Let Countries Go Bankrupt
The Case for Fair and Transparent Debt Arbitration
Kunibert
Raffer
Economists know that
protracted maneuvering does not make unpayable debts paid but
increases the debt overhang. So-called phantom debts[1]
accumulate, which are economically non-existent as they cannot
be recovered, but which make things difficult for everyone. History
proves that the impossibility of collecting them has to be faced
eventually. The choice is between further delays with damaging
effects on debtor economies and an orderly, fair, and
quick procedure to cancel unpayable debts, bringing
debt service in line with the ability to pay.
Such procedures,
called insolvency, exist and have been routine for centuries.
They are only denied to sovereign states, based on the subterfuge
that corporate or individual insolvency does not address
sovereignty, nor governmental powers. Legalistically, this
is right. Economically though creditors can choose to apply the
essence of insolvency procedures to sovereign debtors. In 1876
private creditors used Egyptian insolvency law as the yardstick
to solve Egypt’s debt crisis. The administrator appointed to protect
creditor interest, Evelyn Baring, did not apply the "lemon
squeezer" approach of today’s Bretton Woods Institutions
(BWIs). He lowered, for example, taxes and postal charges, financed
expenditures on public health and education, and encouraged improvements
in irrigation. Wages and pensions were paid out in full. After
surprisingly few years he was economically successful for creditors
and the debtor alike.[2] A hard-nosed 19th century capitalist
managed this crisis much better and more quickly than international
public sector institutions nowadays. Generally, debtors were treated
much more generously in the past, before the BWIs became debt
managers. Germany's London Accord, Indonesia's solution of 1969-70,
or Poland more recently show that meaningful debt relief can be
done quickly if creditors do not oppose it.
The legalistic sovereignty
argument is right as far as it goes. But the proposal of sovereign
debt arbitration modeled on the basic principles of U.S. Chapter
9 insolvency - first made in 1987[3] - offers a way out.
The only successful solution, generally accepted in the
case of other debtors, can be easily and immediately applied to
countries. Sovereign insolvency can be done.
The discussion on international insolvency subsided around 1990, starting
again in the late 1990s, largely due to civil society, especially
the Jubilee movement. This renewed interest justifies recapitulating
the arguments in the light of the present debate.
The Essence of Insolvency
Insolvency is not an act of mercy but of economic reason, generally
recognized as the best way to solve hopeless overindebtedness.
After the Asian crash of 1997 (domestic) insolvency procedures
were to be improved. For creditors insolvency is part and parcel
of lending. It makes them look closely at how their money is spent,
denying further loans if the first ones are not put to good use.
This fundamental disincentive against misallocation of resources
within market economies, by which credit risk becomes relevant,
is absent in centrally planned systems and within the international
public sector.
The basic function of insolvency is the resolution of a conflict between two
fundamental legal principles: the right of creditors to payments
and the principle recognized generally (not only in the case of
loans) by all civilized legal systems that no one must be forced
to fulfill contracts if that leads to inhumane distress, endangers
life or health, or violates human dignity. Debtors, unless they
are Southern Countries, cannot be forced to starve their children
to be able to pay. Although claims are recognized as legitimate,
insolvency exempts resources from being seized. Human rights and
human dignity are more important than repayment. Insolvency only
deals with claims based on solid and proper legal foundations.
For odious debts, for example, no insolvency is needed; these
are null and void. Demands for canceling apartheid debts are therefore
based on the odious debts doctrine.
Debtor protection is one essential feature. The other is the most fundamental
principle of the Rule of Law: one must not be judge in one's own
cause. A neutral entity must assure fair settlements. Insolvency
must comply with the minimal demand that creditors must not decide
on their own claims. Even at the time of debt prisons creditors
were not allowed to do so - in contrast to present international
practice, which violates this very basis of the Rule of Law. Creditors
have been judge, jury, experts, bailiff, even the debtor's lawyers,
all in one. This unrestricted creditor domination is even inefficient
from a purely economical perspective. Creditors tend to grant
too small reductions too late, prolonging the crisis instead of
solving it, as the never-ending story of debt management proves.
Substantial shares
of present debts exist only because of unsuccessful management,
which has refused necessary reductions over years. This increased
debt burden and its economic effects are creditor-caused damage.
When the debt crisis was declared over during the euphoria at
the beginning of the 1990s the World Bank admitted “In a solvency
crisis, early recognition of solvency as the root cause and the
need for a final settlement are important for minimizing the damage.
... protracted renegotiations and uncertainty damaged economic
activity in debtor countries for several years ... It took too
long to recognize that liquidity was the visible tip of the problem,
but not its root.” [4]
Bank economists quantified
the costs of delaying the recognition of the now generally acknowledged
solvency crisis as "one decade" lost in development.[5] It was not mentioned
that creditors denying meaningful relief had caused this damage,
most notably the BWIs, which have supported this strategy with
overly optimistic forecasts. Two thirds of the increase in Sub-Saharan
African debt since 1989 are due to arrears.[6]
The World Bank acknowledged: "In many HIPCs [Highly
Indebted Poor Countries] the negative impact
of external debts seems to come more from the growing debt stock
rather than from the excessive burden of debt service actually
paid."[7] Countries pay little, amassing arrears.
In spite of this insight, official creditors responsible for this delay qualified as wrong and damaging
to debtors by the World Bank go on delaying.
The Usual Objections
The counterarguments usually brought forward are often at odds with
logic or even the truth. Even parliamentary questions have been
answered misleadingly or incorrectly. General problems have often
been presented in a highly selective way as if they would uniquely
arise in the case of sovereign insolvency.
An anecdote seems to illustrate the position of creditors most tellingly.
The Chapter 9 solution was presented at the Civil Society Forum
of the UN's Financing for Development Initiative in November 2000.
Pointing out that this meeting had a certain informality the representative
of a Southern Country, who found the speaker's reasoning convincing,
asked the representatives of creditor governments to produce a
convincing argument why it could not be done. An embarrassingly
long silence followed before one of the usual arguments was finally
produced to end it - sovereignty would stand in the way of this
solution.
Sovereignty
Although arbitration is a traditional and
well established mechanism of international law, seen as
compatible with sovereignty by any textbook, it has regularly
been asserted that sovereignty would not allow this solution.
A study of the Advisory Council of the German Ministry of Economic
Cooperation and Development[8]
drew parallels to private insolvencies, especially the "strict
supervision" of debtors in Germany to summarize that "political
sovereignty and, linked to it, the impossibility to remove governments"[9]
would not permit an international Chapter 9. Answering a parliamentary
question by Christoph
Eymann in June 2000 the Swiss government argued the U.S.
Chapter 9 to be incompatible with sovereignty because "external
authorities" would "as a rule" be "appointed
to manage the finances of insolvent states and municipalities".[10]
U.S. laws clearly exclude receivership for municipalities. U.S.
states are sovereign regarding debts pursuant to the 11th
Amendment. A paper submitted by the German Ministry of Finance
(BMF) to the Committee on Finances of the Bundestag[11] argued in a more sophisticated way, seeing
insurmountable problems in accepting arbitration. Debtors would
not waive their sovereignty nor accept arbitral decisions. Neither
with regard to Paris Club decisions nor IMF conditionality is
any insurmountable sovereignty problem identified.
Debtors borrowing
in capital markets routinely waive sovereign immunity. About half
the loan agreements are governed by New York, almost half by British
law[12]. Some agreements
with private creditors foresee arbitration.[13]
Brazil is legally required to insist on arbitration. Paris Club
members forced Brazil to change this, and to "exempt specifically
... Paris Club bilateral restructuring agreements”.[14] The impression
created by the German Ministry of Finance (BMF) that no debtor
would accept arbitration is at severe odds with the truth. The
BMF is right, though, that creditor governments are unwilling
to do so. Arguing that neutral arbitration panels must replace
bankruptcy courts, I used the London Accord as an example,[15]
which foresaw arbitration to settle disagreements between Germany
and its creditors. Arbitration has become quite popular recently.
The World Trade Organization (far more than 100 cases already)
and the NAFTA Treaty apply it. OECD governments wanted it to be
part and parcel of the fiercely debated Multilateral Agreement
on Investment. Apparently arbitration is popular, provided it
does not safeguard the human dignity of the world's poorest.
U.S. Chapter 9 excludes receivership with utmost clarity (sections 902 and 904).
For conflict cases the chapter foresees a trustee with a clearly
limited mandate, who cannot take over and operate the debtor as
a receiver in private insolvency cases would. Only the municipality’s
citizens can remove elected officials by voting them out of office. Thus, Chapter 9 is custom-made for sovereigns. One might wonder, though, whether
debtors who are that strongly protected would not simply refuse
to pay. But, economically forced to find a solution to regain
economic viability and normal access to capital markets, municipalities
have to make acceptable offers. The law's history in the U.S.
(some 500 cases) proves that it works.
Need
for a Treaty
Another often heard
argument is that sovereign insolvency would require a detailed
treaty, whose negotiation would delay a solution for ages.[16] This is technically wrong - treaties
are but one option in international law. The London Accord was
possible without any OPEC-type institution. The Paris Club, too,
functions without treaty.
Lack of Enforcement
In no case can
agreements between countries and creditors be enforced like domestic
contracts. This is true for dispute settlement within the World
Trade Organization and for agreements with the Paris Club or the
IMF. International law knows no bailiff. Attempts to sue sovereigns
that had waived immunity and to attach their assets have been
largely ineffective.[17] Here, a general problem is presented
as if it would exclusively affect insolvency.
Rogoff identifies
lack "of enforcement clout" as the main problem, but
concedes: “Advocates of international bankruptcy point out that
similar problems arise in the case of bankrupt state and local
governments, and that the obstacles have not proved insurmountable.
For example, Chapter 9 of the U.S. bankruptcy code, which governs
municipalities, has proven relatively effective (Raffer, 1990).”[18]
Access to Capital Markets
It is said that
a country that declares insolvency would lose access to capital
markets. If it were true, no reorganized firm could ever get any
loans. Daily experience proves this manifestly wrong. Indonesia
got debt reduction by de facto insolvency in 1969-70. In the mid-1970s
the Pertamina crisis erupted because its public sector had again
been able to overborrow. The Deputy Governor of the Bank of England,
David Clementi, saw no empirical evidence of “any discernible
negative long-term effect of a country’s prior debt servicing
record on the terms and volume of its borrowing”.[19]
The World Bank itself
showed "timid attempts" to present Indonesia with its
significant debt reduction of 1969-70 "as an alternative
model" during the 1980s,[20] but it now downplays this case.[21]
Misuse
of Recuperated Funds
Since the case for sovereign insolvency is based in great deal on the principle
of safeguarding basic social services it is imperative that countries
use the resources saved from debt servicing to the benefit of
the poor. Concern exists that this might not be done.
A transparently
managed fund financed by the debtor in domestic currency is the
solution. Discussing with public servants of the G7 and representatives
of the German Ministry of Economics, Ann Pettifor proposed such
a Fund to guarantee proper use in favor of the poor, and for a
fresh start for the debtor economy. [22]
The Fund's management could be monitored by an international board
or advisory council consisting of members from the debtor country
and creditor countries. They could be nominated by NGOs and by
governments (including the one of the debtor country). The Fund
being a legal entity of its own, checks and discussions of its
projects would not concern the government’s budget, and thus not
impinge on the country's sovereignty. Counterpart funds have worked
successfully so far, and have frequently been demanded by civil
society.
Lack
of Need for Insolvency
A standing argument
is that present debt management works well and hence there is
no need for insolvency procedures. Written in 2000 the BMZ study
posits that the Brady Plan was successful, right after Ecuador
had defaulted on its Brady bonds.[23]
The BMF simply states that the Cologne Initiative solves the debt
problem of HIPCs.[24]
Space prohibits detailed
criticism,[25] but suffice it to recall that
Ecuador, e.g., was at the Paris Club seven times between July
1983 and September 2000 – on average once in less than every three
years. This hardly suggests efficient and viable solutions. Assessing
the enhanced HIPC initiative on congressional request, the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO)[26] points out that maintaining
debt sustainability will depend on annual growth rates above 6
percent (in U.S. dollar terms) over 20 years - in four cases including
Nicaragua and Uganda even above 9.1 percent. The GAO doubts whether
this can be done. It recalls that falling coffee prices increased
Uganda's debt-to-export ratio considerably, despite Uganda's debt
reduction under HIPC I. In April 2000 the BWIs reduced the projected
growth of Uganda's export revenues for 2001-3 by over 16 percent. HIPC II seems built on similarly fragile,
optimistic assumptions as HIPC I. Analyzing HIPC I, officially designed to reduce debts to sustainable
levels, Raffer[27]
predicted two years before Cologne that “another round - HIPC
II - might already be in the making". Unfortunately, HIPC
II justifies repeating this prediction mutatis mutandis.
Implementing
Debt Arbitration
To avoid further
delays the proposal of international Chapter 9 combined traditional
mechanisms: arbitration, and an existing insolvency procedure
for debtors with governmental powers. National insolvency laws
differ, but the only applicable insolvency model, Chapter 9, was
recommended. As discussing procedures can be abused to create
a further delay, it is stressed that the blueprint sketched below
is but an illustration how insolvency can be implemented easily.
Other ways of delivering quick and meaningful relief may exist.
If so, they are just as good.
To start the process, the good services of a respected institution
would be helpful. The country could "file" for debt arbitration/insolvency by depositing its
demand at the UN, e.g. with the Secretary General. Only governments
would have the right to file. It is their sovereign decision.
The UN makes the demand publicly known, enabling all creditors
to represent their interests appropriately. If the debtor could
already present a list of creditors this would speed things up.
Creditors register their addresses and the names of people representing
them during the procedure at the UN.
Creditors and debtor nominate one or
two arbitrators. One per side would have the advantage of a smaller
panel. Two are better if creditors cannot easily agree as public
and private creditors (Paris and London Clubs) could nominate
one person each. Both parties inform the UN whom they have nominated.
Civil Society Organizations and public opinion within the debtor
country may influence the country's choice. The debtor government
may choose to leave nominations either to parliament or the people.
Arbitrators could be elected from a roster by voters. Anyone reaching
a minimum of supporting signatures by voters would have to be
on this roster. Also, one arbitrator may be chosen by parliament
and the other by voters. After a change of government the incoming
government might be prepared to opt for one of these democratic
possibilities.
Neither creditors
nor their employees can be nominated. Fairness to other creditors
also requests this. They might not be unbiased when deciding on
their own claims. “Emerging Markets this Week” addresses
this issue: the Bretton Woods Institutions "will be concerned
with protecting their own balance sheets rather than with
fair 'burden sharing'". Thus they "are not suited either
as arbitrators or as objective regulators of sovereign insolvency
procedures". The publication demands multilateral institutions
to "accept accountability for their past lending", by
sharing the burden of debt reduction. [28]
Unless the problem of official debts is solved, payments to private
creditors will remain discriminated. Although
private creditors had granted a generous reduction of 45 percent
under Ecuador's Brady deal, this was only reflected in a very
small blip downwards in Ecuador's debt time series. New official
money increased debts again. If all creditors had cancelled 30
percent, commercial banks would have saved money. Ecuador would
in all probability be economically afloat again. Bailing-in official
creditors, as demanded within an international Chapter 9, is necessary.
The poorest countries with relatively large shares of multilateral
debts need meaningful reductions of these debts for a fresh start.
Nominated arbitrators elect one further
person to reach an uneven number. The panel must be absolutely
independent, also from the UN. It proceeds on the basis of the
main principles of U.S. Chapter 9, such as protection of the governmental
sphere and the population's right to be heard (by representation),
deciding on procedural matters as they come up. This
is not unusual and makes the process quicker and flexible. The UN might provide one or two persons as secretariat
staff, or an office if needed. One has to stress again:
no international treaty is needed. The Paris Club works without
any, even without any proper legal foundations, based only on
the will of creditors. International insolvency can be implemented
immediately once important creditor governments agree to respect
Human Rights, to apply the Rule of Law and economic reason to
their own claims.
Respecting the Rule of Law and
Human Rights, arbitration would nevertheless resemble present
negotiations in several ways. Creditors and the debtor (re)negotiate,
they would just do so before the panel. Good arbitrators encourage
both sides to reach a fair and feasible outcome. HIPC II demands
the participation of civil society and anti-poverty measures.
A transparent process and the population's right to be heard should
thus be seen as simply implementing these demands more efficiently.
Ideally, creditors, the debtor and the representatives of the
population can all agree on the result. If so, there is practically
little if any apparent difference to mediation. But one cannot
assume this optimal outcome to be the rule. Someone with authority
to decide, if and when necessary, is needed. Mediators have no
power to do so, they can only appeal to both sides, provide arguments,
help as a disinterested party. Arbitrators can do so as well,
but also decide if necessary.
The independent panel
determines which civil society organizations, trade unions, employers'
associations, grassroots organizations, or international organizations
such as UNICEF are given the formal status of representing the
affected population. The parliamentary opposition - if one exists
– might also nominate someone. One of the parties, the government
or any organization affiliated with it must not be considered.
To nominate these representatives popular vote or collecting signatures
are possibilities. In order to give all affected groups a voice,
the number of the population's representatives should not be too
small. Northern and domestic civil society organizations should
be given that status, as Northern organizations cannot be put
under pressure by their governments so easily. But during an open,
transparent procedure, anyone would have the possibility to comment
and to voice their views in public, even without any formal right
to speak before the panel, thus influencing public opinion as
well as those formally participating. This would assure "a
fair and open process devoid of any overreaching however subtle"
as demanded in the U.S. Seconding the Hermes Kreditversicherung,
the German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development criticizes
that civil society organizations would not duly defend the interests
of creditors. [29] But as creditors are party – thus enjoying
more rights than civil society – this should not be reason of
concern.
Creditors and the debtor negotiate before
the panel. Representatives exercising the population's right to
be heard can comment on any topic, present proposals, data, etc.
These negotiations produce a set of feasible outcomes, as each
side has to support their points by data and arguments. Ideally,
agreement between creditors, the debtor and representatives of
the population is reached. The main task of arbitrators is determining which percentage of debts
is uncollectable, either being phantom debts or because of debtor
protection including resources necessary for economic recovery.
The settlement must also take creditors' justified interests duly
into account. This is essential. Only a fair mechanism will be
as generally accepted as national procedures are. Open and transparent negotiations allowing both parties and the representatives
of the population to argue their points and produce supporting
evidence, can be expected to reduce the set of feasible outcomes
considerably. Differences between the remaining concrete solutions
are likely to be relatively small. Thus arbitral awards are likely
to affect relatively small sums of money -"peanuts"
in the language of a distinguished German banker.
To reduce the costs of participation
for Southern civil society organizations the panel could sit in
the debtor or a neighboring country. Technically,
a permanent court could handle cases as well. But ad hoc
panels can be established much more quickly, and too much time
has been wasted because of creditors. One may also hope that -
once the backlog of cases is gone - debt arbitration will not
be needed frequently enough to justify a permanent institution.
The very existence of an international Chapter 9 will be a disincentive
to the sort of lax lending that happened during the 1970s when
lenders assumed that countries would always repay. Finally, ad
hoc panels are custom made for each case.
The Slow Progress
of the Debate
Rich countries’ governments, not private interests, have proved to be the
main obstacle to applying insolvency procedures to poor countries’
debt problems. Ever since it was brought up the idea of insolvency
has been fiercely opposed by public creditors, who are not under
market discipline. Bankers have been much less inimical. In fact,
a banker, D. Suratgar, had proposed the idea early on. Another
banker, the late Alfred Herrhausen, was among the most vocal advocates
of negotiated debt reduction. A publication by the German Commerzbank,
“Emerging Markets this Week”,[30] sees "sovereign insolvency
procedures" as an option "in cases of extreme borrower
distress" to which private creditors would not object. This difference between public and private creditors is explicable. Bankers
are used to calculating costs and benefits in strictly economic
terms. At one point, the costs of (re)negotiations - which commercial
banks, unlike the public sector, have to pay and earn themselves
under market conditions - start to exceed expected payments. Insolvency
is a professional and economic solution known from everyday business.
In 1990 the Working Group Swissaid/ Fastenopfer/
Brot für alle/ Helvetas/ Caritas submitted the idea of international
insolvency to the Swiss Bundesrat, supported by two papers by
Prof. K.W. Meessen (Augsburg/Geneva) and myself. The Swiss Parliament
took it up. Switzerland tried discreetly to discuss the proposal
internationally, but stopped when no other government signaled
any interest. When the proposal was again addressed in
Parliament[31]
in 2000, the Swiss government had changed its view.
The lack of reactions
to the Swiss initiative might partly be explained by official
euphoria about new capital flows to Latin America. The World Bank
declared the debt crisis over. The 1990s were touted as years
of hope and recovery[32]
until the Mexican crash.
After 1994 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
System, suggested thinking about international insolvency. The
Financial Times reported that Treasury Secretary R. Rubin said
he carefully avoided the term "international bankruptcy court"
but that some procedures to work out debt obligations were needed.
In the Wall Street Journal of 10 April 1995 Jim Leach, the Chairman
of the U.S. Congress’ House Banking and Financial Services Committee,
wrote: "What is needed today is a Chapter 11 process for
the global financial system, a technique to keep nation-states
and their people from the impoverishing implications of insolvency."
Mentioning Chapter 9 briefly, he specifically emphasized its implicit
understanding that local government must continue to function.
Informally raising the issue at the Halifax G7 summit was even
considered, but finally not done. New euphoria on capital flows
to East Asia eclipsed the Mexican shock.
At the end of
the 1990s international arbitration based on U.S. Chapter 9 has
gained some currency again. Many years of failed attempts by creditors
to find a solution may be one explaining factor. But the main
reason is the strong lobbying by civil society campaigns for meaningful
debt relief. Jubilee 2000 UK, the first Jubilee campaign taking
up the issue, demanded the cancellation of unpayable debts. To
determine the unpayable part international arbitration based on
Chapter 9 was demanded. The word insolvency - even more radical
then - was not used by the official platform. The German and Austrian
Erlassjahr campaigns followed suit, expressly demanding international
Chapter 9 insolvency for states. So did the Tegucigalpa Declaration,
or the German Commission Justitia et Pax, which published a paper
just before and for the Cologne Summit.[33] Internationally,
however, particularly in the South, the term arbitration is usually
preferred. Presently a global NGO working group on FTAP (Free
and Transparent Arbitration Process) is pursuing the issue.
UNCTAD[34] renewed its proposal of an international
Chapter 11 insolvency, initially made in 1986. It also referred
to international Chapter 9 and its arbitration mechanism.[35] In the Chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa UNCTAD demands
to apply the key principles. This would dictate an immediate write-off
of all unpayable debt determined on the basis of an independent
assessment of debt sustainability.[36]
UNCTAD doubts whether an international bankruptcy court applying
international insolvency rules laid down in the form of an international
treaty ratified by all members of the UN can be expected to be
established easily. This doubt is wholly shared by most proponents
of Chapter 9 insolvency. Therefore they propose ad hoc panels,
not a court acting on the basis of virtually universal ratification.
This is, for example, the official position of Erlassjahr 2000
Germany, repeatedly stated by their spokesperson Jürgen Kaiser.
After the Asian
crash corporate insolvency is seen as essential to avoid future
crises. The Reports on the International Financial Architecture
recommend it strongly, but avoid insolvency with regard to sovereign
debtors. The Working Group on International Financial Crises demanded
that the international community provide “in exceptional and extreme
circumstances ... a sovereign debtor with legal ‘breathing space’
so as to facilitate an orderly, co-operative and negotiated restructuring”.[37]
Emulating insolvency features, such as debt reduction by qualified
creditor majority or "Collective Action Clauses" for
sovereign bond contracts, was recommended as a critical contribution
to "creating the institutional structure needed to encourage
orderly workouts",[38]
because a "binding insolvency regime for sovereign debtors
is unlikely".[39] The Report admits that "a purely voluntary
approach" might not work because "the government may
not have the bargaining power to obtain sustainable terms".[40] It remains to be asked why it shied away from the
obvious conclusion - the need of an independent entity empowered
to decide.
The OECD[41] has come around to accepting insolvency:
“Moreover, an international lender of last resort and an international
bankruptcy court could help to prevent financial panics altogether.”
Although the IMF is still a bulwark against insolvency, Michel Camdessus suggested
“some sort of Super Chapter 11 for countries” in the Financial
Times of 17 September 1998. One has to ask why he demanded the
legally unviable variant of a Chapter 11, not Chapter 9. Chapter
11 - made for firms - does not have the transparency of Chapter
9. It is comfortably closer to the IMF's tradition of behind-closed-doors
decisions. No evidence is known that he tried to put his obvious
conclusion into practice.
The Chapter 9 proposal has been widely discussed in Germany. Due to Erlassjahr
2000 it has received attention by the Bundestag and the administration.
On 22 April 1999 the German Parliament requested the government
to examine it. The Advisory Council of the Federal Ministry of
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commissioned the report
mentioned above. A question by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group
in March 2000 requested information about what the Federal Government
had done to fulfill the Parliament's request, whether it considered
initiating such a mechanism, if so on what basis and what concrete
steps had been taken. The Bundestag's Finance Committee held a
public Hearing on the evolution of international financial markets,
debts and international insolvency on 14 March 2001.
Italy’s Parliament
passed a law on debt relief. Its article 7 requests the Government
to try to obtain a ruling from the International Court of Justice
on the consistency between present debt management and the general
framework of legal principles and human and people’s rights.[42]
In the UK, the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons[43] published the proposal
of international Chapter 9 insolvency with symmetrical treatment
of international financial institutions as a measure to bring
financial accountability to the IMF in an appendix of the document
reproducing their hearings. In 2000 the International Development Committee of the House of
Commons published its 9th Report on The Effectiveness of EC Development
Assistance.[44]
Although the topic is not debt issues specifically, a submission
of mine was published as Appendix 10, suggesting an international
Chapter 9 as the necessary precondition for any meaningful development
cooperation in highly indebted African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries.[45]
Urging that "debt cancellation
should become part of the dialogue within the ACP-EU Partnership
and that the EU should encourage other donors also to take measures
to relieve or cancel debt"[46]
the
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly demanded fair and transparent arbitration
processes (FTAP) in 2000. It called for an International
Debt Arbitration Panel to restructure or cancel debts where debt
service has reached such a level as to prevent the country providing
necessary basic social services.[47]
After the default of Ecuador's Brady
bonds, civil society - possibly best represented by the demands
contained in the paper by the Confederation of Ecuador’s Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) - demanded
a debt-to-development swap of all present debts, as well as international
arbitration to solve problems of future overindebtedness. It was
demanded that debt service be replaced by payments into a “Fondo Social y Ecológico” to finance
social, cultural and ecological programs (including education). [48] CONAIE refers specifically to U.S. municipalities. It also refers to Ecuador's
experience with counterpart funds created in connection with debt
reductions by Belgium, Switzerland and with partial debt reductions
by Germany. Especially the Swiss case, the “Fondo de Contravalor
Ecuatoriano Suizo” is presented as highly successful. Finally,
the paper refers to Germany's London Accord of 1953 (which offered
generous terms to a debtor whose situation was perceptibly better
than Ecuador's), the basically similar Indonesian case in 1969-70,
and the more recent cases of Poland and Egypt to show that demands
for meaningful debt reduction are technically possible.
“AFRODAD”, a platform of African NGOs, has taken up the demand for an international
arbitration court on foreign debt, stressing
the same concerns as CONAIE. Speaking of "institutional imbalances"
AFRODAD becomes undiplomatically explicit: “As is said in West Africa: In a Jury of Foxes (the Creditors),
the Chickens (the Debtors) are always the guilty! The Paris Club
for example, is itself undemocratic as it is a gang of creditors
against one debtor etc. … These undemocratic practices have to
be replaced by structures which respect human rights, democracy
and the right of the debtor countries and their peoples to be
heard. ... A proposal for internationalization of Chapter 9 Insolvency
Law of the USA was presented as part of the NGO Hearings to the
United Nations in the context of the Financing for Development
(FfD) Conference preparations during November 5-9, 2000, in New
York by Professor Kunibert Raffer of Austria. Chapter 9 of USA
Laws is a procedure for solving the insolvency of a governing
body, a Municipality, without violating or undermining its governmental
power. Applied to sovereign countries, the Law would not violate
sovereignty of the state.”[49]
AFRODAD
also sees a need for an international arbitration process explicitly
addressing the responsibilities of creditor countries and the
effects of exogenous factors that might be influenced by creditors,
such as denied market access, trade imbalances and declining terms
of trade. Finally, an arbitration court with a larger mandate
is demanded. It should expressly deal
with both the issues of debt and of retrieval of money stolen
by leaders and put into foreign banks. Compared with an international
insolvency in the strict sense, AFRODAD's variant is more ambitious
and addresses problems at the root of the debt crisis in a more
direct and comprehensive way. Implicitly, of course, problems
such as Northern protectionism cannot be ignored within a normal
Chapter 9 either. The question of market access, for instance,
is inseparably linked with the percentage of debt reduction necessary
to reach economic viability of a debtor.
In the United
States, the “Global Sustainable Development Resolution” drafted
in 1999 by Congressman Bernie Sanders called for an international
insolvency mechanism based on U.S. Chapter 9, including arbitration.
More recently, the Secretary of the Treasury, L. Summers, said
in an interview in Time magazine:[50] "Even the toughest private
lenders write off their bad debts. That's what governments - and
private lenders - need to do with bad loans they have made."
In his Millennium
Report Kofi Annan demanded a "debt arbitration process to
balance the interests of creditors and sovereign debtors and introduce
greater discipline into their relations".[51]
Meanwhile - one may assume: under strong pressure - he totally
took back his courageous demand for FTAP, speaking of mediation
not arbitration.[52]
Unfortunately, he seems to have felt forced to retreat even one
step further, demanding an "independent" mediator, assisted
by the IMF and other experts on a voluntary basis. This would
not change the creditor domination. In contrast to arbitration
it would deny sovereign debtors and the poor the Rule of Law,
but might produce the wrong impression as though something had
actually changed in their favor.
Chapter 9 international insolvency was presented and discussed
at the Civil Society Hearings of “Financing for Development”
in New York in November 2000.[53]
The High-Level Regional Consultative Meeting on Financing for
Development, Asia and Pacific Region (Jakarta, 2-5 August 2000)
called for an international bankruptcy procedure as an area for
regional co-operation.[54] The very next sentence demands
that it be "ensured that private debt does not become government
debt". As long as governments are denied insolvency relief
the option of socializing private losses - as happened in Asia
- will remain unduly attractive.
In the academic debate,
Rogoff[55]
presented an international Chapter 9 as a means to stabilize the
international financial system. He states that with enhanced global
and regional political institutions "ideas like a global
bankruptcy court or an international system of financial regulation
may not seem so far fetched".[56]
At present, the lack of an effective international bankruptcy
system would allow "'junk' country debt" to play "too
large a role".
Listing "Raffer's
International Bankruptcy Court" in his "Architecture
Scorecard"[57]
Eichengreen mentions quite a few arguments in favor of insolvency,[58]
including "vulture" funds.[59] But Eichengreen
eventually comes down on the side of new clauses (e.g. majority
voting clauses) in bond contracts as the "only practical
way",[60]
as "infinitely more realistic than .... some kind of supranational
bankruptcy court empowered to cram down settlement terms."
These clauses make sense, and he is right that there is not yet
any political will of official creditors to allow such a procedure.
He is wrong, though, in thinking of a supranational institution,
as ad hoc arbitration panels to be dissolved when no longer needed
are not normally referred to as supranational.
In the German language
area, a conference volume edited by Dabrowski et al.[61] discusses the proposal
of an international Chapter 9 in detail. Frenkel and Menkhoff
mention it,[62] summarizing, however, largely
Rogoff.
Conclusion
The progress towards a reasonable solution to the problem of excessive
sovereign indebtedness is slow. The main obstacle is the unwillingness
of official creditors to relinquish their dictatorial power over
debtors in favor of an economically efficient solution that safeguards
human rights and respects the Rule of Law. It appears that logic
and facts cut little ice. A great deal of political lobbying is
necessary, but one must not give up hope that a child's life expectancy
will eventually depend a bit less on whether (s)he is born in
a heavily indebted municipality within an OECD country or in a
heavily indebted country in the South.