Harald Müller
Middle Eastern Threats to the Atlantic Community
The Atlantic community consists of
democracies and market economies who share basic values and whose
interests in a stable and peaceful Middle Eastern region coincide.
In spite of these joint interests, politics on how to pursue them
diverge sharply between European countries and the United States.
With regard to weapons of mass destruction, divergences include
the relationship with the political actors, the imminence of the
threat related to weapons of mass destruction, the instruments
of their non-proliferation and the responses to proliferation.
These differences signal a principal disagreement not only on
non-proliferation and arms control, but also on broader issues
of the world order.
The Middle East: An Explosive Region
The
Middle East - extending from the Egyptian borders with Libya and
Sudan to the Eastern boundaries of Iran - contains approximately
two thirds of the world's reserves of crude oil. With the Suez
Channel, it links the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea
and the Atlantic, and it is the neighboring region to unruly Caucasus
and resource-rich Central Asia. Beyond its essential role in the
world's energy supply, the Middle East thus must be recognized
as an area of strategic importance in its own right.
The
region contains some of the most dangerous and longest-burning
conflicts in the world. The Arab-Israeli conflict overshadows
the rest in virulence. This conflict has led to five hot wars
and extended periods of bloodshed in Palestine proper. While Israel
has succeeded in concluding peace treaties with two neighbors,
Egypt and Jordan, Syria (and Iraq) remain enemies, and the Palestinian
issue is far from being settled, as the present unrest documents.
Southern Lebanon, where the radical Shiite Hezbollah militia enjoys
tolerance by Syria and support by distant Iran, continues to be
a source of danger to Israel. Whether a settlement for Palestine
would pacify the region for good can only be speculated about:
other conflicts could be equally explosive once energies are freed
from the presently central Israeli-Arab contest. First, there
are the disputes about supremacy in the Arab world, which drove
Syria and Egypt into the Gulf War coalition against rival Iraq.
The Arab-Iranian dispute has led to Iran’s occupation of a group
of islands in the Strait of Hormuz that are also claimed by the
United Arab Emirates, provoked the eight-year-long, extremely
bloody war between Iraq and Iran and feeds the arms race around
the Persian Gulf. Arab-Turkish disputes concern a strip of territory
in Turkey’s South and, more important, the waters of the Euphrates
and Tigris, the most important lifeline of the “fertile crescent”.
In addition, a dozen or more minor territorial, ethnical, religious
and sectarian disputes add to the volatility of peace and conflict
in that area.
The
presence of weapons of mass destruction in that kind of region
creates a most serious headache. Our experience with deterrence
that functions - or at least does not explode into a conflagration
in which Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are used in significant
numbers with catastrophic effect - is fairly limited. The East-West
Conflict, to be frank, was fortunately soft in that regard. The
two protagonists did not share contiguous borders, had no territorial
dispute, did not compete for the same resources, had no religious
squabbles worth talking about, had no ethnic differences and did
not share a history of bloody wars against each other. For the
countries in the Middle East, very few of these benign conditions
apply. We must thus be most careful when transferring experiences
from the East-West Conflict onto this very different region. Iraq,
a state armed with WMD, dared to attack Israel, a nuclear weapon
state in all but name, with intermediate-range missiles. Iraq
did not put biological or chemical warheads onto these missiles;
the calculation of the leadership was obviously that Israel would
ride out the attacks and wait for the results before deciding
about retaliation. In East-West terms that would have been seen
as an incredible, irresponsible gamble. In the Middle East, it
was sort of "normal" behavior. Our European deterrence
experiences are thus a very uncertain guide for addressing security
in this very different
region.
There
are several scenarios that demonstrate the seriousness of the
situation. In another Middle East War, Israel would be acutely
anxious that the two mainstays of its defense for survival – its
airbases that are the condition for air superiority against manpower-strong
Arab armed forces, and assembly points for its huge reserves –
would come under instant attack by chemical and, possibly, biological
weapons, denying Israel a chance to defend itself. In turn, Israeli
nuclear weapons would probably be on high alert from the beginning
to preserve the survivability of this “deterrent of last resort”.
In
another Iraqi-Iranian war on the Persian Gulf, chemical weapons
would probably be used at even a larger scale than before. If
Iran and Iraq manage to procure nuclear weapons, their use for
the sake of war termination could not be excluded, notably by
the weaker side. Likewise, a nuclear armed Iraq might be tempted
in another Gulf War rehearsal to attack Israel with chemical rather
than conventional armed missiles, in the hope that Israel would
enter the war, but would be deterred from using its nuclear capabilities
by the fear of Iraqi retaliation in kind. The possibilities for
escalation are unpredictable.
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: The State of
Affairs
In
the Middle East, we know for sure that one undeclared nuclear
weapon state exists, i.e. Israel. The size of its arsenal has
been estimated somewhere between 50 and more than 200 warheads.
The diversity of its nuclear armament has been reported to include
artillery shells, gravity bombs, and missile warheads. In connection
with the impending supply of nuclear-capable, diesel-engined submarines
originating in Germany it has been speculated that Israel can
mount warheads on sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Usually,
Israel is credited with more than first-generation gun-type or
implosion warheads. It is generally believed that the miniaturization/yield
expanding technology of boosting has been mastered, and since
the famous revelations of Vanunu, a former employee of the Israeli
nuclear complex who published details about Israel’s nuclear arsenal,
the possibility that Israel possesses hydrogen weapons has been
discussed.
After
Israel, Iraq is the only Middle Eastern country that has come
very close to becoming a nuclear weapon state. How far Baghdad
was removed from a physical capability when the Gulf War hit,
and afterwards the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
dismantled the remainders of the multifaceted program, is still
a matter for conjecture. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Iraq
could produce the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons
without the signature (notably the heat of enrichment or reprocessing
activities) being picked up by US or other satellites. Close control
and observation of Iraq, and the determined will to act if signals
indicate dangerous activities, is a precondition to prevent an
escalation of Middle Eastern risks from the present state of affairs.
It
is likely that Iraq has preserved some amount of chemical weapons
and/or chemical weapons agents, and that the biological weapons
program has progressed on a low level of activity.
The delivery vehicles program, unfortunately, was permitted to
continue below the 150 km range, but it is likely that Iraq has
exploited this permission to work on more fundamental technologies
to enhance its skills for longer-range ballistic delivery vehicles
as far as could be done without actual testing. In addition, it
is probable that some vehicles survived in disguise the end of
the Gulf war and the ensuing efforts of UNSCOM to disarm Iraq.
Nevertheless, as long as United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Resolution 687 is applied, it should be possible to stop an emerging
Iraqi threat in its tracks, if necessary by brute force. The problem
is much more the politics of UNSC diplomacy than intelligence
failures or lack of offensive options.
Iran
is generally regarded as possessing chemical weapons after some
reported retaliatory use during the first Gulf War. Iran is a
party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, thus it should be possible
to clarify all ambiguities over a period of years. Biological
weapons capability has been inferred for Iran, but rather casually
and without firm evidence. By and large, the same
story applies to the nuclear sector. The country is credited with
a nuclear weapons program - and certainly there were corresponding
activities during the reign of the Shah - but the evidence is
far from the one obtaining in the case of Iraq. Iran is, obviously,
eager to conduct a comprehensive nuclear research program, opening
all avenues in nuclear technology. Its procurement activities
point to a distinct interest in enrichment technology, something
that is not a logical priority in a country without operating
research reactors and in a world market where light water reactor
fuel can be bought at low prices and without difficulties. This
is bound to raise suspicions, even though the inspections and
"visits" of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
to some undeclared sites have not resulted in any hard evidence
that would prove the existence of nuclear-weapons activities.
Iran's
missile program, built on the Soviet Scud and considerable input
from North Korea, is impressive. The Shahab II is credited with
a range of 1500-2000 km and has been tested successfully once.
Whether this missile is reliable in a mass-produced version and
capable of carrying a warhead right to the target remains an open
question. Its appearance is disturbing in itself, as it puts part
of Europe in its range.
Syria's
chemical weapons production is seen as multifaceted and quantitatively
significant.
Syria produces several nerve agents in addition to traditional
agents such as mustard gas. Much has been speculated, but few
hard facts are known, about the country's biological weapons activities.
The nuclear program is rudimentary, and there is no evidence whatsoever
of a strong push for nuclear weapons. Syria's missiles' range
is around 1000 km - again developed with North Korean assistance
- and appears to be aimed at its regional rivals, Turkey, Israel,
and Iraq.
Saudi-Arabia
bought - during the frenzy of the first Gulf war - a dinosaur
missile, the CSS-2 with a range of some 2.500 km, from China,
to have some counter to the Iraqi and Iranian missile threats.
The CSS-2's inaccuracy is pathetic, and it would make military
sense with a WMD warhead only. However, Saudi-Arabia - closely
aligned to the United States - is not reported to possess or strive
for WMD, even though reports of support to the Pakistani nuclear
weapons program have surfaced from time to time.
Egypt
is, of course, the most important Middle East country in the Arab
world. Its nuclear ambitions, nurtured under President Gamal Abdel
Nasser, were renounced when Anwar al Sadat took power. Egypt has
become a very active member of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Cairo's diplomats focus much energy - notably in the First Committee
of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process - on putting pressure
on Israel, the only nuclear weapon state in the region. But they
are careful not to rock the boat and are always prepared to compromise
at the right moment. Being avowedly non-nuclear, Egypt has nevertheless
preserved a chemical retaliatory option, and has been reported
to work on biological weapons as well. It has acquired Scud missiles
from the Soviet Union, and participated in the Condor missile
program with Argentina and Iraq until its abandonment in the eighties
under the pressure of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Egypt
has been reported to continue with missile development, with the
assistance of North Korea and/or Chinese/Russian assistance.
It has kept a very low profile about all these activities and
has distinguished itself as the leader of protest against Israel's
nuclear weapon capability. It was Egypt, under the leadership
of its Foreign Minister Amr Musa, that has persuaded a number
of Arab countries not to become full members to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) as long as Israel abstains from the NPT.
The
picture would be incomplete without Libya. Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi
once had clear nuclear intentions, trying to buy the bomb first,
and, after these attempts led him nowhere, trying to buy relevant
assistance from both the Soviet Union and Belgium. Belgium was
dissuaded from continuing nuclear assistance to Libya, and the
Soviet Union was too careful to transfer technology that could
prove of military value. Finally, Ghaddafi settled for a chemical
weapons program and succeeded in obtaining a turnkey chemical
weapons factory from a German businessman who ended up in jail
once the matter was revealed. The original plant at Rabta suffered
from a huge fire, but there have been reports about a second,
underground, plant, and, anyway, it is not unlikely that Libya
has some stocks of chemical weapons agents. Libya's missile program
was comparably adventurous, but indigenous production never did
reach maturity. Libya is stuck with Scud-Ds, and, possibly, North
Korean upgrades. This is enough of a capability, however, to hit
parts of Italy.
The
trend of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has
been stagnant in the last two decades.
No new programs have appeared, and some old ones have been stalled
or reversed, though not in the Middle East, with the exception
of the forced interruption of Iraqi efforts. Three developments,
however, work into the opposite direction: the availability of
foreign assistance, notably in the form of experts-to-hire, could
shorten the development of full-fledged, sophisticated programs
considerably. Secondly, the evolution of bioengineering makes
the production and the storage of biological weapons much easier
than it used to be. Thirdly, the range of missiles is slowly expanding,
notably with North Korean, Russian and/or Chinese assistance.
However, the transition from one to two-stage missiles is a difficult
one, and in-flight stability becomes even a greater headache with
three stages (or true intercontinental range). It is for that
reason that the time when Iranian missiles are estimated to be
able to reach Central and Western Europe has been, once more,
rescheduled to after 2010 in more recent intelligence estimates.
Who is Threatening Whom, and Why?
The
actual threat possibilities that the capabilities of Middle Eastern
states may imply for Europe depend upon these capabilities and
upon the overall political relationship between them and the European
country in question.
To
start with, the country most concerned is certainly Turkey. It is within the reach
of the missiles of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.
Israel can be discounted as a source of threat as it is actually
allied with Turkey by way of several military cooperation agreements.
With the Saudis, Turkey has no quarrel whatsoever. However, for
its immediate neighbors Syria, Iran and Iraq, the same cannot
be said. By its own choice, Iran is a party in the Middle East
conflict, and the Turkish-Israeli entente is a source of dispute.
In addition, the Kurdish population lives on the Iranian as well
as the Turkish side of the border, and this could create troubles.
Iran and Turkey are also competitors for the preferred route of
Caspian oil to the world markets. The quite thorough suppression
of Islamist political movements in Turkey could prove another
bone of contention. However, relationships between the two countries
have gone reasonably well. The Kurdish issue appears to link them rather
than to divide them, as Iran is weary of its own minorities. Turkey's
position as a bulwark against Iraq makes it useful for Iran, and
this common pool of interest may, in the end, be more important
than the dividing issue of the Middle East.
With
Iraq, things are very different. Turkey has intruded into Iraqi
territory several times in recent years in order to combat the
PKK, the Kurdish Worker's Party, and though Iraq is as tough towards
its own Kurdish population as Turkey, if not worse, the infringement
of its national sovereignty, exploiting the military weakness
of Iraq after the Gulf war and under the imposed no-fly-zone imperative,
does not amuse Baghdad. Turkey has been serving as an "aircraft
carrier" for allied forces during the Gulf war and for the
enforcement of the Northern no-fly-zone, is virtually allied to
Israel and exacerbates the situation of Iraqi agriculture with
its huge Ataturk dam project.
That
construction endeavor in Southwest Turkey imposes a distinct diminution
of the headwaters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the lifeline
of both Syria and Iraq. Once completed, the dam system will permit
Turkey to regulate at will the water flow into its downstream
neighbors. Ankara has already indicated that it views the project
as a national affair and is not willing to consider the "neighborhood
rule" that has come to govern the handling of most multi-country
river flows.
If
anything, Syria is even more aggravated by this development. In
addition, there is an open territorial dispute concerning the
border area between Turkey and Syria along the Mediterranean
coastline. And Syria is the main target of Turkish-Israeli military
cooperation, since utilization of Turkish airspace could enable
the Israeli air force (coming through the open waters of the Mediterranean)
to circumvent Syria's air defenses directed against Israel and
to attack Syria's forces "from behind".
Turkey,
in other words has to calculate seriously the capabilities of
its neighbors. As NATO ally and candidate for EU accession (though
not in the very near future) Turkey's security cannot be divorced
from the European one, whatever the barriers to quick accession
to the European Union might be. European countries thus cannot
stay aloof if Turkey is seriously attacked.
Greece
is within the reach of some of the Middle Eastern military assets,
but its good relationship to Arab countries makes it a very unlikely
target. Italy was once the victim of a single Libyan missile attack
- against the Liparian island of Lampedusa in the wake of the
US retaliatory attack for the Lockerbie terrorist attack - but,
significantly, the missile fell short of the target. Italy is
also well within reach of the Shahab II, but, again, it has no
trouble with Iran.
Central
and Western Europe could be within the range of Iranian and Iraqi
missiles within a decade or so, provided these countries pursue
determined programs, get some foreign assistance, and achieve
technical success, neither of which condition can be taken for
granted. These odds notwithstanding, it makes sense to consider
that possibility in the course of a sober threat assessment.
US and Western European Positions: Common Interests, Different
Strategies
Given
the primary economic and strategic interests of the West, from
a Western perspective it would be by far the best solution if
the conflicts in the region would come to a rest. The West has
no need of imperial preponderance in the Middle East. This is
a matter of the past that will, presumably, never come up again.
And if the Middle Eastern countries could somehow settle their
differences, one of the major concerns of Western policy could
be disposed of.
The
Western interest with regard to WMD proliferation in the Middle
East should thus be very clear: prevent it where possible, contain
it and slow it down where it happened, reverse it where the opportunity
arises, find responses to it where reversal is not a real-world
option for the near future. A Middle East armed with weapons of
mass destruction not only provides a recipe for catastrophe, presenting
an example of a virtual Armageddon to the rest of the world which
would leave every moral person - the origins of the morality notwithstanding
- traumatized because of the number and state of victims; it would
not only threaten the rest of the world with a serious and possibly
fatal disruption of the supply of essential raw materials. It
might well extend beyond the regional boundaries in military terms,
given the range of the delivery vehicles at hands, and the interconnectedness
of strategic interests and alliances.
It
should be emphasized that, up to this point, there is nothing
dividing the European from the American interest. On the general
level discussed so far, the interests of the transatlantic partners
coincide. Unfortunately, this is no reason to celebrate unity.
In politics, the devil is in the detail of what to do as much
as in the detail of what the facts are. And concerning the what
to do, starting with the assessment of the size and direction
of threat and extending into strategies and tactics, Europeans
and Americans do not, alas, see eye to eye at all.
Threats
are not immutable facts. They are political animals, subject to
evolution and change. Whether or not a relationship to another
country emerges as a threat is very much a matter of the interaction
between the potential threatener and the potential target. European
countries are no helpless victims of mightily threatening Middle
Eastern "rogues". They are in a position to shape their
relationship to those countries which, singly, are much weaker
and in much more dire straits security-wise than the European
Union as a whole and, as a corollary, its member states.
Security
diplomacy, of course, is no appeasement. Basic interests, attitudes,
principles and values are not at disposal. Where a Middle Eastern
country, WMD armed or not, pursues dangerous, illicit or aggressive
policies, such as Iraq against Kuwait in 1990, it has to be opposed.
Likewise, Israel's existence and security will remain an important
policy objective of the Europeans. Beyond that, possibilities
for a flexible and creative diplomacy abound.
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Turkey and its Neighbors
As
a first line of action, the Europeans should make it clearer to
the Turkish accession candidate that accession presumes viable
relations of all EU members (and, by implication, the countries
wishing to accede) with their neighbors. Repeated mini-invasions
in order to combat the militant exponents of a national minority
is simply out of order - this view coincided with the European
line that Turkey has to accommodate relevant Kurdish grievances
and settle that issue non-violently. Likewise, Turkey should be
pressed hard to enter into a reasonable water-sharing arrangement
with its Southern neighbors. Europe with its trans-border regimes
for the Rhine and the Danube can ill afford a regression into
unregulated use of river waters that may have been adequate for
the 19th, but certainly not for the 21st century. With this position
delineated clearly, Europe is in no danger that its security might
be compromised by Turkey's over ambitious water use plans.
As
far as the Turkish-Syrian border dispute (that has not been virulent
for a long period) is concerned, the Europeans, in concert with
NATO, should make it crystal clear that Turkey's territory is
sacrosanct. It can be ruled out, given the sober approach of Syria
to power politics, that Damascus would confront
both the EU and NATO over an issue that, after all, is a very
minor one given overriding national interests such as reclaiming
the Golan heights, securing a reliable water flow or developing
the fledgling trade ties to the Western world. This leaves the
Middle Eastern conflict as a source of contention; this will be
dealt with further below. Otherwise, the relationships between
Turkey and its neighbors should not emerge as a WMD/missile threat
to Europe.
-
Iran and Islamic Fundamentalism
It
is on Iran that one of the major European-American disagreement
emerges. There is little doubt that Iran takes an active part
in its regional environment including the Gulf, the Middle East,
the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the early Khomeiny years, the
country displayed a missionary hyperactivism; beyond supporting
Hizbollah, this was clearly to be seen in the close ties to Sudan
and events in Saudi-Arabia and Bahrain that bore an Iranian imprint.
This zeal has markedly receded in the last decade. Iran continues
to oppose the Oslo peace process (which is not in great shape
anyway) and to lend assistance to Hizbollah. Beyond this, its
foreign policy has become much more cautious and geared more to
preserving traditional national interests.
Iran
is one of the countries in the world with the most serious security
problems. It had to repulse an aggression, absorb the large-scale
first use of chemical weapons without any international diplomatic,
military or moral assistance, survive a war in which the whole
world was supporting the enemy - the aggressor - and in which
it confronted several times the navy of the United States close
to its own shores. It learned about the extensive WMD programs
of Iraq and has to be aware that these programs might be presently
revived. It borders highly unruly regions in the Caucasus and
Central Asia. Its neighbor to the East, Afghanistan, is run by
another brand of Islamism which is hostile to Shia, the Muslim
minority faith that reigns in Iran. Relations to Afghanistan are
tense, and Kabul, in turn, is supported by nuclear-armed Pakistan.
Altogether, this is not an enviable position in security terms. Nevertheless, these security
problems have never been addressed by the West in any reasonable
way. Iran has been under constant embargo, constraints and pressure
since 1979 - initially no doubt self-inflicted - and has been
left to deal with its own problems by way of self-help. In that
security situation, consideration of WMD should not come as a
surprise.
Even
under Khomeiny, Iran abstained from direct aggression against
its neighbors. Since then, this conservatism has become even more
distinct. Over the last few years, Teheran has pursued an intense
diplomacy with its neighbors around the Gulf. The latest fruit
of these efforts has been the recent Iranian-Saudi security agreement.
One can conclude that, if Iran is pursuing WMD and missile capabilities,
the purpose is to guarantee national security and state survival
in an extremely unruly environment, while a diplomacy of reassurance
towards its neighbors is the first line of Iranian security diplomacy.
The
United States has been conducting a policy of confrontation and
isolation. The Europeans, in contrast, have tried, though cautiously,
to engage in a "critical dialogue", in the hope that
a sensibly pursued engagement may, in the end, support the forces
of change and reform that are, no doubt, available in the country
in big numbers; if the last elections indicate anything it is
that they represent the clear majority of the population.
Europeans
have continued to trade with Iran while the US has largely embargoed
that country. It should be kept in mind, however, that European
export control offices have been very prudent before granting
export permits for the transfers of goods and technologies that
are subject to licensing. Apart from Iraq, where exports are governed
by UNSC 687 and follow-up resolutions, Iran is the destination
with the highest rate of denials. Taking into account that companies
do not even apply for licenses when they receive advice, on an
informal inquiry, that a denial was impending, this shows that
the EU members are not on a sell-out to Iran, but pursue an export
policy that parallels the approach of critical dialogue.
European-Iranian
relations, while not brilliant, are not bad either. They are certainly
not in the state of mutual threat. As unwelcome as an expansion
of Iranian WMD capabilities would be as an element of instability
and insecurity in the region, it would not really present a military
threat to Europe on the basis of political analysis. This diverges
considerably from US assessments, where such Iranian capabilities
appear as a grave threat to US national interests.
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Another Gulf War?
The
most frequent scenario in which regional WMD and long-range missiles
figure as a serious threat to the West is a replay of the Gulf
War: a regional conflagration that would jeopardize the flow of
crude oil to the rest of the world with a possibly devastating
impact on the world economy and global stability would provoke
another massive Western intervention. The aggressor (which could
be Iraq or Iran according to the prevailing discussion) would
then employ its WMD and missiles to compel the West into abstaining
from such intervention.
Popular
as it is, the scenario is lacking credibility. The distribution
of destructive capabilities between the West and any regional
aggressor will remain highly asymmetrical for the indefinite future.
Any aggressor knows that the West could retaliate against an attack
on Europe or the US with devastating force, even if the decision
were made to stick to conventional means only. If the Gulf War
gives any indications, it is that the sanctuary of deterrence
would be regime survival and the preservation of the existence
of the state; Iraq never dared to attack Turkey, the NATO member,
though it was clearly within reach of its missiles. Its attacks
on Israel that served the strategic purpose to split the coalition
were confined to conventional munitions. In other words, intrawar
deterrence was at work, and the WMD means in Iraqi hands were
not used because the core values of the regime were not under
attack. It is much more likely that an attempt to conquer Baghdad
would have responded to by the employment of WMD.
Middle
East rulers, while calculating their interests and the means to
pursue them in different terms from the West, are by no means
completely irrational, as precisely the Iranian and Iraqi examples
demonstrate. They - particularly Saddam
Hussein - might be more willing to take risks than Western policymakers.
But their risk-taking knows boundaries as well. Intervention remains
possible if and when the most vital interests are at stake. What
would be impossible in a WMD/long-range missile environment would
be pushing the enemy into unconditional surrender. This, however,
has not been the Western style of warfare since 1945, and certainly
not since the end of the Cold War. Rather, the political objectives
of interventions were narrowly circumscribed, and they included
never explicitly the removal of the hostile regime, even though
this might have been the unspoken desire of Western leaders in
the Gulf and Balkan campaigns.
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Iraqi Sanctions, Litmus Test for International Regimes
International
regimes - the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
and the Missile Technology Control Regimes have always been regarded
by the Europeans as the main line of defense against the proliferation
threat in the Middle East and elsewhere. There was not a big difference
within the Atlantic community on this point. In recent years,
however, the United States has lost its enthusiasm for supporting
these regimes. The outrageous exceptions claimed by the US Senate
in the ratification resolution to the Chemical Weapons Convention
were a first, serious indicator of this tendency: the refusal
to permit chemical probes taken in the US to leave the US and
the right given to the US President to refuse inspections if they
contradicted the US national interests undermine squarely the
CWC verification system. In the negotiations for the Protocol
to the Biological Weapons Convention, the US figures, together
with China, among the most obstinate parties, believing that the
Convention is unverifiable, that illusions and complacency might
be created by an ambitious system, and that US commercial and
military secrets might be given away if the system were made intrusive.
On the other hand, the Europeans were among the steady supporters
of a strong protocol; the negotiations turned out to be as much
within the Western group as between the West and the rest.[29]
In the Missile Technology Control Regime, it was Canadian and
European initiatives that led to the present outreach effort and
the attempt to universalize the regime through a "Code of
Conduct" for dealing with missiles and missile technology;
throughout, the US was much more reluctant and skeptical. In the
NPT context, the US was certainly very helpful in shaping the
compromise that led to the consensus resolution of the 2000 NPT
Review Conference, but the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty means nothing less than the US refusing to pay
its price for the bargain that led to the indefinite extension
of the NPT in 1995, thereby severely undermining global support
for the Treaty.
Instead,
the US gives priority to military responses to proliferation,
defensive and offensive alike. The regimes are accepted and even
supported as long as they do not require compromises by and constraints
on the United States. Since regimes must always rest on give-and-take
exchanges among the different parties, this attitude runs counter
to the spirit and very nature of international arms control and
non-proliferation agreements. It is all the more serious as compliance
and enforcement measures - possibly the weakest spot in the regime
construction - must rely on the consensus of the vast majority
of regime members. Regimes cannot be enforced over an extended
period of time in the way resolution 687 is presently being enforced
by the US with UK assistance - on a national, unilateral basis.
On
the other hand, it has to be recognized that the Europeans have
not addressed the enforcement problem in any consistent manner.
The division on how to deal with Iraq is an obvious case in point:
France leads the front that works for a relaxation of the sanctions
against Baghdad. The UK is the only country lending military support
to US enforcement actions. The rest of Europe sits uncomfortably
between the two without any convincing alternative.
Regimes are legal orders.
They depend on their norms being shared among the vast majority
of their members. On the basis of this consensus, redress can
be sought for ambivalent behavior and outright breaches. Most
of these problems can be resolved by regime-internal negotiations.
In extreme cases, sanctions will be in order, and in instances
of a momentous threat to security military action might be deemed
to be necessary. Preparations for sanctions and military actions
must be known, reliable, and convincing. We are far from that
situation; and ironically, the only country prepared for enforcement,
the US, is willing to enforce not rules, but its own, idiosyncratic
national policies.[30]
Ultimately, the policy
towards Iraq is the litmus test. The economic sanctions that were
imposed as long as the WMD programs were not convincingly abandoned
and dismantled are not tenable as the civilian population has
proven to be the main victim, not the regime. The international
discussion about "intelligent" and "tailored"
sanctions is well taken.[31]
It will no doubt result in an improved instrument that, however,
then has to be adapted and applied thoroughly by the international
community. The EU should lead the way; it would be an important
step to repair the apparent rifts in the Atlantic community if
the Europeans and the US could coordinate their approaches carefully.
Nevertheless, the issue
of military sanctions as the ultimate means of enforcement remains
on the agenda. If the sanction regime on Iraq changes, agreement
must be restored on when and under what circumstances to conduct
what kind of military action against Iraq which is still under
the reign of UNSC Resolution 687 and the ensuing implementation
resolutions. It would be the ultimate defeat of the non-proliferation
regimes, indeed of multilateral arms control as a whole, if Iraq
could defy the content of 687 ten years after the war.[32]
The military risk which a revived program would entail must be
stated clearly, and by all members of the Security Council. The
insistence on restoring an inspection regime - a point on which
the permanent members were never in disagreement - should be clearly
restated.
-
The Palestine Conflict in the Proliferation Equation
In
the end, the proliferation problem in the Middle East cannot be
solved without a solution to the conflict over Palestine. This
is not to say that all troubles would go away that serve as motivation
to acquire weapons of mass destruction once Israel and the Palestinians
have agreed on a settlement that would satisfy both; they would
not. But as long as the conflict continues, there is hardly a
prospect for reasonable and detached considerations of regional
arms control opportunities which, in turn, could help to lay to
rest the proliferation problem.
On
the conflict as such there is basic agreement - as stated in the
first chapter - between Europe and the United States on Israel's
right to secure, threat-free borders and the necessity to establish,
in due course, a Palestinian state. But there exist considerable
divergences on the distribution of blame for the stalemate in
the peace process and on the necessity to apply stronger pressure
on Israel to make the big territorial concessions that are needed
to come to a final settlement. Most in Europe would agree that
all settlements in Gaza and the overwhelming number of those in
the West Bank should be either evacuated or put under Palestinian
authority, that small corrections around Jerusalem might be in
order, provided there is adequate compensation, and that administrative
authority over East Jerusalem must go to the Palestinians. There
is some understanding for the Arab view that Israel's nuclear
capability, under present circumstances, serves less as an existential
deterrent but as an umbrella under which territorial annexation
is taking place.
Israel's determined
refusal to entertain any conversations about the nuclear issue
- even on the whereabouts of a nuclear weapon free zone once it
was established - not a negotiation, but exploratory talks - and
to refrain even from closing the aged Dimona reactor meets with
European criticism and US acquiescence. Europeans fear strongly
that Arab willingness to succumb to the rules of the NPT may wane
if the status quo continues without any sign of change at either
the nuclear or the Palestinian front, while the US appears to
be content as long as there is no climactic change for the worse.
While Europeans do not refuse in principle to cooperate with Israel
in the military sector - note the transfer of German diesel submarines
that could even serve as a sea based platform for Israeli nuclear
weapons - the degree and intensity of US-Israeli collaboration
creates some concern. The fear is that the persistent experience
of unequal treatment on proliferation issues - harsh pressures
or military action against Arab countries, tacit tolerance of
Israeli WMD and missile activities - will enhance Arab resentment
to a point where there see no interest in continuing to abide
by, or even support, the rules of the non-proliferation regimes.
The refusal by major Arab countries, led by Egypt, to sign the
CWC is seen as a sobering sign.[33]
Europeans,
in other words, emphasize Israeli security in the borders of 1967
and are critical of specific Israeli policies that go beyond this
objective. The United States is much more inclined to condone
whatever policies are conducted by the current Israeli government,
restricting the expression of concern to quiet diplomacy until
a high threshold is passed, as during the recent military operations
in Palestinian territories in the Gaza strip. Europeans suspect
that this difference is very much related to the fact that the
European stance rests on a moral commitment reflecting a recognition
of guilt of the perpetrators and collaborators of the holocaust,
or shame of insufficient support for the Jewish cause during these
years, and/or the deep sympathies for the survivors and their
progeny, while, other than in Europe, in the United States powerful
political organizations support aggressively real Israeli politics
and request the US government to lend assistance or at least acquiescence
to it. In the European view, this hampers the US role as the honest
broker and, simultaneously, the enforcer of non-proliferation
in that region, while the US accuses the Europeans of putting
their economic interests in the Arab world above principle.
Minor Technical Differences, or a Question of Principles?
In contrast to a more
alarmist view, Europeans see the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East as no immediate threat to their
national security.[34] Their priority is still the strengthening
of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation agreements
that they regard as the first line of preventive efforts against
proliferation and that they judge, by and large, as relatively
successful. Next comes a diplomatic approach towards the region
and individual countries therein with a view to addressing national
insecurities and grievances and to creating an environment more
conducive to progressive economic development and less to radicalism
and interstate conflict. The Barcelona process launched in the
nineties has successfully tried to engage the countries around
the Mediterranean in cooperation with the EU as well as with each
other; it is the cornerstone of the European Union's regional
policy and is meant as integral part of a long-term security policy.[35]
Beyond these diplomatic
tools, the Europeans believe that the deterrent effect embodied
in the overwhelming military superiority of the Western Alliance
will suffice to dissuade any country in the region from attacking
the territory of European countries with weapons of mass destruction.[36]
Whether a nuclear component must be implicated in this deterrent
posture or not is contested, but not the matter as such. This
assessment extends to intrawar deterrence in case of an armed
intervention as long as the core survival of the hostile power
is not immediately at stake in the military operations.
Missile defense is largely
of interest as a tactical tool for troops in the battlefield in
WMD-containing environments in order to protect the soldiers and
deny hostile forces the battlefield advantage of WMD use. It is
seen as a much less urgent priority in terms of homeland defense,
not the least because confidence in the reliability of available
technology is not too high. In the French and British case, the
concern about the devaluation of their nuclear deterrent in a
more and more defense-dominated world is added, but this does
not bother the European non-nuclear weapon states.[37]
In contrast, the United
States regards the missile threats emerging from countries like
Iran and Iraq as grave and imminent. It does not believe that
deterrence is a reliable tool in confrontations with these states,
particularly in the course of a military intervention; Washington
sees the distinct danger of these countries using their WMD capabilities
for deterring the US from intervening by threatening missile attack
against the US homeland. [38] The trust in diplomacy, arms control and multilateral
regimes has declined dramatically in recent years, while the emphasis
on military countermeasures and the trust in the feasibility of
missile defenses has risen commensurably.
As
a consequence, missile defense has become the priority number
one for the US to counter the perceived threat, followed by military
countermeasures; these may include new nuclear options such as
deep-penetrating warheads with very small yields to hit underground
WMD storage sites or command posts. Only such active measures,
defensive and offensive, will restore a credible deterrence posture
in US prevailing opinion. Diplomacy, arms control and non-proliferation
measures are acceptable complements as long as they do not restrain
the pursuit of the military options that the US wants to acquire
or to maintain.
The US-European disagreements
are no minor differences on technical issues in some far away
region.[39] They reflect a deep cleavage about
principle and visions for world order. The Europeans see order
in agreed multilateral norms and rules that reflect the interests
of all major parties. The US expects order from the unfettered
pursuit of its national interest, bolstered by its unique military
and economic power. If these views cannot not be somehow reconciled,
the Atlantic community may be in serious trouble.
[1] Scott D. Sagan/ Kenneth
N. Waltz, The spread of nuclear weapons, New York : Norton,
1995
[3] Avner Cohen, Israel
and the Bomb, New York : Columbia Univ. Pr., 1998
[5] Anthony H. Cordesman,
“Iraq – Alexandria”, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute, 1998; Cordesman, Anthony H., “Iraq's past and future
biological weapons capabilities”, Washington, DC : CSIS, 1998
[6] Anthony H. Cordesman,
Iraq and the war of sanctions: conventional threats and weapons
of mass destruction, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999; Pearson,
Graham S., The UNSCOM saga : chemical and biological weapons
non-proliferation, Basingstoke (i.a.) : Macmillan (i.a.),
1999
[7] Michael J. Eisenstadt,
“Iran – Alexandria”, VA : Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute, 1998
[8] Shahram Chubin, “Iran's
national security policy: capabilities, intentions and impact”,
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1994; David A. Schwarzbach, “Iran's nuclear program: energy
or weapons?”, Washington, DC, NRDC, 1995, (Nuclear weapons databook
/ Natural Resources Defense Council); Anthony H.Cordesman, “Iran
and nuclear weapons”, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2000
[9] Wyn Q. Bowen, The
politics of ballistic missile non-proliferation / Mountbatten
Centre for International Studies. - Basingstoke (i.a.), Macmillan
; (i.a.), 2000; Federation of the American Scientists, Intelligence
Resource Program, Missile Proliferation Summary, http://www.
fas.org/irp/threat/missile/summary.htm, 2001
[15]
Harald Müller, “Neither Hype Nor Complacency:
WMD Proliferation after the Cold War”, in: The Non-proliferation
Review, Year. 4, No. 2, Winter 1997, p. 62-71
[19] Henry J. Barkey (ed.),
Reluctant neighbor: Turkey's role in the Middle East,
Washington, DC : United States Institute of Peace Pr., 1996
[22] Philip H. Gordon, The
transatlantic allies and the changing Middle East, IISS,
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Pr., 1998 (Adelphi paper; 322)
[25] Cordesman, Anthony
H., India, Pakistan, and proliferation in the Middle East,
proliferation's "western front", Washington, DC:
CSIS, 1998
[26] Fred Halliday, “Western
Europe and the Iranian revolution, 1979-97: an elusive normalization”,
in: Middle East and Europe, 1998
[27] Peter R. Lavoy (ed.),
Planning the unthinkable: how new powers will use nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons / ed. by Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Pr., 2000, Cornell studies in security affairs
[29] Jean Pascal Zanders
/ Elizabeth M. French / Natalie Pauwels, “Chemical and biological
weapon developments and arms control”, in: SIPRI Yearbook
1999, 565-595; “Graham S. Pearson, The Protocol to the Biological
Weapons Convention is Within Reach”, in: Arms Control Today,
Vol. 30, No. 5, June 2000, 15-20
[31] David Cortright and
George A. Lopez (eds.), Economic sanctions: panacea or peacebuilding
in a post-Cold War world?, Boulder, Westview Pr.; Larry
Minear et al., Toward more humane and effective sanctions management:
enhancing the capacity of the United Nations system, Providence,
RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr., Institute for International Studies,
1998, Occasional paper 31; Daniel W. Drezner, The sanctions
paradox: economic statecraft and international relations,
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1999
[34] Richard N. Haass (ed.),
Transatlantic tensions: the United States, Europe, and problem
countries, Washington, DC: Brooking Inst., 1999. - 251 p.
[35] “Peace and security
in the Middle East and the future of the EuroMediterranean Partnership”:
Ebenhausen, conference report / ed. by Volker Perthes, Ebenhausen,
SWP, 1998; Sven Berendt and Christian-Peter Hanelt (eds.), Bound
to cooperate: Europe and the Middle East, Gütersloh , Verl.
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2000
[36] For a discussion of
the deterrence issue, cf. Moodie, Michael, “Chemical and biological
weapons: will deterrence work?”. Alexandria, VA: Chemical and
Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998
[37] Ian Kenyon, Mike Rance, John Simpson, Mark Smith, “Prospects
for a European Ballistic Missile Defence System”, Southampton,
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton Papers,
in: International Policy 4, 2001
[39] Robert D. Blackwill
and Michael Stürmer, Allies divided : transatlantic policies
for the Greater Middle East, Cambridge, Mass. (i.a.) : MIT
Pr., 1997; US-European policy in the Persian Gulf : time for
precrisis management / The Royal Institute of International
Affairs ; The Stanley Foundation. - Muscatine, IA , 1999