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Mitchell G. Ash, Science and Politics. A Relational History in the Twentieth Century
On the basis of an enormous literature and a large body of research that has accumulated over the past twenty years, the thesis is presented here that – in opposition to the ideal of science and politics as fixed, separate spheres – the relationships among these fields of action in the twentieth century is best described as one of constant interaction and resource exchange. From the standpoint of institutional or social history, this network of relationships is not limited to high level political actors, but involves constantly changing alliances of high ranking scientists with politicians, industrialists, military men or civil servants acting in the relevant government agencies. In addition, and much more important, this relational history involves – or has led to – basic changes in the content of both politics and science. At this level we can speak of two complementary processes: an increasing scientification of politics on the one hand – meaning the tendency to treat political projects as technocratically solvable problems – and a politicization of science on the other hand – meaning the tendency to take on the scientific topics and research issues that appear to be presented by political projects and administrative programmes. Thus, scientists in the twentieth, as well as the twenty-first centuries have not only been servants of politics or opportunists taking the chances that politics appears to offer; often enough they have played significant parts in the formulation and execution of political projects. Examples of all this come from all fields of scientific knowledge. Not only for the natural, medical and technical sciences, but also the social sciences and humanities the statement holds, that this relational history cannot be reduced to the ideologization of supposed value neutral science.

Kerstin Brückweh, An Act of Planning Necessity or »an Exercise in Applied Racism«? How British Censuses generate Information on Ethnicity
Since 1801 a national census has been held in Great Britain every decade. It is the most important data basis of social scientific survey. It is, therefore, of great significance for the different users – whether they are market researchers, pollsters, providers of consumer classifications or state sponsored social research itself – what questions are asked in the census. The article shows that census questions are not dictated by higher authorities. They are, in contrast, the result of a communication process, embedded in public discourses, which involves several historical actors such as social researchers, their clients, interviewers and respondents. Reliable information can be generated only if concepts, the wording and reply options of the questionnaire are clear, for instance the question about the place of birth and its modifications (such as the question about nationality), which is a traditional question in the British census. This question was criticised by the respondents particularly in 1971, when the census also asked about the parents’ place of birth and thereby indirectly about skin colour. Many people expressed doubt as to whether this kind of data elicitation was necessary and denounced its allegedly racist basis. From the late 1970s and especially from the 1980s onwards there has been a striking change among interests groups: The opposition against the question was given up and its benefits (for instance the chances of eliminating discrimination and establishing effective programmes of affirmative action) were expected to outweigh the damages. This, however, would only apply when the question’s wording was »right«. The article shows the processes of negotiation which resulted in the »right« question, that is to say in the question which was accepted by all involved. In so doing it links applied social research with legislation, political and public debates.
Heinrich Hartmann, A Scientized Modernity? Population Policy and its Spheres of Activity in Turkey as an Area of Complex Knowledge Transfer from the 1940s to the 1970s

As many other developing countries after 1945, Turkey was at the centre of international efforts towards birth control and family planning. What initially appeared to be a mere variation of a global strategy proved, on closer inspection, to be a borderline case combining several scientific concepts. In programmatic terms the Turkish Kemalist nation state and its welfare state reforms pursued a policy of population increase. International experts and their efforts of modernisation on the other hand followed the contrary paradigm. Particularly with regard to the question of rural modernisation of Turkey this caused tensions which influenced the realisation of several demographic policy projects.

Against this background this article asks how the transfer of these concepts of knowledge was possible and how an allegedly purely scientific approach of modernisation was instrumentalised in a specific national framework and how it was changed by transferring it to different social contexts. In so doing the concept of unilateral scientization is called into question from a transnational perspective.

Ariane Leendertz, Beginning and End of a Scientific and Administrative Mission. National Spatial Planning Policy in Germany, 1935 to 1975

By using the example of spatial planning policy this article looks at two intertwined processes: the scientization of politics and the politicization of science. It focuses on the attempts to establish spatial planning between the 1930s and the 1970s as a policy based on scientific findings at national level and shows the continuous interplay between science and policy. Furthermore different aspects of the often diagnosed »failure« of spatial planning at federal level in the 1970s are examined. Inspite of an increasing amount of knowledge about spatial development »better« solutions could not be enforced. More and more participants voiced different opinions and the role of scientific experts became a matter of growing controversy. First and foremost, however, as the article summarises, spatial planning had developed its concepts and instruments under the conditions of the »classic« industrial society and of industrial growth. New circumstances and a new structure of society, which began to emerge in the 1970s, created a need of adjustment that spatial planning was then not able to deliver. Finally it is discussed to what extent the concept of the »knowledge society« as the macro theoretical framework of analysis and interpretation qualifies to explain the processes of societal transformation since the 1970.

Martin Lengwiler, Booms and Crises in the Scientization of Social Policy in the Twentieth Century

This article looks at the scientization of social insurance systems in Western European welfare states in the twentieth century. It highlights, in particular, the role of international organisations such as the International Congress of Actuaries and the International Labour Organization. In so doing it points to crises and booms of social political scientization. Up to the First World War the influence of scientific expertise was still marginal for lack of epistemic foundations. The period from 1914 to 1945, on the other hand, was like a laboratory which enabled fundamental learning processes thanks to the social and economic instabilities and the transformation of risk. The great boom of scientization coincided with the development of European welfare states in the 1950s and 1960s. The expansion of the social welfare system created an increasing demand for a formalised governing, controlling and planning knowledge. The limits of scientization have to be noticed: internal limits such as calculation problems and uncertainties of the actuarial specialist discourse, but also external limits such as an insurance system that is distant
from science and based on voluntary associations and corporations. All in all, the scientization of social policy has been an ambivalent and uncompleted process which implied the understanding that the power of interpretation of scientific expertise was limited.

Torben Lütjen, From the ›Gospel of Efficiency‹ to the ›War of Ideas‹. The Relationship between Science, Politics and Ideology in the USA

In the USA varied processes of scientization can be observed in the twentieth century. On the one hand, preconditions were particularly favourable thanks to the deeply rooted American belief in progress. On the other hand, scientization had to face distrust of state interventions and a specific traditional American anti-intellectualism which perceived the experts’ claim on policy-making as elitist arrogance. From establishing social sciences during the »progressive era«, to the planning efforts of New Deal politics to the »great society« under Lyndon B. Johnson, those two contrary poles shaped the discussion on the chances of »rational« and »effective« politics. The end of the 1960s marked a caesura: The rise of conservative think tanks ultimately indicated that it was no longer possible to find a consensus in American society on the question of what kind of knowledge qualified as »objectively correct«. Hence, hopes of overcoming ideologies by employing science proved to be an illusion. Instead of the »end of ideology«, a »war of ideas« began.


This article examines the process of scientization of employee policy during the first two decades of the Federal Republic of Germany. After describing the current state of research and the methodical approach of analysing discourse coalitions, it outlines the scientific context for the history of industrial sociology. A case study of the political usage of employee sociology follows. The article takes the split into the »unified trade union« of employees (»Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft«) and the »unified trade unions« of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (»Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund«), which organised industrial workers, industrial employees and employees of the service sector, as a starting point. Then, it examines the social political discussions which were sparked off by the social scientific thesis of the »levelled middle class society« (»Nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft«) and led to a renaissance of employee sociology in Germany. The competing discourse coalitions between industrial sociologists as experts and political practitioners in ministries and trade unions are analysed.

Christiane Reinecke, Questioning the Socialist Way of Life. Empirical Social Research and Social Knowledge under the SED-›Fürsorgediktatur«

What happens if scientific research divides society into different groups and classifies their attitudes, if, however, this knowledge, on the other hand, is only partially accessible for this society? In the GDR, several empirical studies were conducted by means of questionnaires and interviews from the 1960s onwards in order to survey citizens of the GDR about their preferences. On the basis of the social scientific discussion about social inequality in the GDR, this article investigates the role these surveys played in SED regime and examines the interplay between empirical social research, politics and society. It is highlighted that the communication between the political elite and social researchers changed in the course of time: Whereas during the 1960s political representatives were particularly interested in basing their political decision-making on scientific evidence, the SED leaders during the 1970s and 1980 were less and less willing to include social science
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Egle Rindzeviciute, Purification and Hybridisation of Soviet Cybernetics. The Politics of Scientific Governance in an Authoritarian Regime

Focusing on the history of Soviet cybernetics this article analyses the negotiation of the boundaries between techno-science and the political. These relations are analysed with the help of Bruno Latour’s concepts of hybridisation and purification. Since its introduction in the Soviet Union cybernetics was hybridised and purified in relation to two notions of the political: first, with regard to the membership in the Communist Party and, second, with regard to the friend-enemy divide. The article questions the predominant view which regards the hybridisation of Soviet politics with cybernetics as a negative phenomenon. It maps out how both purification and hybridisation were used as strategies of survival and critical devices by Soviet scientists and policy-mak ers. The Soviet government had a strong rationale for espousing the political neutrality of computer-based sciences, because this legitimised the transfer of these technologies from the West. Soviet scientists had a strong rationale for espousing the political neutrality of these sciences, because it aided their construction of professional autonomy.

Wilfried Rudloff, Expert Commissions, Masterplans and Model Programmes. The Psychiatry Reform in the Federal Republic of Germany as an Example of »Scientized Policy«?

Psychiatry policy is a special policy area with its own institutional arrangements and its own framework of action. Psychiatrists as the leading medical professionals hold the key position in the policy network of psychiatry policy. For the psychiatric experts the »scientiza tion« of politics was not only a reform strategy but also a type of boundary work whereby the experts’ sphere of action could be politically secured and consolidated. By applying the »policy-cycle model« in its different stages this article analyses the history of the psychiatry reform in the Federal Republic which spanned several decades. Science played an important role as a political actors in nearly all stages of this cycle – from the problem identification to the agenda setting to the policy formulation and finally to the evaluation. It should be noted that the psychiatrists in their function as policy advisers represented science. Nevertheless, they were, at the same time, also stakeholders. Their knowledge was, therefore, interested knowledge. Thus the limits of the process of »scientization« of psychiatry policy are examined in conclusion.


There have always been changes in the economic structure, since the beginning of the 1970s, however, the Federal Republic was in a completely different situation. The accustomed dominance of the industrial sector started to decline, and the trend towards service society became ever so obvious. At the same time the high growth rates of the Postwar boom stopped which had cushioned the social results of structural change until then. How did economic political advisory boards cope with this situation? Noticing structural change and dismissing Keynesian ideas were closely linked processes, as the article shows. They even changed the mechanisms of political advice. Scientific expertise was appreciated and
depreciated at the same time: It was considered as indispensable for reasons of legitimacy and as a power political instrument, however, it became increasingly many-voiced and inconsistent. Economic politicians reacted to this paradox by publicly avowing themselves to be pragmatic. On the basis of the expertises on the steel crisis, which remained without any political consequences, the article shows how this contributed to the increasing dogmatisation of policy advice on the part of economic scientists.


»Future researchers« served as policy advisers of the grand coalition and the social liberal coalition from the mid–1960s onwards. Against the background of an extended political understanding of planning, which by 1970 became increasingly euphoric, future studies were supposed to support an extensive and long-term planning policy. They were expected to forecast the results of different options for action and decision-making and to make project design and operations planning more effective and transparent by employing scientific knowledge. By this means politics was supposed to be »modernised« and »rationalised«. This article looks at three representatives of future studies: the »Studiengruppe für Systemforschung«, the »Zentrum Berlin für Zukunftsforschung« and the Prognos AG. It examines, furthermore, the process of interaction between science, policy and ministerial bureaucracy as well as the results and chances of effect of future studies as means of policy advice in different political areas. It is shown that assuming future studies as being omnipotent, overestimating the system character of social formations and using a hermetic language based on cybernetic thinking caused problems. At the same time the understanding of planning on the part of the Federal government became more pragmatic. As early as 1971/72 the limits of policy advice by future studies also reflected the limits of the policy planning euphoria.

Roderich von Detten, Environmental Policy and the Sense of Uncertainty. The Interplay between Science and Environmental Policy in the Debate on the Waldsterben during the 1980s

Today the discussions during the 1980s on the alleged Waldsterben of the German forest are perceived as a merely historical debate on environmental hazards. Current environmental disputes such as on climate change, however, very often refer to the Waldsterben controversy for the purpose of comparison. Against this background, the article discusses the interplay between science and policy in the context of a specific set of circumstances, which was characterised by the heated social debate on catastrophes on the one hand and a widespread scientific uncertainty about causes and necessary countermeasures on the other. The paper interprets the historical Waldsterben debate with reference to the often ignored reports on forest damages and status reports. By this means it will be explained that this debate was first and foremost about how ignorance, risk and uncertainty were evaluated and handled by the society. Thus, a new perspective on questions such as of the role science played, of the legitimacy of environmental policy and of the significance of political consultation is developed. The reports on forest damage, which are sometimes political, sometimes scientific in character, and their scientific and environmental political reception are described on the basis of the specific characteristics of the Waldsterben discourse. In so doing it becomes apparent that the Waldsterben debate has to be evaluated irrespectively of the scientific question of whether the forest damage had been »real« (a question which – even in retrospect – can not be answered). When science was neither able to offer reliable probability statements and prognosis nor able to
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deliver alternative options for action and scientific expertise did not come to an unequivocal result which would have been usable in political terms in regard to the Waldsterben, all decisions on this matter were genuinely political. Environmental policy could confine itself to an already existing space of action and make path-dependent decisions. If one accepts the assumption that the Waldsterben played a significant role in the context of the ecological modernisation of the Federal Republic, one has to consider the Waldsterben debate as an early example of a society which was able to successfully handle the environmental issues of uncertainty and ecological risks even when it was under strong compulsion to act.