



Compass 2020

Germany in international relations
Aims, instruments, prospects



Crises and Wars in Times of Globalization

How German Crisis Prevention
and Peace Building could help

Michèle Auga

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The Compass 2020 project represents the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung's contribution to a debate on Germany's aims, role and strategies in international relations. Compass 2020 will organise events and issue publications in the course of 2007, the year in which German foreign policy will be very much in the limelight due to the country's presidency of the EU Council and the G 8. Some 30 articles written for this project will provide an overview of the topics and regions that are most important for German foreign relations. All the articles will be structured in the same way. Firstly, they will provide information about the most significant developments, the toughest challenges and the key players in the respective political fields and regions. The second section will analyse the role played hitherto by German / European foreign policy, the strategies it pursues and the way in which it is perceived. In the next section, plausible alternative scenarios will be mapped out illustrating the potential development of a political field or region over the next 15 years. The closing section will formulate possible points of departure for German and European policy.

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Abstract

Wars between states have been largely superseded by new forms of violent conflict. These cannot be contained using the conventional procedures of international law. The circumstances of this new century call for a policy of prevention, for a widening of the notion of security to include non-military categories, for sustained state-building and for civil conflict transformation. So-called "new wars" are resulting in the privatisation of the use of force, transnational criminality and also terrorism. Despite the general tendency towards the erosion of nation statehood, however, the state must remain the principal regulatory model of international politics. If its status as such is eroded, the probability of conflicts deteriorating into violence will increase. The erosion of the state's control capacity facilitates the emergence of civil war economies and so-called "shadow globalisation". State decay is not an unforeseen, randomly occurring problem; state decay can be seen to be coming long before the event. A fundamental challenge for the future therefore is to strengthen endangered states using the tools of state-building. A distinction must be made here between *state-building* and *nation-building*, which is not a priori geared to peace-building. There is a need to go beyond analysing the core functions of the state and turn the focus to good governance, the equitable distribution of resources and civil society.

There is today a broad-based consensus in Germany that peace-building is a challenge which calls for a coherent approach across the various fields of policy-making, with a decisive role being assigned to development cooperation policy. The notion of "civil conflict transformation and crisis prevention" has successfully found its way into the debate on foreign policy. Civil society actors and their conflict-regulating potential are becoming increasingly important. Various German policy documents stress the concept of prevention. This paper subjects the current security-related reasoning, planning and actions of German foreign policy in matters of peace-building to scrutiny on the basis of a number of scenarios. Do the current priorities stand up to the scenarios of the world in 2020?

The findings show that Germany is not yet making optimal use of the existing potential in terms of instruments, actors and financial resources. Policy corrections are both possible and necessary if the crises besetting the world in 2020 are not ultimately to lead to crises in Germany as well.

The recommendations for a far-sighted German peace policy include the drafting of a national security strategy, interministerial concepts, strategies and sets of criteria on state-building, a review of the existing financing instruments, public relations work for civil conflict transformation, improved governmental and non-governmental cooperation, and the development of European coordination strategies to unleash synergies.

I. Crises in Times of Globalization – How German Crisis Prevention and Peace Building Could Help

“Need is conflict. Where there is hunger, there will be no durable peace. Where there is abject poverty, there will be no justice. Where human existence and its simple needs are daily under threat, it is not admissible to speak of security.”¹

I.1 In the shadow of globalisation: hunger, violence and state decay²

As long ago as 16 years before the end of the East-West conflict, on 26 September 1973, in a far-sighted speech before the United Nations, Willy Brandt deflected attention away from the confrontation between systems to the structural factors which are today often seen as the origins of so-called “new wars”³ and the outbreak of violent conflict. He thereby laid the foundations for what, in 1994, was to become the concept of so-called “human security”. Drawn up by the United Nations Development Programme, the concept contained the demands repeatedly voiced by Kofi Annan at the 2005 Millennium Summit for “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. It contrasted the hitherto state-centred approaches to international politics with a new concept which centred on the individual and postulated that stability cannot be achieved in any given region as long as the people there remain exposed to various forms of threat. However, the UN has also had recourse to the notion of “human security” in its reactions to the increasing social vulnerability emerging within the context of globalisation and the privatisation of public resources. Accordingly, Annan called for “[a] comprehensive concept of collective security: one that tackles new threats and old and that addresses the security concerns of all states”.⁴ The security needs of states in the world of the 21st century may be very diverse, but on the other hand, the Secretary-General argued, “new insecurities” are a threat to the entire international community: “civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. [...] On this interconnectedness of threats we must found a new security consensus, the first article of which must be that all are entitled to freedom from fear, and that whatever threatens one threatens all.”⁵

The framework for international politics has changed drastically. Wars between states have been largely superseded by new forms of violent conflict which cannot be contained using the conventional procedures of international law. The term “intra-state” wars, however, is not an entirely apt description of the new phenomenon. In many cases these conflicts involve actors in neighbouring states, generate transnational flows of refugees and thereby ignite conflagrations which affect entire regions. The characteristic feature of so-called “new” wars is that their protagonists resort to unconventional methods for which no provision is made in international law. According to Münkler, they typically entail more cruelty and brutality against the civilian population and are more reminiscent of the wars of early modern history than of the national wars à la Clausewitz.⁶

1) Brandt, Willy: Berliner Ausgabe, Band 6: Ein Volk der guten Nachbarn. Bonn. 2005. p. 504.

2) The members of the Conflict Transformation Team of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung were heavily involved in preparing, discussing and drafting this paper. Special thanks are due to Anja Dargatz, Ralf Hexel, Britta Joerißen, Marei John and Annette Lohmann.

3) See Kaldor, Mary: Neue und alte Kriege, Frankfurt a.M. 2000; Münkler, Herfried: Die neuen Kriege, Reinbek bei Hamburg 2004; and Pradetto, August: Neue Kriege, in: Gareis, Sven Bernhard und Klein, Paul (Hg.): Handbuch Militär und Sozialwissenschaft, Opladen 2004, who questions the notion.

4) In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all; report of the Secretary-General / United Nations, General Assembly. March 2005. [New York] 2005. p. 62.

5) Ibid.

6) Münkler, Herfried: op. cit, pp. 10-25.

Supposedly predictable national armies are replaced by protagonists such as paramilitary units, rebel organisations, terrorist groups and criminal gangs. Even police forces are behaving as laws unto themselves. The distinction between public and private is incrementally becoming more blurred. The result is that the use of force is no longer the prerogative of the state.⁷ All 19 major armed conflicts waged in 2004 conformed to this pattern. The renowned institute of peace research SIPRI has also drawn attention to one recent case where the opposite was true: "In a reversal of the classic spill-over of conflict from intra- to inter-state, developments in Iraq during 2004 raised the prospect of an international conflict creating a fully-fledged civil war."⁸

In the literature on peace-building, conflict is seen as a necessary phenomenon of societal change. Trust in social co-existence, the "freedom from fear" called for by Kofi Annan, cannot develop, however, unless conflicts can be solved without having to fear the use of force. For this, any type of community requires norms (constitution, political culture) and institutions (courts, police force, parliaments, parties) and methods, instruments and procedures (negotiations, minority rights), which prevent the use of force. *Civil* conflict transformation in this context means "having or establishing norms and institutions which prevent the use of force in current and future conflicts."⁹ The recognition of rules by society and acceptance that the state has a monopoly on the use of force are fundamental prerequisites for this.

With the end of the Cold War and the associated transfer of attention to other crises, the international community found itself brutally confronted with the fact that in many cases the "state" itself had become a party to the conflict, that governments – for example that in Sudan – were attacking their own citizens. A "crisis of state integrity" was increasingly frequently being named as *one* of the causes of conflicts escalating into the use of force.

Despite globalisation and a tendency towards the erosion of nation statehood, the state remains the fundamental regulatory model for international politics. If its status as such becomes eroded, the probability of conflicts deteriorating into violence will increase. State integrity and non-violent conflict regulation are closely correlated. Because of its regulatory function and status as a fundamental element in international relations, a state which is in decay becomes a structural problem. It was only when Afghanistan became a failed state that it became a retreat and transit area for international terrorist networks. The failure of the Palestinian Territories to achieve statehood is known to have strengthened Hamas. Removal of the distinction between public and private makes for the emergence of civil war economies.¹⁰ Erosion of state control capacities paves the way for the emergence of the so-called "shadow globalisation," transnational corruption channels, human trafficking, narcotics markets, small firearms trading – organised crime. And finally: state failure is contagious. The symptoms of failure affect the entire region and include refugee flows, arms proliferation, transnational crime and the collapse of regional markets.

7] See Kaldor, op.cit.

8] SIPRI Yearbook 2005. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm 2005.

9] See Weller, Christoph und Kirschner, Andrea: Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung – Allheilmittel oder Leerformel? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines vielversprechenden Konzepts. In: IPG 4/2005, p. 10-29.

10] See Ehrke, Michael: Zur politischen Ökonomie post-staatlicher Konflikte. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hrsg.), Bonn 2002 (Internationale Politikanalyse) and Andreas Hahn: Realitäten der Quasi-Staatlichkeit. Zur politischen Ökonomie alternativer Herrschaftsordnungen. In: INEF Report 82/2006.

1.2 "Come on, let's build a state!"

To date there has been no standard definition of the term "state decay" (Staatszerfall). The expression is indeed problematic. The parallel notion in English of *failing* suggests an inevitability and linearity which are not borne out by reality, as demonstrated by a number of "resurrected" states such as Uganda and Cambodia. In other cases (e.g. Lebanon), the degree of the erosion has varied over the decades. State decay, therefore, has to be defined as a process during which the institutions of certain states are incapable, or only just capable, of fulfilling fundamental state functions both within the country and in its relations with other countries. These include the *security function* (guaranteeing internal and external security), the *welfare function* (state services and transfers plus an equitable allocation of resources) and the *legitimacy and rule-of-law function* (political participation, judicial system, public administration).¹¹ The degree of erosion in the various sectors can be measured using quantitative data such as that compiled in the Human Development Index or the Freedom House Index. State decay is therefore not an unpredictable, randomly occurring problem; state decay announces its advent long in advance. A fundamental challenge for the future is thus to strengthen endangered states by means of *state-building* using a set of intervention instruments appropriate to the type of country concerned ("consolidated", "weak", "failing" or "failed").¹² A "one-size-fits-all" approach cannot lead to success. There is also a need to go beyond analysing the core functions of the state as described above and broaden the remit to cover good governance matters as well. How does a country acquire *responsible and competent elites* and a *civil society which is capable of dialogue and ready to engage in it?*

1.3 The spectre of "ethnicity"

There is likewise a need to sharpen awareness of the often glaring contradictions incorporated in the notion of *nation-building*, such as the "ethnicisation" of politics. In contrast to essentialistic standpoints which proceed from the assumption that ethnicity can be described as a type of natural category on the basis of objective criteria and classifies people on the basis of these criteria, effective peace-building needs to explore the historical, social and political circumstances which are the causes of an exaggerated identification with supposedly "ethnic" groups. The 1995 International Commission on the Balkans called for programmes to be developed which defuse "ethnic conflicts and the logics of exclusion". In its understanding, the survival of a society depends on its becoming "a civil society within which social cross-ties and solidarity structures can develop as a counterweight to the ties of nationalism".¹³ In crisis regions elsewhere in the world too, the assumption of a supposedly "natural community" based on ethnicity has proved to be calamitous.¹⁴ In the case of Iraq, the American policy of dividing the population into Kurds, Sunni and Shia has led to a vicious circle which has awakened hopes of secession.¹⁵ One of the great challenges for peace-building will therefore be to promote the *establishment of strong (transnational) civil societies* which are capable of advancing something to countervail the notion of "ethnicity". The term "ethnicity" must be shown to be what it really is: an artificial assignment of identity for the purpose of collective mobilisation which, in its totalitarian incarnation, serves as a concept for expulsion and a

11] See Miliken, Jennifer and Krause, Keith: *State Failure, State Collapse and State Reconstruction*. Oxford et al. 2003, and Schneckener, Ulrich (Hrsg.): *States at Risk. Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem*. SWP-Studie. Berlin, November 2004. p. 43.

12] Schneckener, op. cit., p. 17.

13] See Aspen Institute Berlin/Carnegie Endowment (Hrsg.): *Der trügerische Frieden*. Bericht der Internationalen Balkan-Kommission. Hamburg 1997. p. 75.

14] See Balibar, Etienne: *Die Nation-Form: Geschichte und Ideologie*. In: Balibar, Etienne und Wallerstein, Immanuel: *Rasse, Klasse, Nation. Ambivalente Identitäten*. 2. Auflage, Hamburg 1998. p. 111.

15] See Wieland, Carsten: *The Bankruptcy of Humanism? Primordialism Dominates the Agenda of International Politics*. In: IPG, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Hrsg.). April 2005. p. 149. See also: Gärber, André: *Der Nahe/Mittlere Osten – Die blockierte Region am Scheideweg*, Reihe Kompass 2020 – Deutschland in den internationalen Beziehungen, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2007, p. 15.

“pure nation” (cf. Rwanda in 1994 or Srebrenica in 1995)¹⁶. *Nation-building* on the basis of “ethnicity” is therefore not a priori peace-building and should also not be confused with *state-building*.¹⁷

1.4 New, old mediators: the rediscovery of political parties

The conflict-resolving potential of *political parties* has long been underestimated; that potential is assumed to rest instead with civil society. In many so-called “defective democracies”, dysfunctional parties and defective party systems are indeed responsible for holding back the consolidation process, yet their central function, namely to serve as a transmission belt between political views on the one hand and their transposition into state decisions on the other, continues to remain incumbent on them and cannot be fulfilled vicariously by civil society.¹⁸ A party system’s degree of fragmentation has a decisive influence on the consolidation of democracy and thus on the course of conflicts within the society concerned.¹⁹ It is the parties which are supposed to enable citizens *peacefully* to participate in political life. Because of their sometimes decisive role in the building up of political will, one of their pre-eminent functions is that of conflict-solving and mediation. Problems and countervailing forces, dysfunctional parties and defective party systems should therefore not lead to the conclusion that parties are not (or are no longer) an important element in leading a country towards consolidation. Peace-building therefore can and must see itself as mandated to put parties in a position to carry out their functions within a representative democracy.²⁰

1.5 “Development policy is peace policy”

Since the 11th September 2001 in particular, increasing importance is being attached to the contributions of *development policy* within the context of conflict prevention. The self-reflection in the sense of the *do-no-harm* principle²¹ is greater here than in almost any other field of policy-making. In this connection, the current debate has arisen from the experience that any measure will itself have an impact on the trajectory of the conflict, and sees development policy – again in the tradition of Willy Brandt – as peace policy.²² The notion of “civil conflict transformation and crisis prevention” has successfully found its way into the development policy debate. Actors from civil society with their conflict-regulating potential are seen as increasingly important. Within this context, civil peace-building today incorporates all civil measures which before, during or after a violent conflict which are intended to bring about a peaceful transformation of that conflict and establish structures and mechanisms of non-violent conflict transformation.

Peace requires the involvement of the entire society in the peace process and cannot be imposed top-down. Moreover, external actors can at most provide support for such an intra-societal process; they cannot themselves implement that process. For this reason, it follows that it is of critical importance to support local peace activists and peace alliances, the so-called *peace constituencies*. A broad consensus exists today acknowledging that peace-building is a challenge which requires a coherent approach involving various fields

16] See Balibar, Etienne und Wallerstein, Immanuel: Rasse, Klasse, Nation. Ambivalente Identitäten. Hamburg 1998.

17] See Jochen Hippler: Nation-Buidling. Ein Schlüsselkonzept für friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung? Bonn 2004.

18] See Sartori, Giovanni: Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge 1976; Burnell, Peter: Building Better Democracies. Why Political Parties Matter. Westminster Foundation. December 2004; Saxer, Marc: Parteiförderung als Instrument der Demokratieförderung. Unv. Manuskript. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Berlin 2006.

19] Sartori, p. 119 ff.

20] See Saxer, op. cit.

21] *Do no harm* is by far the most important rule for development cooperation in crisis situations. The principle aims to prevent the occurrence of unintentional consequences flowing from humanitarian aid and development cooperation activities, for example the problem of possibly provisioning of war-mongering elites. See Anderson, Mary B.: Do no harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War. London 1999.

22] See Report of the North-South Commission: A Programme for Survival. (Brandt Report) of 12.12.1980.

of policy-making. A decisive role, however, is played by development cooperation activities. The causes of conflicts need to be recognised and eliminated, governmental and non-governmental peace activists need to be supported within the framework of societal and political programmes, structural stability needs to be created. Peace-building has become a mainstreaming issue right across the development cooperation spectrum. Of decisive importance in this connection is the processual nature of civil conflict transformation. The continuous and personal internalisation of experience with *non*-violent conflict transformation is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable peace. Short-termist, rapid de-escalation strategies administered through external intervention deprive a constructive conflict culture of the humus from which it should obtain its nourishment. Civil conflict transformation is a highly demanding matter, but it also offers great potential provided it is understood not as the one-off forestalling of an outbreak of violence but instead as a long-term strategy of social development.

II. New German approaches to policy-making

In view of the challenges described above, the Federal Republic of Germany has also been obliged to reformulate its foreign policy. Escalating intra- and extra-European conflicts on the one hand and its reacquired full sovereignty on the other forced the reunited Federal Republic to react to the changed circumstances within which it found itself operating. It did this first through its contribution to formulating the European Security Strategy (ESS) and played a recognisable role in developing the “expanded notion of security” enshrined therein. The ESS clearly highlights in several passages the EU’s overall instrumentarium for prevention, such as EU trade, development and environment policy, disarmament and arms control, plus security and defence policy actions such as the largely EU-driven Stability Pact and the Stabilisation and Association Process for Southeast Europe or the EU contribution towards the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal.

The commitment to the United Nations Charter makes it clear that military force is to be used only as a last resort and only on the basis of Chapter VII (including Article 51). Responsibility for peace and security rests – the ESS suggests – with the UN Security Council. Moreover, the ESS contains a clear commitment to arms control – here again clear evidence of German influence.²³

The experience gathered from “new wars”, and also from what has occurred nearer home in the Balkans, has led in all EU Member States to recognition of the fact that military measures alone are not sufficient for establishing sustainable peace and democracy in the countries concerned. As a result, like other countries too, Germany saw an ever greater need for innovative foreign and security policy tools. The *Agenda for Peace* formulated in 1992 by former UN Secretary-General Bhutros Bhutros Ghali had a strong impact in this respect. It called first and foremost for support to be given to structures “which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into [violent] conflict”.²⁴

A broad range of *non-military instruments and methods* was then developed by both governmental and non-governmental actors.²⁵ In the security field these include disarming and demobilisation programmes and the reintegration of former combatants. The year 1999 brought the founding in Germany of the Civil Peace Service (ZFD), still the

23] See also the SPD’s “Four-Point Plan for Nuclear Disarmament” of 26.6.2006.

24] Bhutros Ghali, Bhutros (1992): *Agenda for Peace*. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. New York: United Nations.

25] See Berghof: Handbook for Conflict Transformation (http://www.berghof-handbook.net/std_page.php?LANG=e&id=1) [15.11.2006]

only organisation of its kind in Europe. The Civil Peace Service aims to promote the non-violent transformation of conflicts and contribute to post-conflict reconciliation. ZFD experts are currently working together with local civil society partner organisations in, for example, Uganda and Sierra Leone, to help re-integrate displaced persons and child soldiers. In the field of public life, concepts have been drawn up for election support, law and judicial reform, and criminal prosecution procedures. The political foundations have played a significant role among the community of non-governmental actors here. With its campaign against electoral corruption, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been able to make valuable contributions to ensuring fair elections in former crisis regions in, for example, Benin, Kenya and Tanzania. A rule-of-law programme for Southeast Europe run by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation was launched to promote the establishment and sustainable consolidation of democratic states based on the rule of law in the countries of this region. Special economic promotion programmes of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) supported the transition from a planned to a market economy in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. A primary aspiration informing this financial cooperation scheme was “to take account and counteract” conflict-exacerbating factors “such as socioeconomic inequalities, the lack of opportunity for political participation, fragile state structures, inadequate civil society structures, political violence and repression and competition for scarce resources”.²⁶ The debate on “business and conflict” has resulted in progress being made in the sensitive matter of investing in post-conflict countries, for example in the development of new codes of conduct for business transactions, restrictions on trade in “conflict commodities” (diamonds, oil), measures to combat the so-called “resource scourge” and stricter money-laundering checks for the proceeds of corruption. For example, the GTZ was mandated to address itself more actively to “private-sector economic development in conflict regions” and is exploring appropriate instruments and formulating principles of best practice for private-sector economic promotion during periods of reconstruction.

Special attention has been given to the development of programmes for the reintegration of refugees, for coming to terms with past atrocities and for promoting independent media. One factor identified as helping to inhibit conflict is the build-up of police forces comprising officers from different communities; this was particularly evident in connection with the repatriation and integration of former expellees from Bosnia-Herzegovina and dealing with the social conflicts associated therewith.

II.1 Prevention as a call to battle

The concept of *prevention* was relatively slow to gain ground in connection with the paradigm change in security policy thinking in Germany. The 1998 coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens was the first official text to document an ex-ante and coherent coordination of policies in the fields of foreign affairs, security and development. A major reason for this new departure was the experience of the 1990s, which had entered the history books as the decade of the Balkan wars. As the wars in the former Yugoslavia moved progressively from north to south, the international community found itself powerless to stop their spread. What began in Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 was repeated in Bosnia in 1992 and finally reached Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo in 1999. The classical politics of reaction to events and the traditional diplomatic mechanisms of conflict prevention and containment clearly seemed to be no longer effective. None of the various actors and likewise none of the various instruments and strategies they had deployed had proved to be adequate and effective in the practical matter of conflict prevention.

26] See http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/DE_Home/Fachthemen/Konfliktpr89/Friedensentwicklung_in_der_Finanziellen_Zusammenarbeit.jsp [01.11.2006]

Realisation of the need for a different policy of prevention was also directly connected with the disasters taking place in Somalia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. The shocking images transmitted into German family homes courtesy of modern communication technology have been shown to have helped the concept of prevention become more established in German minds. Moreover, when the bipolar system structure dissolved in 1989/90, the time had evidently come for placing collective action at the forefront of international politics.²⁷ And equally important were financial constraints which suggested that it would make sense to identify, contain and resolve conflicts before they degenerate into violence. The notion of prevention is thus also clearly linked to the legitimation needs of the foreign and development policy elites vis-à-vis an increasingly critical public. Various statements of principle for various fields of German policy-making thereafter tried to emphasise the European consensus on maximum coherence in approaches to peace-building and the notion of prevention. Moreover, all German federal governments since 1998 have done all they can to stress the merits of a standard policy approach pursuing civil objectives. Such an approach is reflected in the Federal Government's 2000 concept document on "Civilian crisis prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding", the 2004 Action Plan on "Civilian crisis prevention", and in the document of the Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation (BMZ) entitled "Cross-sectoral concept for crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace building in Germany's development cooperation activities". These new forms of coordination and strategy development were genuinely innovative for Germany. For the first time ever, governmental and non-governmental actors were brought together and military and civil approaches combined. And 1 September 2001 saw the founding of "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungspolitische Friedensarbeit" (FriEnt), the Working Group on Development and Peace which brings together seven governmental and non-governmental organisations engaged in development and peace work.²⁸

II.2 Competition instead of coherence: the White Paper and civil crisis prevention

In the absence of a national security strategy, the 2006 "White Paper on Germany's Security Policy and the Future of the Armed Forces" is of outstanding importance in the public debate on security issues.²⁹ It explains the security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany within the given strategic framework conditions, its values, objectives and interests. Remarkable here is the clear consensus within the Grand Coalition and thus between the two main parties in Germany to the effect that "a far-sighted, sustainable, and ultimately successful security policy [...] has to coordinate and deploy, in coordinated manner, both civil and military instruments."³⁰ The White Paper examines in detail the consequences of intra-state and regional conflicts, the decaying of states and the frequently concomitant forfeiture of the state's monopoly on the use of force. It states that "the strategies successfully tried and tested in the past for warding off external threats – such as deterrence – [...] are not sufficient for use against the new, asymmetric [...] threats." For that reason there is a need for "preventive, effective and coherent cooperation within both the national and international framework, including effective actions to tackle the causes."³¹ Providing for security is therefore best achieved by means of early alert and must involve the "entire security policy instrumentarium". "This includes diplomatic, economic, development, police and military means, and if required, also armed intervention."³²

27] See Leibold, Joseph und Weiss, Thomas G.: *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics*, New York 1988.

28] See www.frient.de [11.10.2006]

29] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Hrsg.): *Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*. Berlin, Oktober 2006.

30] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

31] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

32] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

However, apart from quotes from the Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,³³ the White Paper contains no references to instruments, methods, institutions or organisations of civil crisis prevention and conflict transformation. The scant attention given in the public debate in Germany to this civil-society-based approach is partly attributable to this omission. The White Paper does not question the success of civil society actors in solving conflict, but surprisingly it names the German armed forces as forming part of such a civil-society-based approach.³⁴ Conflict transformation – a field in which foreign and development policy and likewise numerous non-governmental actors such as the churches and political foundations have accumulated decades-worth of expertise and experience – is envisaged in the White Paper as being incumbent on, inter alia, the German armed forces. The authors of the White Paper want to eliminate (societally necessary, normal) conflict as such altogether: “international conflict *avoidance* [sic!] and crisis management, including the struggle against international terrorism are their [the armed forces, M.A.] more likely tasks in the foreseeable future. [...] Interventions to *avoid* conflict and manage crises do not differ in terms of intensity and complexity from interventions to defend alliance partners.”³⁵ The notion of prevention thus does not remain merely on the abstract and declamatory level. And any possible considerations of shifting funding from the cost-intensive military sector to the less costly non-military sector are thus deprived of arguments.

Just where the German armed forces could obtain the expertise for such future preventive work within the context of failing or weak states remains unclear. The document provides no information on the possible civilising potential of the armed forces or the possible recruitment of external experts with the appropriate skills - in fields such as constitutional reform, reform of rule-of-law structure, preparing for elections, promotion of democracy, promotion of civil society and media. An element of the Red-Green heritage is still evident in the White Paper, namely where it acknowledges that the more exacting “requirements [...] call for appropriate funding within the framework of the available budget, not only for the armed forces but also for all other governmental agencies concerned [...] with safeguarding peace.”³⁶

If the irrefutable conclusion here is that the circumstances of the new century call for preventive politics, for the broadening of the notion of security to include non-military categories, for sustainable *state-building* and for civil conflict transformation, it is interesting to subject Germany’s current foreign policy to scrutiny – specifically its security policy thinking, planning and action in matters of peace-building. Do the current priorities withstand such scrutiny in the scenarios of the world in 2020?

33] Ibid., p. 26.

34] „The term ‚civil crisis prevention‘ should be understood not as distinct from military crisis prevention, but instead as including the latter.” Ibid., p. 26.

35] Ibid., p. 64.

36] Ibid., p. 142.

III. The year 2020: scenarios

Numerous studies on state decay and new wars repeatedly cite ten factors which have a *substantial* influence on the probability that a conflict will turn violent.³⁷ These include (1) the competence of the country's elites, (2) the sense of responsibility felt by the country's elites, (3) the extent to which the rule of law obtains, (4) the degree of equity in the distribution of resources, (5) the strength of the local economy, (6) the stability of the regional environment, (7) the degree of democratic control of the security sector, (8) the functionality of the political parties, (9) the dialogue capability of civil society and the media and (10) justice in the allocation of resources (access to welfare benefits and education). The following two scenarios were selected from a large number of possible courses of events and on the basis of special attention to the factors "competence and sense of responsibility of the country's elites" and "justice in the allocation of resources" and their impact on all other factors in the overall development process.

III.1 Scenario: The boomerang

For the first time in years, the 2020 European Easter marches are again marred by violent clashes between the police and demonstrators. The German public is polarised in a manner reminiscent of the NATO twin-track debates of the 1980s. In view of the ever more frequent arrival of servicemen and women's corpses from war zones and the increasingly diminished quality of life resulting from terrorist threats in Germany, the German public has reached the limits of its tolerance. According to many experts, however, the deeper reason for the clashes is the conceptual weakness of national and European security policy. There is still no national security strategy and, apart from the armed forces, virtually no other actors are invited to contribute to deliberations on strategic matters. The Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its activities. Too many tax-funded development projects have literally been set ablaze by wars. In many states in 2020, access to land, water, mineral resources and energy is governed by arbitrary decision and the use of force. The "South" is described in the "North" as nothing more than an array of black holes and, offering fertile ground for terrorism, arms-trafficking, drug-trafficking and criminal gangs, as a danger to Europe. This is the perspective from which security strategies are devised; the interventions take place in situ. The world in 2020 is encircled by a crisis belt.

In the regional Bermuda Triangle involving Afghanistan, Iran and Turkmenistan, instability and coercive structures have become established at a high level. The Afghan government in Kabul forms an enclave within its own territory. The entire region is governed by innumerable autonomous warlords who purchase the loyalty of autonomous militia. Several attempts by the international community to contain poppy cultivation in the region have failed. Of the over 1,100 Afghan and international non-governmental organisations which were operating in Afghanistan alone in 2005, only just over 200 have remained. Clashes over the control of roads, heroin crops, water and mining rights, modern slave-trading and the predatory exploitation of natural resources are the factors which shape the everyday lives of the people. The situation is extremely complex and unpredictable because it is made up of various regional conflicts superimposed on each other. Socioeconomic conditions have deteriorated dramatically. Permanently being at war has devastated the infrastructure. Afghanistan alone has lost over three million lives and reports having over twenty million anti-personnel mines on its territory, an illiteracy rate of over 70 per cent and up to eight million people who have fled the country for Pakistan and Iran. At the same time, the region between Herat and Mashhad has devel-

37] See the Guidelines Helping to Prevent Conflict devised within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), or Schneckener, op. cit.

oped into a hub for international heroin smuggling. Some groups are receiving additional military aid from Pakistan, Iran and Russia to defend their interests in Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. The USA is likewise involved. Turkmenistan in particular has acquired strategic importance as a deployment base for a military operation against Tehran.

In many countries of the South, justice and the security sector serve the interests of the elites. There is virtually no control of the executive. The press in many of these countries has been brought into line. Corruption and clientelism have replaced the rule of law. The political situation in Southeast Europe has hardly improved.³⁸ The countries of the region have indeed endorsed the principles of democracy and continue to aim for EU membership, but their efforts to reform and modernise the public administration are being pursued with ever less vigour. And the advances once made in protecting the rights of minorities have also unravelled. In 2018, Serbia and Montenegro indulged in more violent attacks on internal expellees from Kosovo, this in the wake of an unsuccessful application for EU membership, an economic crisis and resource shortages. The number of unofficial settlements established by these expellees rose from 586 in 2005 to 701 in 2020, though the older camps now look more like permanent settlements like those in the Gaza Strip. And while in Serbia politicians still regularly exert influence on the judiciary and the media, in Kosovo organised crime and corruption form one of the main pillars shoring up the economy.

A climate like this has an impact on economic development, to the effect that hardly any state is simultaneously in crisis and integrated into the world market. Falling tax revenues and a persistent disparity between urban and rural areas prevent a state from being able to fulfil its social welfare function. Unemployment, low incomes and poverty finally lead to the accumulation of a huge potential for violence among young men. That which started as a student demonstration on the campus of Cairo University in the spring of 2016 spread to become a youth revolt inflaming all of Egypt and ended in a bloodbath perpetrated by the overstretched forces of law and order. The trajectories of many of the young suicide bombers who have long been active in European cities can be traced back to Egypt, Pakistan and the Autonomous Palestinian Territories.

In many cases it was the so-called *trigger factors* which allowed societal conflict to degenerate into war: in West Africa in 2015 it was the effect of droughts and other natural disasters which occurred at the same time as incoming refugee flows swelled. Too many people had failed in their attempts to flee to the EU. In Belarus, decades of suppressing the opposition in conjunction with a rapid deterioration in the economic situation resulted in 2017 in riots akin to civil war. The clashes in Colombia which started as domestic violence spread to other parts of Latin America and became a regional conflict which escalated fast after the USA intervened. A very weak state, no state monopoly on the use of force in remote regions and, more particularly, easy access to small firearms had for years been preparing the ground for the rise of non-state perpetrators of violence.

Although Germany does not see itself as a cause of the course of events in world politics which led to this 2020 scenario, the debate on failed concepts for foreign and security policy is becoming more heated. How was it that events took the course they did?

Whereas all German federal governments since 1998 acknowledged the principles of an enlarged notion of security, a lack of political will meant that attempts to implement them in practice had failed. The 6th independent report of an expert commission on

38] See Britta Joerßen, *The Balkans – On War, Peace and Europe*, January 2007, *Kompass 2020 – Germany in international relations – Aims, instruments, prospects*, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin 2007.

the implementation of the action plan adopted in April 2016 laments “existing inefficiencies, an ongoing lack of coherence and the lack of any appearance of civil-military cooperation”. Whereas deployments of the German armed forces were approved under broad-based public scrutiny and interest, civil actors struggled to get their mandates endorsed. Assets such as manpower, funding and the scheduled timing of military and civil interventions differed to an extent which was in crass conflict with the terms of the action plan. Conflict demarcation lines existing between the various ministries in Germany were transported into the countries in which the deployments were taking place, with the result that disputes over intervention approaches and target groups were conducted locally at the intervention sites, thus undermining the legitimacy of both the troops deployed there and the civil-society specialists working alongside them.

A series of intensive debates on the priorities for Germany’s foreign and development policy conducted in the German Parliament in 2008 and 2009 had failed to lead to a concentration of minds on core issues. Domestic political constraints and the apparent unattractiveness of civil-society approaches compared with the popular appeal of media images of “Germany’s armed forces in action” stopped the approval of an increase in the budget appropriation for conflict transformation. The work with decision-making elites, which the UN had pointed out as being particularly important, was carried on by political foundations and numerous non-governmental organisations, but a lack of resources meant that the impact of their activities remained well below what it might have been. Nor was there any pooling of resources at EU level. Instead, priority was given to prestigious national programmes. The lack of a common vision also affected the EU’s partner countries in their perception of the EU. A lack of consensus, the prevalence of competition and the pursuit of vested interests within the EU counteracted any possibility of Germany or the EU setting an example and caused policy-makers in Africa, Asia and the Middle East to refrain from pursuing similar projects.

The growing threat of terrorism in Germany since then has led to a business boom for private security companies. At the same time, more and more voices are calling for the withdrawal of the German armed forces from all interventions abroad and the reallocation of budget appropriations. The Federal Government finds itself under increasing pressure. Whereas at the turn of the millennium in 1999/2000 the possibility of a crisis belt emerging in the South had been seen as the worst case scenario, the politicians of 2020 are irritated to find that the crisis in the South has now led to a domestic crisis in Germany.

III.2 Scenario: Give peace a chance!

Despite the many setbacks experienced in the various countries in which Germany has intervened, by 2020 the Federal Republic of Germany has emerged as an active advocate of a policy of “preventive diplomacy”. Germany is able to make a substantial contribution to global peace-building by including civil crisis prevention and conflict transformation as an integral part of its “networked” foreign policy. It is true that violent conflicts are still raging in many partner countries, but in many cases such conflicts have been successfully transformed by strengthening the civil component of peace-building activities. The trend towards state failure was also successfully halted in numerous countries and in some others it was even reversed.

Sudan, which for many years was considered to be a failing state, had been stabilised by means of a massive deployment of blue beret forces in conjunction with the targeted intensification of the national dialogue. The pressure of international sanctions

caused the government to start extraditing war criminals to the International Criminal Court in 2009. Sudan's relations with the international community improved, and many international organisations returned to the country to engage – with the government in Khartoum in full knowledge of the fact – primarily in conflict transformation activities. Germany's development policy provided for measures to stabilise the living conditions of refugees and facilitate their reintegration into Sudanese society. DED, GTZ and the German political foundations set up regional offices in Juba and are working to resettle and reintegrate former expellees. Particular importance is attached in this work to the use of conflict mediation mechanisms. Severely affected groups are being taken care of by means of a concept for community-based peace-building. Some 200,000 Sudanese refugees who had fled to Uganda and 80,000 further refugees from Kenya have been reintegrated by the year 2020, and this achievement has significantly reduced the potential for the use of force in the entire region.

Elections and the 2011 referendum on national unity took place without disturbance. The new government proved to be stable and workable as both governing parties – SPLM and NDC – derive their legitimacy from fair and free elections held in 2013 and 2018 and monitored by the international community with a massive observer presence. A sensible election law and programmes for monitoring the conduct of the elections had guaranteed that they were fair. The political back-up resulted in all factions of the decision-making elite being prepared to be more pragmatic and willing to cooperate. The northern regions of Sudan were better integrated into the state in both political and economic terms, with the result that the Darfur conflict de-escalated and other regional conflicts were prevented from escalating. ZFD experts from Germany worked together with local civil society partner organisations on reintegration measures for former combatants. Unlike in other countries, however, Sudan has a massive presence of UN peace-keepers. It was only with the targeted intensification of the national dialogue by the civil international actors that a sustainable peace began to take shape.

By 2020, other states which, at the beginning of the new millennium, seemed to be at risk of failure are for the first time able to present a stable public budget, initial indicators of a strengthening of the formal sector, and evidence of slowly onsetting economic growth. This is particularly true of Jordan and Yemen, both countries being rent economies vulnerable to crisis and having suffered from the failure of Iraq, increasingly scarce resources, structural imbalances and growing unemployment. Increasing social inequality in both countries led to terrorist attacks on the regime around 2010 and an extremely tense security alert situation which not infrequently was accompanied by violations of human rights.

After stabilising public security and introducing reforms in the security sector, the governments in both countries were careful to ensure the success of further measures to enhance the legitimacy of state institutions. Yemen introduced reforms in the tax, customs, fiscal and budget administrations which raised government revenue and created greater efficiency and transparency in public spending. Jordan successfully concentrated on introducing reforms in the health and education sectors. Better educated and trained, the Jordanian population then successfully demanded better performance from its government in terms of applying the rule of law. The Federal Republic of Germany was a strong supporter of the corresponding standard-raising programmes. Progress was made in both countries in combating mismanagement and the abuse of office by means of political education schemes for adults and long-term consultancy measures run by Germany's Ministry of Economic Affairs. The resources freed up from the closing off of corruption channels could be redirected towards health and education, a measure which restored the citizens' faith in and loyalty to their state system. Yemen also drafted and

introduced a “Code of good administrative practice”. The cross-sectoral approach by German foreign and development policy had paid dividends.

On Germany’s insistence, support within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Action Plan for Jordan was no longer made conditional on Jordan’s implementing economic reforms but instead on government action to ensure good governance. Jordan in 2020 is on the road to consolidation and has recently launched a democratic reform process to transform the country into a constitutional monarchy.

In 2020, Germany’s foreign and development policy is renowned as being a successful peace policy. How did that come about?

Of decisive importance were the policy decisions taken in the first decade of the new millennium. The process of European integration had made great leaps forward in terms of foreign and security policy. A newly set up EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs henceforth made it possible to ensure coherence in European foreign policy. This did not make action by the individual member states obsolete, but more importantly it released synergies and made for better use of existing capacities. For example, German politics began to concentrate on dealing with structural factors in partner countries which were at risk of state failure and war. The establishment of a European intervention force lent this policy additional credibility and clout. A 15,000-strong Human Security Response Force, a combined civil and military intervention unit accountable to the EU Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is now operating under the aegis of the Civil-Military Planning Centre in Brussels. This Human Security Response Force is not a substitute for the German armed forces in matters of foreign intervention; on the contrary it is dependent on the contributions made by such forces. The now successfully completed transformation of the German armed forces enables the Federal Republic of Germany to be a credible player within the framework of the Alliance. Since the 11th September 2001, however, there has been no occasion when the NATO defence alliance had to be invoked.

The international debates on effective state-building measures also had an impact on strategy considerations in Germany. Since the intensive series of debates in the German parliament in 2008 and 2009, German initiatives within the CFSP framework have concentrated on strengthening the local civil society, the building up of democratic systems and reforms in the rule of law and security sector. Underlying this prioritisation is the recognition that in many conflict analyses the factors “elites within a society” and “equitable resource distribution” are found to have a particularly strong impact on the trajectory of a conflict. The EU Member States are pooling their resources and making more extensive use of the respective national organisations, organisations which have a comparative advantage over their counterparts from other countries.

Through numerous non-governmental organisations specialising in adult education, German experts have long been focusing more on the *initial and continuing training of elites*. The decision-makers of a country and likewise the representatives of civil society there are to be trained to higher standards and, more importantly, encouraged to sharpen their sense of responsibility. This is accomplished by means of aid for democratisation, the promotion of political parties, combating corruption, the holding and monitoring of elections, judicial reform, the promotion of human rights and gender democracy, encouragement for press freedom, constitutional reform, administrative reform, more robust decision-making structures at local or municipal level and, not least, culture and arts projects.

In terms of the second priority area in Germany's foreign and development policy, the aim here is to introduce / re-instate within a state its *social welfare function*. This is predominantly a matter of ensuring more equal opportunities and an equitable distribution of the country's resources. By 2020, Germany's development cooperation activities have acquired a reputation for quality in terms of measures to improve the basic welfare provision for the population, to strengthen education and health care institutions and to promote rural development. An evidence-based improvement in the distribution of state transfers has been achieved as a result of German development aid. The merits of concentrating efforts on the factors discussed above were self-evident. In the countries in which German development cooperation activities were concentrated, by 2020 it could be observed that positive results with these factors had in turn had a positive impact on other factors which typically trigger the outbreak of violence. By focusing on work with decision-making elites it had been possible to achieve a sustainable overall impact. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the deliberate policy change initiated by a group of decision-makers in the countries concerned had injected the decisive impetus needed to change the course of history. Their more responsible attitude to their 'official responsibility' was clearly noticeable and once again underscored the significance of political education.

A similar effect, incidentally, could be observed in German politics. On the strength of a national security strategy adopted in 2009, the conflict lines within the ministerial bureaucracy were removed and capacities pooled in joint regional budgets and inter-ministerial crisis management teams. Though many had fearfully predicted more ineffective bureaucracy, the reform brought better liaison and a more coordinated approach. Since 2010 the armed forces, the liaison unit for the International Police Task Force, the Centre for International Peace Missions and non-governmental organisations have been operating joint planning and recruitment mechanisms without having to forgo their respective independent status. Joint analysis, planning, implementation and evaluation on the basis of country-specific concepts have resulted in a holistic approach to conflicts, their causes and the possible intervention tools to defuse them. By surmounting their conventional reluctance to communicate, civil and military organisations were better able to work together, and this in turn led to greater mutual respect and the acceptance of differences in approach. German servicemen and women and civil peace experts are now self-confidently working together on international missions. As a result, the level of respect and legitimacy accorded to them by the populations with whom they are working is high. In international expert circles, Germany is referred to as an "identification force", i.e. a force which wants the people in the countries of deployment to identify with its objectives and values instead of assuming that the troops have a hidden agenda.

Not least because of their lower cost, non-military conflict resolution models have become much more popular with the German public, and this is reflected by the increased demand for positive reports from prevention projects, for example in coverage on German television channels. Where they have proved still to be indispensable, German forces' missions abroad are readily accepted by the German population. The fact that German soldiers have been among those who lost their lives on such missions is a subject discussed with critical attention and respect. The resistance within Germany to an alleged remilitarisation of German foreign policy has diminished considerably.

IV. Options for action

IV.1 Development of a national security strategy

The controversies which accompanied the 2006 “White Paper on Germany’s Security Policy and the Future of the German Armed Forces” have once again highlighted the urgent need for a national security strategy. In the opinion of many of those involved in civil conflict transformation, not enough use has yet been made of the opportunities to formulate a new, future-proof understanding of security and peace policy and upgrade the status of non-military measures for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. The “concept of collective security” invoked by Kofi Annan still needs a broader support base in Germany. Simply defending one’s own country against threats is not sufficiently far-sighted as the guiding principle to inform security policy. What is required is a comprehensive, holistic approach which is appropriate to the circumstances of the interdependent world of the 21st century. Ideally, a national security strategy could be the culmination of a broad-based public debate on Germany’s future responsibilities, the contributors to which would be politicians, civil society organisations, security experts, representatives of the armed forces and also people from the South. Responsibility for coordinating the debate should rest with the Federal Chancellery, not the Ministry of Defence.

IV.2 From the *ultima ratio* to the *prima ratio*: primacy for civil conflict transformation

One conclusion from the scenarios developed here is that German foreign and security policy in the coming years must try to make use of the entire range of instruments available for civil conflict transformation. In addition, there is a need to elevate crisis prevention to a *prima ratio* before the use of military force is seized upon as the *ultima ratio*. Overestimation of the merits of military intervention as a means of dealing with conflict has hitherto often undermined the quest for political solutions (an example here is the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon of 2006). Although the use of military force is not able to bring about a sustainable and lasting peace, since the end of the 1990s it has been possible to observe a trend in Germany whereby the increase in the scale of the country’s military interventions abroad is accompanied by growing acceptance of such interventions as a political tool - and this despite the fact that the experience gained in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan would suggest that the opposite might be the more reasonable reaction.

IV.3 Civil-military cooperation

In its security strategy, the European Union has recognised the new threats of the 21st century but has not yet developed adequate capabilities to respond to these threats. The traditional approaches to territorial defence are no longer robust enough. The EU – and with it Germany too – is therefore obliged, in the longer term, to gear its foreign policy not only to states but also to individuals. This obligation not only derives from history but also exists in the EU’s own interests. The Human Security Doctrine for Europe is the first step in the right direction. The Human Security Response Force mentioned therein, which represents a kind of hybrid between classical peace-keeping and military intervention, is an innovative approach, but it leaves a lot of questions unanswered. Civilian measures must not run the risk of being dominated by security considerations. Development cooperation and humanitarian aid must not be perceived as purely strategic options in the wake of military interventions. What is required is a type of cooperation which, building

on joint training modules and coordinated strategies, leads to mutual recognition and respect. In civil conflict transformation to date, the best protection available to the actors has been their neutrality and independence and access to the local population. Even though it might sound paradoxical, this does not mean strict demarcation lines between military activities, humanitarian aid and civil conflict transformation. On the contrary, the more openly military and non-military actors work together in crisis regions, the more credibility they will have in the eyes of the local population. People in the countries of the South do not – or no longer – assume that the work of non-governmental organisations is entirely selfless.

IV.4 Inter-ministry concepts and strategies

Stabilising and consolidating weak and failed states is not something that can be accomplished by any single ministry. In Germany there is an urgent need for inter-ministry concepts, strategies and criteria for state-building which help remove the conflict lines between ministries. The concept drawn up by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development entitled “Development-oriented transformation in fragile states with poor governance” has outlined some provisional criteria, strategies and areas for action. The German experience in dealing with fragile states should also be fed into the EU debate on further developing the ESS.

Regarding consultation and coordination, there is still a lot more potential to be tapped for synergies. The setting up of inter-ministerial circles and an advisory panel marked the first institutional conclusions to be acted on with regard to the infrastructure of crisis prevention in Germany. Enhanced manpower and financial resources – compared with those for military infrastructure – would be a positive pointer for the future.

IV.5 Financing instruments

Although the German armed forces cannot make any substantive contribution to dealing with the causes of conflict, it receives many more times the amount of taxpayers’ money in funding than those actors whose approach to crisis prevention and conflict transformation is via the origins and causes of the problems. The budget of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (sub-budget 23) for 2004 amounted to 3.8 billion and was thus about one sixth the size of the budget of the Federal Ministry of Defence. While BMZ funding for the Civil Peace Service and the Foreign Office’s budget item for peace-keeping measures together amounted to about 30 million, the 2004 federal budget allocated a total of 24 billion (sub-budget 14) for armed forces operations alone. The German Foundation for Peace Research (DSF) had to make do with a capital stock of some 25 million, whereas the Ministry of Defence appropriation for research alone amounted to 952 million. These figures show clearly that success in crisis prevention work calls for a redistribution of funding. Synergies could be tapped in this connection by setting up joint financing instruments to dovetail the policies of the foreign affairs, development cooperation and defence ministries (thematic or regional funds).

Moreover, the funds spent on civil crisis prevention should at last be identified as such in the federal budget and presented in the Federal Government’s report on the Action Plan in a manner which shows whether civil crisis prevention is actually being improved, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, along the lines envisaged by the Action Plan. An additional recommendation for this area of activity to promote gender mainstreaming there is separate gender budgeting.

IV.6 Governmental, non-governmental and pan-European cooperation

Experience shows that international efforts to handle and transform conflicts are most likely to succeed if they entail a range of concepts and instruments deployed in coordinated fashion within the framework of multilateral cooperation involving both governmental and non-governmental actors. Germany, with its political foundations and a large number of non-governmental organisations engaged in development work, has a series of comparative advantages over many other countries in this respect. In future, Germany could concentrate its efforts on areas of activity where it has already gained considerable experience. Instead of tackling all the structural causes of a conflict in a given country, it would make sense to select a few – in consultation with other European countries – and concentrate on these. Germany has accumulated a considerable body of expertise in the field of promoting democratisation, a field which covers programmes to strengthen political parties, civil society, the rule of law, the media, development work with decision-making elites, democratisation aid, anti-corruption measures, ethics in administrative practice, the holding and monitoring of elections, judicial reform, promotion of human rights and gender democracy, strengthening press freedom, constitutional reform, administrative reform, strengthening local decision-making structures, and also cultural and arts projects. A second pillar of German foreign and development policy could and indeed must help establish / re-instate a country's *social welfare function*. Unless it distributes its resources equitably, a state will forfeit its *raison d'être*: acceptance by its population and identification between society and state.

IV.7 Prevention lobby

Not only in terms of resource endowment but also with respect to media coverage could a better balance be struck in Germany between the centralised military apparatus on the one hand and the decentralised structures of crisis prevention on the other. The current power disparity exerts a virtually automatic push in favour of dealing with crises by military means. Even the Federal Government, in its "First Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan", notes, *inter alia*, that crisis prevention still has no strong lobby. So it is not just the Federal Government but also the German media and German civil society as a whole which still have work to do. What is required here is not only de-escalation journalism from crisis regions but also coverage of success stories, this being all the more so because crisis prevention leans more towards the quiet diplomacy side and has no need for what O. Hennig termed "large-scale media spectacle".

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