Religious Globalisation in Post-war Europe

Spiritual Connections and Interactions*

Post-war Europe is usually portrayed as a secular age, in which the importance of religion was dwindling. Certainly in Western Europe it seemed that the time when Christianity still dominated had come to an end, at least in most parts of the continent, but also in the perception of those who had long before abandoned traditional Christian faith. However, if the old Christian churches were apparently done for – and appearances can be misleading – »magic« and spirituality suddenly broke through in the decade of change. »Searching for God« was how one enthusiastic post-war baby-boomer described the search for an antinomian alternative to materialism and rationality in the 1960s.¹

The search spanned the four corners of the globe, but mainly focussed on Asia – from Japanese Zen gardens to intriguing Indian gurus and mysterious lamas of the high Himalayas, with the odd magic mushroom from the Amazon and Native American prairie dances thrown in for good measure. British, Dutch, Scandinavians, Germans, Italians and French all joined the global quest – some South and East Europeans did not dispose of the liberty to do so, though it is highly unlikely that they were totally unaware of what was happening in the »Free World«. And no one was better placed than the Beatles, from Liverpool, to illustrate the oriental predisposition of the »spiritual sixties«, with their memorable (though not entirely successful) visits to the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the references to Hare Krishna by George Harrison (»My Sweet Lord«) and the Buddhist inclinations of John Lennon, though they merely followed the example set forth before them by others. At times it seemed that every icon of the pop world or Hollywood had his or her guru, embarking upon retreats and meditating.

The spirituality of the 1960s, however, is not the first thing that comes to mind today when reflecting on a global perspective on religion in Europe. The dechristianisation – I largely prefer that term to the chameleonic concept of secularisation² – was certainly a

* This article is written in the framework of a discussion on religious globalisation. Although I discuss Asian religions I do not pretend to be a specialist in any of them or having done primary source research on them. Most material I used were secondary sources from the Doe/Moffitt libraries of the University of California, Berkeley, as well as at my home university in Leuven, but the Internet, and particularly Wikipedia – I thought it should be said – proved a most valuable source of information for this research as well. Most research and writing for this article took place when I was PP Rubens Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. I thank the members of Dutch Studies for their hospitality, in particular Jeroen Dewulf, as well as the Flemish Interuniversity Council and the Flemisch Community for making this stay possible.


² There were times »secularisation« referred to the decline of religion in modern society. As this appeared empirically incorrect, it has quietly been broadened in ways to encompass all forms of religious change (E. g. David Martin suggests »thinking [about secularisation] in terms of successive Christianizations followed or accompanied by recoils«; David Martin, On Secularization. Towards a Revised General Theory, Aldershot 2005, p. 7), which largely renders the concept redundant. Another problem is that theorists of secularisation sometimes shift between religion and institutionalised religion (churches), de facto restricted to Christianity, which turns the concept into a sociological version of the Heisenberg principle. Although presented as a sociologi-
transnational European phenomenon as well (global, however, it emphatically was not, as Christianity was about to embark on a new phase of global expansion, largely originating in the United States). Even if the churches the world over retained an important position in society and particularly with regards to the rites of passage – the importance of which should not be underestimated – in some way or another in all of Western Europe, Christian churches lost ground as less and less people practiced and the basic understanding of traditional Christian faith evaporated: One can argue that, to a large extent, an exculturation of Christianity in Europe took place (Danièle Hervieu-Léger).

Certainly there were important differences in scope and pattern between European countries and regions, including between confessions – between Catholics, Lutherans, and Reformed (including Anglican) – and between countries as diverse as Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland. Nevertheless, some similar trends were observable in all of Western Europe – Orthodox Europe is another matter, in part because most Orthodox countries (including Greece) for the most part did not enjoy basic civil liberties, among which religious freedom. The latter fact makes it still difficult to include Eastern Europe in an encompassing assessment of the post-war period, also after 1989. But it can be reasonably stated that an evolution towards dechristianisation, religious indifference and pluralism is by far the dominant development in Western Europe.

The main question of this article is if, and if so to what extent and through which channels and processes, these and other changes in the religious landscape were the result of what is usually called globalisation. Globalisation certainly is the latest buzz word for something that has always existed, but one can argue that it developed a new dimension in the 1960s, and especially so in the 1990s. The term mainly refers to the different connections and interactions between units from all over the globe. The technological advances, especially with regard to communication, made the world appear much smaller: Television projected images from far away into the household, and later the Internet created instant and visual connections between the four corners of the world, while affluence and increased shipping possibilities opened up markets, creating, so it seems, global capitalism. In that respect, globalisation is often seen as one expression, if not the core, of a new phase of capitalist development, the creation of a new world system (Emmanuel Wallerstein). Such a view on globalisation leaves little space for religion, though there are examples of scholars who have developed a theory of religious globalisation against the backdrop of the world system analysis.

Globalisation is often associated with its effects – the presumed homogenisation and glocalisation of cultures, for example, or the question of whether it increases or, in contrast,

cal theory, it is more meaningful to consider the concept as a narrative conveying an underlying presumption that modernity and religion/Christianity are fundamentally incompatible. This narrative, however, is based on an ill-conceived view of modernity associated with rationalism and individualism and opposed to »tradition«. This is, however, not the place to develop my criticism on this. The latest state of the art in: Callum Brown/Michael Snape (eds.), Secularisation in the Christian World. Essays in Honour of Hugh McLeod, Farnham 2010.


reduces poverty (both have their advocates) and whether it ruins or benefits the environment (there are few who argue the latter) – but these effects (which in the meantime should have become clear) are not that easily understood. Once Europe was the motor of globalisation – roughly from the sixteenth to the early twentieth century – but this is no longer the case.

In discussing religious globalisation, one has in the past mainly referred to the expansion of Christianity from out of Europe as the result of mission. My purpose, however, is rather to assess how religious developments elsewhere had an impact on Europe and how Europeans somehow connected with people from other continents with regard to religion. However, globalisation is never a one way process – and not necessarily between equals. I will not focus on how religious developments in Europe affected other regions, nor make systematic comparisons, but I will need to take a closer look at Europe’s religious identities. Although the major part of the following article is devoted to the contemporary period after the Second World War, I adopt a long-term perspective, meaning that I will begin my analysis at the end of the nineteenth century (II.). I will then discuss the different ways in which globalisation opened up Europe, sweeping aside its main symbolic boundaries and allowing, in particular, non-European religions and spiritualities to proliferate, at least to some extent (III.).

With regard to these non-European religions and spiritualities, I will devote much time on Asian religions, especially Buddhism and Hinduism, but without leaving out the significance of Islam and American Christianity which are covered more extensively in other chapters of this volume. While the traditional emphasis lay on the role of the West in the globalisation process, I will argue that far more agency must be placed with others: Americans with regard to American (Evangelical) Christianity, but also Asians with regard to Asian religions and spiritualities. I indeed come to the conclusion that Europe was the target of sustained and eventually successful missionary efforts, though the subject of specifically Asian missions was not particularly on spirituality or religion, but often a spiritual commodity. The commodification of spirituality indeed was not just the result of a Western capitalist development (IV.). Nevertheless, there was also a demand for non-European spiritualities driven by deep cultural transformations in both Europe and North America (V.). I will emphasise these issues mainly with regard to Asian religions and spiritualities, and will discuss the impact of globalising Christianity and Islam in a separate paragraph (VI.). In the conclusion I will mainly assess the modalities of religious globalisation, which includes a particular reappraisal of some recent developments (VII.).

However, before venturing into this analysis, I first need to reflect on some basic concepts and terms, including the meaning of Europe (I.).

I. COMING TO TERMS

I have already indicated that I will restrict Europe largely to north-western Europe. Also, in the period under review, Europe was part of that even vaguer and in many respects problematic notion of the West. I will occasionally use that term as well, as I will do with the even more problematic the East. When I refer to the West, I just mean Europe and North America, excluding any other country (Israel, Latin America, Japan). But in some respects Europe and North America were so entangled and similar that separating them is not always useful. I will avoid speaking about the East, unless it is with regards to the orientalist, mythical construction without clear geographical location.

Europeans, including scholars, emphasise European diversity as an essential feature, if not the core of the continent’s identity. Religion is sometimes invoked as an element of that diversity – together with language, ethnicity, and nation. But as language and religion are important markers of ethnicity, they often coincide. They are also believed to lay at the basis of the innumerable violent conflicts that haunted the continent for centuries. These are real enough – if something characterises Europe it is the history of quasi permanent fighting between its inhabitants, leading to attempts in the modern age to dominate, purify and, eventually, exterminate those who were deemed to be ‘outsiders’. In this perspective, major religions in Europe were and still are viewed as non-European. That was the case with Judaism – culminating in the Holocaust – for centuries and is mainly the case with Islam today.

However, from the outside it is not the image of diversity that prevails, but rather one of homogeneity, certainly in comparison with civilisations that in my view are far more diverse than Europe, such as South and Southeast Asia. For the outsider, Europe appears almost inevitably as a Christian continent, and these ‘outsiders’ nowadays certainly include the vast majority of immigrants. However, the dominant self-perception of Europe today is as a secular and tolerant continent. This is promoted nowadays in particular against Islam by the ethically ‘liberal’ extreme Right – the most outspoken representative being the Dutch Freedom and Progress Party (PVV) of Geert Wilders, – and ‘leftists’ such as the famous German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas and the Dutch writer Benno Barnhard. In some cases they join the ‘anti-Islamic racism’ of neo-fascists and populists such as the Front National in France, the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang in Flanders and Thilo Sarrazin in Germany. Strangely enough, in a radical turn from past appreciations, Joseph Ratzinger, alias pope Benedict XVI, has also defended such views. It has become fashionable, e.g. in the work of Christopher Caldwell, to link secularism, tolerance and Christianity as European values in contrast to Islam.

The remarkable difference between European opinion-makers and intellectual and scholarly elites from the Extreme Right to the Far Left on the one hand, and so-called outsiders on the other, is not just a problem of distance (from a distance, differences always tend to fade). In the case of migrants, two elements come into play. First, most of them are Muslims, and many Muslims emphasise the conflict with Christendom (even if Islamic-Christian relations were not always, nor only characterised by conflict, far from it). This perception no doubt colours their views on Europe, the more so as many Muslims do not today, in contrast to Christians, distinguish between the public and the private, between politics and faith (actually the practice is, as always, somewhat more com-

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9 If religion was a main factor in these conflicts, as is the generally held conviction (part of the secularist self-understanding of Europe), is highly questionable, though not the issue in this chapter (in the main twentieth century conflicts religion played no primary role). See the thought-provoking and ground-breaking volume by William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence. Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict, Oxford 2009.
plex, in the case of Muslims as well as for Christians, e.g. the Holy See did neither until the Second Vatican Council). In addition, both radical Muslims and Westerners (Christian and secular) tend to cultivate a view on the historical relations between Islam and the West as a conflict between world religions, as a »clash of civilizations« (Samuel Huntington).

This brings me to a second element, that the perception of Europe rarely was a secular one when European countries waged war against non-Western powers and colonised half of the world. Even if colonial regimes were secular, the dictum that after every colonist stood a missionary captured a reality that is hard to deny. Colonial regimes indeed were rarely secular, even if the metropolis was. The clearest example is perhaps Belgium, which introduced the separation of church and state in 1830 – though admittedly this was far from absolute – but in the Belgian Congo (as in Congo Free State) the Roman Catholic Church and the State concluded an almost sacred alliance, that only after the Second World War (though before independence was granted in 1960) was dissolved. In British and Dutch colonies, Christianity constituted the basis of the moral order, while French colonies offered the opportunity for the missionaries to establish a ›modern‹ Christian empire overseas.

When one ventures outside the familiar paths of the recent history of one’s own region and culture, one is quickly confronted by questions of terminology, of which one is often ill prepared. This is especially the case with the term ›religion‹, which obtained its present meaning(s) as nation states carved a ›secular‹ space, a process that already was initiated around 1500 and culminated in the nineteenth century. The concept is thus very closely bound to European history, which makes it difficult to apply elsewhere without imposing underlying assumptions about the secular state. Moreover, as the nature of the nation states profoundly modifies, partly as a result from globalisation, it has been increasingly problematic also for contemporary analysis since the late twentieth century.

In that respect, the term ›spirituality‹ was introduced as an alternative. It has however a similar history as religion, though it is used in more different contexts. It obtained its main significance for emphasising inner life in the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centu-

15 Jeremy Carrette/Richard King, Selling Spirituality. The Silent Takeover of Religion, London 2005, pp. 30–86. They incidentally conclude from the start (p. 3) that ›there is no essence or definitive meaning to terms like spirituality or religion‹.
ries, a significance that Abraham Maslow reinforced in the 1960s as he crafted a new theory of transpersonal psychology in which spirituality functioned as a means towards self-actualisation. Since the 1950s however, the term also became used to designate religious traditions detached from their institutional form. In the 1990s, the term was then appropriated by a wide range of people and interests, and commodified as something that could be bought and sold. It certainly helps to sell a wide range of commodities, both material and immaterial – products as well as dreams. Hence some scholars have again narrowed down its meaning, mainly focussing on the sacralisation of the Self. Stef Aupers and Dick Houtman in particular emphasise the common belief that diverse religious traditions essentially refer to the same underlying spiritual truth. This perennialism indeed constitutes the core of contemporary New Age. Whether this particular understanding of the term can be generalised and applied in a historical context, however, is another matter.

This short reminder, if that is what it is, should not only make us aware of the changed meaning of the terms we use, but especially of the hidden significance and power relations behind them, in particular the expanding national state striving towards secularising and thus monopolising the public space, and the commercial interests behind the marketing of spirituality today. But we also need this information in order to obtain an analytical grasp of our study material, as the ordinary use of terms raises particular problems. A solution is not easily available though – changing the term »religion« with alternatives such as »cosmographic forms« as Daniel Dubuisson suggests (or simpler »cosmologies«) is of not much help. Hence, I decided to adopt a rather pragmatic stance, defining the main concepts in terms of inclusiveness. I use the term »religion« when I refer to Buddhism, Hinduism, or Christianity in general. This is of course problematic for most non-Western »religions«, Hinduism for example, mainly because the term fails to grasp the diversity of Indian spiritualities. To cope with the problem of diversity, I will sometimes speak of Buddhism or Hinduism in the plural. I refer to »denominations« to denote the main strands within these religions (e.g. Mahayana, Vajrayana and Theravada Buddhism), of »churches« with regard to the main Christian institutions (in fact we use the latter term alongside Christian denominations in a European context); I call »schools« rather formal, institutionalised »strands« within denominations (e.g. Pure Land, Zen Buddhism, but also for their subdivisions) and »spiritualities« particular, relatively deinstitutionalised »religious« expressions (emphasising practices rather than cosmologies), but without excluding spirituality (abstract, hence singular) from religion. I will also use »spiritual prac-
tices« to indicate bodily practices with a »spiritual« dimension, such as yoga and meditation, which were sometimes practiced disconnected from a broader religious, denominational or spiritual context. Obviously these terms blur the boundaries between sacred and secular, meaning that any of them becomes more and more difficult to apply and to interpret. They have been viewed as signs of secularisation, but as they introduce religious symbols in secular contexts, they can also be interpreted as signs of a »re-enchantment« of the secular.20 I will return to these issues in my conclusion.

Having »solved« the problem of the terms »religion« and »spirituality«, at least for our purpose, naming the different denominations appears like a walk in the park. Let’s start with the most obvious. As a historian I will not decide who is Christian and who is not. That may seem like a peace of cake, but it is not. Christianity encompasses a number of ideas and principles. While one can easily understand that the way these are interpreted may diverge – as in the innumerable amount of churches and denominations that call themselves Christian – Christian churches, in part as a result of globalisation, came to include non-Christian elements, such as reincarnation or the recognition of new messiahs, which is hard to reconcile with »traditional« Christian understanding. Christian churches have often struggled with it themselves, especially when »new« Christian churches were created, as it was the case with the »Church of Latter Day Saints«, the Unification Church, or Kimbanguism. Some scholars even argue that established Christian churches somehow may become »less Christian«. The American literary critic from Yale, Harold Bloom, for example calls American mainstream Evangelicals no longer Christian but Gnostic, while the Belgian sociologist of religion, Karel Dobbelaere, and his British colleague Steve Bruce also consider changes in theology as a form of »secularisation«.21

That is exactly what I will not do, but historicising in this context may indeed prove the necessity to comment on such developments. Incidentally similar problems exist within other religions as well. The biggest difficulties obviously arise with regard to Hinduism, but paradoxically, because the term is known to be largely an artificial construct, its application is quasi automatically recognised as problematic, raising less issues in practice. That is not the case with Buddhism, whose external boundaries appear more obvious. However, in reality there is an extensive literature and debate, largely connected to the issue of legitimacy through lineage, for example with regard to some movements such as Sōka Gakkai. I will treat these as Buddhist, though remaining appreciative of their »particular« and disputed character.22

The case of Sōka Gakkai brings me to another, more contentious issue, that of sects or cults. Obviously, these terms are all but neutral. They have nevertheless often been used to distinguish dynamic, militant religious groups from the larger, more established and institutionalised churches, which is also the way they are usually understood in common language, albeit that they have often yielded a negative connotation.23 However, based on Ernest Troeltsch’s seminal distinction between three main types of religious behaviour

23 Although: My current students at the University of California at Berkeley use the term »sect« for any religion or religious association: Catholicism, Protestantism, Mahayana Buddhism and so on, are all considered to be »sects«. A shift in meaning that dictionaries apparently have not yet noticed.
– churchly, sectarian and mystical – Howard Becker has contrasted sects and cults, defining cult as corresponding to the mystical type of religiosity, referring to small religious groups without strong organisation, very inclusive and emphasising the private nature of personal beliefs, in contrast to hierarchical, exclusive sects with elaborated views on religious doctrine.24

While theoretically thus quite different, in reality these distinctions are far from evident, and religious groups tend to move from one to the other type of religious association. While I will consider these distinctions (which fit perfectly into the theoretical framework that underpins this article), I will avoid the use of these terms as excessive use of them in the past and the rise of the ›anti-cult‹ movement of the 1970s (which actually, in the Troeltsch/Becker trichotomy, is an anti-sect movement) have led to a ›spoiling‹ of them. Partly as a reaction against this confusion, social scientists invented the term ›new religious movements‹, which is supposed to be more ›neutral‹. But as these new religious movements have in common only that they appeared ›new‹ in the perception of the largely amnesiac public of the 1980s, the term has only limited value (though it has proven to be very effective in obtaining research funds).25 Nevertheless, I do use it as an encompassing term to convey the general meaning.

This assessment follows the one I published in the 2009 issue of this journal, in which I appraised the major changes that had taken place in the religious landscape in Europe from the 1950s following Grid-Group Cultural Theory, which to some extent also underpins this research.26 I argued that European societies became individualised as a result of a double evolution, which particularly came to the fore with regard to religion. On the one hand, social order and hierarchies declined, leading the public to stop following established traditions and practices, and appear seemingly master of their own decisions. On the other hand, social boundaries evaporated, leading to less social cohesion and an increased interaction and hybridisation. Globalisation contributed to both processes. The confrontation with other lifestyles, underpinned by growing affluence, mobility and higher education, undermined traditional power structures, if only by pointing at alternatives. But it is especially in the decreasing boundaries that globalisation is expressed: in the appearance of new religions, in ecumenism and deconfessionalisation, in breaking through the secular-religious divide, in the increased orientation on this world instead of the afterworld, and in the abandonment of the ›missionary ideal‹.

All these developments, so my argument goes, lead to a situation of religious ›amnesia‹ which allows people to ›pick and choose‹, creating their own ›Weltanschauung‹ from a


wide variety of religious and spiritual elements, looking for the source of the sacred in either oneself or nature or mother earth. The effects on one's personal life becomes rather dependent on context and circumstances, and is seldom lasting or consistent. I concluded in my assessment that there are, however, signs of a reversal, of a search for new boundaries and new hierarchies, new certainties and new religiosities. In the following, I will adopt a long-term perspective again and include some of the same developments, but focus on the impact and significance of globalisation.

II. MODERN EUROPE IN THE WORLD

One cannot reasonably discuss the impact of globalisation in Europe from roughly the 1950s – that is after the immediate post-war reconstruction which, depending on country and circumstances, emphasised restoration or renewal – without proper understanding of modern Europe and its relationship with the rest of the world (which means that we distinguish between modern Europe, which starts somewhere in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and a post-modern or, preferably, contemporary period from the late 1950s onwards).27

First of all it is necessary to situate Europe in a colonial-imperial perspective, especially as most European countries possessed important colonial territories on other continents. However, a case could be made that countries which did not colonise outside Europe to some extent shared the same European culture and were somehow also marked by the imperial and colonial perspective: An Orientalising attitude existed elsewhere also, rather than only in the main colonial powers. That being said, the relationship between colony and metropolis was complex; by no means were colonial possessions just territorial extensions of the metropolis, not even if that was formerly the case (as for French Algeria), if only because the native population never enjoyed the same rights and privileges as the Europeans. Among the many distinctions that were made, the most intrusive was that of race, arguably more omnipresent in the colony than in the metropolis (save for the time when fascists promoted racial exclusion and even extermination in Europe itself). It is only one aspect which shows to what extent the colonies differed from the metropolis.

In this respect I have to return to the issue of the Christian mission. I have already referred to the intense entanglements between colonial politics and missions: Even if colonial and imperial politics were officially declared secular, as in French and British colonies, this distinction was rarely perceived that way, even if colonised populations did recognise the rhetoric of distinction and sometimes used it to their advantage.28 Catholics as well as Protestants invested massively in missions, especially in Africa and Asia, in the nineteenth and (first half of the) twentieth century. In some colonies there were more missionaries than colonial administrators (in the Belgian Congo missionaries outnumbered administrators three to one). Missionaries did much more than evangelise. They also built hospitals and schools, spreading European culture and values. As the latter contained principles of human dignity, liberty and emancipation, they actually had the potential to undermine the colonial project, even though that was certainly not the purpose: apart from spreading God’s message, missions were supposed to encroach values of order, civility and obedience.


It was particularly the American Evangelical Christian missions, including notable efforts to spread the *Christian Gospel* in late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which influenced anti-colonial eschatological revolt movements.\(^{29}\) Indian nationalists for example were educated by Methodists, just as at least one faction of Congolese nationalists had their roots in Catholic Action.\(^{30}\) In addition, missionaries gathered information and knowledge about colonial lands (including geography, biology, and botany) as well as history and local culture that was diffused in Europe as well. Their activities contributed strongly to establishing complex ties between European and colonial populations. The information they spread and the support they solicited in Europe, for example the money that was raised, created solidarity and connections, but also confirmed the fundamental inequality between Europeans and others.

Missionaries were not the only ones who gathered information. Scholars did so too, inspiring philosophers and writers. They often focussed on Asian religions. Many became converts themselves, and learned societies were also meeting places for converts, helping to propagate Asian religions. Indeed, religious studies, cultural critiques, exoticism (or Orientalism) and religious (mostly Buddhist) practice or experiment, occasionally combined with an interest in spiritism, often amalgamated, as was the case with Theosophical societies and, to some extent, with Buddhist or Hindu associations such as the »Society for Buddhist Mission« founded by the German Indologist Karl Seidenstücker (1876–1936) in 1903, the »Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland« founded by the Englishman Allan Bennett (1872–1923), alias Ananda Metleya, in 1907, and the »Société des Amis du bouddhisme«, established in Paris in 1929.

Orientalism, while sustaining imperialism and colonialism, also became associated with Western cultural critique.\(^{31}\) This comes to the fore especially with regard to Theosophy, a blend of Eastern and Western esoteric traditions. Its founders and advocates – Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891), colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907), William Quan Judge (1851–1896), and Annie Besant (1847–1933) – studied Eastern religions, in particular Hinduism and Buddhism, and propagated them in North America as well as in Europe. Theosophy, part of the esoteric »secret religion of the middle class« (Wouter Hanegraaff), was in many ways a global religion, active all over the globe and profoundly influenced by Eastern religions.\(^{32}\) It split up into different factions and »denominations« in the twentieth century, but continued to function as a cultural broker between East and West, creating and sustaining to a large extent this mythical dichotomy.

Annie Besant even heralded Jiddu Narahina Krishnamurti (1895–1986) as the next Theosophical Messiah, the incarnation of Lord Maitreya. Krishnamurti himself would repudiate this claim and went on to develop a spirituality in Europe independent of the Theosophical Society. Scholars, Theosophists and early converts – not seldom unified in a single person – also provided sacred texts: The »discovery«, editing and translation of

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30 The issue is complex though, as this »emancipating« strand in Congo was introduced by Belgian Catholics only in the early 1950s, with some antecedents in the 1930s.


32 There exists no real scientific synthesis on the development of Theosophy. See esp. Wouter Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture. Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought, Leiden 1998, and Frédéric Lenoir, La rencontre du bouddhisme et de l’Occident, Paris 1999, pp. 186ff., for the relation between Theosophy and Buddhism. The most renowned strand, Anthroposophy (created by Rudolf Steiner in Germany between 1907 and 1912), however, concentrated on Western esoteric traditions, integrating key elements of Christianity, but much less Eastern elements; Geoffrey Ahern, Sun at Midnight. The Rudolf Steiner Movement and Gnosis in the West, Cambridge, MA 2009.
sacred texts were an important part of the process of invention of world religions. Asian religions and spiritualities were «created» somehow tailor-made for the West, while at the same time emphasising some particularities. This, however, was not a purely «academic» process, as Westerners used their study as a means to criticise Western society and look for an alternative. But it was not a purely Western endeavour either.

Some Asian and African leaders and intellectuals indeed were influenced by Western esoteric views and practices, Transcendentalism and New Thought, but they combined it with their own ideas and concepts, rooted in their own history and culture as well as elsewhere (Islam offered powerful alternatives), creating new religious reform movements and interpretations of old traditions. Incidentally, the drive towards reform sometimes existed before the coming of the Westerners, as was the case for example in Ceylon and Thailand. Anyway »Modern Buddhism« and »Modern Hinduism« (which rather should be used in the plural, as there may have been many »modern« forms of Buddhism, yoga, and so on) came about as hybrid religious and political movements. Some of these reformers indeed did not so much advocate religious reform, but rather anti-colonial and anti-imperial revolt, or had other domestic strategies. The Buddhist denomination Sōka Gakkai, based on the dissident Japanese Buddhist tradition of Nichiren Shōshū, for example, has its roots in a Japanese movement for educational reform »Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai« (Value-Creation Education Society).

The Indian reformer and charismatic founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, Swami Vivekananda, born Narendranatha Dutta (1863–1902), incidentally made no secret of his opinion that Hinduism was morally superior to Christianity, which illustrates how views on religious universality and ecumenism corroborated with anti-colonial nationalism, »Hindu-nationalism« in Vivekananda’s case, »Buddhist nationalism« in the case of the Singhalese Anagarika Dharmapala (Don David Hewavitarne, 1864–1933) and the Japanese Zen master Shaku Sōen (1859–1919). Dharmapala, the main architect of the representation of Buddhism as a fundamentally peaceful and »scientific« religion, indeed believed Buddhism to be superior to Western religions as well. The »Parliament of World Religions«...
Religions» in Chicago in September 1893 offered a huge platform for such reformers. Some grasped the opportunity to travel and teach in the West, particularly in the United States, but also, in the case of Vivekananda and Dharmapala, in Europe. Zen Buddhism would be propagated mainly by Shaku Ŧōen’s English speaking and university educated pupil Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki (1870–1966).\(^{36}\)

Both as a result of their and their followers’ efforts and those of Theosophists, the main Asian religious systems, especially Theravada Buddhism (considered as the most authentic), found a foothold in Europe in the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century. A few Westerners joined the »Theravādin sangha« as monks in Asia, some staying for years, some returning at some point to spread the Buddhist faith in the West. Some of these converts created institutional platforms for the development of Eastern religions. One of the first Western Buddhist monks, Allan Bennett, who took the vows in 1902, established the Buddhhasana Samagama or the International Buddhist Society in 1903, and as mentioned four years later the »Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland«.

His example was followed by the German Anton Gueth (1878–1957) alias Nyanatiloka Thera, in 1904. Gueth constituted the Island Hermitage for Western monks in Ceylon in 1911, and a number of Germans or German-speakers followed him there.\(^{37}\) Paul Dahlke (1865–1928) built the first Buddhist monastery, »Das Buddhismische Haus«, in 1923 in Leipzig, the place where Karl Seidenstücker had founded the »Society for Buddhist Missions. Together with Georg Grimm (1868–1945) Seidenstücker also established the »Buddhist Parish for Germany« in Munich in 1921. The German lama Ernst Lothar Hofmann (1898–1985) alias Anagarika Govinda, was initially devoted to Theravada Buddhism but had been impressed by Tibetan Buddhism since 1931, creating the Arya Maitreya Mandala as a means to propagate Tibetan Buddhism in 1933.\(^{38}\) In England, the Buddhist Theosophist and later High Court Judge, Christmas Humphreys (1901–1983), created a Buddhist Lodge within the Theosophical Society in 1924. This Buddhist Lodge, re-baptised the London Buddhist Society, split from the Theosophical Society in 1926. Fundamentally ecumenical from its very conception, the London Buddhist Society stimulated the interest and proliferation of all Buddhist schools and denominations, also after the Second World War.\(^{39}\)

Also in Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Hungary and Italy (Giuseppe Tucci), Buddhist groups were formed, though they remained small and ephemeral.\(^{40}\) Zen Buddhism, mainly as presented by Daisetsu T. Suzuki, was popularised in Europe by authors such as Rudolf Otto (1869–1937), Eugen Herrigel (1884–1955), Hubert Benoît (1904–1992) (who translated Suzuki’s work in French), Robert Raam Linssen, founder of the »Center for New Philosophies and Sciences« in Brussels in 1935, Christmas Humphreys in the 1930s, and


\(^{38}\) On Buddhism in Germany see Martin Baumann, Deutsche Buddhisten. Geschichte und Gemeinschaften, Marburg 1993.


\(^{40}\) Baumann, Buddhism in Europe.
above all Alan Watts (1915–1973) who, already in 1936, had published »The Spirit of Zen«, but who would gain worldwide popularity from the late 1950s onwards. Each of them interpreted Zen in his own way, often infusing it with ideas stemming from different origins, in particular Taoism, and trying to show the relevance of Buddhism to modern science, in particular psychology.41

Some early converts publicised their experiences and views in books (e. g. Allan Bennett, »The Religion of Burma«, 1911, and »The Wisdom of the Aryas«, 1923; Ernst Lothar Hoffmann, »Die Grundgedanken des Buddhismus und ihr Verhältnis zur Gottesidee«, 1920; Maurice Magre, »Pourquoi je suis bouddhiste«, 1928). Writers such as the Belgian-French adventurer, Buddhist and Theosophist Alexandra David-Néel (born Louise Eugénie Alexandrine Marie David, 1868–1969) and the German Nobel Prize winner Hermann Hesse (1877–1962), author of the immensely popular novel »Siddhartha« (1922), and later documentary and filmmakers, popularised romantic and mystical images of the East, in particular of Tibet and Tibetan religion and spirituality, during the inter-war and post-war periods.42 However, Westerners also looked for publications by Asian »masters« and gurus, who complied more than willingly. In Germany, and probably also in other non-English speaking countries where Asians passed by infrequently and even more rarely settled, publications and letters from Asian masters and gurus became particularly important. It obviously led to an even greater variety of interpretations and adaptations to particular national traditions.

A telling example is Aryan yoga, as propagated by Sigmund Feuerabendt (*1928) at the first yoga school in Germany in Speichersdorf near Bayreuth (at least until c. 2000). This school was established in 1939 by Boris Sacharow (1899–1959), who learned yoga from correspondence with the ashram of Swami Sivananda Saraswati in Rishikesh, without having any direct contact with any guru. Rarely Asian gurus or masters passed by in Europe before the 1960s. The main exception arguably is the Indian Selvarajan Yesudian (1916–1998), who established another yoga school in Hungary. Yesudian became very popular and influential in German-speaking Europe after the Second World War, when he established himself in Switzerland.43

During the first half of the twentieth century, it was mainly the mystical East that inspired Europeans who looked for an alternative worldview. However, two new superpowers offered different alternatives, the Soviet Union and the USA. The first attempted to eradicate religion and stimulated secularism beyond its borders, while the United States under pressure from Evangelicals manifested itself as another kind of »moral empire«. Europe became the subject of American efforts to impose its views on morality, religion and the relationship between church and state.44 After the Second World War, as part of an anti-communist crusade, some American preachers toured through Europe. Billy Graham (*1918), the most famous among them, attracted hundred of thousands in football stadiums. According to Alana Harris and Martin Spence, their success illustrates a »hitherto unexplored shift in post-war England towards new configurations of religiosity«. Ac-

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According to them, American preachers managed to convey a message of authenticity, at once appealing to personal freedom and self-expression and offering answers that revitalised historical traditions, real as well as imagined, in face of the Communist threat.

In fact though, these features were less novel than it appears. Such charismatic figures, using the most modern means of communication, have also generated similar revivals in Europe’s history, actually functioning as ‘yeast in the dough’ – Harris and Spence’s assessment inevitably calls to mind the charismatic personality and preaching methods of the Social Gospel by the Belgian Father Joseph Cardijn (1882–1967), the founder of the Catholic Youth Movement in the 1920s and 1930s. In contrast to the USA – though one should not overestimate it – these renewals originated within the institutional framework and eventually reinforced it. Billy Graham and Patrick Peyton, however, came as outsiders, though – in contrast to Dwight L. Moody (1837–1899), for instance – they effectively adapted their language and carefully avoided what they believed would alienate them from their European public. Nevertheless their success did not last – though especially Graham may have sowed the seeds for later. In the meantime, European universities continued to function as sources of knowledge and learning for Christians in the rest of the world. European theology after the Holocaust (Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hannah Arendt, Karl Barth) led the basis of new forms of theology and philosophy even up to the 1950s. Catholic «Nouvelle Théologie» constituted the basis of a more radical renewal, Liberation Theology, which then, in turn, would inspire Europe in the 1970s and 1980s.

Neither the American Evangelicals nor Buddhists, Hindus, nor even Theosophists were able to carve out more than the proverbial niche for themselves, though arguably Theosophy did attract quite a number of followers in the artistic and intellectual milieus. If one adopts a more general view, Europe appears «closed» – emphasising its external borders – and relatively hierarchically structure, establishing relatively firm divisions between class, gender, ethnicity, and «Weltanschauungen», which include confessions. The Second World War did put an end to many of these divisions, temporarily perhaps – while also reinforcing some – but on the whole they were resumed (obviously not exactly the same way) after a transitional period. The attempts at «breakthrough», which also engaged Christians and secularists, were effectively dwarfed, and internal order restored, even if inter-

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nal dissidence, particularly in the Catholic Church, continued— but, then again, the established order had always been challenged and criticised.  

III. OPENING BORDERS

Somewhere in the (late) 1950s and 1960s, a series of fundamental changes transformed the European society, as comes particularly to the fore with respect to the place of religion. Certainly the confrontation with other lifestyles and cultures, along with increased affluence and leisure time, and, especially the democratisation of education, contributed to undermine established hierarchies and patterns of behaviour. But this confrontation also came about as a result of a fast erosion of boundaries. In this respect one can particularly refer to the ‘Americanisation’ of European economy and industry, of consumption and popular culture. Perhaps more important was the communication revolution— though penetrating research on the impact of television in the 1960s and the Internet in the 1990s on lifestyles largely lacks. Contemporary research on the impact of television mainly looked at how it affected the use of leisure time and undermined associational culture, and thus social cohesion, but not quite how it impacted on religious and moral beliefs and practices. There are indications though that television presented alternative worldviews and spiritual practices, which incited curiosity and sometimes inspired people to go looking elsewhere. The success of Tibetan Buddhism for example is certainly stimulated by television documentaries and movies.

A factor whose importance is hard to assess is European decolonisation, which in my view encompasses much more than individual countries becoming politically independent from colonising empires, but (here, in this context) refers to European nations ceasing to be and ceasing to aim at being colonial empires. Indeed, the immediate post-war decolonisation did not necessarily imply yet that European nations thought their role as colonial empires was over—in fact quite the contrary. One could argue that it took until the latter 1950s/early 1960s before most Europeans fully realised that the colonial or imperial era was over, even if major colonies had already gained independence immediately after the Second World War. It is often noted that the Suez crisis of 1956 signified the end of Europe’s colonial dreams, correctly in my mind, though some European countries continued to possess colonial possessions until deep into the twentieth century.
Of course, the Second World War had more than one effect on decolonisation, not only the various stimuli given to decolonisation movements, but also by discrediting European racism. Anti-Semitism quickly evaporated – though some remnants still pop up now and again, often in surprising contexts – but also other forms of racism became increasingly untenable and were marginalised, first in Europe and then – with notable delay – in the colonies. Moreover decolonisation did not imply that the new countries that gained their political independence had become fully independent. It does mean however that a new relationship had to be imagined. The boundary between the European countries and the post-colonial countries indeed became more permeable, but not necessarily equal.

That the boundaries became more permeable comes to the fore in the arrival of migrants from the former colonies, though in this respect differences prevail: Some countries for different reasons did not host many people from the colonies (Germany, Belgium), some gave them (or some of them) citizenship (United Kingdom; France with respect to Algerians), others with strict restrictions (the Netherlands). But Europe welcomed (if that is the right word…) migrants especially for the purposes of labour in the 1950s and 1960s, and afterwards especially political and economic refugees. In the 1950s, most labour migrants, guest workers as they were called in Germanic languages, were either East, Central or, mainly, Southern Europeans (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), and in the following decade mainly from North Africa and Turkey – most of them Muslims.

Although I will return to this question below (though I will not focus on Islam in Europe), a few observations must be made here and now. Firstly, the treatment of the guest workers in the 1950s – most of which Christians (Catholics, some Orthodox) – did not substantially differ from the later Muslims, in part because religion did not really matter much, as they came to work and generally kept their faith invisible, in part because both immigrant Christians and Muslims were perceived as outsiders by the autochthonous Europeans and treated as such. Though it was not (yet) the most important factor, for both Muslim and Christian immigrants in Northwest Europe, religion was part of what defined them as outsiders – even Polish or Italian devotions in the eyes of northwestern Europeans, even if they were Catholics, looked equally unfamiliar in the 1950s as Islamic practices.

Secondly, Islam became the second religion in Western Europe, but it was the religion of isolated (though quite large) groups of mostly low skilled immigrants which hardly proselytised, though there were some exceptions – in itself a most remarkable observation in a historical perspective, as Islam is one of the most missionary religions in human history, together with Christianity and Buddhism. Arguably the main reason for this relative absence of proselytising is social: The European Muslims as immigrant workers are, and still are after three generations, considered outsiders. It is indeed only recently, in my view, that Islam has slowly begun to progress within the autochthonous white population, due to the increased contact and intermingling of third or fourth generation


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Muslims with autochthonous youth. This was different for so-called Eastern religions, even if some migrants, though not ›guest workers‹, did play a role in their dissemination.

IV. SELLING SPIRITUALITY

With regard to the dissemination of Asian religions and spiritualities, it is perhaps useful to adopt a market metaphor and to distinguish between ›offer‹ and ›demand‹, and to include the role of ›mediators‹ or cultural brokers. A countercultural as well as a scholarly interest in Eastern religious and spiritual traditions had become ›endemic‹ in Europe since the nineteenth century. It sustained Buddhism and some form of Hinduism during the inter-war years and allowed them somehow to survive the Second World War, even in Germany and Austria. Theosophy often offered a platform of contact between East and West. In the United Kingdom the London Buddhist Society in the 1950s and 1960s increasingly functioned as a bridge between pre-war and post-war generations, and as a central knot in a Buddhist web that connected Asia, Europe and North America. The Society also stimulated the development of Buddhism elsewhere in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The Dutch ›Theosophical Society Adyar‹ welcomed several renowned Buddhists from the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Japan, and the USA, including Suzuki, offering accommodation to the Dalai Lama during his visit to the Netherlands in 1973.

The decolonisation of Asia and the increasing international mobility stimulated the coming of Asians to the West. However, one should make a clear distinction between the Asian migrants that retained their religion of origin, but hardly proselytised, and these individuals, monks, teachers, gurus, who came to proselytise. Little interaction existed, certainly in the 1950s and early 1960s, between the two groups, though there are signs of a growing convergence in the 1990s (more below). Incidentally, it appears that the distinction between ›immigrant‹ and ›convert‹ religion – a distinction that has been particularly emphasised with regard to Buddhism – was and still is stronger in Europe than in the United States, where religion functions more as a resource of integration than in Europe.

Speaking about mission in the case of Asian religions may surprise – modern social sciences tend to confine the concept of mission to the monotheistic religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Also specialists on Asia such as Eric Zürcher and Geoffrey Samuel have questioned the relevance of the concept of mission because of the

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55 More below, par. VI. Obviously, speaking about third and forth generation migrants distinguishing between immigrant and ›autochthonous‹ becomes questionable.
56 I borrow this title from Carrette and Kings’ book, but while they refer to a contemporary corporate ›takeover‹ of spirituality, as will become clear in what follows, I mean something quite different.
58 Cf. Warburg, Globalization, Migration and the Two Types of Religious Boundary.
lack of a central missionary authority.\(^{61}\) This is, however, largely playing on semantics. Indeed, Buddhism does not have a centralised church structure directing a mission, but its proselytising ambitions cannot be denied: I do not see why one should limit the concept of mission to a concerted and centralised missionary enterprise, though one can theoretically imagine a distinction between organised mission and unorganised proselytising. Historically, the missionary nature of Buddhism has never been questioned though. That is different with Hinduism, which never proselytised until ›modern gurus‹, transforming a particular current within Bakhti yoga, began to preach to large crowds and to also travel outside South Asia, initiating large numbers of followers in the twentieth century. The introduction of a missionary perspective hence lies at the core of ›modern Hinduism‹.\(^{62}\)

The ›modernisers‹ and ›missionaries‹ usually shared a similar middle-class background and education as their mostly middle-class and educated public in the West,\(^{63}\) that was just as much the case in the 1900s as it was at the end of the twentieth century, even if the outlook of that Western public had changed. Several, though certainly not all, of the Asian ›missionaries‹ had a high academic education in Western academia as well, several of them studied and lectured at Western universities (Chögyam Trungpa and Akong Tulku studied at Oxford, Namkhai Norbu lectured in Naples) and in the United States (e.g. Thich Nhat Hanh). This certainly contributed to their understanding and allowed them to harmonise Western scientific insights with their own Eastern beliefs – as especially Suzuki demonstrated – but also gave them credentials and legitimacy and opened doors to people of influence (one may observe the parallel with Jesuit missionaries propagating Christianity by targeting the elites in Asia in the seventeenth century).

A particular figure in that respect is the Vietnamese Zen Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh, born Nguyễn Xuân Bào (*1926). Already a well-known Buddhist personality in Vietnam, he studied comparative religion at Princeton University in 1960 and lectured in Buddhism at Columbia University. Returning to Vietnam he taught Buddhist psychology and Prajnaparamita literature at the Van Hanh Buddhist University, which he had founded in Saigon in 1956, and further engaged in the protest movement against the war in Vietnam. Out of his involvement with the peace movement he developed a new form of socially and politically oriented »Engaged Buddhism«.\(^{64}\)

Moreover, the spiritualities that were presented to Europeans were usually – with the exception of Tibetan and Thai Buddhism – rather ›modern‹ interpretations that I discussed earlier. This was especially the case for ›Hindu‹ spiritualities – it actually appears impossible to talk about Hinduism as such. What was propagated were rather ›schools‹ or ›sects‹ (Hare Krishna), if not spiritual world views and practices that were sometimes presented as part of a lifestyle, or even just as a practice of self-development, but not as a religion.


\(^{64}\) Patricia Hunt-Perry/Lyn Fine, All Buddhism is Engaged. Thich Nhat Hanh and the Order of Interbeing, in: Christopher S. Queen (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the West, Boston 2000, pp. 35–66.
In this respect, one may think of yoga and meditation, but neither of them is exclusively Hindu, though there are important differences in the conception and practice of meditation and yoga in different religious traditions. Hence, in an essentialising Orientalist mindset they are marketed as quintessentially Eastern, common to the major Asian traditions of wisdom; the differences are then easily put aside and ignored in the West – giving way to new divisions (as e.g. the innumerable forms of contemporary Western yoga).

In this respect the example of Transcendental Meditation (TM) is highly relevant. TM is a form of mantra meditation introduced in India in 1955 by the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi (1917–2008) and presented as a way to God, a scientific version of Hinduism. Offering a universal message integrating different religious and secular perspectives, in particular its therapeutic value (beyond psychology), TM became completely detached from its Hindu origins in the 1970s. Such an evolution was already initiated by Vivekananda more than 50 years earlier and particularly by Paramahansa Yogananda (1893–1952), founder of the Self-Realisation Fellowship, who laid the basis of the development of Kriya yoga in America in the 1930s and presented a secularised form of yoga in the global bestseller Autobiography of a Yogi (1946). Swami Muktananda (1908–1982) expressed similar views with regard to Siddha yoga, as did his successor Swami Gurumayi – who considered Siddha yoga a way of life, not a religion – as well as Swami Vishnu-Devananda (1927–1993), who established Sivananda yoga in the West.

Their conceptions run remarkably parallel to those of New Thought, which emphasised a similar universal spirituality. There were certainly intense connections; at the very least Unitarians offered these Asian reformers a platform in the West, but arguably they did influence their thinking and certainly the phrasing of Eastern spirituality in the West. In this context however, it is also important to keep in mind the transaction that was operated. In the eyes of these Asian reformers, spirituality and spiritual practices were also a commodity that they sold to the West in exchange for support for their social activities in India: »As our country is poor in social virtues, so this country is lacking in spirituality. I give them spirituality and they give me money«, Swami Vivekananda commented during his visit to the USA after his address to the Parliament of Religions in 1893.

While Paramahansa Yogananda and Swami Muktananda went to the West themselves, Swami Sivananda (1887–1963), a medical doctor who became a monk, rarely ventured outside India. However, Sivananda used other means to propagate his interpretation of yoga. His retreat in Rishikesh (where the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi also lived), at the foothills of the Himalaya, became an international ashram which welcomed guests from all over the world who wished to learn yoga and which was taught in English. Many Europeans visited this ashram and made publicity for it, among whom Jean Herbert (1897–1980), who translated and published work of Sivananda and Ramakrishna into French, Lanza del Vasto (1901–1981), follower of Ghandi and founder of the non-violent Community of the Ark, and the French filmmaker Arnaud Desjardins (*1925), who made television films and documentaries on Eastern religions, and who contributed a great deal in making Sivananda known in the French-speaking world (»Ashrams«, 1959; »Voyage au Cœur de l’Inde«, 1960).

Moreover, Sivananda sent his pupils, such as Swami Vishnu-Devananda, to the West. With the Divine Life Society (1936), the All-world Sadhus Federation (1947) and Yoga-Vedanta Forest Academy (1948), among others, Sivananda created a worldwide infrastructure to propagate his views, including a publishing house. A prolific writer, he authored almost 300 books on yoga, vedanta and a variety of other subjects related to Hindu spirituality, health, freedom, security and self-realisation. His mission was continued after his death.  


in 1963.\textsuperscript{67} The most popular form of contemporary yoga in the West, Modern Postural Yoga (MPY), is strongly inspired by Sivananda’s synthetic conception of yoga and is actively propagated in the West at the initiative of its designer, Belur K. S. Iyengar (*1918).\textsuperscript{68}

Likewise the Hare Krishna movement, that would symbolise the Eastern influence of Hinduism on the 1960s like no other, came about as a result of an Indian mission, as Abhay C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada (1896–1977), obeying the call of his master Bimala Prasada aka Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati Thakura (1874–1937), who revived and propagated Gaudiya Vaishnavism, went to the USA to develop the movement there in 1965. Although already then 69 years of age, Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupada created the »International Society for Krishna Consciousness« (ISKCON, or the Hare Krishna movement) as the institutional form of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Although in many ways the absolute opposite of the hippy lifestyle – ascetic, strictly hierarchical and ordered, and increasingly corporate – ISKCON became widely associated with the counterculture and attracted many followers among the youth, spreading over North America (1966–1968), Europe (1968–1973) and back to India (1970–1977).\textsuperscript{69}

However, one can argue as to what extent ISKCON is a ›modern‹ religion as I defined it earlier. But there is no doubt that Zen Buddhism is.\textsuperscript{70} Also Zen was actively promoted by Buddhist monks and teachers such as the Japanese Sōtō Zen master Taisen Deshimaru (1914–1982). The latter came to Europe to propagate Zen Buddhism and the Zazen Meditation Technique in 1965. Though he settled in Paris, where he established the Association Zen Internationale (AZI) and built the La Gendronnière temple in Valaire (near Blois, in the Loire Valley) in 1970, he travelled widely throughout Europe, promoting Zen and training followers.\textsuperscript{71} Buddhist laymen also acted as missionaries in the West, such as the Japanese Professor emeritus Nagaya Kiichi (1895–1993), who returned to Berlin in 1965 to bring Zen to the place where he had studied in his youth.\textsuperscript{72} A particular case is that of Sōka Gakkai, that slowly proliferated in the 1960s as a result of the proselytising efforts of the Japanese wives of Japanese businessmen (in the United States through the Japanese wives of American soldiers).\textsuperscript{73} One may observe that these missionary initiatives did not diverge fundamentally from earlier missionary initiatives, though their numbers increased as the new post-war world order and economy facilitated such movements.

An interesting case is that of Tibetan Buddhism. The occupation of Tibet drove thousands of Tibetans out of the country in the 1950s. Many settled in neighbouring countries, especially Tibetan Buddhist areas in Northern India (Sikkim), Nepal and Bhutan, but many also found refuge in Europe and North America. While most monks concentrated upon the refugee communities, some also took to the road, reconnecting with an ancient tradition that was at the origin of the globalisation of Buddhism. In Switzerland, which wel-

\textsuperscript{67} Altglass, Le nouvel hindouisme occidental, pp. 41–44ff.; Strauss, Positioning Yoga, pp. 47–52.
\textsuperscript{68} De Michelis, A History of Modern Yoga, pp. 194–260; Strauss, Positioning Yoga; Singleton, Yoga Body.
\textsuperscript{70} Lenoir, The Making of Buddhist Modernism, esp. pp. 91–97; Sharf, The Zen of Japanese Nationalism.
\textsuperscript{71} Baumann, Deutsche Buddhismen, pp. 68–81.
\textsuperscript{72} Bluck, British Buddhism, p. 90; Seager, Encountering the Dharma, pp. 146–147.
comed several thousands Tibetan refugees, the monastic Tibet Institute Rikon was established to accommodate the spiritual needs of the refugees in 1968. Though not its initial purpose, the institute would also function as a meeting place for Western converts. Tibet indeed strongly appealed to the Western ‘Orientalist’ imagination. This interest was given a boost during the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Several Westerners travelled to Northern India and Nepal to meet and study with Tibetan lamas, while a number of Tibetan monks visited Europe in the late 1960s and 1970s, preparing the ground for further expansion.

For example, Chögyam Trungpa rinpoche and Akong Tulku rinpoche established Kagyu Samye Ling Monastery in Dumfriesshire, Scotland, in 1968. Lama Thubten Yeshe and Thubten Zopa rinpoche (*1946), the founders of the »Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition« (1975), began teaching Tibetan Buddhism to Westerners at Kopan Monastery in Nepal as early as 1965, offering advanced meditation training from 1971 onwards. Likewise, Kyabje Kalu rinpoche (1905–1989) attracted Western visitors to his retreat centre at Sonada Monastery (Samdrup Thargyay Ling) near Darjeeling in West-Bengal from 1967 onwards. Responding to the demand of his European adepts – it is difficult to establish from whom the original idea came – Kalu rinpoche made a grand tour of Europe in 1971, during which he paid a famous visit to Pope Paul VI. He established a first centre where Westerners could make a Three Year Retreat, Dashang Kagyü Ling (Temple of Thousand Buddhas) in La Boulaye (Saône-et-Loire), the base of a successful expansion in France and beyond. While initially surprised, the seat of the Tibetan community in exile in Dharmapala responded to this Western interest by organising classes and training from 1971 onwards. The main Tibetan Buddhist leaders, such as the 16th Karmapa Lama Rangjung Rigpe Dorje Gyalwa and the Dalai Lama himself, travelled extensively throughout Europe in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s. During that time, Tibetan lamas founded monasteries and centres in Europe belonging to all major traditions of Tibetan Buddhism.

However, not all Buddhist traditions were so actively promoted in the West: »Eastern Theravādins – Sri Lankan, Burmese, or Thai – simply did not come to the West«, Andrew Rawlinson observed, noting that Dharmapala constitutes the exception to the rule, but that Dharmapala’s ideas diverged considerably from Theravadin traditions as they were practiced in either Sri Lanka or further east in Southeast Asia. Still, his affirmation is not entirely true, as Thailand as well as Sri Lanka supported Theravada Buddhism in Europe, for example by subsidising temples, while the Vietnamese Thich Nhat Hanh – whose teachings constitute a synthesis of Mahayana (mainly Zen) and Theravada Buddhism – is one of the most prolific Buddhist sages in the West. Thai monks and laypersons particularly played a role in the development of Theravada Buddhism.

75 Lenoir, La rencontre du bouddhisme et de l’Occident, pp. 291–299; Obadia, Bouddhisme et Occident; idem, Tibetan Buddhism in France; Samuel, Tantric Revisionings, p. 301.
78 Thich Nhat Hanh constituted the (non-Zen) lay monastic »Order of Inter-Being« in 1966, the Unified Buddhist Church (»Église Bouddhique Unifiée«) in 1969 and several meditation centres in France (Sweet Potatoes Meditation Center in 1975 and Plum Village Buddhist Center, a monastery and practice centre in the Dordogne in the South of France, in 1982) and in the United States.
For example, the renowned meditation master Ajahn Chah (1918–1992), after welcoming Westerners at his forest monastery Nong Pah Pong in north-east Thailand, founded the temple (Wat) of Pah Nanachat to host Western followers in 1975. Moreover, after a visit to Britain in 1977, he ordered his favourite pupil and the first abbot of Wat Pah Nanachat, Robert Jackman aka Ajahn Sumedho (*1934), to create a Western branch of Thai Forest Theravada. The Thai Forest Sangha is interesting in more than one respect, as the initiative originates in a tradition that cannot be considered a form of ›Modern Buddhism‹. Though maintaining the continuity with Theravadin traditions was an important concern, some adaptations to monastic life in the West and to demands of the lay adepts nevertheless proved necessary for the very survival of the Sangha, but these adaptations allowed it to become a relatively successful Buddhist school in the West, with viharas and monasteries in Britain (starting with the Cittaviveka Forest Monastery, in Chithurst, Chichester), Switzerland (Kandersteg), Italy (Sezze Romano), the United States and New Zealand.79 Also the Samatha Trust, favouring Samatha Meditation, goes back to the initiative of a Thai, the layman Nai Boonman Poonhathiro (*1932).

A particular case obviously is that of the Unification Church, which few list as ›Eastern‹ even if it does originate from Korea. The Unification Church presents itself as Christian, though as Eileen Barker observed, it has deep roots in Korea’s post-war history.80 But the concept of the ›East‹ obviously refers to an imagined East-West in which an ›Americanised‹ Christian Church does not fit, and which can easily be recognised as an orientalistic construct – the present article has already given a number of elements to send it where it belongs, to the dustbin of history. In the framework of this argument, however, it again demonstrates the flexibility and agency of Asian religious leaders and ›entrepreneurs‹.

V. CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS AND THE CALL OF THE EAST

The 1950s set the tone for the following generations in at least three distinctive ways. I will mainly focus on the interest in Eastern religions as a genuine alternative for established Christianity. This interest is associated with the Beat generation and which was shared by the next generation of hippies in their spiritual quest.81 The most underestimated factor – may be the most important one in the long run but less relevant in the perspective of this article – was the increased desire for ›the body beautiful‹, related to the emerging ›beach culture‹ in California and the Mediterranean which, together with a sense of exoticism, stimulated the interest in bodily techniques from the East. In particular Modern Postural Yoga would benefit from this, a healing ritual of ›secular religion‹ that would develop within the margins of ›sports‹.82

But there was another generation which grew interested in Eastern religions' ability to offer spiritual well-being and psychological healing. This dimension was to develop very

79 Bluck, British Buddhism, p. 10 and 27–64.
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strongly in the United States, to some extent separated from the countercultural revolution of the 1960s, though interaction did exist. In this respect, the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow (1908–1970) must be recognised. He believed people striving towards realising their »full potential«. This underpinned a new holistic therapeutic culture which aimed at self-realisation and self-development (or »self-actualisation«). It inspired many to a spiritual quest and stimulated interest in non-Western modes of finding and of developing the Self.

In Europe too, similar therapeutic dimensions had already been explored in the work of Karl-Gustav Jung (1875–1961), which would influence more than one generation of psychologists and psychoanalysts. Especially noteworthy in this respect is the work of the German psychologist Professor Karlfried Graf Dürkheim (1896–1988), one of the founders of Gestalt Therapy in Germany. He became acquainted with Zen Buddhism in Japan in the late 1930s. After the war he founded the »Existential-Psychological Place of Meeting and Education« in the village of Todtmoos-Rütte (in the Black Forest near the Swiss border), along with Doctor Maria Hippius (1909–2003), a friend of Jung. There they practiced a combination of psychoanalysis, meditation and esoterism, called »initiation therapy«, and focussed on the realisation and conciliation of the Self within the world in a higher dimension. In this context, Zen Buddhist practices are dissociated from their religious origins, mixed with mainly Western esoteric influences and applied in a Western therapeutic setting.

Though the 1960s’ cultural revolution is mostly represented as a secular event, it certainly also contained a spiritual dimension – some have claimed that it heralded a »spiritual revolution« (Robert Ellwood). That may be somewhat overstated, certainly with regard to Europe, but while the 1960s generation rejected the »established« and – in their views – out-dated faith of their parents, the hippies also opposed a world driven by materialism and consumerism. That did not, however, necessarily imply a search for God let alone an interest in religion, but it did lead to all kinds of »mind-expanding« experiences. Drugs – LSD, marijuana particularly – offered one obvious way, but Eastern religions and spiritualities another, not necessarily incompatible path, while esoteric practices – Eastern or Western Pagan – appeared helpful in this respect and an alternative for the bourgeois rationality of their parents. In fact this association of Eastern spirituality and psychedelic experiments existed earlier. It was particularly the British writer Aldous Huxley (1894–1963) who had already connected psychedelic experiments and Eastern spirituality, especially Vedanta and the Tibetan Book of the Dead. Some of the early Buddhist con—

83 Carrette/King, Selling Spirituality, p. 79; Paul C. Vitz, Psychology as Religion. The Cult of the Self Worship, Grand Rapids, MI/Carlisle 1994.
87 Ellwood, Sixties Spiritual Awakening.
88 Baier, Meditation und Moderne, pp. 912–919.
verts – most notably Alan Watts – joined the cultural revolution, and they became Asia’s most effective advocates, though in the process they adapted the ›original‹ messages and practices.

Alan Watts was strongly involved in the London Buddhist Society in his early adult life, most especially studying Zen Buddhism. Watts moved to New York in 1938 and to the San Francisco Bay Area in 1951, where he became associated with the Beat generation and experimented with psychedelic drugs in the 1960s. However, he became most famous worldwide with his writings on Zen Buddhism (›The Spirit of Zen‹, 1936; ›The Way of Zen‹, 1956; »This Is It: and Other Essays on Zen and Spiritual Experience«, 1960), his amalgamation of Buddhist thinking with semantics and psychology (»Psychotherapy East and West«, 1975) and his radical reinterpretation of Buddhism and other oriental spiritualities (»Tao: The Watercourse Way«, 1975; »Buddhism: The Religion of No-Religion«, 1995). He also became acquainted with the German lama Govinda (Ernst Lothar Hoffmann), another key figure in European Buddhism. Though Watts particularly promoted Zen Buddhism, also other Asian religions and spiritualities benefited from the hippie interest in all spiritual things. Monasteries and retreat centres in Northern India and Nepal exercised a particular attraction to Western students in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Though often tolerant towards the inquisitive though disoriented youth and their spiritual quest, the message that these Eastern spiritualities brought was often not one of simple accommodation. Rather they offered a way out »from the self-destructive pandemic during that period‹, which may explain why they actually experienced their major growth in the 1970s and 1980s rather than in the actual 1960s. ISKCON’s »four regulative principles« that each member had to follow, imposing a life of self-restraint (no meat, fish or eggs; no free sex; no drugs, no gambling, drinking, or smoking), can hardly count as typical for the hippie lifestyle. Likewise, Buddhists opposed the use of drugs, alcohol and free sex, emphasising spirituality and an alternative life-style that rejected materialism and consumerism.

There were exceptions though. Kagyu Samye Ling Monastery in Scotland, for example, had a reputation of »sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll« in its early years. Its founder Chögyam Trungpa rinpocche experimented with sex and drugs, though Trungpa sometimes legitimised his somewhat »crazy‹ approach as a teaching method. The Englishman Denis Lingwood (*1925) aka Sangharakshita, who created the »Friends of the Western Buddhist Order« in 1967, became (in)famous for his sexual adventures with young men. But even if in the 1980s Buddhist monasteries and masters were confronted with allegations of licentiousness and sexual abuse, they were exceptions. Some Hindu spiritualities in contrast adopted quite different attitudes, especially towards sex, compared to Christianity. Some considered sex to be a way to God. That was particularly the case with the Rajneesh In—

89 After having created the Arya Maitreya Mandala as an instrument to propagate Tibetan Buddhism in the West in 1933, Hoffmann established several centres in Europe in the 1950s. He published widely, among which: Die Grundgedanken des Buddhismus und ihr Verhältnis zur Gottesidee, Leipzig 1920; Grundlagen tibetischer Mystik, Zürich 1956; The Way of the White Clouds, London 1966; Der Weg der weißen Wolken, Zürich 1969; The Inner Structure of the I Ching, San Francisco 1981; URL: <http://www.komyoji.at/content/lamagovinda.htm> [17.3. 2011].
90 As Coleman, The New Buddhism, pp. 66–72 observes, Zen appealed particularly to the Beats, but was far more difficult to accommodate with the Hippie culture. It is the particular personality of Shunryu Suzuki (1904–1971) who made Sōtō Zen Buddhism popular among the hippies.
92 See the fine analysis of Seager, Encountering the Dharma, pp. 150–151, with regard to Sōka Gakkai.
93 Bluck, British Buddhism, pp. 110f.
ternational Movement (Bhagwan, Neo-Sanyas) and its leader, the Indian mystic Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (Osho, 1931–1990), who promoted »free love« – but exclusive devotion to the movement itself – in the 1980s. 94

It seems that particular interest in Eastern religions and spiritualities grew when European youth travelled to India and Nepal – Tibet being out of reach – in search of an alternative life-style in the late 1960s and 1970s. This travelling was part of the global 1960s, as not only Europeans but also Americans and Australians took the same path. On their journeys they encountered monks and gurus who sent them on a different road towards Enlightenment. Revealing of the transnational processes at work is the case of the American Paula Koolkin (*1958), who arrived in the »world capital of magic« Amsterdam from San Francisco in 1970. After further travelling in the Himalayas with a number of Dutch friends, and with the help of Scottish/Tibetan lamas from Kagyu Samye Ling, she laid the basis of what was to become one of the largest Buddhist institutions in the Netherlands, the Maitreya Institute in 1979. 95 Indeed, many Buddhist centres, and Kagyu Samye Ling in particular, opened their doors to these young seekers, helping to establish other centres throughout the world.

More influential was one of the many European students who journeyed to Nepal in 1968, the Danish student – he studied Philosophy, English and German at the University of Copenhagen – Ole Nydahl (*1941). 96 As so many of his generation he smoked and smuggled hashish. He was, however, caught and imprisoned. After that experience he found deliverance in Buddhist refuge with the 16th Karmapa lama at the Rumtek Monastery in Sikkim, India, in 1969. Three years later he returned to Denmark with the mission – note that the agency lay with the Tibetan lama – to bring the Buddhist teachings to the West. Nydahl did so, quite successfully, establishing the first Karma Kagyu centres in Denmark (Copenhagen), Austria (Graz), Norway, and Sweden in 1972 and Germany in 1974, and finally all over Europe, including Eastern Europe (Poland as early as 1975), the Soviet Union (1989), and the world – presently there are officially over 600 centres worldwide that belong to what became known as Diamond Way Buddhism. Nydahl also organised missions of Tibetan teachers throughout Europe and later the Americas, Russia and Australia.

Though Nydahl initially worked under supervision from the 16th Karmapa and the centres stood in the Karma Kagyu tradition and lineage, his approach to Buddhism was quite unconventional and in many ways adapted to the Western world – the terms »Buddhism light«, »instant-Buddhism«, »life-style Buddhism« have been employed, though this approach seems to have been approved by the highest authorities of the Karma Kagyü Tibetan Buddhist order and any dispute would actually come from within the new movement itself.

Nydahl created a new kind of Buddhism, very typically »Western«. Such an appropriation is somehow common with adaptations by Western converts; hence it is often called »convert Buddhism« in the case of Buddhism. In this respect however, I would rather speak about »neo-movements«, so too with respect to Hinduism. With the term »neo-religions«,

I refer to those ›Asian‹ religious movements that are created, mainly in the West, by Western converts, even if they maintain the lineage of an Asian original, or by Asians who somehow start anew, which may actually imply cutting the lineage that bound them to the tradition. These neo-movements illustrate the new departure that took place in the 1960s. Martin Baumann speaks about »global« Buddhism, but Buddhism, just like Christianity, was already global long before the present wave of globalisation. Incidentally, relations with older, ›established‹ (but ›modern‹) Asian traditions in the West were often strained. The emphasis on the laity, gender equality, and a more relaxed relationship between master and pupil were only the most visible adaptations made to Asian neo-religions when introduced in the West – and the main causes of growing pains as well as of tension with the ›established‹ modern Asian religions in Europe.

One of the most successful ›Neo-Buddhist schools‹ is the »Friends of the Western Buddhist Order« (re-baptised Triratna Buddhist Order in 2010), which was created by Denis Lingwood aka Sangharakshita, after he was dismissed by the English Sangha Trust as head of its Vihara in Hampstead in 1967. The new movement explicitly presented itself as a synthesis of the three major Buddhist denominations and focussed particularly on meditation and yoga, offering very simple basic rules. Sangharakshita, although a fully ordained Buddhist monk and having received education by well-known and respected Buddhist teachers, fully engaged with the counterculture, experimenting with (gay) »sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll«, which further alienated him from the Buddhist establishment in the United Kingdom. It did not hamper the steady growth of the movement though, quite the contrary – by 1980 it was probably the largest single Buddhist organisation in Britain, but allegations of particularly sexual misconduct and authoritarian abuse would continue. Its popularity arguably rests upon the relatively simple and accessible practices offered, but also on its economic enterprises.

A particular case of a Neo-Buddhist movement is the »Order of Buddhist Contemplatives«, which was created by the British born Peggy Kennett (1924–1996) aka Reverend Master P. T. N. H. »Houn Jiyu« Kennett. Kennett was the first Western women to be recognised as a Zen Roshi or master and was sent by Kôhon Chisan to direct the expansion of Sōtō Zen in Britain. She was rejected by the London Buddhist Society in 1964 because she was a woman (!) but went on to found Shasta Abbey in Mount Shasta, California in 1970, developing a monastic form to spread the Serene Reflection Meditation in North America, Britain and continental Europe (Germany and the Netherlands). Within this monastic robe, however, Kennett went quite far in adapting Zen practices within a Western context, including introducing many Christian references – Serene Reflection Meditation is sometimes characterised as »Protestant Buddhism«.

Examples of Neo-Buddhist movements created by Asians would be the so-called New Kadampa Tradition, an international Tibetan Buddhist movement founded by Geshe Kelsang Gyatso in England in 1991, as well as the Japanese Buddhist lay movement Sōka Gakkai International. Emphasising the importance of Western teachers, the New Kadampa Tradition dissociated itself from the Tibetan Buddhist authorities (though claiming, through lama Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, to be faithful to the Gelugpa tradition). It is quite

97 This definition is different from Véronique Altglas’, as her circumscription of Neo-Hinduism corresponds rather with my »modern‹ religion.
98 Bluck, British Buddhism, pp. 152–178.
successful in England and has begun to develop outside the United Kingdom as well, with temples in Spain, Canada, the United States and Brazil. Sōka Gakkai’s worldwide expansion led to tensions with the Nichiren Shōshū priesthood, which refused to recognize Sōka Gakkai in 1991 and excommunicated its charismatic leader Daisaku Ikeda (*1928) and his followers in 1992.

Sōka Gakkai had sometimes been greeted with suspicion and mistrust by traditional Buddhists in Europe already before its excommunication, especially in France where it is not recognised by the interdenominational »Union des Bouddhistes de France«, in part because of its aggressive proselytising or shakubuku (»break and subdue false teachings«), though this is no longer adopted as it once was, as well as out of fear of intrusion in the public sphere – in Japan Sōka Gakkai is strongly involved in politics, though that seems not to be the case in Europe nor the United States. Its original source of inspiration, Nichiren Shōshū, is also considered problematic, as its historical founder Nichiren (1222–1282) tends to eclipse the historical Buddha as the subject of devotion. All this did not prevent Sōka Gakkai from remaining one of the fastest growing new religious movements in the world, including Europe. In the process, it has discarded its nationalist clothes in exchange for a radically cosmopolitan outlook, reasserting its religious identity by redefining what is religion and what is sacred and secular in the modern global age. It cut its ties with its Japanese sacred locus of origin, while maintaining the link through its corporate organisation (and its headquarters in Tokyo).

Neo-movements do not necessarily break with tradition or the lineage though: Even Sōka Gakkai emphasises continuity, as does Kadampa Buddhism. Adaptation (what the Sōka Gakkai call zuho-bini) is natural for Buddhism, and Asian masters have indeed often sanctioned quite radical departures from traditional Buddhist practices, sometimes notwithstanding protest from other established Western traditions, as was the case for example with Ole Nydahl’s Diamond Way Buddhism.

While interest in Asian religions received a notable boost from the global spiritual quest that we associate with the 1960s, the actual boom of Asian religions only followed in the following decades. This coincided with the coming of age of New Age.

Like the Theosophical Society for earlier generations, New Age offered a platform for the diffusion of Asian religions and spiritualities, where Asian as well as Western esoteric and other traditional spiritual practices – among which North American Indian, Korean shamanistic and Brazilian Ayahuasca practices – were taught and practiced, and also increasingly where spiritual objects and paraphernalia were sold. However, where the Theosophical Society stimulated interest in Asian religions and spiritualities per se, New Age rather limited itself to certain practices such as yoga and meditation in a secularised form, discon-


nected from the ›original‹ context and appropriated and loosely integrated into a hybrid secular New Age religious setting. As emphasised earlier, especially Hindus had already initiated this development in the way they propagated spiritual practices to the Western public. Buddhists, however, rather objected to the amalgamation.

While New Age was not a significant factor in the diffusion of Eastern religions, it did contribute to the popularity of certain spiritual practices and their further disconnection from their culture of origin. In this respect, the transformation of New Age from countercultural and social critical in the 1960s and early 1970s into a movement aimed at stimulating spiritual as well as physical well-being in the 1980s and 1990s needs to be emphasised, as it went along with adopting capitalist values. Although its basic principles are fundamentally different, New Age nevertheless not only builds upon the American capitalist and psychological perspectives (in particular on Maslow’s Humanistic Psychology), but also upon the ›modernisation‹, propagation and commodification of Hinduism by Indian gurus such as Vivekananda and B. K. S. Iyengar. The most renowned examples were different forms of yoga and meditation, especially Vipassanā, that were appropriated and integrated into new spirito-religious as well as purely secular contexts, be it medical, psychotherapeutic or as part of more general program of well-being, aesthetics or simple recreation. The fusion is epitomised in the person of Deepak Chopra (*1948), a medical doctor and onetime preferred pupil of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, but above all a prolific and immensely popular writer and public speaker propagating health, well-being and happiness based upon a combination of the traditional Hindu medicine Ayurveda,106 spiritual and esoteric practices from East and West, and ›scientific‹ terminology used irrespective of its actual meaning (›quantum mysticism‹), for example in the books: »Quantum Healing«, 1988; »Ageless Body, Timeless Mind«, 1993. Likewise Transpersonal Psychology has assimilated Asian spiritual practices in an exclusively secular context.107

Although some Buddhists sometimes oppose such amalgamations, the same happened with Buddhist spiritual practices. Buddhist Vipassanā Meditation – which originally differed from Theravadin and Mahayana traditions – gave way to Insight Meditation, which established some common ground between the different techniques. It, however, was presented as a psychotherapeutic technique: Practitioners were neither pupils nor church members, let alone devotees, but rather clients. Insight Meditation and later Mindfulness completely transformed into psychotherapeutic practices, and were propagated in Europe as well. Hence European Buddhist psychologists and therapists regularly visited American institutions such as the Naropa University (which developed out of the Naropa

105 Carrette/King, Selling Spirituality, p. 79; Vitz, Psychology as Religion.
Institute) and the Kanzeon Zen Center in Salt Lake City, where Dennis Genpo Merzel (*1944) created Big Mind as a synthesis of psychology and Zen Buddhism in 1995. Gradually Buddhism became perceived as a »philosophy of life« or a psychology rather than as a religion. It is in a similar context that Mindfulness also developed. In Mindfulness, the link with Buddhism as good as disappeared completely.

Spiritual practices such as (forms of) yoga and meditation became part of standard psychotherapeutic treatments in the 1980s, but were also pursued outside a therapeutic context as conducive to a general feeling of self-awareness, well-being, and self-development – a »chameleon« term that, just as spirituality does, defies definition and can be used in the most diverse and contradictory ways. However, Buddhist insights were also used to become more aware of oneself and accepting, even welcoming setbacks and even suffering, which is closer to the »original« Buddhist perspective than self-development. It may be that this perspective is more pertinent in Europe than in North America, though further research is needed.

The cases discussed until now indicate an intense interaction between Asia, Europe, and North America. While the interest in Eastern spirituality was partly inspired by developments in the United States – the Beats, the hippies, but also the new »body and beach culture«, as well as developments in psychology and psychotherapy – Asian religions and spiritualities did not rely on Americans for their diffusion in Europe: The Asian »missionaries« in the West usually visited both sides of the Atlantic, although some major figures were only active in America or in Europe (e.g. Taisen Deshimaru). Due to its colonial ties and the strong position of Theosophy and the London Buddhist Society in particular, the United Kingdom played a major role in Europe, and arguably new religious movements developed earlier and became even more successful there than in the United States and, certainly, than in continental Europe. For linguistic as well as other reasons, Asian religions and spiritualities had only a limited impact on the European continent up until the 1960s, mainly indirectly by translated publications. Nevertheless, Europeans went to the United States where they saw more possibilities to develop; some of them did have a noticeable effect on the proselitising of Asian religions and spiritualities, from the British Alan Watts and Peggy »Houn Jiyu« Kennett, to the Dane Ole Nydahl. From the 1960s onwards, many Europeans went to the United States for further training and education. So, while historically the USA was not exactly the place to go for spiritual inspiration – »mankind goes to America to learn the earthly life, to live the heavenly life, they go to some other people«, the Japanese intellectual Kanzo Uchimora observed in 1926 – this appears to have changed. However, the diffusion of Asian religions and


spiritualities in the West was foremost an Asian affair, in which Europeans as well as Americans surprisingly only played a secondary role.

VI. GLOBALISATION, CHRISTIAN RENEWAL, AND ISLAM IN EUROPE


One might expect that the reason for Europe’s particular position would have attracted a great deal of sociological and historical research, but that obviously is not the case. The question is not so much why Christianity remains strong in the United States while Europe secularises or dechristianises or why Europe dechristianises while the United States and much of the rest of the world (with inter alia Australia and New Zealand as significant exceptions) experience religious growth, but why the revival and globalisation of Christianity, which engulfs Latin America, Africa and the Far East, stops short of Western Europe’s shores (although it does progress in Eastern Europe).\footnote{One might expect that the reason for Europe’s particular position would have attracted a great deal of sociological and historical research, but that obviously is not the case. The question is not so much why Christianity remains strong in the United States while Europe secularises or dechristianises or why Europe dechristianises while the United States and much of the rest of the world (with inter alia Australia and New Zealand as significant exceptions) experience religious growth, but why the revival and globalisation of Christianity, which engulfs Latin America, Africa and the Far East, stops short of Western Europe’s shores (although it does progress in Eastern Europe).} These issues obviously are not unrelated though. In that perspective it is important that even if the Eastern religions and spiritualities that we discussed to some extent in the previous paragraphs did make real inroads in Western Europe, they remain marginal in quantitative terms, nowhere do they approach 2% of the population.\footnote{Nevertheless Evangelicals, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons did cross the Atlantic along with Scientologists and Christian Scientists, though media}
reporting was outspokenly negative. This points at a particular factor, the association of some forms of Christianity with the American establishment, capitalism and ›imperialism‹ (compare Vietnam) – which implies that those movements that were not perceived as such, received a better press coverage. That was effectively the case with the Jesus People, who were welcomed quite similarly to other movements of the 1960s: quite critically by conservatives, more positively among those who sympathised with the hippies. The impression one gets from the scarcely available data is nevertheless that no form of Evangelical Christianity did really take root in Western Europe – the development in Eastern Europe since 1989 appears different. One particular reason is undoubtedly the cultural state monopoly in continental Europe until the 1980s that de facto largely restricted access to media, especially radio and television, that proved so important in the expansion of Evangelical religion, and particularly of Pentecostalism, in the USA and elsewhere. Moreover, the media, especially in north-western Europe, was remarkably secular not to say secularist – and notoriously critical of ›New Christian‹ faiths if they appeared, particularly focussed on exorcism and ‹spiritual warfare› or in some cases dominated by Catholics (especially in Italy and Spain). This factor also obviously impeded the growth of other religious movements – given the lack of reliable figures, and the small size of them anyway, it might be wise not to focus too much on the differences.

Still, one risks to underestimate the impact of Evangelical Christianity in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Notwithstanding critical reporting and dwindling coverage by the mainstream media, Evangelical preachers continued to tour Europe. The »International Congress on World Evangelisation« which was held in Lausanne, Switzerland, at the initiative of Billy Graham in 1974 (and which actually followed a first »World Congress on Evangelism« in Berlin in 1966) witnessed more than 2,000 Evangelicals from over 150 countries agreeing with a manifesto to promote active world-wide Christian Evangelism. The manifesto became one of the most influential documents in modern Evangelical Christianity. Especially Pentecostals and Charismatics took on the challenge in Europe. Most were Americans but quite a number originated elsewhere, testifying to the global character of Evangelical Christianity, such as the Indian-born Derek Prince, the South African David du Plessis and David Yonggi Cho, founder of the Yoido Full Gospel Church (the largest single megachurch in the world) in South Korea. They created communities and Chris-

118 Cf. esp. Davie, Religion in Modern Europe.
tian centres, mainly in or around major cities, and stimulated existing groups. Also European Evangelicals went to the United States and had some impact there as well, especially the English. As visits provoked return visits for learning and inspiration, intense and lasting connections were developed, very much in the same way as the Eastern religions discussed in the previous paragraphs. Their publications were widely disseminated and translated into several European languages, though mainly within certain Evangelical circles – the translations are indications of the spread of the respective preachers’ movements.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a new Evangelical-charismatic wave reached Europe, usually originating in the late 1970s Charismatic renewal in the USA. Especially noteworthy are the Willow Creek Community Church, which originates in Chicago in the mid-1970s, and the Vineyard Movement, an offspring of the Jesus People. The founder of the Vineyard Movement, John R. Wimber (1934–1997), also inspired the popular Alpha Course as well as New Wine in Britain in the late 1980s and 1990, which offered important tools for Christian renewal taken on by followers from different denominations, including Catholics, also on the continent. These Charismatic Christian renewal movements are typically non-denominational and strongly permeated with a sense of marketing. Nevertheless, the renewal manifests itself mainly within the existing churches and not so much via splits and new dissidence. In the Netherlands, these movements certainly did influence the renewal of the Gereformeerden (»New Dissent«), particularly among youth, but they did not cause splits. The therapeutic culture that is a characteristic feature of this American way of believing, however, was not taken on by mainstream Christian churches in Europe, but remained marginal.

During this time, a new wave of migrants from Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and especially Africa arrived in Europe’s major cities. A significant number of them belonged to particularly active and dynamic Pentecostal churches. Nigeria and the Congo particularly became centres of Charismatic diffusion. While they had difficulties in connecting with local churches, even if these were Evangelical or Pentecostal, they maintained strong transnational bonds with the »mother«-church in Africa and with similar communities elsewhere, offering the migrants a sense of belonging as well as a new per-
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perspective of success and integration in the host country. In contrast to other migrant religions, these African Pentecostal churches appear to appeal outside their ethnic communities. First, they connect to the broader African communities, irrespective of nationality or ethnicity. But their dynamics in a cosmopolitan urban environment also seems appealing outside the African communities, though apparently to a limited extent. Some preachers such as Matthew Ashimolowo, founder of the Kingsway International Christian Centre in London, directly appeal to white European Christians as well as people from Latin America and the Caribbean. African Pentecostalism hence offers bridges between Christians from the North and the South.126

Globalisation also affected mainstream Christian churches, though one has to keep in mind that they always have been transnational, global movements, which means that they always remained in contact with the rest of the world and were influenced by these interactions. Hence they were, paradoxically perhaps, comparatively less transformed than other sectors of society by the globalisation of the post-war era, though it may also be a sign that they lack flexibility. Nevertheless, a number of developments merit to be identified.

One of the most spectacular, profound and yet undervalued phenomena of the post-war transformations of religion is what I earlier called «the end of the missionary ideal», which no doubt is related to decolonisation but is arguably a broader phenomenon. Indeed, roughly around 1960, mainstream European (and American) Christian churches – certainly global institutions but in reality largely directed by Europeans – gave up their missionary ambitions – which incidentally did not imply that these Christian churches suddenly disappeared from the decolonised world as, surprisingly, the opposite happened: Also mainstream Christian churches flourished outside of Europe along the new Charismatic and Pentecostal movements (which had not given up their missionary ambitions).127 In Europe mainstream church missions were largely replaced by development aid, in which they all invested massively.

They created development associations which not only gathered and distributed funds, but also mobilised the faithful and »educated« and informed the European public about development issues. Over time the content of these changed – from financial assistance


to engagement in solidarity and emancipation, and back to aid – but the main issue is that they kept alive intense relations with churches and people overseas. Significantly this aid, while obviously distributed to and through related associations and people, was not destined exclusively to fellow believers. This solidarity moreover not only covered those far away, but applied to the new arrivals nearby as well, such as migrants and asylum seekers. Increasingly the churches reflected upon social and economic issues in a global perspective and were willing to give up their Eurocentric outlook.

This global social orientation also came to the fore in the new-found public role that the churches took on in the global public sphere, through which churches strengthened their transnational character again.\footnote{Makrides, Religions in Contemporary Europe, esp. p. 553; José Casanova, Public Religions Revisited, in: \textit{de Vries}, Religion, pp. 101–119; \textit{idem}, Globalizing Catholicism and the Return to a »Universal« Church, in: Susanne Hoeber Rudolph/James Piscatori (eds.), Transnational Religion and Fading States, Boulder, CO 1997, pp. 121–143; Jenkins, The Next Christendom, pp. 141–162.} Even if one can trace its origin at least in part to post-war European theological developments, Liberation Theology as it developed in Latin America and Africa nourished the drive towards social relevance in European Catholicism from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. This even became visible in the local base committees that developed in those years. There is some shift in that public discourse though, particularly in the case of the Catholic Church. The latter downgraded its support for the social and political struggles of the poor and the deprived in reaction to Liberation Theology. Their adoption of Marxist concepts and assessment schemes was considered to be a derogation of Catholic teaching. While Paul VI hindered the movement wherever he could, his successor, John Paul II, and his head of the »Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith«, Joseph Ratzinger, explicitly condemned (aspects of) Liberation Theology in 1984 and 1986.\footnote{Dagmar Herzog, The Death of God in West Germany. Between Secularization, Postfascism and the Rise of Liberation Theology, in: Michael Geyer/Lucian Hölscher (eds.), Die Gegenwart Gottes in der modernen Gesellschaft. Transzendenz und religiöse Vergemeinschaftung in Deutschland, Göttingen 2006, pp. 431–466; Makrides, Religions in Contemporary Europe.}

Hence the Catholic Church moved towards a more moral approach on social issues, including environmental ones. Since John Paul II, who actively and publicly combated communism as a political force worldwide, the Catholic Church manifests itself prominently as a major player on the international scene. It did not prevent the Church from continuing to lose ground and to particularly lose appeal amongst the individual faithful. One result was the decline of vocations, the aging of, and eventually shortage of the clergy. This led to another very concrete form of globalisation, the arrival of clergy from outside of Europe, particularly from Africa – a remarkable reversal from the pre-1960 missions. Europe indeed is increasingly perceived as a mission land by non-European Christians, who send missionaries to re-evangelise what was once the »Christian Occident«.\footnote{Cf. Jenkins, The Next Christendom, pp. 204–207.}

Obviously there was a relationship between the end of mission, the development of a global social and moral vision, and the breakthrough of ecumenism in the mainstream Christian churches. Protestant churches had already radically chosen this path from the Second World War, Catholics followed with the Second Vatican Council, though without completely giving up their conviction that they had disposed of the ultimate truth. The papal »Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions«, »Nostra aetate« (1965), recognised the value of other religions than Catholicism, in particular Mahayana Buddhism (which includes Zen Buddhism) and Hinduism, but then constructed a hierarchical evolutionary scheme that positioned Catholicism as the ultimate...
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religion and considered non-Christian religions as »earlier stages«. While important steps were made towards mutual understanding and genuine respect, this not only continued to hamper relations with other faiths, but determined the Church’s reaction towards initiatives of interfaith cooperation and, particularly, the infusion of non-Christian religious and spiritual ideas within Catholic theology and practice.

The Church’s reaction actually illustrates another feature of post-war religious globalisation, the delusion of denominational boundaries, as religious and spiritual practices and ideas cut through such boundaries. Liberation Theology for example built upon influences from Catholic as well as Protestant origin and from the civil rights movements, and inspired Catholics as well as Protestants. Conversely the Charismatic Renewal originated in California among Episcopalians in 1959, traversing the Atlantic as early as in 1963, transforming both Evangelical as well as mainstream Christian denominations and churches, including Catholics: The Catholic Charismatic movement became the most successful renewal movement within the Catholic Church, even if it did also raise opposition.

Catholics also searched for spiritual renewal in the East, especially in Zen Buddhism but sometimes also in Hindu spiritual practices. Many »seekers« exchanged Catholicism for Buddhism particularly, but others searched for accommodation. Jesuits particularly played an important role in making Asian religions known and strove towards mutual understanding and a synthesis with the Catholic faith, such as the Germans Hugo Makibi Enomiya-Lassalle (1898–1990) and Heinrich Dumoulin, S.J. (1905–1995), who spent most of his life in Japan but whose publications were widely translated and read in the West, as well as the internationally renowned Indian Jesuit Anthony De Mello (1931–1987). They also initiated the development of transnational contacts and networks, including in the United States, where Christian Buddhism became almost a separate Buddhist school. Several monastic orders integrated meditation in their spirituality, offering meditation and yoga in their retreats. Father Jean-Marie Dechanet (1906–1992) pioneered Christian yoga in France in the 1950s and 1960s, his books such as »La voie du silence« (1956), »Yoga in Ten Lessons«, »Yoga and God« became bestsellers worldwide. The activities of the British Benedictines Dom John Main, O. S. B. (1926–1982), and Laurence Freeman, O. S. B., in the 1970s and 1980s would eventually lead to the establishment of


132 Herzog, The Death of God.


138 A Buddhist Christian Vedanta Network was formed in 1999; URL: <http://www.buddhist-christian.org> [17.3.2011].
the »World Community for Christian Meditation« in 1991. The Dutch psychologist and Catholic priest, Han Formann, also acquired an international reputation for his search for a synthesis between Christianity, psychology and Asian spirituality.

There were, however, also opposing voices. In Germany, Josef Sudbrack (1925–2010) argued for the integration of social engagement and »new spirituality«, but he emphasised Christian mysticism and rejected Asian spirituality. The Catholic Church hierarchy did not fully endorse the apparent convergence between Buddhism and Catholicism. The Vatican was concerned about a possible amalgamation and warned against Eastern meditation techniques in 1989. According to the »Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith«, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Anthony De Mello’s self-oriented spirituality also deviated from the Catholic faith, especially with regard to the concept of God, the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and the absence of sin. Hence he issued a »notification« condemning De Mello’s views in 1998. John Paul II once again emphasised the fundamental differences in the way of perceiving the world and its relationship to God between Christianity and the religions of the Far East, in particular Buddhism, reiterated the warnings of 1989, in »Crossing the Threshold of Hope«, published in 1994. Likewise he condemned New Age – the religion that most epitomises the amalgamation – as a form of Gnosticism. The document of the »Pontifical Council for Culture«, and the »Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue« »Jesus Christ. The Bearer of the Water of Life – A Christian Reflection« (2003) not only applies to New Age, but reiterates the differences between Catholicism and Buddhism and Hinduism respectively, and calls for »caution« and »guidance« when following Eastern spiritual and therapeutic practices.

Obviously the Church also emphasised its distinction from Islam, though »Nostra aetate« recognised some parallels and common ground. In the 1960s, Christian churches and Muslims established regular ecumenical contacts. But Europe increasingly feels the need to restate its position towards Islam at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Islam indeed expands worldwide and hence competes with Christianity. Particularly it appears threatening as some Islamic factions have engaged in a terrorist fight against the West. Anti-Western feelings, for various reasons, are widespread in the Islamic world (not necessarily leading to anti-Western violence though), while most European countries host relatively large groups of mostly low-skilled Muslims, which are widely discriminated against. Moreover, Muslim values and practices appear challenging to contemporary European secularity. In addition, the Turkish application for membership of the EU, formulated already since 1987 (in fact going back to the early 1960s) and accepted in principle in 1999, raises the question of the identity and circumscription of Europe.

139 URL: <http://www.wccm.org> [17.3.2011].
141 Baier, Meditation und Moderne, pp. 919–927.
In this tense situation, both the secularist-enlightened nature of modern Europe is emphasised, but also its Christian roots are pulled out of the back closet. On the one hand secularists strongly push towards further eliminating religious symbols from the public sphere (interpreted in a very encompassing sense, e.g. including public schools). This reaction, however, is opposed by Muslims and some Christians who in this respect join forces (e.g. in the issue of the headscarf), with these Christians expressing solidarity with the beleaguered Muslims. A second reaction is different, and leads to a remarkable, though yet timid rapprochement between some secularists and conservative Christians against an Islam that is perceived as threatening Europe’s core identity.\textsuperscript{146} It remains unclear which reaction eventually will prevail.

In the meantime one may notice an increased Europeisation of Islam, as Muslims reformulate a new identity based on their faith as well as multiple national and other collective affinities. What should be emphasised foremost is the increasing individualism that comes to the fore in this process, in which personal choice prevails. This choice indeed is often one for Islam as a prime source of identity and inspiration for individual as well as collective (and I would speculate political) action.\textsuperscript{147} However, in a globalised world it is a more uniform, orthodox, often radical Wahhabi or Deobandi Islam that presents itself as an alternative counterculture to the new generations of young Muslims in Europe through cassette, satellite television and increasingly the Internet.\textsuperscript{148} As world religions since the late twentieth century increasingly go public again\textsuperscript{149}, it would be quite unrealistic to expect the opposite to happen with Islam in Europe, all the more so that Muslims living in Europe continue to feel connected with Muslims all over the world and in particular in their own land of origin as well as the Arab world. The case of the headscarf, however, mainly illustrates how Islam rather questions the placing and definition of the boundaries between the public and the private, as do some claims with regard to the application of the Sharia, with regard to the boundaries between secular and religious law.\textsuperscript{150}

VII. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: MODALITIES OF RELIGIOUS GLOBALISATION

If globalisation is mainly about transnational networking and interaction at a global scale, religion always offers an excellent venue to study globalisation processes. Religions indeed are not tied to national or civilisational boundaries, although they have contributed to shape national identities and civilisations. Universal and global historians have also succumbed to the temptation of confining religion to certain geographical spaces, especially with regard to Islam and Christianity, though they also acknowledged the variations over time. For the ancient Romans for example, Christianity was the religion of the (Near) East. In later centuries it has been associated with, or even defined, Europe, today it is rapidly becoming a religion of the Americas, Black Africa and some areas in the Far East.

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. Pasture, Religion in Contemporary Europe, pp. 347 ff.; Laitin, Rational Islamophobia in Europe. See also the articles by Leora Auslander and Thomas Mittmann in this volume.


\textsuperscript{150} Cf. Warburg, Globalization, Migration and Two Types of Religious Boundary, esp. pp. 90 and 95.
The impact of globalisation on religion in post-war Europe turned out to be far more important than I previously assumed. Globalisation has certainly contributed much to the transformation of Europe. In a way it has functioned as a cause of the changes, but also as a catalyst – speeding up changes that probably would have occurred anyway – and as an amplifier. The latter comes to the fore in the complex processes of adaptation and appropriation that in the end completely transformed different religions and spiritualities, and also in the anecdotal happenings that received widespread coverage and which obtained significance elsewhere that they did not initially have. The Danish Mohammed cartoons may serve as a case in point.\textsuperscript{151}

Nevertheless, one should not overestimate the impact of globalisation either. The relative dechristianisation of Europe was not ›compensated‹ by the new religious movements and spiritual practices that appeared, even if many Eastern religious and spiritual terms and concepts invaded popular culture, to some extent replacing Christian ones, and contributed to the transformation of a dualistic into a monistic European culture.\textsuperscript{152} Remarkably, the result of dechristianisation did not imply secularisation as an extension of the secular space. José Casanova has emphasised the ›de-privatisation‹ of religion and the public role of religion in the contemporary world – the Christian churches but also Islam, Hinduism (mainly in India though) and Buddhism (e. g. in ›Engaged Buddhism‹).\textsuperscript{153} But there is more. While Asian spiritualities were associated with the counterculture, Hindu gurus also contributed to the commodification of spirituality, thus blurring the distinctions not only between the secular and the private, but also with the economy, while Asian spiritualities were also introduced in psychotherapeutic settings.\textsuperscript{154}

Nevertheless, Europe has been the ›target‹ of conscious religious-political missionary attempts to win its ›heart and soul‹. Notwithstanding calls about the Islamisation of Europe by radical jihadists, Europe is in no danger of becoming ›Islamicised‹ as some contemporary prophets – with either political or religious agendas – warn against.\textsuperscript{155} Nevertheless Islam certainly progressed in Europe and became Europe’s second religion, though largely as a result of immigration and procreation, much less and only recently also by proselytising. Also Americans hoped to conquer Europe spiritually. Although it remains difficult to fully appreciate the impact of American efforts to associate Europe to American religious views, one may conclude that the Evangelical and Pentecostal missions, even backed up by United States intelligence, never really succeeded, even if one may still underestimate their effectiveness. American style worshipping has not really penetrated (yet) either, and that includes healing practices such as are common in Pentecostalism. Even the American emphasis on religion as contributing to well-being only infused very indirectly, mainly via New Age, when all too obvious religious and spiritual connotations had been ›secularised‹.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} Jytte Klaussen, The Cartoons that Shook the World, New Haven 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Colin Campbell, The Easternization of the West. A Thematic Account of Cultural Change in the Modern Era, Boulder 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. One could in this respect also point at the role of religious international/European NGOs as an underinvestigated subject. For a first assessment see John Boli/David V. Brewington, Religious Organizations, in: Beyer/Beaman, Religion, Globalization, and Culture, pp. 203–232.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Carrette/King, Selling Spirituality.
\end{itemize}
Although American religions surprisingly did not gain a foothold, there was no ‘Easter-
nisation’ of the religious landscape either. Nevertheless the appearance of Asian religions
and spiritualities was remarkable. In that respect I wish to emphasise that while studies
on Asian religions in the West have often analysed their development as a process of
Westernisation and focussed on the role of Westerners, such as ‘orientalist’ scholars and
Theosophists, and only relatively recently have acknowledged the role of Asians in the
formation of ‘modern’ Asian religions, I come to the conclusion that Asians have had an
even greater initiative than has been imagined. While there are notable differences be-
tween and among these Asian religions and spiritualities, nevertheless there is to some
extent a common sustained effort on the one hand directed to the culture of origin – for
example in the framework of ‘nationalist’ religious revitalisation (I did not emphasise
these dimensions) – and on the other hand, the subject of the present assessment, focussed
on the West. Buddhist as well as Hindu masters and gurus set up centres (ashrams) to
welcome and ‘educate’ Westerners, they consciously adapted their messages to them,
got to the West themselves, and sent their disciples, Asian monks and laymen (rarely
women) and especially Western converts (men and women) on what cannot be considered
anything other than a mission – even before they had completed their training and some-
times against their wishes (for example Ole Nydahl).

Especially remarkable is the way that these new converts and their Asian ‘masters’
were prepared to adapt their message, sometimes more than even established converts in
the West did. The occasional author who has observed the Asian ‘agency’ (I still feel so
without fully realising its magnitude and significance) interpreted it as the reverse or subal-
tern influence from the periphery to the centre, but I think this is too simple, for two rea-
sons: Firstly, because we observe the same pattern not only in India – admittedly rather
in the periphery of the world system in Wallerstein’s perspective (at least until recently)
– but also in Japan, which in my view does not qualify as periphery in the twentieth cen-
tury (certainly not from the Japanese perspective), and secondly because these Asian re-
ligious and spiritual leaders did not design their mission from a perspective of inferiority
or subalternity, not even in the late 1800s (let alone later). To the contrary, they considered
themselves equal or even superior, and presented their endeavours sometimes as a com-
mercial venture: spirituality for money (which, in passing, obviously does not correspond
to a popular Western ‘orientalist’ imagination that associates the West with material in-
terest and represents the ‘East’ as ‘spiritual’ and hence detached from such worldly con-
siderations). In this respect, we may also simply overstate the impact of colonialism: Thes
Asian reformers used the colonial condition as a tool for realising their own ambi-
tions, which were only partially related to the imperial encounter.

Their efforts to ‘sell spirituality’ to the West, however, were only successful when their
‘offer’ was matched by a demand. That demand came through the countercultural cur-
rents in the West, which remained rather marginal or at least tied to certain intellectual,
artistic and bourgeois circles until the 1950s. Esoterism may have been the ‘secret religion
of the middle class’, it was not the dominant religion in Europe, and Asian religions and
spiritualities were only an aspect of it. However, their popularity received a new boost in
the late 1950s and 1960s, especially from the hippies, but increasingly also from new in-
terests in body and health culture and spiritual well-being – which to some extent how-
ever were influenced by Asian spiritualities, or at least by Western interpretations of them.
Entrepreneurial and missionary Buddhist masters, Tibetan lamas, as well as Hindu
gurus, saw and grasped the opportunity and targeted the seeking generation, which once

156 On this subject, and the observation that Asians used this Orientalist discourse to their advan-
tage – such as Vivekananda – see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies. Decon-
structing Historiography, in: Ranajit Guha/Gayatri Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies,
Patrick Pasture

converted, was deployed as soon as possible, with sometimes minimal training, to continue the missionary endeavour.

Interest in the psychotherapeutic virtues of Asian religious practices received a new boost in the late 1970s and 1980s as a result of the increased emphasis on productivity and the resulting focus on stress. Again, especially Indian gurus saw no objection in adapting their message. Hence meditation and bodily practices to control the mind, such as yoga, mushroomed. It points at one dimension that all new religions and spiritualities had in common, including Christian ones: the emphasis on the Self and the importance of self-development. In this respect the nature of the sacred could diverge considerably. While most Asian religions regard the sacred rather as immanent, the successful Christian churches, while focussing on the Self and the mediating role of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless emphasise the fundamental gap between heaven and earth – as Joel Robbins has argued, the success of Charismatic and Pentecostal churches resides in their offering a model that mirrors their peripheral place in a global world to people who do not grasp the benefits of globalisation, in which they may find a perspective of betterment in another life. If that is so, then it is only a matter of time before Pentecostal and Charismatic churches start breaking through also in Europe – there are signs that they are doing just that among African migrant communities and in Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps we can advance the hypothesis that the different cosmologies between Asian and Christian Pentecostal and Charismatic movements – dualistic or monistic – correspond to different socio-economic realities, Neo-Buddhist and Neo-Hindu movements appealing to the intellectual and the middle classes who feel comfortable with economic and cultural globalisation, whilst Christian Pentecostal and Charismatic movements being more attractive to those people who feel as if they are on the losing side of globalisation.

The last quarter of the twentieth century shows different developments. In general, Europe re-emphasised its external boundaries and internal hierarchies, although the basic contours of the social and cultural-religious order had fundamentally changed and the boundaries were still moving. The most experimental and sectarian new religious movements – I will return to this question below – experienced a backlash. Especially since the mass-suicide of members of the Peoples Temple at Jonestown in 1978, an anti-cult movement manifested itself both in North America and Europe. In Europe it was the »Children of God«, an offspring of the Jesus People, that first stirred the anti-cult movement. The »Children of God« became infamous for its »flirty-fishing«, by which women prostituted themselves in order to attract new members (not quite representative of Evangelical Christianity, which emphasises rather »traditional« family values), and so-called »brainwashing« techniques.

Nevertheless, they illustrate a general attitude of rejection of many new religious movements, mostly perceived as dangerous sects or cults, Asian as well as Christian ones such

158 Warburg, Globalization, Migration and the Two Types of Religious Boundary; Pasture, Religion in Contemporary Europe.
as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Scientology – which has particularly raised a lot of opposition, especially in Germany. Gradually the new religious movements also became somehow less visible as the media focussed on other issues, and they no longer appeared attractive exotic phenomena. On the contrary, they were gradually written out of the history of the 1960s, at least in Europe.

At the same time many new religious movements experienced organisational problems, often related to leadership, relations with their mother-organisation, and sexual misconduct and abuse. That was certainly the case with Neo-Buddhism, for example the »Friends of the Western Buddhist Order«. Tibetan Buddhism experienced several splits in the West (e.g. the New Kadampa) as well as some nasty doctrinal disputes, such as the Dorje Shugden controversy and the issue of the succession of the 16th Karmapa, splitting the community into bitterly opposing camps, with the Dalai Lama incidentally more as a participant in the fight than as peaceful mediator. Succession problems after the death of Taisen Deshimaru in 1982 also split the International Zen Association. Sōka Gakkai became embroiled with the Nichiren priesthood; its leader and members were even excommunicated and its temple in Tokyo destroyed.

The Rajneesh movement split apart after its leader was briefly imprisoned on allegation of violations of the American immigration laws and his wife condemned for attempted murder and for plotting murder by bio-terror in 1985. Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, however, reinvented himself and became Osho, establishing some sort of Neo-Buddhist movement in India which offered a meditation retreat and counselling for business. ISKCON experienced serious leadership problems and became entangled in a child abuse scandal in the United States in the 1990s. But also mainstream Christian churches had their fair share of problems – during the first decade of the twenty-first century the Catholic Church became devastated by one case of child abuse after another.

Notwithstanding ›growing pains‹, and in contrast to what their dwindling presence in the media may suggest, many new religions and spiritualities in Europe however continued

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164 Dorje Shugden is a Tibetan god who was promoted by Trijang rinpoche as »the supreme protector of the Gelug tradition« in Tibetan Buddhism. However, the Dalai Lama (himself a Gelugpa) argued against his worshipping in the 1990s, considering him an »evil spirit«. The controversy has been interpreted as a fight between »Gelug conservatism« and the »modernising« approach by the Dalai Lama (Black, British Buddhism, pp. 131f.; Kay, Tibetan and Zen Buddhism in Britain, pp. 49–51; Lopez, Prisoners of Shangri-La?, pp. 186–196), but this view is disputed, on good grounds, by Georges Dreyfus, Are We Prisoners of Shangrila? Orientalism, Nationalism, and the Study of Tibet, in: The Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 2005, URL: <http: //www.thlib.org/collections/texts/jiats/#jiats=/01/dreyfus> [17.3.2011].
166 Seager, Encountering the Dharma, pp. 114–140.
167 Goldman, When Leaders Dissolve.
169 Jenkins, God’s Continent, pp. 34–36.
to expand. The 1980s and 1990s were indeed years of consolidation and growth for mainstream Buddhist schools as well as for yoga groups. The real generalisation of Buddhism dates from the 1990s and early 2000s.\textsuperscript{170} This did not necessarily imply that these religions and spiritualities demanded more involvement, though they certainly offered that possibility. Relations with the ›members‹ became more clientelistic, even in rather demanding movements such as Tibetan Buddhism, resulting in a high turnover.\textsuperscript{171} In some contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, these successful movements tended to emphasise historical continuities and respect for basic traditions. Some appeared more hierarchic and exclusive. Paradoxically, distinctions between converts and immigrants declined as historical continuities were emphasised.

Neo-movements – ISKCON offers a case in point as it came back from its engagement in the hippie counterculture and redefined itself as a Hindu-movement\textsuperscript{172} – sometimes even turned their attention in the first place to migrant communities. There were different reasons for this. Legal factors played a role in the United Kingdom, where collective representation follows an ethnic-geographical logic, elsewhere it recalls a social rapprochement as immigrants increasingly resemble mainstream culture and Europeans become acquainted with their immigrants’ faiths and culture. Especially in the case of Tibetan Buddhism, the boundaries tend to become totally blurred. But some of the most successful neo-religions’ social background and global ambitions make the distinction between convert and migrant irrelevant, as in the case of Sōka Gakkai, whose militants usually belong to globalised middle and upper classes.

Notwithstanding its difference from the Asian religions, New Age also contributed to making Asian spiritual concepts popular: Terms such as reincarnation, yoga, mantra, meditation have all entered the collective consciousness and become part of a discursive ›Easternisation‹, to some extent supplanting Christian terms. By doing so, New Age actually permeated the East-Western imaginary between a materialist West and a spiritual East, while at the same time commodificating spirituality. New Age also contributed considerably to broaden the spiritual perspective even more, especially with Native American, Latin American, African and Oceanian spiritual practices. Hence, several new spiritual and religious movements set foot on European soil, such as Brazilian Ayahuasca Religion (including Santo Daimê).\textsuperscript{173}

All this made Europe religiously more diverse, as new religions, different denominations, schools, ›sects‹, and spiritual practices entered the religio-spiritual market, though surely the continent remains far less diverse compared to the United States (the United Kingdom is to some extent a different story). While the newcomers definitely competed, they also displayed a remarkable tolerance towards each other, although conflicts and tension, mostly originating elsewhere, did exist, especially between ›modern‹ and neo-religions, as well as between neo-religions and the traditional Christian churches. It also resulted in changing patterns of conversion. The neo-religions – from Neo-Buddhism to Evangelical Christianity – almost exclusively appealed to those who searched for a spiri-

\textsuperscript{170} Baumann, Buddhism in Europe.

\textsuperscript{171} Samuel, Tantric Revisionings, p. 327.


\textsuperscript{173} Groisman, Trajectories, Frontiers, and Reparations.
tual alternative to either the traditional Christian churches, or (aspects of) the dominant secularist and materialist Western culture until the 1980s. In the 1960s and 1970s, this often implied a radical break from mainstream culture. This incidentally also applies to Islam, where conversion appears to have implied an even more radical break for social and ethnic reasons.\(^\text{174}\)

From the 1980s onwards, however, conversion resulted rather from intercultural contacts, due to the increased opportunities and widespread presence of non-European religions and spiritual practices. The choice of another religion no longer usually implied that all aspects of Western culture were rejected – already some time before the fall of the Wall, any opposition to capitalist consumerism had all but evaporated. On the contrary, the new religions actually adopted more features of modern capitalist society, offering clientelistic solutions to spiritual needs which the traditional churches appeared – for various reasons – unable to fulfil. Hence the success of alternative religions and of secular spiritual practices is much less radical than it may appear at first sight. Often for example yoga and meditation revealed a desire for something else, something more. For many, practicing yoga and meditation did not lead to a lasting religious engagement. However, it could lead to further interest in Eastern spirituality. Yoga movements such as Sivananda and Siddha yoga not only offered evening courses and yoga holidays and retreats, but also opportunities to become monks and staff members.\(^\text{175}\) But also when a more radical break is suggested, as in conversion to Islam, it did not necessarily signify a rejection of life in Western democracy. In the latter case, however, the global radicalisation of Islam also affected converts, who perhaps feel particularly motivated to defend their new faith. Hence some converts went to Pakistan and Afghanistan, first for education, then sometimes for joining the actual transnational jihad.\(^\text{176}\)

The latter points at the importance of transnational, global networks and religioscapes that all religions constitute. Obviously these are not new: Indeed, what else is the Umma than a huge religioscape? In the case of the \(\text{g}\)lobal\(\text{-}\)neo-religions that I emphasised in this article, we can nevertheless point at the small groups of \(\text{f}\)aithful, \(\text{f}\)ollowers or \(\text{c}\)lients that remained connected through global networks, the nods functioning as starting points of new networks, establishing rhizomes spanning Europe and (parts of) the rest of the globe. Within these networks, a sense of community developed that connected people irrespective of their location. Increasingly, as the neo-religions distanced themselves from their origins, original sacred centres lost their significance and were replaced by corporate-like administrative \(\text{h}\)eadquarter\(\text{-}\)structures. These could remain in the country of origin – the Sôka Gakkai offers a case in point – but could be placed anywhere. Neo-Hindu movements established their headquarters in the West\(^\text{177}\), Plum Village can be considered


\(^\text{175}\) Cf. esp. Altglas, Le nouvel hindouisme occidental.


\(^\text{177}\) Such as Val Morin in Canada (International Sivananda Yoga Vedanta Centres), South Fallsburg, NY (Siddha Yoga Dham) and New York, later San Francisco (ISKCON).
the centre of the Unified Buddhist Church of Thich Nhat Hahn. In the case of Pentecostal networks, the "origin" or centre is even hard to pin down.

Nevertheless, these networks create a sense of community and belonging among the participants (faithful, members, clients) and at the same time alienate them from their local communities. This does not only apply to exclusive "sects", but also very open, inclusive movements or even just for those who follow spiritual practices such as yoga. Some become involved in it more than just sporadically, and e.g. travel to Indian ashrams for further training and perfection, even if only for a "yoga holiday".178 These are not the only bonds that constitute the global outreach. As did the traditional Christian churches in Europe, also the new religious movements – at least the most institutionalised ones (Pentecostals as well as engaged Buddhists) – developed extensive global activities, particularly in the field of development aid.

Globalisation automatically raises the question of the relationship between the global and the local. Though variations exist – place constraints do not allow for developing these – some common features do come forward. I have in the above emphasised the adaptability of Asian religions and spiritualities as well as of Pentecostalism. The globalisation of religions and spiritualities mainly concerned certain "transportable messages" and "portable practices", to adopt the terms of Thomas Csordas, which are cut loose from their initial cultural context to be introduced, applied and appropriated elsewhere.179 Especially Neo-Hindu movements focussed on simple and practical methods of self-development, "spiritual technologies" (Véronique Altglas) up to the point of denying their religious nature. This implies that uniformity was created within the new established spiritual form. To various extents this applies for elaborate religious "schools" or sects (e.g. within different Tibetan Buddhist traditions) as well as for single spiritual practices: A practitioner of yoga for example would feel comfortable practicing his or her specific form of yoga in Berlin, Brussels as well as in New York, Tokyo or Rishikesh, but he or she would not feel at home in a traditional Hindu temple. This always leads to tensions, sometimes – Scientology is a case in point – to bitter conflicts between the non-European religion and the European – national – authorities and environments.180

Unity is created by the lineage in teaching, supported by elements of ritual and material culture – to be kept to a minimum, as these constitute obstacles for Westerners, who often object to rituals that symbolise submission and obedience (e.g. kneeling)181 – even if symbolic meanings change by transplanting them into a different context: Instead of referring to the deities they mainly generate community bonds. In this respect, cosmologies become easily mixed up, as in the omnipresent amalgamation of Hindu and Buddhist deities and sacred symbols in New Age (which incidentally corresponds remarkably with traditional Chinese amalgamations, where Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist deities are worshipped side by side in the same temples). Europeans who feel attracted to Eastern spiritualities believe all religions are similar, each offering a different perspective on the same truth, and thus interchangeable. In such a perennial perspective, ideas and practices from different religious and spiritual backgrounds can be mixed.182 Christian churches appear less prone to such amalgamation and syncretism, although Pentecostalism effectively integrates elements from very different contexts while maintaining a basic unity

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178 De Michaelis, A History of Modern Yoga.
181 See the comments of Altglas, Le nouvel hindouisme occidental, pp. 147–151.
182 See e.g. extensively ibidem, pp. 89–94.
based upon a strong division between the sacred and the profane. Even the Catholic Charismatic revival movement combines traditional Catholic and Pentecostal practices and encompasses elements of African healing.183

Finally it is obvious that the globalisation of religion and in particular the arrival of non-European religions and spiritualities not only transformed the European religious and spiritual landscape, leading first of all to a diversification of it, but also implies the formation of new ›global‹ religions and spiritualities. They demonstrate that globalisation does not necessarily originate in the West, nor that it can be considered a form of ›Americanisation‹ or ›Occidentalisation‹.184 Particularly the main Asian religions and spiritualities reveal a very different logic. Some scholars have spoken of ›return globalisation‹ when neo-religions and spiritualities seem to be ›exported‹ back to their country of origin – for example in the case of Western yogis going to India to teach their interpretations.185 This may offer interesting venues for research at first sight, but the concept is problematic for several reasons. First it again reveals a very Euro- or Occidentalo-centric view on globalisation, as the West is again presented as the ›norm‹, the centre of development. However, our analysis, although focused on Europe, implicitly made clear that religious globalisation, at least in the post-war period, did not necessarily centre on the West: Pentecostalism spread from the United States to ›the global South‹ and from there to Europe, while Asian religions and spiritualities developed from Asia to Europe, to the USA as well as in other parts of the world. Nor is contemporary globalisation an expression of a ›re-Orient-ation‹ where the West, and particularly Europe, becomes the periphery of rising Asian powers (even if that may be the case in economic terms).

But at a more fundamental level one could question the underlying concept of a ›location‹ or origin. This is problematic first of all as not all religions share the same territoriality. Abrahamic religions and Hinduism both focus on territory, but conceive it in entirely different ways. The Hindu centrality of territoriality – which historically bound Brahmins to the South Asian soil – moreover has fundamentally changed since the late nineteenth and twentieth century.186 But some religions do not share such an orientation on territory at all, or the concept of origin, and the related concept of authenticity has lost its significance. That is largely the case with Buddhism, as Buddhism became extinct in the historic region where the Buddha lived, and transformed so much in the process of its globalisation, which began around 250 before Christ when Buddhism became defined as a missionary religion. In fact also some modern Christian churches lost somehow their territorial connection, as in the cases of the Mormons, Moonies and in some respect contemporary Pentecostal churches. One could make a case that, as new global or neo-religions are constituted in the deterritorialised interaction between ›the four quarters of the world‹ it makes no sense to define ›origins‹.187 The globalisation of religion shows how increasingly networks are formed with knots without a real centre, continuously interacting. In this respect the impact of new media and communication tools needs to be emphasised, as they transform the relations and interaction between people also within a religious context, e. g. between leaders and ›followers‹.188 Not all knots are as important or of the same size.

183 Csordas, Global Religion and the Reenchantment of the World.
186 Altglas, Le nouvel hindouisme occidental, pp. 25–36.
187 In making these observations I am partly indebted to J. Lorand Matory, The Many Who Dance in Me. Afro-Atlantic Ontology and the Problem with ›Transnationalism‹, in: Csordas, Transnational Transcendence, pp. 231–262.
I analysed some waves of religious globalisation and indicated some ways in which religions changed in Europe. The 1960s to 1980s were a period in which Europe’s borders appeared porous and its traditional structures disintegrating. Since then, however, the continent seems to be shutting itself off again, searching for a new stability, a new identity. Hence religion comes into play again, offering ways of cohesion as well as distinction for Europe as a whole and for different groups within the continent. Recently the emphasis has been on the divisive powers of religion. The American example, though one should refrain from idealising it, may offer an alternative, as religion in the United States is much more a force of integration and social cohesion. Notwithstanding the existence of a militant jihadi movement within Islam, most religions and religious people, even when they chose to isolate themselves, emphasise peaceful collaboration and living together. In contrast to an omnipresent European secularist prejudice, the history of religious globalisation in the twentieth century demonstrates the validity of this opportunity.\footnote{On this subject see Cavanaugh’s iconoclastic »The Myth of Religious Violence«.}