of a professional soldier was reconcilable with their civilian personality:

»[...] This is your death
When you state, »I am not me
But two or three people:
A skilled professional slayer
And a kind father.«

Humanist frames were not only crucial for Protestant nuclear pacifists in the 1950s and 1960s, they also allowed Catholics to articulate their critique of the bomb. In Italy, the parish priest and former military chaplain Don Primo Mazzolari was one of the foremost proponents of a left Catholicism, from the early 1940s until his death in 1959. Since 1949, Don Mazzolari edited the fortnightly journal *Adesso*, which turned into one of the most important voices of a critical Catholicism to the left of the ruling *Democrazia Cristiana*. Mazzolari combined pacifism with a struggle against injustice and social inequality, and he rejected the attempts of the Church hierarchy to stifle and control independent lay initiative through the rigid framework of the Catholic Action. In 1955, he published his reflections on peace in a booklet entitled *Tu non uccidere!*, a critique of the theory of »just war« and an indictment against the hypocrisy of a Christian »civilization« that supported the bomb.

Another crucial proponent of Catholic antinuclear pacifism in Italy during the 1950s was Giorgio La Pira (1904–1977), who served as mayor of Florence since 1951. In this capacity, he organised a series of conferences on »Civilization and Peace« which brought together some of the most prominent Catholic thinkers and theologians from many countries in Europe and beyond. The final statement of the first conference in 1952 declared that »true peace« was impossible to achieve where the »spiritual vocation« of »human beings« was not guaranteed. These examples should suffice to make clear that the »metaphysics of antinuclearism« were a common frame among both Socialist, Protestant and Catholic peace activists during the first mobilization wave until 1963.

In a remarkable contrast to the metaphysical nature of framing in the 1950s and 1960s, the antinuclear protests during the 1980s were embedded in practical, tangible frames. The most tangible perceptions for many peace activists across Western Europe were the facts that the Cruise Missiles were American weapons and that US-politicians, particularly Ronald Reagan, who took office as US-president in January 1981, and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, were the foremost promoters of the dual-track solution as a necessary complement and reaction to the increasing number of Soviet SS-20 missiles. To be

112 Ibid., p. 566.
sure, European politicians had contributed to one strand of the debates in the run-up to the dual-track decision, most notably the German chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In his famous speech at the London International Institute for Strategic Studies on 28 October 1977 he drew attention to the military disparity in Central Europe as a result of USSR-armsments.\footnote{See Nuti, Origins, pp. 62 f.; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation among Democracies. The European Influence on US Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ 1995, pp. 184–193.} But in the perception of and visual representations by peace activists, Schmidt and other domestic politicians had at best supporting roles as »further speakers« in the grand drama »A Man walks over Corpses«, presented by the »White House Corporation« and starring the former Hollywood B-movie actor Reagan in the leading role, depicted in his trademark pose with a pistol in his hand and a cowboy hat.\footnote{See the poster issued by the Socialist German Workers Youth, 1982, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Bonn (AdsD), 6/PLKA006334.}

Historians who are close to the peace movement usually tend to downplay the significance of anti-American attitudes as a crucial factor in the framing of and thus the mobilization for the campaign against the Euromissiles in the early 1980s.\footnote{See Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 238.} Opinion polls, however, despite methodological reservations one might have against the use of scales for the measurement of political attitudes, provide substantial and reliable evidence for the fact that anti-Americanism\footnote{Anti-Americanism is here defined as a position that takes »America as a metaphor for a modernity threatening one’s own community«. Jan C. Behrends/Árpád von Klimó/Patrice G. Poutrus, Antiamerikanismus und die europäische Moderne. Zur Einleitung, in: idem (eds.), Anti-Amerikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Studien zu Ost- und Westeuropa, Bonn 2005, pp. 10–33, here: p. 17.} was a pivotal attitude among peace movements activists and, to a lesser degree, sympathisers. According to Eurobarometer polls conducted in April 1982 and again in April 1986, »members« of the movement were »twice as likely as opponents […] to believe that Americans are not trustworthy«, and »four times as likely« to show high scores on a scale that combined responses to a variety of questions to model political anti-Americanism.\footnote{Rochon, Mobilizing, pp. 38 f. Countries polled included the UK, France, West Germany and Italy. Less precisely conceptualised but effectively similar data for the Netherlands in: Richard C. Eichenberg, The Myth of Hollanditis, in: International Security 8, 1983, pp. 143–159, here: p. 157. Unconvincing is the attempt to deny these trends with other polling data by Koen Koch, Anti-Americanism and the Dutch Peace Movement, in: European Contributions to American Studies 11, 1986, pp. 97–111. On anti-Americanism in CND and END, see Burke, European Nuclear Disarmament, pp. 103 f., 113; Byrd, Development, p. 63. Greenham Common women issued a poster with the line: »Did you vote to become Americas largest aircraft carrier?«, printed in: The Danish Peace Academy (ed.), Greenham Common Peace Camp Songbook, p. 64, URL: http://www.fredsakademiet.dk/abase/sange/greenham/greenham.pdf [19.5.2009].} Peace activists in Western Europe were, however, »as critical of Soviet foreign policy« as with regard to US foreign policy. As such, they basically refused to buy into the assumption held by most West Europeans that the bi-polar world of the Cold War contained »one good superpower and one bad superpower«.\footnote{Rochon, Mobilizing, p. 40.}

Quantitative information about anti-American attitudes as a frame for antinuclear activism needs to be supplemented by a qualitative analysis of the symbols and metaphorical expressions which informed and fuelled these attitudes. I will present some material for such an analysis with regard to the Federal Republic and Italy, and will stress the overarching point that the anti-American framing was never undisputed and straightforward. Images and metaphors of American power-craziness and unrelenting drive for mili-
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Tary aggression prevailed. But many activists also acknowledged positive traditions of the ›other‹ America, both in spatial and in political and cultural terms. A song by Herbert Grönemeyer shall serve to illustrate this point. It will also exhibit some of the essential anti-American perceptions among West German activists in the 1980s. One of the key 1980s stars of a pop-cultural current aptly called Deutschrock, Grönemeyer was rather a fellow-traveller of the movement than its foremost troubadour, but he showed an ingenious ability to tap into the emotions of his youthful audience. His album »4630 Bochum«, released in 1984, included a song entitled »America«:

»you are coming as saviour in every need
you show your sheriff star to the world
you send semi trailers into the night
you bring yourself in position, america
oh america
you have done so much for us
oh america
don’t do that to us
many care parcels you have send to us
today missiles, america
you have so much more more space over there than we
why should they be here, america
oh america
then fight, if you have to fight,
in your own country
you want to excel in everything
larger, faster, further, america
I feel angst about your phantasies
about your ambition, america
oh america
invite russia to your place, finally
be united, indignant and disarmed [entrüstet euch], america
or shoot yourselves together up to the moon
fight yourselves up there, the moon is uninhabited«

In his lyrics, Grönemeyer turned American »ambition« into a cause for German angst. He invoked the Care-parcels dispatched to freezing and malnourished Germans in the rubble society of the immediate post-war years as a positive symbol for American altruism, while rejecting the unwanted missiles and implying that the Germans would not any longer need to be thankful or deferent for American liberation from Nazi dictatorship in 1945. Tapping into the chain of signifiers ›Ronald Reagan-film actor-western films-sheriff‹, the song denounced the selfish and aggressive nature of the US-claim to police the world. When invoking the lack of space in Germany as an argument, however, Grönemeyer tapped into a commonplace that was shared by those who tried to stem the tide of anti-American sentiment. When chancellor Schmidt tried to explain this current even among his own party comrades to interlocutors from the US, he would always point out that the FRG comprised only 2.5 % of US territory, but would already store 50 % of the US nuclear potential.

125 Herbert Grönemeyer, 4630 Bochum, EMI Electrola, 1984.
The ambivalent images of the two Americas, seen as a force of liberation and an imperialist power, were often displayed. A poster inviting to an »anti-NATO demo« in June 1982 in the city of Giessen depicted the statue of liberty, a classical symbol of America as a haven for the oppressed and downtrodden, here adorned with sunglasses and thus giving her a pop-cultural touch. Out of her head, however, grow serpents with the heads of Reagan, Schmidt, Thatcher, Haig and a GI, thus showing her as Medusa, one of the three Gorgons, a figure that had often been used in anti-Semitic discourse. Even where outright moral righteousness and a Manichaean discourse prevailed, as among many Protestant ministers and theologians, who often combined these strands with apocalyptic doomsday scenarios, some balancing remarks were added. In a conversation with the Spiegel-magazine in the autumn of 1983, Dorothee Sölle minced no words. As a Protestant theologian, a supporter of the progressive Latin American liberation theology and as an active participant in protests such as the blockade of the US weapons-depot in Mutlangen in September 1983, Sölle had just reached the apex of her public fame and popularity among progressive Christians in Germany. In the interview, she repeated her often used comparison of 1983 with 1933, condemning both Hitler and the bomb as »antichrists«, and insisted that the »global holocaust« was nigh. In a gloomy remark, she added: »The evil has an address, has a telephone number. [...] We can name it. We know who destroyed Hiroshima, not to speak of Nagasaki. We can trace the US senators who are in favour of further armaments and will gain profit from it with their dividends.« Quizzed about these stark enemy images, which stood in a pronounced contrast to the gospel of love and reconciliation, she hastened to add that she »would love the American people« and would know that only 27 % of Americans had voted for Reagan.

Sölle’s interview with the Spiegel-magazine revealed also another aspect of the anti-Americanism of the West German peace movement, its connection with and support for a new German nationalism. Sölle described Germany’s lack of independent decision making vis-à-vis the US as a superpower as a new form of »colonialism«. Confronted with the questionable moral rationale for such a critique against the backdrop of German liberation from Fascism by American troops, she added that this »nationalist element« of the peace movement would be a »quite productive affair«, as the approval of Germans would be needed if their territory should be more than »just the theatre of war«. The German campaign against the Euromissiles »linked pacifism with nationalism, because the security fears central to its identity formed the basis for a new facet of German identity.«


130 Der Spiegel 1983, no. 41, p. 48.

131 Cooper, Paradoxes, p. 193.
Expressions of this new nationalism were widespread among many of the constituent groups of the peace movement. Protestant theologians were particularly outspoken. An older generation of theologians could tap into notions of a national Protestantism they had already held during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they tried to present disarmament as a lever to achieve reunification. The theologian Helmut Gollwitzer, for instance, had been a high-profile member of the »Campaign for Disarmament«, which was since 1962 the official name of the movement that organized and supported the West German Easter Marches.132 Echoing the resentment of Dorothee Sölle, he wrote in 1981 in a letter to the editor of the Spiegel-magazine:

»No public outcry sweeps away a government which gives the sovereignty of the state away with regard to a crucial issue. This demonstrates the extent to which the Germans have been left spineless as a result of Hitlerei, defeat, Marshall plan bribery and Russenangst. […] Something like this has never happened before in European history, only in the history of colonialism. […] No German can accept this unconditional subjugation of the interests of our people under foreign interests, this surrender of control about the existence of our people to a foreign government.«133

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this diatribe against American power preponderance was not the way in which Gollwitzer compared the fate of the Germans with that of colonial subjects, but rather the use of the collective personal pronoun »our people« (unseres Volkes), repeated twice in a single sentence. This was an idiomatic phrase which had been only very rarely used in the semantics of the West German left since 1945. Speaking with emphasis on behalf of the German people as a collective had been part and parcel of the semantics of völkisch nationalism and was hence a no-go-area for anyone who had drawn some lessons of the Nazi past. Social Democrats after 1945 expressed their nationalist sentiments with the semantics of the nation-state rather than the people. The fact that such a language resurfaced in the anti-Euromissiles campaign shows how desperate many Social Democrats and other non-communist leftists were to wrestle hegemony over the discourse on the ›national question‹ from the Christian Democrats. Peter Brandt, born in 1948, and Herbert Ammon, born 1943, both of whom had gone through the usual commitment to far-left groups after the student revolt of 1968, were among those who tried to instil the peace movement with nationalist ideas. Participating in a »Berlin-Working Group«, they saw »German unity« and the severing of ties with the military blocs as a »presupposition« for peace in Europe.134 For Peter Brandt, the son of Willy Brandt, a professional historian who was working as an assistant professor in Berlin at the time, his commitment to a left nationalism was part of his attempts to disentangle the idea of nation from the right and to demonstrate the progressive potential of nationalism. Ammon, however, co-editor of their source collection on the »Left and the national question«, was simultaneously active in rightwing-circles.135 Seen in the historical context, this fact that

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135 See Brandt/Ammon, Die Linke; Davis, Gender of War, p. 119. The ›peace researcher‹ and right-wing member of the Green Party, Alfred Mechtersheimer, is another example for a 1980s peace activist who, radicalising ideas already held during the anti-Euromissiles campaign, moved to a distinctive right-wing nationalism after reunification. See Diner, America,
helps to explain why neo-fascists could not only mimic but truly adopt both the symbols and the anti-Americanism of the 1980s peace movement after German reunification in 1990.136

The anti-Americanism and nationalism of the 1980s West German peace movement did not escape the attention of contemporary observers, both in Germany and abroad.137 Already in 1982, Volkmar Deile from Aktion Sühnezeichen had to respond to many anxious queries from peace activists in Belgium and the Netherlands who were concerned about the attempts to link disarmament with German reunification. Deile himself feared the possible negative repercussions of the German focus on the »national question« for joint European movement activism.138 The political class in France was quick to identify, in comparison with the shared European characteristics of antinuclear pacifism, a »frustrated nationalism« as the distinguishing feature of the West German campaign.139 In the Federal Republic, at least some leftist critics were putting the new nationalism at their end of the political spectrum under close scrutiny. Wolfgang Pohrt, a journalist who was well-versed in the »negative dialectics« of the Frankfurt School, described the neutron bomb as the »fuse for a German-national awakening movement«.140 While this was a polemical remark, it also contained a kernel of truth, not only because pietist ideas about the sinful nature of the atomic bomb were deeply ingrained in the peace movement. In a historical perspective, pietism had also been a crucial trailblazer and core constituency for German nationalism.141 Ultimately, both anti-Americanism and nationalism of the West German campaign were bound up with the perception held by many Germans that they were victimised by the decision to deploy Cruise Missiles and by their potential use, a feeling which was summed up in the catchphrase of an imminent »Euroshima«. A local voter’s initiative for the Greens in Ammerland (Lower Saxony) presented their support for the »Krefeld Appeal« under the heading »We want no Euroshima!«, citing a statement by US Secretary of State Alexander Haig that there were »more important things than to sustain peace« for the Americans.142

p. 138; Alfred Mechtersheimer, Friedensmacht Deutschland. Plädoyer für einen neuen Nationalismus, Frankfurt/Berlin 1993, see pp. 61 ff. on the »negative model USA«.


137 One of the first scholarly accounts to include these aspects was Jeffrey Herf, War by other Means, Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles, Oxford 1991, esp. pp. 118–144. But while the material presented by Herf is worthwhile, his overall narrative and his understanding of German political culture are fundamentally flawed. Many of his metaphorical remarks are grossly exaggerated too, for instance to see the protests against US-missiles rooted in a »mentality of the popular front« (ibid., p. 143). See the substantial critique by Diethelm Prowe, in: German Studies Review 16, 1993, pp. 166 f.


While many West German peace activists paid only lip-service to a positive image of the American people, the perceptions framing antinuclear activism in Italy were much more complex. Protests against the deployment of Cruise Missiles in Comiso (Sicily) sparked a very heterogeneous campaign, which mainly consisted of members of the ecological movement and the Green party, and members of the small Radical Party under the leadership of Marco Panella, which had agitated on a platform of radical pacifism and unilateral disarmament since its beginnings in the 1960s. Although the leadership of the main opposition party, the Eurocommunist PCI, rejected the dual-track-solution in principle, it was not able – and due to the danger of reigniting anti-Communist stereotypes – also not willing to mobilize its rank-and-file members in a broad coalition against the deployment.\footnote{143} Both the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the leadership of the main governing party, Democrazia Cristiana, were firm in their support of the NATO-decision. As a result of the campaign, however, the DC-leadership felt the need to reconnect with lay Catholics and to thread a fine line distinguishing between ›good‹ Christian pacifism and a ›bad‹ fundamentalism. In late 1979, some of the largest associations of lay Catholics, including not only the pacifists in Pax Christi and Mani Tese, but also Focolari (a spiritual movement founded in 1943), ACLI (the Christian Worker’s Association), and other groups of the Catholic labour movement, had joined ranks for a unique manifestation of lay initiative. They addressed the parliament, and particularly those members who based ›on the Gospel the reasons and the motives in order to set up a proper life‹, in two open letters. They demanded to abandon the idea that peace could be based on armaments and on an equilibrium of terror, to stop the ›spiral of destructive power‹ and to commence a ›unilateral reduction of military spending‹.\footnote{144}

This was an impressive manifestation of the inroads pacifist ideas had made into many groups and lay initiatives on the left wing of Italian Catholicism. Left Catholics shared the rejection of US-imperialism, which was the only widely shared frame of the heterogeneous campaign against the Euromissiles in Italy.\footnote{142} Their anti-Americanism, however, was matched by a positive orientation towards Latin America. The interest of Italian Catholic pacifists in Latin America was based on symbolic representations of progressive Catholicism in countries such as Brazil, Nicaragua, Chile and Mexico, and elsewhere. During the rallies against Cruise Missiles in Comiso in 1981/82, for instance, demonstrators displayed posters showing Oscar Romero, the bishop from El Salvador who had spoken out against the poverty and the brutal repression in his country, and who was shot on 24 March 1980 by a right-wing death squad while celebrating mass.\footnote{146}

The significance of Latin America for Italian Catholic pacifism was also based on personal links as a result of mass emigration of Italians to countries such as Argentina and Brazil. Since the late 1960s, when Latin American bishops and theologians rallied behind the programme of liberation theology, with its denunciation of underdevelopment and military dictatorship and its ›option for the poor‹, a radical reinterpretation of the gospel in favour of those affected by exclusion, an increasingly dense network of personal

\footnote{145} Rosso/Ilari, Italy, p. 144.
communications and exchanges between liberation theologians and Italian peace activists emerged. For Italian left Catholics in the 1970s and early 1980s, empathy with progressive Catholics in Latin America addressed three different aspects of framing: as a «diagnostic» frame, it identified global capitalism and its corollary, global injustice, as the root cause of the arms spiral and its disastrous effects on people in underdeveloped countries; as a «prognostic» frame, it envisaged joint action of the people in Western and in Third World-countries as a possible solution; and the spiritual vitality of the leading liberation theologians and the grassroots communities inspired by them worked as a «motivational» frame, which triggered and channelled the protest communication. This distinctive framing of Catholic peace activism during the 1970s confirmed and extended elements of Italian pacifism which had already been apparent in debates on non-violence during the 1950s, for instance in the work of the proponent of Gandhian ideas, Aldo Capitini (1899–1968). With their focus on the link between injustice and violence on a global scale and the search for a «third camp» between capitalism and state socialism, Italian activists considered the dangers of nuclear weapons in a wider perspective, both in thematic and in spatial terms, than many of their European counterparts.

IV. POLITICS OF CONCERN: WOMEN’S PROTESTS AND THE GENDERING OF PEACE

Gender is in many respects an important category to understand the dynamics of antinuclear protests during the Cold War. Not only were the anti-American frames of peace activism based on gendered perceptions, as indeed many other enemy-images held on both sides of the bloc confrontation more generally. Gender is also crucial for an analysis of the aims and practises of women’s peace movements, as these movements formed an important strand of European antinuclearism from the mid-1940s until the caesura of 1990. With regard to the aims of protest, gender can help to understand how female peace activists conceptualised their specific calling for and contribution to a world without nuclear arms. With regard to practices, historians should seek to analyse, firstly, if and how widespread peace activism helped to promote alternative gender roles in society, and, secondly, how these roles were put into practice in the workings of the peace groups themselves. The following remarks are only a first and tentative attempt to address some of these issues, with a strong focus, due to the uneven state of research in this field, on British women’s peace protests in the 1980s. They are incomplete also in conceptual terms, as they do not address, although implied by gender as a relational category, to what extent the protests brought new forms of masculinity to the fore. Did antinuclear activists develop a muscular pacifism, which allowed to demonstrate the strength of their commitment and to fend off accusations of effeminacy? Or did they try to develop dif-

147 De Giuseppe, Discovering the ›other‹ America.
150 See Davis, Gender of War.
ferent, non-hegemonic forms of masculinity? These are important questions which should be tackled by comparative research.

In the immediate post-war period, female pacifists in many European countries had to grapple with the political consequences and moral legacies of the Second World War. These issues had a particular urgency for female peace activism in the Federal Republic and in Italy. Here, in these post-Fascist countries, activists had to meet the challenge of coming to terms with a peculiar national past. In Germany, activist Freda Wuesthoff gathered many prominent representatives of the bourgeois women’s movement from the interwar period in a »Stuttgart Peace Circle«. During their meetings, they discussed the specific contribution women could make to a peaceful reconstruction of Germany. As a trained physicist, Wuesthoff focused on the perils of nuclear weapons and considered 6 August 1945, when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, to be her »key experience« for a commitment to female citizenship. This focus on the bomb, if deliberately or inadvertently, also helped to avoid any serious engagement with German guilt and female participation in the Nazi-regime. In Italy, women’s peace activism was not only one important form to explore and strengthen the new dimensions of female citizenship which had opened up with the introduction of women’s suffrage for national elections in 1946. It was also, as in particular the Communist peace activists of the »Italian Women’s Union« (Unione donne italiane, UDI) pointed out repeatedly, an opportunity to stress the need to distinguish between the Fascist dictatorship and the Italian people, many of whom, they claimed, had participated in the anti-Fascist struggle of the resistenza. Thus, a female commitment to peace provided also an opportunity to underpin the Italian desire to »return to its position in the community of democratic nations«. Women in the Centro italiano femminile (CIF), however, a group that had been founded in late 1944 and that was closely associated with the Catholic Church, pursued a different agenda. Catholics in Italy and abroad were their preferred interlocutors, and in their engagement for peace they envisaged a European federation based on the principles of an idealised Christian Europe.

Communist and Catholic women’s activists in Italy had established separate organizations almost immediately upon the liberation of their country. Activists in the UDI continued throughout the late 1940s and in the following decade to accuse bourgeois and Catholic women pacifists of being »apolitical«. The UDI supported the activities of the Partigiani della pace, the Italian member in the Communist-led World Peace Council. In 1949, the Partigiani della pace had collected signatures against an Italian NATO-membership. This initiative had yielded a massive response. Women were well represented among the six million Italians who signed this appeal. These opposite and openly contrarian endeavours, however, illuminated a problem. In what respect could women claim to make a specific contribution to the struggle for peace, if they were organized along political cleavages and directed most of their energies to propaganda which contributed

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further to a hardening of Cold War fissures? In Italy, the Associazione internazionale madri unite per la pace (AIMU), founded in 1946 by Maria Remiddi, aimed to overcome the Cold War fault line. Supported by liberal democratic women, AIMU, which became the Italian section of the »Women's International League for Peace and Freedom« (WILPF) in 1957, tried to reach out to the opposing camps and to establish a transversal women’s solidarity for peace based on the semantics of motherliness. 157 These attempts, however, yielded only ambivalent results, as Remiddi explained in a letter to Aldo Capitini in May 1954. AIMU activists in Rome had had many encounters with Communist women, and they had not only been welcomed with »great cordiality«, but also discovered a strong »will to work together« and a »complete and profound« agreement in their respective views on issues of peace and armaments. But in the aftermath of such meetings, Noi donne, the journal of the Communist UDI, had repeatedly misrepresented these encounters as if the women from AIMU had joined ranks with the Communists. Experiences like these were, as Remiddi concluded, particularly off-putting for those women in her association who had a »clear political personality«, but did certainly not want to be compromised by such a coverage. 158 In comparable attempts to overcome the Cold War fault line and to stress their genuine contribution to peace, German women’s peace activists until the mid-1950s vacillated between attempts to overcome motherliness as a programme and a focus on an »essentialist motherliness«. 159 It is still a largely unresolved issue to what extent antinuclear protests during the 1950s and 1960s were able to challenge traditional gender roles, to empower women and to usher into »more egalitarian ideas« about the relation between men and women. Further research into these questions is urgently required. 160 There can be no doubt, however, that women’s antinuclear protests during the 1980s provided a fundamental challenge not only to societal gender roles, but also to organizational routines and gender roles in peace activism and to the public debate about nuclear armaments more generally. I will discuss some of the key characteristics of these developments by taking Greenham Common as an example, not only because this protest has produced a wealth of primary material, but has also received some scholarly attention. 161

In September 1981, a handful of women from Wales, most of whom were associated with the group »Women for Life on Earth«, set off to march from Cardiff to Greenham Common in Berkshire, site of a Royal Air Force base which had de facto been put under the control of the US Air Force and was earmarked for the deployment of Cruise Missiles. They had been motivated by reports about a walk from Copenhagen to Paris, organized by Scandinavian women peace activists. Locally, their mobilization was based on a broad cross-section of people situated in an alternative milieu, anarchists, Christian feminists,}

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158 Cited in De Giuseppe, Movimenti pacifisti, p. 260.
160 See Wittner, Gender Roles, p. 214.
Quakers and others. Upon their arrival at the site, they decided to set up a peace camp outside the perimeter fence. Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, as it became known to a wider public within only a couple of months, attracted widespread interest from a very diverse spectrum of ordinary women and self-declared feminists from many different backgrounds, both from the UK and from abroad. In terms of their social background, the long-term supporters of the camp were equally diverse, a fact that serves to refute the assumptions of the new social movement-approach about a correlation between the new middle-class of academically trained specialists and a post-materialist propensity for protest. Those women who were in paid employment worked in a variety of jobs, and many of the campers had no paid employment and were depending on state benefits, husbands or their parents. After intensive discussions, the women decided in February 1982 to turn the camp into a women-only protest and asked the few remaining men to leave. This was a momentous decision, as it opened up a flank for the overwhelmingly hostile coverage of the camp in the British media, which portrayed the protesters as a bunch of lesbians with unshaved legs. To these stereotypes the women responded, self-ironically, by calling themselves brazen hussies:

»We’re brazen hussies
And we don’t give a damn […]
Men call us names to be nasty and rude,
Like lesbian, man hater, witch and prostitute
What a laugh, ‘cause half of it’s true.«

Part of the success and the radicalism of Greenham Common was the refusal to substantiate female commitment to nuclear disarmament in one particular form of femininity, as earlier generations of activists had done it with their reliance on organized motherliness. While the initial press release which had announced the march to Greenham expressed opposition to nuclear weapons in terms of women’s roles as carers and nurturers, it also framed the protest in the context of a feminist discourse about women’s exclusion from political life, and with a materialist argument. This materialism was an important part of both of the motivations for protest and the political intervention of Greenham Common. Trident missiles fired from submarines were criticised with the lines »We can’t afford medication or proper education, but we must pay, a million a day, so that Britain can disappear.« Anne Pettitt, one of the organizers of the march from Cardiff, explained her motivation to protest with her disgust about political leaders who squander vast sums of money and human resources on weapons of mass destruction while we can hear in our hearts the millions of human beings throughout the world whose needs cry out to be met. An interest in material wellbeing, including a proper provision with key public services such as hospitals and schools, was part and parcel of the motivation of many women to camp outside the RAF base at Greenham. As women, they tried to reject traditional labels and gender roles, also with regard to the vicious cycle that had

162 Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy, pp. 14–38; Jolly, We are the Web.
164 Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy, pp. 17, 41–44.
166 Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy, pp. 34 f.
167 Trident, Trident, in: Danish Peace Academy, Greenham Common Songbook, p. 57.
168 Pettitt, Walking, p. 76.
women left in bereavement while their sons and husbands had been called up and killed in the First and Second World War. One of the many songs which were frequently performed in the camp expressed this search for diversity in expressions of femininity in a fictitious dialogue with an older woman:

»And now you're growing older
And in time the photos fade
And in widowhood you sit back
And reflect on the parade
Of the passing of your memories
As your daughters change their lives
Seeing more to our existence
Than just mothers, daughters, wives.«  

As a women’s project, Greenham Common aimed to sustain an »elective« community of women, based on a non-essentialist feminism which was able to accommodate a wide variety of possible personal and sexual orientations. As a political project and a protest movement, Greenham Common was based on a fundamental critique of both the established antinuclearism of CND and END, and of the political elites and their decision-making. As in similar actions by women in other Western European countries, this double broadside against masculine forms of political engagement rested on the diversity of female identities and on the attempt to explore the »personal as political«, the key principle second wave feminism had proclaimed since the late 1960s. Political action had to be based on the »autonomy« of personal choices and political decisions, an autonomy which was best exercised in the face-to-face encounters of women in a small »peer group« which resembled a »family«. Male peace activists in the UK, and members of CND in particular, rejected the approach taken by Greenham women as divisive for the peace movement. A report issued by CND in 1983 stated that they would bury »a potentially popular cause in a tide of criticism levelled against them on personal grounds.«

But these »personal« issues were precisely those which had motivated women to pursue independent and autonomous forms of protest. They were tired of traditional forms of protest, which were largely confined to an endless stream of meetings characterised by the »posturing or speech-making« of male activists. All they wanted was »just speaking, listening, hearing«. While CND meetings were »very bureaucratic« and »invariably run by blokes«, women activists sought to establish a forum where they could express their »fear, panic« and »terrible distress« about the impending dangers of Cruise Missiles. In Britain and in mainland Europe, such an approach also implied a fundamental critique of the organizational machismo of peace campaigning, which was still, or, due to the intensive media interest even more than in the 1960s, characterized by »manager« and »Macker« (blokes) figures. On purpose, they would neglect women in the media relations

170 Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy, p. 75.
173 Cited in Roseneil, Disarming Patriarchy, p. 149.
174 Pettitt, Walking, p. 67.
of the movement and would only invite reformist women to press conferences. Defying both traditional protest politics and the political establishment, radical feminist pacifism in the early 1980s was based on a fundamental critique of the »politics of inherent necessities« (Politik der Sachzwänge) and its discursive underpinnings. In the 1980s, both the defence community and established antinuclear movements relied heavily on scientific expertise in order to justify or deny the necessity for a new generation of nuclear weapons. Both defence intellectuals and peace researchers tried to prove the cogency and valency of their »facts« with an elaborate apparatus of statistical calculations, graphs and other models derived from political science. But this discourse of objectivity failed to impress and convince the women at Greenham Common. They objected to the weapons quite deliberately as laypersons with regard to the intricate details of arms control and political necessities, subverting an approach were men mostly worked »with their heads« or at least tried to rationalize their emotions with scientific models. Instead, the women of Greenham Common sought a »chance to express themselves and their feelings«. Theirs was not a (masculine) politics of instrumental rationality. They preferred non-violent action that lead to a state of »trance«.

Ultimately, thus, the women’s protests against nuclear weapons during the 1980s were based on a politics of concern. Women engaged in protest actions because they were affected by and, as civilians, women and mothers, personally concerned about the decisions taken by male politicians and officers. And the personal and quite emotional character of this concern structured the performative forms and rituals of their protest. In this respect, women’s antinuclearism at Greenham Common differed also from other, predominantly class-based protest movements in the 1980s. In 1984/85, the year-long miner’s strike conducted by the National Union of Mineworkers became one of the defining moments in post-war British social history. Female campaigners tried to provide a common link to antinuclear campaigns under the heading »Mines not missiles«. But the logic of protest was fundamentally different. While the miners went through a series of bitter clashes with the police, their struggle was based on the integrative and accumulative logic of nineteenth-century popular protest. Eventually, everyone, perhaps even the policemen, would join in, and the overarching solidarity ultimately outweighed the confrontation. Billy Bragg, the protest singer and foremost muse of the miner’s strike, expressed these ideas in his song »Which side are you on?«, written in 1985:

»Which side are you on, boys?
Which side are you on?
Which side are you on, boys?
Which side are you on?

179 Cook/Kirk, Greenham Women, pp. 83 f.
181 Pettitt, Walking, p. 41.
We set out to join the picket line
For together we cannot fail
We got stopped by police at the county line
They said, 'Go home boys or you're going to jail.'\(^{183}\)

The women at Greenham Common sang a song with the very same title. But their take on the same question drove home the core message that some people could simply not join in, that they stood and stayed on the other side of the rift between insanity and humanity, between life and death. While there was space for a personal, moral decision to opt for life, the gap between decision-making and concern could never be overcome.

»Which side are you on
which side are you on
are you on the other side from me
which side are you on?

Are you on the side that don't like life
are you on the side of racial strife
are you on the side that beats your wife
which side are you on?
I ask you –
(chorus)
Are you on the side who locks the door
are you on the side who loves the Law
are you on the side which wants a war
which side are you on?\(^{184}\)

The women who gathered at Greenham Common have had a notoriously bad press. While the campaign against Cruise Missiles lasted, most British newspapers despised them, and their reception in British public opinion was rather chilly.\(^{185}\) Even more than two decades after the events, some historians tend to ridicule them as »women on the verge«, restless in their efforts but without even the slightest impact on the greater scheme of things, i.e. the dual-track solution and the deployment of nuclear weapons.\(^{186}\) Such a negative assessment is certainly correct as it is tremendously difficult to prove any direct impact of peace protests on political decision making.\(^{187}\) But searching for a direct impact of Greenham on political decisions is bound to miss the crucial point, as the confrontational style of the camp was not really meant to change the minds of politicians. Greenham Common mattered as it opened the lid of »Pandora’s box«. Up to this point, nuclear strategy had been a »leadership decision«, discussed and finally »taken by an informed few.« The protests opened the box up for »public participation« in the debate on nuclear armaments.\(^{188}\) While


\(^{184}\) Gillian Booth, Which Side are you on?, in: Danish Peace Academy, Greenham Common Songbook, p. 80.


this assertion has been made with regard to the campaign against Euromissiles more generally, it is particularly true for the women’s protests at Greenham Common and elsewhere. When housewives, mothers and other ›ordinary‹ women pitted their personal concern against the strategic ›necessities‹ proclaimed by the political elites, they dragged the nuclear debate from the detached sphere of policy-making and turned it into a matter for everyday-life.

V. CONCLUSION

Shortly after the collapse of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the veteran peace researcher Dieter Senghaas published a book on the »Peace Project Europe«. This was, argued from the perspective of a political scientist, one of the many attempts to envision a scenario in which Europeans could cash in on the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, and could start to build a unified political space based on a commitment to non-violent conflict resolution and to a reduction of both nuclear and conventional armaments.\(^{189}\) As this brief essay on the history of antinuclear peace activism during the Cold War has shown, though, Europe was not really a peace project, at least not in terms of a deliberate attempt to conceptualise antinuclear activism across Europe. Many Europeans were involved in sustained attempts to halt or curb nuclear armaments in the decades until 1990, and their endeavours could build on the established European traditions of pacifism.\(^{190}\) Also, they were able to adapt these traditions for the nuclear age. But already the Western European countries were too diverse and too fragmented, in terms of their geo-strategic position, their inclusion in military alliances, their party-system and also in terms of distinctive cultural traditions which informed protests in search of alternative security policies and radical non-violence.\(^{191}\) In a stark contrast to the developments in Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or trade union activism, a European polity, a space for a shared approach to defence politics did not emerge, neither on the side of the peace protesters, nor, for that matter, on the side of the decision-makers. Even the protest movements during the Euromissiles campaign in the 1980s kept their distinctive


\(^{190}\) On the extent of transnational peace activism in the interwar period see Thomas Richard Davies, The Possibilities of Transnational Activism. The Campaign for Disarmament between the two World Wars, Leiden 2007; on French-German reconciliation as an example for European pacifism see Barbara Stambolis, »Shared memory«: Erinnerung an deutsch-französische An näherungen am Beispiel symbolischer Orte der Grenzüberschreitung und ihrer Nachwirkungen, in: Jahrbuch für Europäische Geschichte 6, 2005, pp. 137–150. For older traditions, see Peter Brock, Pacifism in Europe to 1914, Princeton 1972.

\(^{191}\) The most striking example for divergence in terms of the party-system and the inclusion in military alliances is France, where a national consensus in favour of the force de frappe included the Communist peace movement »Mouvement de la paix« (MVP), and the incoming socialist president François Mitterrand turned to a support of an independent French nuclear deterrent and the deployment of Cruise Missiles in 1981. As a consequence, CODENE, a small network of non-aligned nuclear pacifists founded in 1981, remained relatively weak and fragmented, as even the usually optimistic peace historian Lawrence Wittner has to admit. See idem, Toward Nuclear Abolition, p. 157; on CODENE, see Jolyon Howorth, France. The Politics of Peace, London 1984, pp. 62–83; on the MVP see Sabine Rousseau, The Iconography of a French Peace Movement. The »Mouvement de la Paix« from the 1950s to the End of the Cold War, in: Ziemann, Peace Movements during the Cold War, pp. 189–208; on the French nuclear consensus, see Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities. Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, Basingstoke 1998, pp. 74–115. See also Jacques Fontanel, An Underdeveloped Peace Movement: the Case of France, in: Journal of Peace Research 23, 1986, pp. 175–182.
national characteristics and orientations at least to some extent. For all these reasons, it does not seem helpful to interpret the trajectory of peace movements in post-war Europe in terms of a narrative of convergence or even integration. Even while movement activists interacted and tried to coordinate their efforts across national borders, they did not simply merge into a European civil society. They were «subjects of Europe», but did not constitute a European subject. In their worthwhile attempts to escape the confines of national narratives, historians should not make the mistake to reify the «European» character of social phenomena. Europe was and is, in the end, a construct that can only be described from a multinational perspective. Or, in other words, instead of portraying Europe as the arché and telos, the origin and inherent goal of a universalist narrative, historians should narrate the history of Europe as a set of «differential processes».

Throughout this article, I have stressed plurality, divergence and the fact that peace movements in many countries were bound up with the specific trajectory of their national context and its history. This insistence on the limits of antinuclear pacifism as a deliberate European project, however, should not motivate us to accept the assertion that the endeavours of antinuclear pacifists were futile and without significance for post-war European history. Such a negative assessment is usually based in a conventional approach to conceptualizing political history, which is focused on the autonomy of acts of «decision-making in the narrow sense.» Such an approach does not only ignore the possibility that peace movement activism, while perhaps not able to impact directly on key decisions such as the dual-track solution, may have had a more indirect but nonetheless crucial impact on the political process. One important example is the evolution of normative frameworks for acceptable security policies in the medium-term, not least the «nuclear taboo», the refusal of US-decision makers to contemplate the actual use of nuclear weapons in earnest. In addition, the conventional focus on the policy and politics-dimension of the political fails to understand the major contribution of antinuclear activism to new performative forms of political communication. In order to analyze and conceptualize this aspect properly, a broader cultural history of the political is needed, with a focus on symbolic performances as a crucial prerequisite of the political process.

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Seen in this perspective, campaigners for nuclear disarmament made a vital contribution to post-war European history. While they failed to achieve a substantial number of their immediate aims, they were utterly successful in the creation of a new approach to politics, an approach that transcended the boundaries of the Cold War consensus through incremental change and paved the way for subsequent waves of protest movements, including the feminist and ecological campaigns from the 1970s onwards. Some astute contemporary participants in and opponents of peace activism were aware of the changes this form of popular mobilization had brought about. During a discussion conference in June 1963, not by chance in a moment when CND had reached a deadlock with its campaigning and conflicts over strategy broke up, the political scientist Nigel Young attempted to define the successes and failures of CND as a protest movement as follows:

»We have failed in five years to spell out unilateralism; we have failed in education and organization and central leadership; we have failed to experiment; and we have failed to show political courage. What have we succeeded in doing is in creating a »style« – a new kind of politics in which policy is not of paramount importance. But even this style regularly wilts, and is in as much danger as the organization itself. […] With respect, this style has nothing to do with Canon Collin’s pipe or Peggy Duff’s red coat; it is the way the movement does things – the symbols and the pennants, the songs, the typography and lay-out of its posters and literature, the atmosphere of the marches and sit-downs, the attitude of direct-action and to individual participation. Moreover, it is the way in which the bomb is related to other issues, local and international. It is an ambience which is contagious; it has spread to North America, to Scandinavia and the rest of Europe, it is still spreading; a new sort of politics.«

This was a clear recognition of both the limits and the successes of the peculiar CND-style of campaigning. While it had opened up a new political space and ushered in a new language for the articulation of popular demands, it had infuriated the flag-bearers of a traditional top-down approach to the democratic political process, not only in the UK, but also in all other European countries where activists had followed the example of the Aldermaston march. In 1963, Anton Böhm, editor of the conservative newspaper Rheinischer Merkur, used a letter to Arno Klönne, a leading Catholic protagonist of the West German Easter March movement, to voice his criticism to the new political approach. He ridiculed protests with »pushchairs and toy balloons« as »foolish«. But while he designated his own critique as the position held by »politically considered people«, he failed to understand that the boundaries and parameters of the politically considerate were about to change. European antinuclear activists during the Cold War accomplished more than only offering »a quantum of solace« for societies living in the shadow of the bomb.

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199 See also the lucid remarks by Havel, Anatomy, p. 310. He sensed that more was at stake for Western peace activists than only disarmament: »an opportunity to erect non-conforming, uncorrupted social structures, an opportunity for life in a humanly richer community«. Compare the quote by a CND-activist in Eley, Forging, p. 563.

200 Cited in Duff, Left, Left, Left, pp. 221 f. The Anglican priest John Collins was the chairman of CND from 1958 until 1963.

