FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

An Urgent Need for Clarity

On the Post-2015 Development Agenda and Financing for Development

BARRY HERMAN
August 2014

- In September 2015 at the UN, heads of state will lower the flag of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and raise the new flag of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They will also have to address the »means of implementation« as part of the post-2015 development agenda.

- The post-2015 development agenda is meant to revitalize the »global partnership for development«, now defined as Goal 8 of the MDGs. As part of the preparation of the agenda, the UN convoked the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing to prepare options for the UN General Assembly to consider as recommendations for an effective sustainable development financing strategy.

- In addition, UN member states have agreed to hold a third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) from 13 to 16 July 2015 in Addis Ababa. The scope of that conference will be all policy matters that influence the ability of countries to finance their development, covering policies impacting the domestic and international activities of public and private actors.

- The unique success of the first FfD conference was that governments agreed to pursue specific reforms that had won a certain measure of support in their specialized institutions and forums. These were then shaped to form a holistic and pragmatic agenda, to which the Monterrey Consensus gave additional political support.

- There is a danger these negotiations will produce empty outcomes, but there is also the possibility to advance a fully coherent, holistic, and pragmatic package of policies to complement the post-2015 development agenda. Whether the outcome is empty or full depends more on the degree of political understanding and commitment forged in the preparatory processes than in agreed language. The FfD process provides a way to build the consensus needed to move forward.

Dialogue on Globalization

The UN is embarking on multiple intergovernmental negotiations concerning international cooperation for development, after more than two years of exhaustive consultations and multiple expert initiatives involving various sets of »stakeholders« around the world. Government representatives who will be participating in these negotiations may be forgiven if they are not clear about what their focus and the scope of their ambitions should be. In fact, important opportunities to advance international cooperation for development are embedded in the different negotiation mandates, but it is also possible that the outcomes will be empty of commitments to act differently—in the language of development diplomacy, the outcomes might do no more than reflect »agreed language«. If that turns out to be the case, member states would be hard pressed to answer the challenge: what was the point? This analysis argues that it is possible—and would be highly desirable—to break new ground on agreeing to a coherent, holistic, and pragmatic package of policy actions to complement the post-2015 development agenda programme for enhancing the sustainable development of the developing countries. It also argues that the degree of political understanding and mutual commitment forged by the participating governments and institutions, which should be the focus of the preparatory processes, will be more important than fine words in the formally adopted texts.

The Negotiating Challenge Facing UN Member States

To some extent, the UN's member states are guilty of the charge that when a substantive agreement cannot be reached, a committee is formed. The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) fell into this pattern (see A/CONF.216/16).[1] It created two committees that will complete their work by September 2014 and return the matter to the General Assembly for resumed consideration. That is, after the two committees present their reports to the General Assembly in September 2014, the Assembly will begin to negotiate the »post-2015 development agenda«, which is to be adopted at a meeting at heads of state level in September 2015 (as per resolution 68/6). They will face some difficult decisions owing to the different approaches of the two committees and the Assembly's further decision to organize an additional negotiation forum to work more or less in parallel with the Assembly's post-2015 effort—namely, the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (resolution 68/204).

Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals

One committee that Rio+20 created is the Open Working Group (OWG) of the General Assembly. Its purpose is to devise a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which it will propose to the Assembly in September 2014 for adoption. The General Assembly had agreed in September 2013 to work »towards a single set of goals, universal in nature and applicable to all countries, while taking account of differing national circumstances and respecting national policies and priorities« (resolution 68/6, para. 19). While developed countries can be assumed able to attain the SDGs on their own, various forms of international cooperation will be required to assist developing countries in reaching the SDGs, while also realizing their national development priorities. The post-2015 »global partnership for development«, which the General Assembly will start to negotiate in late 2014 or early 2015, would thus include—but not necessarily limit itself to—international cooperation policies aiming to assist the developing countries attain the SDGs.

At its session of 5–9 May 2014, the Working Group had a first reading of a proposal to adopt 16 »focus areas« of SDGs—they were not yet willing to call them »goals«. Each focus area included a set of targets, most of which were aspirational—and hopefully also inspirational—embodiments of social, economic, and environmental imperatives of »sustainable« development. However, one focus area—number 15—was called »Means of implementation / Global partnership for development«. It contained a list of 22 targets for international economic cooperation. Key areas included: market access for exports of developing countries; enhancing the means for

1. Rio+20 also asked the General Assembly to create a more credible process for follow-up discussions to Rio+20 than the failed Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which had been created following the original Rio conference in 1992. The outcome of those deliberations is the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (resolution 67/290), which will meet in the General Assembly every four years and annually in the Economic and Social Council and will »spearhead the implementation and review« of the SDGs (see below). While aiming at high-level participation, the duration of its annual meeting and its Secretariat support seems organized much like that of the CSD, as per »Key messages of the Expert Group Meeting on the role of the High-level Political Forum…«, New York, 30 April–1 May 2014; available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3750keymessagesegm.pdf (last accessed on 11.05.2014).

technology transfer to developing countries; improving flows of official assistance and private financial resources to developing countries, while ensuring their debt sustainability; and strengthening the technical capacities of developing countries in various domains, while also promoting SDG-related partnerships among public and private stakeholders and monitoring overall progress in advancing toward realization of the SDGs.[2]

Based on the discussion at that meeting, the OWG co-chairs proposed a set of goals and targets on 2 June. The international cooperation goal, now number 17, grew apace. Its name was lengthened to »Strengthen and enhance the means of implementation and global partnership for sustainable development«, and it contained 46 separate targets instead of 22. The targets were no longer clustered by type of cooperation (trade, aid, et cetera), but as means of implementation for each of the preceding 16 other goals. Some of the targets were fairly anodyne: for instance, to help attain the proposed goal »Achieve peaceful and inclusive societies, rule of law, effective and capable institutions«, target 17.42 said that »all countries should continue to act within the provisions of existing relevant international agreements«.[3] Other targets were more focused, albeit mostly embodying promises that had already been made previously, frequently with operative phrases such as »realize timely implementation«, »implement [an existing commitment] fully«, »strengthen implementation«, or more generally calling on UN Member States to »enhance«, »encourage«, »improve«, »promote«, and so on. Perhaps more importantly, there was no accompanying analysis to demonstrate that the targets identified as helping implement each specific goal will in fact be necessary or sufficient to actually attain the goal.[4]

The document was, nevertheless, far from its final form, which was agreed on 19 July.[5] The number of targets was reduced to 19 and they have been grouped again by type of cooperation. The text remains quite general, the most generic target being »mobilize additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple sources« (target 17.3). Nevertheless previously agreed specific targets are included, such as for provision of official development assistance (target 17.2). Notable among the targets is to complement the global partnership for development with multi-stakeholder partnerships (targets 17.16 and 17.17). This suggests that the OWG is giving primacy to the global partnership as an intergovernmental undertaking, while also welcoming initiatives involving other partners. Only four of the global partnership targets specify deadlines for achievement, while most of the targets under the preceding 16 goals refer to 2030 as the target date. Perhaps the authors had 2030 in mind for Goal 17 as well, although they did not commit to it except in one case. In any event, the OWG says that the targets »will be further elaborated through indicators focused on measurable outcomes« (para. 18). It is not said but it is probable that the indicators will be drafted by the Secretariat and perhaps they would be approved by the General Assembly.

One might uncharitably call the set of targets for Goal 17 a »shopping list« of mostly familiar policy proposals. It bears a striking resemblance (albeit updated) to Goal 8 of the MDGs, which has been roundly criticized since its launch in 2001 to today, including recently by an interagency UN Secretariat team.[6] The formal wording of Goal 8 is »develop a global partnership for development«; however, the targets and indicators of Goal 8 did not address how to build an effective global partnership, but rather proposed a selected list of substantive international policies that had been in various stages of negotiation or implementation when the goal was launched, as appears to be the case as well for Goal 17. Indeed, the content of Goal 8 did not compare well to the comprehensive and coherent package of domestic and international policy actions adopted in 2002 as the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (A/CONF.198/11, chapter 1, resolution 1, annex).

2. »Working document for 5–9 May session of Open Working Group«; available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/3686WorkingDoc_0205_additionalsupporters.pdf (last accessed on 13.05.2014).

3. See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4528zerodraft12OWG.pdf

4. For example, only one target is specified to help attain proposed Goal 4, »Provide equitable and inclusive quality education and life-long learning opportunities for all«. The specified target would expand higher education scholarships »by x%« by 2020, »with a particular focus on science, engineering, health, economics, finance, management and sustainable development«. While important for adding to technical capacities in the mentioned fields, this target hardly seems to address the goal per se.

5. See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

6. See UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, »Assessment of MDG8 and lessons learnt: Thematic think piece«, January 2013; available at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/thinkpieces/19_thinkpiece_mdg_assessment.pdf (last accessed on 13.05.2014).

Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing

The content of Goal 17 of the SDGs is important, because it differs markedly in approach from that taken by the other committee established by Rio+20—the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing. This committee was mandated to propose options that the General Assembly would consider for an effective sustainable development financing strategy. At its meeting of 12–16 May 2014, the committee started reviewing a »zero draft« of its report, which is not in the public domain because the committee meets behind closed doors. It is understood, however, that quite a different draft will be prepared for the members' review, and that they will have an opportunity to work on it so that a subsequent draft would be tabled at the last scheduled meeting on 4–8 August.

Although details of the committee's deliberations are not available, the nature of the approach that the committee is taking was described by the co-chairs of the committee, Ambassador Pertti Majanen of Finland and Mr. Mansur Muhtar of Nigeria, who is an Executive Director of the World Bank. They issued a joint public statement at the end of the second session of the committee on 6 December 2013 in which they reported on some major highlights of the committee's discussions as of that point, which included the following,

> (...) it was agreed that the domestic and international policy environments as well as their level of coherence have a profound impact on the mobilization of finance for sustainable development. Good governance at the national and international levels is a prerequisite for long-term investment, growth and stability. Experts also emphasized the importance of addressing additional issues critical to development financing, such as a fair multilateral trading system, external debt sustainability, and macroeconomic and financial market stability. Regional cooperation is also important for generating development finance and ensuring stability (…) financing needs are large. (…) Global savings are adequate, but are currently not being allocated where needed to achieve global sustainable development (…) all types of flows will be necessary. (…) Domestic resource mobilization will be [a] critical element of public financing. (…) ODA [official development assistance] will remain crucial for the eradication of extreme poverty (…) ODA alone will not be sufficient, even if all countries meet their commitments. (…) Private investment will also need to play an essential role in meeting sustainable development needs. Nonetheless, to date, private sector investment has been insufficient in many areas of sustainable development. The private sector is profit oriented and would require appropriate incentives to invest adequately in sustainable development. In particular, the current international financial system does not encourage sufficient long-term investment. Furthermore, externalities are not priced into certain areas, such as the energy sector, which distorts production and consumption patterns.[7]

It may be appreciated that the approach of the expert committee is quite different from that taken in the Open Working Group. Indeed, the expert committee's approach is closer to the approach of the Monterrey Consensus.

Post-2015 Development Agenda

The negotiations on the declaration, which is to be adopted in September 2015 as the post-2015 development agenda, will face a number of coherence challenges. Negotiators will need to decide if the final form of Goal 17, as proposed by the Open Working Group, should be substantially revised by the Assembly or jettisoned in favour of the experts' proposals for sustainable development financing. Or, perhaps Goal 17 and a proposal from the expert group will both be adopted without addressing why Goal 17 reflects only some of what is contained in the text drawn from the experts' report—neither of which directly addresses providing concrete strategies to attain the specific, agreed SDGs.

Another challenge facing the post-2015 development agenda negotiators concerns what may be a presumed expectation—especially among developing country representatives—that the reason to hold a summit in September 2015 to announce the SDGs and the global partnership to attain them is that new pledges of international assistance should be made by donor governments, perhaps joined by pledges of intensified South-South cooperation and announcements of development fund-

7. As posted on the Committee's website: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2898cochair2ndsession.pdf (last accessed on 11.05.2014).

ing increases by large private foundations. There might also be expectations of announcements of numerous voluntary »partnerships«, as has been the practice since the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, although many such announcements do not in the end materialize as announced, if at all. As of today, momentum does not seem to be building for major additions to official international resources for development cooperation, but perhaps this will change.

Without additional pledges of assistance, what is left is the announcement of the SDGs. As a developing country delegate said to this author in another context at another time, »We do not need the UN to set our national goals and policies; we can perfectly well set our own goals and targets. What we want from the UN is cooperation in trade and financial policies to assist us in the removal of policies that impede our achieving our goals«. In this context, the decline in the volume of ODA in 2011 and 2012 must be sobering, even though it recovered in 2013 but with donor spending plans not promising any upward trend.[8] The talk in the donor community about »leveraging« stagnant levels of ODA with private investment funds—which are not grants, after all—cannot be an encouraging substitute for a more positive outlook for ODA itself. The ODA outcome will send a signal. It will affect the degree to which the post-2015 document is seen as inspiring or routine rhetoric from the UN. Yet even without ODA pledges, an inspiring post-2015 outcome could result if a set of different commitments is agreed upon at the FfD conference.

The Third International Conference on Financing for Development

Indeed, UN negotiators recently agreed to hold the third International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD) in Addis Ababa on 13–16 July 2015,[9] just before the September 2015 summit. Because the FfD meeting should be a more technical forum on trade, investment, and domestic and international financial policies than the summit would be—and if it embodies a holistic and comprehensive package of policy agreements, as is the intention—then the FfD meeting might be the forum that gives convincing shape to the »global partnership for development«.

The FfD Conference will be an »international« conference, which—applying the meaning that was employed in the first FfD conference in Monterrey, Mexico—should be »owned« not only by the foreign ministry-led UN, but also by the finance and development ministry-led Bretton Woods institutions, the trade ministry-led World Trade Organization (WTO), and even engage central banks and other authorities responsible for financial regulation. The unique success of the first FfD conference was that governments agreed to pursue specific reforms that had been under consideration or had won a measure of interest in their specialized institutions and forums. They were combined to form a holistic and pragmatic agenda to which the Monterrey Consensus gave political support. Can this be done again? Perhaps, but it requires considerable discussion among government ministries and between government representatives at different international organizations. This approach also requires a commitment of a core of UN Missions.

It should be clear that the FfD approach, as encapsulated in the aforementioned Monterrey Consensus and the Doha Declaration made at the 2008 FfD review conference (A/CONF.212/7, resolution 1, annex)—like the approach of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts—did not seek to mobilize the financing required to attain a specified set of goals, but to finance an acceleration of development and reduction of poverty, per se. Thus, FfD has focused on concrete means to attain broad aims. Indeed, there were no MDGs when the preparations began on FfD in 1997. FfD was constructed in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Russian debt crisis of 1998, and the near meltdown of the global financial system in the same year following the failure of a single US hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management. Similarly, the 2008 Doha review conference took place during the depths of the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. Not surprisingly, given the international economic environment at the time, the focus of the developing countries—which had been the prime movers of the FfD process both in the lead up to Monterrey and

8. See the press release from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development announcing preliminary 2013 ODA estimates and current prospects; available at: http://www.oecd.org/development/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm (last accessed on 11.05.2014).

9. Draft UN General Assembly resolution A/68/L.49, »Modalities for the Third International Conference on Financing for Development«, submitted by the President of the General Assembly 6 June 2014; available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/L.49&Lang=E (last accessed on 25.06.2014).

to Doha—was on systemic failures, while accepting the quid pro quo required by developed countries that developing countries also accept focusing on the need to strengthen their own domestic economic environments and financial structures. In addition, developed countries recognized the need to substantially increase ODA, and all agreed to make the assistance more effective and consider developing innovative sources of international public financing.

The FfD policy discussions in the lead-up to Monterrey, in particular, were pragmatic and purposeful, such as to facilitate greater domestic mobilization of financial resources for public purposes and for private investment. FfD has also sought to create domestic and international economic environments that favoured long-term financial flows, which are essential for development, and to minimize the disruptions to economic activity caused by international financial volatility, through more effective financial regulations. It also agreed to strengthen the voice and participation of developing countries in global economic governance—notably at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—a process that continues today.

It is also important to note that FfD, in particular the Monterrey Conference, was a success because UN delegations that drove the process reached out to their colleagues in the finance and trade ministries in capitals and in the multilateral institutions; and because the management and staff of the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO all saw the value of the project, as internationally active civil society organizations and Wall Street emerging market finance professionals eventually did, too. Moreover, the World Bank provided considerable human resources to the UN Secretariat, and several member states made significant contributions to the FfD Trust Fund, providing resources not only to bring country participants and civil society members to New York, but also to send the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee to seek substantive exchanges with the Executive Boards of IMF and the World Bank and the WTO Development Committee.

Nonetheless, not all of the initiatives in the preparation of the Monterrey or Doha meetings went as planned or went smoothly. There were strong differences that could have derailed the discussion at many points, but the vision that something new was possible in Monterrey and the political momentum it gathered over time overcame the difficulties. It seemed especially providential that UN delegations agreed to keep what became the Monterrey Consensus (and later the Doha Declaration) short.[10] Delegations also agreed in preparing Monterrey (unfortunately not also in preparing Doha) to minimize the focus on drafting the final text and concentrate on the policy substance. Indeed, conventional face-to-face negotiations were only permitted in the last three days of the last week of the fourth and last Preparatory Committee session, when all sides felt strong pressure to complete the text and go to Monterrey to celebrate what they had created.

As mentioned above, the unique success of the Monterrey conference was that governments agreed to work seriously toward specific reforms that had been percolating in their specialized institutions and forums, which together formed a holistic and pragmatic agenda to which Monterrey gave a measure of political urgency. Nevertheless, when the Monterrey Consensus was adopted, John Foster of the North-South Institute in Ottawa, speaking to the FfD Civil Society Forum, called it the »Washington Consensus in a sombrero«.[11] He saw it as a fairly conventional text in terms of policy and rhetoric, as it appeared to those making a superficial reading. Another view recommended looking more deeply into the text, which had potentially broken new ground in international economic law and thus held out an important promise:

> The Monterrey Consensus focused on certain concrete and specific dimensions of development instead of dealing with the concept in an abstract and general fashion. (…) The intention was »to achieve measurable improvements in sustainable growth and poverty reduction« [citing the IMF/World Bank Development Committee Communiqué, 28 September 2002] (…) [It] unveiled the blueprint of a new partnership that focused on a shared responsibility between developed and developing countries. (…) It is thus critically important to ensure dynamic, participatory, and sustained implementation and follow-up; without this,

10. There was also playfulness among leading delegates preparing Monterrey who claimed, for example, that they needed to keep the Monterrey Consensus short because it would have to pass muster with finance ministers who had short attention spans.

11. As quoted by Ferial Haffajee in »Monterrey meet: Washington Consensus in a sombrero« TWE No. 277 (16-31 March 2002), Third World Network; available at: http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twe277f.htm (last accessed on 15.05.2014).

> the Monterrey Consensus will only add to the already bloated number of elegant, eloquent, and solemn declarations adopted at high-level Conferences and routinely consigned to the limbo of oblivion.[12]

Indeed, a number of governments and the Bretton Woods institutions maintained enthusiasm for Monterrey for several years, although it ultimately eroded, as the leading participants in its birth moved to other postings and senior managers completed their service in the major organizations. International attention shifted elsewhere, especially among UN delegations, which had only sporadic engagement with FfD in between the conferences.[13] As a UN delegate mentioned to this author less than a year after Monterrey, »we opened channels to the finance ministry, but we are not putting anything into the channels anymore and they are drying up«.

Admittedly, the preparations for the 2008 Doha FfD Conference followed a more conventional UN negotiation path and were less successful, with less buy-in by the Bretton Woods institutions or by the major powers. In fact, FfD was sidelined when the major powers invited other members of the previously ministerial-level Group of 20 (G20) to meet at leaders' level two weeks before the Doha conference, and began to formulate the concerted international programme to respond to the global financial crisis. However, even before the G20 meeting, preparations for the Doha conference had not embodied the same sense of joint international purpose as had Monterrey; in the end, the negotiations on the Doha outcome document became quite contentious, and extraordinary efforts were required to »save« the Monterrey process from collapse during the conference itself.[14]

For the third FfD Conference to succeed, it will be necessary to return to Monterrey processes, which can build enthusiasm among governments and other stakeholders and make them want—each perhaps for their own purposes—to forge a new Monterrey Consensus. UN delegations would have to take the lead and reopen the channels to other ministries, and cut new ones in the instances where UN Missions had not actively participated in the Monterrey process. They will also need to involve the other major international institutions and forums pertinent to development. If they can do it, something important in the revitalization of international cooperation for development can be achieved.

Deliver a Real, Not just a Nominal Global Partnership

Intergovernmental discussions about development at the UN and elsewhere enthusiastically embrace the phrase »the partnership for development« to describe the policy package that is the main focus of the discussions. The term has been used since at least the 1960s to describe a set of policy commitments by all or a group of governments to advance the development of the developing countries.[15] It usually represents a joint pledge by governments to contribute individually to collective undertakings in specified policy areas. The commitments are stated in more or less concrete terms, sometimes with and sometimes without deadlines for action. The parties also usually promise to come together periodically to monitor their progress in implementing their commitments. Unfortunately, the implementation reviews frequently seem to disappoint. If added precision of announced commitments was intended to obligate participants more firmly, the strategy appears to have failed. The question then becomes how to forge more reliable commitments.

One strategy that has been tried in recent years has been to move the locus of decision-making out of the UN and into forums in which decisions embodying effective commitments were expected to be easier to achieve. Two notable experiences in forging such international

12. Inaamul Haque and Ruxandra Burdescu (2004): Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development: Response sought from international economic law, in: *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, vol. 27, No. 2: 219f.

13. On the build up to the Monterrey successes and the dissipation of its energy post-Monterrey, see Barry Herman (2006): The politics of inclusion in the Monterrey process, United Nations DESA Working Paper No. 23 (April); available online at: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp23_2006.pdf (last accessed on 11.05.2014).

14. For a critical review of the status of negotiations as governments began to arrive in Doha, see Concord Press Briefing (2008): Doha, Qatar, 29 November–2 December 2008, International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Census; available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/11concord.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014). For a post-conference assessment, see Sara Burke (2008): The Doha Declaration and Development: What are the Next Steps? Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dialogue on Globalization Briefing Paper 14 (December); available at: http://www.fes-globalization.org/publicationsNY/BP14DohaRevConf.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

15. See Barry Herman (2013): Towards a new global partnership for development: Looking back to look forward. Background Study for the Development Cooperation Forum's Ethiopia High-level Symposium, Addis Ababa, 5–7 June 2013; available at: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/dcf_ethiopia_background_study.pdf (last accessed on 15.05.2014).

partnerships for development seem to offer some points for reflection. As detailed in the annex to this analysis, the G20's Seoul Development Agenda and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation have each promised significantly more than they have been able to deliver.

The 2010 Seoul Development Agenda—and its successor, the 2013 Saint Petersburg Development Outlook—were drafted behind closed doors and with very limited opportunities for engagement with non-G20 governments, non-business civil society, or multilateral development actors not under effective control of the G20. The initiatives have raised suspicions of the G20's intentions, especially among civil society organizations that monitor global development trends and policies.[16] They have also been a point of concern of the Global Governance Group (GGG) of UN member states that are not members of the G20. The GGG has won a number of small victories in instituting G20 dialogues with the General Assembly and in increasing UN Secretariat participation in staff work provided to the G20 by multilateral institutions, ostensibly to broaden the range of voices heard in those reports.[17] Nevertheless, despite the presumed greater homogeneity of the G20 forum, the delivery on its development cooperation commitments can be described as uninspiring. Certainly, there are forums within the UN system where the technical proposals of interest that the G20 has sought to advance can be more universally vetted.

The 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is a follow-up to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which in turn can be said to have grown out of a global mandate to promote aid effectiveness in the Monterrey Consensus (para. 43). Since the beginning, the driving force has been the donor countries in the Development Assistance Committee, although as noted in the annex below, more of the proposed reforms to make ODA more effective have been undertaken by aid-receiving, rather than aid-providing countries. This is not hard to understand. Aid-receiving governments have an obvious interest in better planning and oversight of what donors are contributing to their country. Also, the implied threat for non-compliance with donor reform requests is a loss of funds. For donors, there is less pressure to reform and there may even be parliamentary pressures and government audit requirements to follow the donors' standard procedures rather than use national systems. The agenda for aid effectiveness reform is actually a valuable one, addressing not only the essentially bureaucratic problems, but also improving overall aid efforts by bringing multiple donors together in »mutual accountability« forums in aid-receiving countries. Indeed, the latter is a focus of the UN's own Development Cooperation Forum.[18]

The argument here is that policy makers should look to the UN as the primary forum for forging the global partnership for development. Taking global decision-making outside the UN has never substituted for facing the need to drive toward a concordance of views among all the relevant stakeholders in a fully participative UN forum. This could be seen in a distant precursor of FfD. The oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Arab Oil Exporting Countries in late 1973 raised oil prices from $3 per barrel to almost $12. Soon after, developed countries agreed to a discussion agenda proposed by developing countries, and at a special session of the General Assembly in 1974 adopted the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), followed by another special session on the NIEO in 1975, which was unsuccessful. The discussion was then taken out of the UN and placed in an ad hoc, restricted membership forum called the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, based in Paris.[19] That also failed, and the discussions then returned to a special »Committee of the Whole« (COW) of the UN General Assembly in 1978–79, which was ultimately asked to prepare a global round of negotiations on development and international economic cooperation (resolution 34/138). It failed as well, and the »global round« never took place—although a North-South summit was held in Cancún in 1981. By 1980, the potential for consensus on the NIEO had evaporated, and there was no longer any belief that a deal could be cut trading petroleum

16. Examples of critical global monitors of the G20's development agenda include the Bretton Woods Project, Heinrich Böll Foundation, Eurodad, and Social Watch.

17. See, for example, »Letter dated 20 March 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General« (A/67/807).

18. See Angela Bester (2014): Third global accountability study on mutual accountability, Background study 2 for the Development Cooperation Forum's Germany High-Level Symposium, Berlin, 20–21 March 2014; available at: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/dcf_germany_bkgd_study_2_ma_survey.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

19. See Jahangir Amuzegar (1977): A requiem for the North-South Conference, in: *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 56, No. 1 (October): 136f.

price stability for enhanced cooperation on international financial and trade policies for development.

Global negotiations require a global forum, but a global forum does not guarantee successful global negotiations. If agreement is limited among the parties, the negotiations will ultimately fail, whether debated in a small or large forum. Indeed, periodically in the 1980s and 1990s, the General Assembly was asked to launch a »global round«, which it declined to do each time, until international relationships among developed and developing countries had reached a point that some UN Missions from the South and the North thought it worthwhile to try again for a comprehensive economic policy discussion. That effort began in 1997 in a cautious and exploratory way as Financing for Development, and resulted five years later in the Monterrey Consensus.

It is not clear whether the world has reached another FfD moment or, for that matter, a Millennium Declaration moment—which was an inspiration to many people and governments around the world. However, governments should try to find out as they prepare for 2015. If the preparations are successful, the dual meetings would be inspiring—in a manner unique to the UN—involving both the laudable SDGs and the post-2015 development agenda's promise to achieve them, complemented by a comprehensive set of pragmatic commitments to advance specific policy elements of international cooperation in the third FfD Conference.

Annex: Selected Experiences with »Global« Partnerships for Development

Considerable international attention has been paid to the specification of the MDGs and their targets and indicators as adopted by the UN. Progress in their implementation has been monitored annually by official bodies, reports to which seem to be carefully read outside as well as inside the UN.[20] This is presumably intentional, particularly because civil society watchdogs lobby governments to live up to their commitments when the many gaps are identified. The approach of specifying goals, targets, and indicators of development partnership has spread to other bodies, with no greater overall success in delivering action on commitments. This is the case whether in a restricted group of countries that are meant to have forged a special sense of global responsibility—namely, the G20—or a large group of countries in which the targets are meant to apply only on a voluntary basis to those governments that wish to bind themselves to them, namely, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. It may be useful to keep these experiences in mind as the international community prepares the SDGs and the renewed global partnership to speed attainment of those goals. It may also be time to fold those exercises into the *Global* Partnership for Development.

The G20's Seoul Development Agenda

The »Seoul Development Agenda for Shared Growth« was adopted in November 2010 by the member states of the G20.[21] Following the mandate from its Toronto Summit in June 2010, the G20 adopted a multi-year action plan at the following summit in Seoul to implement a set of development cooperation principles.[22] The plan listed

20. Official multilateral monitoring is coordinated by the United Nations in its annual *Millennium Development Goals Report* and *MDG Gap Task Force Reports* (both sets of reports are available at: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/reports.shtml, last accessed on 14.05.2014), and by the IMF and World Bank in their annual *Global Monitoring Reports* (available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:23100866~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html, last accessed on 14.05.2014).

21. Group of 20 (2010): Annex I: Seoul development consensus for shared growth, in: *Seoul Summit Document*. Seoul, Republic of Korea, 12 November 2010; available at: https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Annex%201%20Seoul%20Development%20Consensus%20for%20Shared%20Growth.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

22. The six Seoul development principles focus on: economic growth; global development partnership (specifically, between G20 and low-income countries); global or regional systemic issues; private sector participation; complementarity (i.e., adding value to existing development ef-

numerous concrete policy promises with deadlines for achieving them, which it asked its Development Working Group (DWG) to monitor. The action plan aimed to help increase economic growth rates in developing countries—including through investments and policy measures in infrastructure, human resource development (focused on skills), trade (enhancing capacity and access), private investment and job creation, food security, growth with resilience (identified as social protection and facilitating remittance flows), financial inclusion (financial services for the poor), domestic resource mobilization (taxation), and knowledge sharing.[23]

One or more »actions« were specified under each of these nine pillars, although sometimes multilateral institutions and not the member states were held responsible for delivering on the actions. For example, the multilateral development banks were called upon to »Identify infrastructure gaps, needs and funding requirements …« (Delivery target: June 2011). In some cases, delivery dates were stated in a general way, for instance: »We call for support to build capacity in tropical agriculture technologies and productive systems« (Target: medium term). In other cases, target dates were omitted, for example: »We agree to make progress towards duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access for the least developed countries.«

In all, the G20 called for considerable activity by the multilateral system to prepare the reports required by its agenda and help initiate pilot projects. Commitments grew as additional DWG proposals were accepted by the G20 leaders. By 2013, there were 67 specific and time-bound cooperation commitments. In its 2013 report on their implementation, the DWG concluded that 33 of its commitments had been completed, 33 were »ongoing« (although 8 were »off track«), and only one had »stalled«—namely, »assess how best to integrate environmental safeguards in a cost-efficient manner«.[24] Nevertheless, quite a few pilot projects had been initiated, which could have broader impact depending on assessment of their results and follow-up.

According to some commentators, the criteria for awarding positive scores were less than demanding.[25] An assessment of the commitments by a joint Canadian and Russian academic project—based on data available up to 31 October 2012—also offered a number of critical comments, if in a nuanced way.[26] A third assessment—which focused on infrastructure, food security, and financial inclusion—saw a »moderate« positive impact of the development agenda.[27] In addition, a Commonwealth survey of the views of its member states pointed to mixed evaluations by non-G20 members. The commitments to give »support to developing countries to strengthen and enhance social protection programmes« and »enhance trade capacity and access to markets« received the lowest marks. Commonwealth countries were most satisfied with the commitment to facilitate the flow of remittances.[28] However, it is also important to recognize the essentially subjective nature of all such assessments. In the latter case, the DWG itself assessed the commitment to reduce the average cost of remittance transfers from 10 per cent of the amount of funds transferred to 5 per cent by 2014 as »off track«.[29]

forts); and outcome orientation (i.e., feasible, practical, and accountable measures).

23. Group of 20 (2010): Annex II: Multi-year action plan on development, in: *Seoul Summit Document*. Seoul, Republic of Korea, 12 November 2010, posted at https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Annex%202%20Multi-Year%20Action%20Plan%20On%20Development.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

24. »Saint Petersburg Accountability Report on G20 Development Commitments«, St. Petersburg, Russia, September 2013; available, posted at: https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/Saint%20Petersburg%20Accountability%20Report%20on%20G20%20Development%20Commitments_0.pdf (last accessed on 14. May05. 2014).

25. For example, »Support for social protection floors is on-track, but it's not clear whether any countries are adopting them…. Moreover, little information is in the public domain about pilot projects or plans that are complete, such as the ›action plan on water, food and agriculture‹« (Nancy Alexander, "Highlights of the Russian G20 Summit« *G20 Update*, Issue #17 (October 2013), Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Washington, D.C. Office, posted at http://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/g20_update_17_1.pdf, accessed 18 May 2014).

26. The assessment covered more G20 commitments than the development agenda per se (see International Organizations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and G20 Research Group of the University of Toronto, *Mapping G20 decisions implementation: How the G20 is delivering on the decisions made*, presented to G20 Sherpas Meeting, Moscow, 12 December 2012); available at: http://www.g20civil.com/upload/iblock/f3a/Mapping_G20_Decisions_Implementation_full_report.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

27. Nathan Coplin (2013): G20 Impact, in: *Global Financial Governance and Impact Report, 2013*. Washington DC: New Rules for Global Governance; available at: http://www.new-rules.org/storage/documents/global_financial_governance__impact%20report_2013%20.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

28. Zhenbo Hou and Dirk Willem te Velde (2013): The accountability of the G20's development agenda. Paper for the Commonwealth-Francophonie-G20 Development Working Group Meeting, Washington, D.C., 21 April 2013, p. 8; available at: http://www.odi.org.uk/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8349.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

29. More generally, the path even to a highly quantified target can be judged in different ways—e.g., by effort applied to reach the target or by a percentage of the target achieved (which implies a linear approach to the target is realistic). Moreover, the target in this case largely pertains to prices charged by private corporations and their decline depends on costs and competition, which depends in turn on the volume of transac-

The Saint Petersburg G20 summit took account of the official assessment and adopted a revised action plan based on five »core priorities«—namely food security, financial inclusion and remittances, infrastructure, human resource development, and domestic resource mobilization. It thus dropped the pillars of trade, private investment and job creation, growth with resilience (social protection), knowledge sharing, and inclusive green growth (which had been added in 2012). Moreover, the »stalled« action noted above, which fell under the retained infrastructure pillar, was dropped from further attention. Certain additional actions were added and most of the ongoing actions under the remaining pillars were continued, although some were dropped, including »increase procurement from smallholder producers« under food security (which had been off track) and »identify ways to help developing countries tax multinationals through effective transfer pricing«, which had been part of domestic resource mobilization (also off track).[30]

In all, while the G20 accountability exercise reflected the importance of monitoring and evaluation of partnership commitments and of periodically updating commitments, the exercise took place behind closed doors. Indeed, there seems to be no public explanation of the revisions made. Why, the public may ask, were the actions on environmental safeguards and social protection programmes dropped? Their omission suggests either that they were no longer priorities or deemed beyond the ability of G20 countries to deliver, or that the Governments decided they had erred in seeking to address the specific policy question within the G20 *development* agenda, as opposed to other G20 working groups.[31] In fact, why had the safeguards commitment »stalled« in the first place? Why were other commitments that had been deemed on track dropped before completion, including all the commitments that had not yet been achieved under the dropped trade and private investment and job creation pillars? The Saint Petersburg changes beg for explanation.

For future assessments, the G20 promised at Saint Petersburg to integrate accountability into its development cooperation work and undertake triennial performance assessments. It may be suggested that the G20 make such assessments openly and with the participation of relevant stakeholders, which include not only the officially recognized »engagement groups« (business, civil society, labour, think tanks, and youth), but also other governments and peoples of the world. Indeed, there is a section of informed international opinion today that asks why the G20 has given itself the task of devising and undertaking a development agenda, most of whose beneficiaries would be non-G20 countries.[32]

In fact, the argument for according a role to the G20 in global economic policy has pertained not to development issues, but to macroeconomic coordination and consistent financial regulatory policies for global growth and financial stability. The case relies on a belief that a small group of major economies would reach good decisions that could move the global economy more quickly than is likely in a universal forum. Whether or not that is true, the argument does not seem to apply to international development policies. Certainly, G20 countries have not demonstrated a greater degree of solidarity in implementing their G20 cooperation proposals than their commitments in universal forums. Moreover, it is not as though smaller countries would not be the source of equally good ideas about development as those emanating from the largest countries in the world. All countries should be encouraged to bring their development policy proposals and initiatives to universal forums on development and in particular to the deliberations for the post-2015 development agenda and the third FfD conference.

tions within particular remittance corridors in a world of rapidly evolving technology. Thus, one may ask if this target was a forecast or a variable under policy control.

30. See, Saint Petersburg Development Outlook, St. Petersburg, Russia, September 2013; available at: http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/development/St-Petersburg-Development-Outlook.pdf (last accessed on 15.05.2014).

31. For example, the G20 currently has a separate working group on »investment and infrastructure«. Also, in 2011, the work of the DWG on food security was largely overtaken by the G20 agricultural ministers who met and produced an Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture. See Robin Davies, "Food security and the G20's development agenda: stop or go?« *Devpolicy Blog*, Development Policy Centre, Australian National University, 18 March 2014, posted at http://devpolicy.org/food-security-and-the-g20s-development-agenda-stop-or-go-20140318/ (accessed 14 May 2014).

32. See, for example, Mike Callaghan et al. (2013): Development and the G20, in: *G20 Monitor,* No. 5 (August). Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy; available at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/g20_monitor_the_g20_and_development_.pdf (last accessed on 14.05.2014).

Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

A different type of international partnership for development emerged from a sequence of high-level forums on aid effectiveness undertaken under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[33] It culminated in the »Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation«, adopted by representatives of developed and developing country governments, international and bilateral institutions, and various other stakeholders.[34] As of March 2014, 161 Governments and 54 organizations had endorsed the principles adopted at Busan.[35] However, the effectiveness-enhancing practices specified in the Busan agreement, which were largely carried over from earlier exercises, were not deemed to necessarily apply to developing country providers. Instead, it was explicitly acknowledged that the normative practices would be a »reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis« because the »nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South cooperation differ from those that apply to North-South cooperation« (para. 2).

The Busan meeting had been motivated by a felt need to make official development assistance more effective and to encompass within a broad effectiveness agenda, the burgeoning cooperation of non-traditional providers. In addition, Busan specified in what ways cooperation for effective development should encompass more than what ODA per se generally can deliver—in particular, insisting on the need for »strong, sustainable and inclusive growth« of developing economies, along with the need to support developing countries as they sought to increase tax revenues, strengthen state and non-state institutions, and deepen regional and global economic integration.

It must be noted that the pre-Busan efforts to boost aid effectiveness had reached their endpoint at the Busan meeting without achieving their goals. Even though considerable improvement had been recorded on many of the 13 pre-Busan targets, only one was achieved: technical cooperation programmes in *half* of the aid-receiving countries would be provided through donor-coordinated programmes that were consistent with partner national development strategies [emphasis added].[36] In other words, it seems that there had been some resistance—more so in a number of ODA-providing rather than aid-receiving countries—to carrying out pre-Busan pledges on aid effectiveness.

Those pledges had begun with a global endorsement in the Monterrey Consensus, which had spelled out a number of measures to boost aid effectiveness and called on ODA providers to apply those measures (para. 43). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—a coordinating body of donor agencies of OECD member states—took up the Monterrey challenge, forming a Working Party on Aid Effectiveness in March 2003 that was composed of representatives of donor agencies and multilateral institutions. In 2004, it invited 14 developing countries to join, and expanded again in 2008 to include representatives of civil society, organized under the Better Aid platform, which had been formed as the civil society vehicle for interaction with the DAC Working Party and its various thematic clusters.[37] Finally, developing countries that had become providers of assistance, ODA recipients, and the private sector were invited to participate. The Working Party helped prepare the Busan meeting and was called on to devise the working arrangements for the Busan follow up, a task it completed in 2012, after which it went out of existence.[38]

The post-Busan structure of meetings would henceforth focus on large-scale, multi-country, and multi-stakeholder reviews about every two years to assess implementation of the Busan partnership. The first meeting of this new »Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation« took place on 15–16 April 2014 in Mexico City. It had been prepared by a steering committee, which is responsible for undertaking the preparatory and

33. See OECD, The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008); available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf (last accessed on 14.03.2014).

34. »Busan partnership for effective development cooperation«, adopted at the Fourth High-level Meeting on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 1 December 2011; available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf (last accessed on 26.03.2014).

35. According to the post-Busan partnership website: http://effectivecooperation.org/about-list.html (last accessed on 26.03.2014.

36. See, OECD (2012): *Aid Effectiveness, 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration*. Paris: OECD; available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/aid-effectiveness-2011_9789264125780-en (last accessed on 26.03.2014).

37. Better Aid was replaced by the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness at the end of 2012, carrying out similar tasks in the post-Busan partnership. For more information, see www.betteraid.org (last accessed on 26.03.2014).

38. See OECD, Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, »Summary record of the Post-Busan Interim Group« (DCD/DAC/EFF/M(2012)3REV2).

monitoring work between the large conferences. The composition of the steering committee mimics that of the earlier OECD Working Party, although it is smaller and has more developing than donor members. As of March 2014, it comprised representatives of five governments that receive development aid, one government that is both a recipient and a provider of assistance, three government providers, one representative each of the private sector, parliaments, civil society organizations and multilateral development banks, plus the Chair of the DAC, which remains the primary mechanism for coordination of Northern donors. The steering committee is chaired by three ministerial level appointees.[39]

The global partnership and the steering committee are serviced by a staff team drawn from OECD and the UN Development Programme. A major project of the staff team, which it completed in June 2012, was to devise a framework and a set of indicators by which developing countries could report their perceived improvements in the effectiveness of the development cooperation they were receiving.[40] The first round of reports under this methodology was presented to the Mexico meeting. It was a sobering report:

> Globally, the results are mixed (…) commitment to the Busan principles remains strong. Achievements made on important aid effectiveness commitments that date back to 2005 have been broadly sustained. (…) More needs to be done, however, to meet the targets that the Global Partnership set for 2015.[41]

In light of the inability to report significant progress in implementing Busan commitments, it seems fair to query the role of this new forum. A communiqué was issued at the end of the Mexico meeting, which reiterated earlier commitments and noted advances in various aspects of the Busan work programme.[42] However, the meeting did not promise accelerated action or seem to breathe additional political energy into the post-Busan process.

If the reason for creating the Busan process outside the United Nations was the expectation of a greater ability to reach a strong commitment to undertake a set of specialized reforms, it does not seem to have been successful. Indeed, the donor resources devoted to the Busan process might well be better allocated to actual development cooperation activities, and greater political (and financial) capital might instead be invested in the UN's much more modest Development Cooperation Forum, whose members' commitment to effective development cooperation is no less strong. In fact, they include many of the same governments. Finally, while a number of interesting voluntary initiatives were described at the Mexico meeting—suggesting that the process may serve well as a platform for sharing experiences and perhaps stimulating participants to emulate some of the initiatives—would it not be even more useful to share those experiences in a universal forum?

39. Information as per the partnership's website: http://effectivecooperation.org/about/steering-committee/ (last accessed on 24.03.2014).

40. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2013): *Guide to the Monitoring Framework of the Global Partnership: Final Version*, 1 July 2013; available at: http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/20130701-Busan-Global-Monitoring-Guidance_ENG_FINAL.pdf (last accessed 26.03.2014).

41. OECD and UNDP (2014): *Making Development Cooperation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report*. Paris: OECD: 16; available at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/making-development-co-operation-more-effective_9789264209305-en (last accessed 26.03.2014).

42. While the communiqué largely followed the structure of the Busan agreement, it gave increased emphasis to middle-income countries, highlighting the vulnerability of a number of them, and the need of many for continuing development cooperation—which the communiqué emphasized should not be at the expense of aid to low-income countries (First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Building towards an Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda, Communiqué, 16 April 2014, paras. 23–26; available at: http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Final-ConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf, last accessed 14.05.2014).

About the author

Barry Herman is Visiting Senior Fellow at the Graduate Program in International Affairs of The New School in New York.

Imprint

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | Global Policy and Development
Hiroshimastr. 28 | 10785 Berlin | Germany

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung | New York Office
747 Third Avenue, 22B | New York, NY 10017 | USA

Responsible:
Michèle Auga, Executive Director, FES New York

Phone: +1-212-687-0208 | Fax: +1-212-687-0261
www.fes-globalization.org/new_york

To order publications:
jlandt@fesny.org

Dialogue on Globalization

As part of the international work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Dialogue on Globalization contributes worldwide to the debate on globalization and global governance. It is based on the premise that – through an inclusive and responsive global policy approach – globalization can be shaped into a direction that promotes peace, democracy and social justice. The program draws intensely on the international network of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – a German non-profit institution committed to the principles of social democracy with offices, programs and partners in more than 100 countries. Dialogue on Globalization addresses »movers and shakers« both in developing countries and in the industrialized parts of the world. The program is coordinated by the head office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin and by the FES offices in New York and Geneva.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in New York serves as a liaison between the United Nations, FES field offices and partners in developing countries to strenghten the voice of the Global South. It contributes to UN debates on economic and social development, and on peace and security issues. Towards this end, FES New York annually organizes some 30 seminars, conferences and round-tables and regularly publishes briefing papers and fact sheets. In addition, it contributes to a dialogue on the work of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Washington, DC.
The New York office is located in close proximity to the United Nations headquarters. The office has four permanent staff members and provides internships for students specializing in international affairs, development and economic policy.

ISBN
978-3-86498-929-2