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Politik und Gesellschaft
Online International Politics and Society 4/2000 |
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Helmut Reisen and Marcelo Soto Why Foreign Capital
Is Good for Post-Crisis Asia
Much of Asia has
long been characterised by high domestic savings. East Asia saved,
before the Asian crisis in 1997, a third of its GDP, more than any
other region in the world. High savings financed rapid capital accumulation
that accompanied remarkable economic growth. A question often raised
is therefore: why should Asia incur risky foreign savings when it
can finance development from local savings? After all, even distinguished
economists such as Joe Stiglitz have argued that countries with
such enviable savings rates as often found in Asia do not need foreign
funds for investment and growth. Foreign savings,
of course, are net capital inflows, the counterpart of current account
deficits (if there is no change in reserves). In particular the Asian
crisis has reminded us of the risks of capital flows — that
is, the unsettling effects of irrational exuberance, investor panic
and financial contagion. As the (mostly temporary) withdrawal of foreign
savings caused and accompanied the great Asian slump in 1997 and thereafter,
policy-makers have got used to terms such as moral hazard, asymmetric
information and adverse selection, as far as global capital flows
are concerned. There have been innumerable conferences and papers
on the prevention and resolution of financial crises and their cross-border
contagion, sharpening the awareness of policy-makers to the risks
of volatile capital flows. This paper wants
to take a respite from the current focus on the risks of capital flows.
It rather intends to explore the benefits of foreign savings, both
by reviewing the analytical arguments and by building fresh empirical
evidence on the growth impact of private capital (in)flows. Some Asian
countries have been blamed (also by the OECD; see Poret, 1998) for
discouraging long-term equity inflows and encouraging short-term inflows
in the past. Thus, a particular effort will be made to provide evidence
on the independent growth impact that the various broad categories
of flows are likely to exert. We proceed in three
steps before drawing conclusions. First, we review the economic arguments
that have been advanced to presume economic benefits from overall
capital inflows, even if domestic savings are plenty. Second, we concentrate
on collecting arguments which have been advanced in favour of (or
against) benefits of four broad categories of inflows — foreign direct
investment (FDI), portfolio equity investment, portfolio bond flows,
and bank lending. This enables hypotheses to be formulated on the
potential growth impact of these four categories and, third, to produce
an econometric panel data analysis for the recent period of strong
private flows to the emerging markets. Fourth, we draw conclusions:
First, why is it important to encourage foreign savings in order to
stimulate growth; second, which forms of private flows should be encouraged
to maximise the benefits of financial integration? The insights should provide valuable inputs
for the appropriate macro-economic and institutional approach towards
capital flows; this paper also warns against relying solely on national
savings for financing development. The Benefits of Foreign Savings The literature has
emphasized the potential of foreign capital flows to enhance growth
· through higher investment
in physical and human capital, · through higher efficiency
with which these factors of production are used and · through consumption
smoothing as a result of cross-border risk sharing. The earlier two-gap
literature (Chenery and Bruno, 1962), assuming fixed prices and exchange
rates and no capital-good production in developing countries, had
postulated that growth was not only limited by a country’s ability
to save, but also by foreign savings to buy imported capital goods.
The assumptions underlying the two-gap literature make the theory
largely irrelevant for today’s Asia. We focus therefore on mainstream,
rather than structuralist, economic thinking by providing capsule
summaries of neoclassical and new growth models as well as of the
intertemporal approach to the current research. Neo-classical Considerations In the neo-classical general equilibrium framework, the benefits of capital
inflows into (capital-) poor countries are essentially derived from
divergences in the marginal productivity of capital. Labour in advanced
countries is equipped with better and more capital than the workers
in developing countries, and capital can be used more productively
by being sent south. The simplest of the neo-classical models, the two-country Kemp–MacDougall
model (see, e.g., Lal, 1990) can provide some basic insights on the
benefit of capital inflows as well as the optimal size of these inflows.
Savings rates are constant and a fixed proportion of per capita income
in both countries. The marginal product of capital is higher in the
poor country than in the rich country in autarky, and is diminishing
in both countries with rising capital–labour ratios. With perfect
capital mobility, the poor country will benefit from capital inflows,
until its marginal product of capital is equal to that of the rich
country; both in turn determine (and are equal to) the world interest
rate. The size of the optimal net capital inflow rises with the difference between
the autarkic marginal product of capital and the world interest rate,
and falls the faster marginal capital productivity declines with a
higher capital–labour ratio. The poor country gains per capita income
– the marginal output of capital, times the capital inflow, minus
the income payments on the capital stock located at home. (The rich
country, of course, gains as well from the capital export: the output
loss due to capital relocation is more than compensated by interest
and dividend payments.) In the new, long-run equilibrium, output will
grow at the same rate as in the closed economy. The Kemp–MacDougall theory crucially assumes that the capital inflow is
invested, not consumed, and that the capital ratio is raised by the
inflow, until the steady-state capital ratio is reached. The inflow
is not consumed, because the world interest rate exceeds the country’s
rate of time preference. This fulfils an important requirement of
the full debt cycle, so that the deficits first incurred on trade
and current accounts will give way to a trade surplus and later a
surplus on current account. Concerns about debt stocks and the size
of the financial and real transfer are unwarranted because they will
adjust in a sort of automatic way. Foreign investors are assumed to
bring in capital goods and take away part of the additional production,
thereby resolving the transfer problem. The traditional neo-classical
model thus seems more appropriate to describe foreign direct investment
(FDI) inflows than other capital flows. Mere capital accumulation does not guarantee that a country will benefit
from capital inflows; first, in the presence of sufficiently misguided
policies, inflows can „immiserize“; and, second, an upward-sloping
supply of capital will mean that the cost of capital inflows rises
at the margin. Even on standard neo-classical grounds, governments
can be justified to resist part of the capital inflows. Models of „immiserizing“ inflows have warned that tariff-induced inflows
of capital magnify the welfare losses due to distorted consumption
and production patterns by stimulating capital accumulation in protected
sectors and by attracting foreign capital into these sectors, if foreign
capital receives the full (untaxed) value of its marginal product
(Brecher and Diaz Alejandro, 1977). Despite drastic structural reform
in most capital importing countries, distortions persist that may
stimulate private credit booms, for example. Moreover, distortions
may be reintroduced in the case of a capital-outflow crisis. Further evidence that capital inflows will not play a crucial role in
the standard neo-classical framework comes from growth accounting.
Adding human capital accumulation to the standard Solow growth model,
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) have found that physical capital, human
capital and labour explain almost 80 per cent of the cross-country
variation in income per capita of the full Summers/Heston country
sample of 98 non-oil countries. Their estimates imply a physical
capital share of 0.31 and a human capital share of 0.28. Taking an
average capital–output ratio of 2.5 and an average current account
deficit of 4 per cent of GDP (a stylized description of major
capital importers), the Solow model would predict an increase in the
growth rate of capital of 1.6 per cent; and the resulting increase
in short-run growth of output would merely reach 0.5 per cent. Implications of
the Endogenous Growth Literature Endogenous-growth
models, unlike neo-classical models which imply decreasing returns
to capital, are characterised by the assumption of non-decreasing
returns to the set of reproducible factors of production. Long-term
growth can be explained entirely by growth in capital, without any
appeal to a Solow residual. In addition, absent arbitrage between
physical and human capital, their ratio is constant over time. This
means that any increase in physical capital induces a rise in human
capital. This implies external economies to capital accumulation:
the elasticity of output with respect to capital greatly exceeds its
share of GNP at market prices. Such externalities create a presumption
that the benefits of capital inflows must be much higher than those
stipulated by the standard neo-classical approach. In the neo-classical
growth model, countries benefiting from large inflows could see large
increases in physical capital accumulation; their growth rates should
peak on impact, to gradually reach the steady state. To change the
growth rate of the capital recipient permanently, though, the inflow
must not only lift the economy to a higher capital equipment (and
income level), but it also has to change the economy’s production
function, by embodying positive spillovers to the host country’s efficiency.
However, if returns to capital are constant, then the rate of return
on capital will not be decreasing in the capital-labour ratio. There
is thus no incentive in the endogenous-growth model for capital to
flow from rich to poor countries, because returns on capital need
not be larger (Lucas, 1990). The Inter-temporal
Approach to the Current Account In the models considered so far, the benefits of capital inflows are derived
from net capital inflows that are fully invested and raise the level
or the growth rate of GDP. However, the benefits of capital flows
are not only derived from directing world savings to the most productive
investment opportunities, but also from allowing individuals to smooth
consumption over different states of nature by borrowing or diversifying
portfolios abroad. Developing countries are likely to benefit greatly
from the international pooling of country-specific risks that would
result in inter-temporal smoothing of consumption levels. First, poor
countries tend to be more shock-prone than richer ones; second, since
per capita income is low, any downside adjustment will hurt more than
in countries with higher consumption levels. In principle, the inter-temporal approach to the current account can be
helpful in answering the question of how much to accept (in terms
of the size of the current account deficit) of capital flows offered
by foreign investors. International capital mobility opens the opportunity
to trade off present levels of absorption against future absorption;
if saving falls short of desired investment, foreigners have to finance
the resulting current account deficit, leading to a rise in the country’s
net foreign liabilities. The inter-temporal approach views the current
account as the outcome of forward-looking dynamic saving and investment
decisions (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1994), which are driven by expectations
of future productivity growth, interest rates and other factors. Table 1
collects some important predictions of the inter-temporal approach
to the (first-period) current account from the two impulses that have
figured prominently in the discussion on the determinants of recent
capital flows to emerging markets. Table 1: Current
Account Effects Predicted by the Consumption-Smoothing Approach
Sources: Discussions in Glick and Rogoff (1992), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994) and Razin (1995). Table 1 yields some important insights about how the „equilibrium“
current account of the developing-country recipients should respond
to a drop in world interest rates, or, alternatively, to a reform-induced
rise of productivity: ·
The capital-importing countries, being net foreign debtors, should shift
the savings rate in response to cyclical portfolio flows, which are
interest-driven. The current accounts should move towards lower deficits
(or into surplus) as people smooth consumption in the face of temporarily
low interest payments. For net creditor countries, temporarily low
interest rates would result in opposite current account effects. If
a net debtor country widens current account deficits in response to
temporary interest rate reductions, the response may well destabilise
rather than smooth the inter-temporal consumption path. ·
Likewise, the inter-temporal approach does not necessarily predict widening
current account deficits when capital flows are attracted by country-specific
productivity surges. The „equilibrium“ response of the current account
depends crucially on the expectation of whether the productivity surge
is temporary or permanent. In both cases, the productivity surge will
raise output immediately, but only a persistent rise in productivity
will cause permanent income to rise. The reason is that only a permanent
productivity surge will induce investment and a higher future capital
stock. The rise in permanent income will also cause consumption to
rise more than output, resulting in a strong current account deficit
as a result of lower saving and higher investment. A transitory increase
in productivity, by contrast, should result in an opposite current
account effect (a lower deficit), since there is no effect on investment
and agents save part of any transitory increase of income (in the
permanent income model of consumption). ·
Productivity surges must not necessarily be interpreted as country-specific,
but can be part of a broader global shock. A persistent productivity-enhancing
shock common to all countries will raise the world rate of interest.
This should dampen consumption in net debtor countries sufficiently
to compensate for the consumption effects arising from higher permanent
income brought about by higher investment. Since all countries cannot
improve their current accounts, world interest rates rise until global
savings and investment are balanced. A global transitory productivity
shock will produce excess world saving and thereby exert downward
pressure on interest rates. A temporary drop in world interest rates
should result in lower current-account deficits for net debtor countries,
as analysed above. It is noteworthy
that – among the capital-flow determinants discussed here –
the inter-temporal approach predicts a widening of current account
deficits (for net debtor countries) only if the country enjoys a permanent
idiosyncratic productivity boom. However, the predictive power of
the inter-temporal approach to the current account may remain very
limited for developing countries, in spite of their higher financial
openness (Reisen, 1998). Specific Types of Capital Flows: Benefits versus Risks It is a statement
as common as it is trivial that capital flows carry benefits as well
as risks. But can we establish something close to a pecking order
for the broad categories of capital flows in view of their inherent
benefits and risks for the capital-importing countries? This requires
looking at the channels through which these benefits and risks operate.
We have seen in the preceding section what theory tells us on how
foreign savings can be beneficial: they need to add to domestic savings
rather than crowd them out in order to stimulate capital accumulation;
they need to raise the recipient economy’s efficiency (e.g., through
improving resource allocation, dynamising competition, interaction
with human capital, deepening domestic financial markets or reducing
capital costs for local entrepreneurs); and they need to lower consumption
risks over various states of nature through enlarging choices for
portfolio diversification, but also through appropriately sharing
risks between capital exporters and importers. The risks inherent
to specific types of capital flows operate through two major channels:
by magnifying welfare losses due to distorted consumption and production
patterns; and by generating bankruptcies and output losses due to
abrupt reversals of flows. Models of „immiserising“ inflows (see,
e.g., Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977) have shown that countries
will be worse off if the foreign savings are attracted into protected
sectors, as long as foreign capital receives the full (untaxed) value
of its marginal product. While trade liberalisation and structural
reform in most capital-importing countries have made the „immiserising
inflow“ argument less relevant today in its original presentation,
ill-regulated financial sectors or implicit credit guarantees have
often created credit boom distortions that foreign flows have magnified
(McKinnon and Pill, 1997). The second channel
through which foreign savings can take a heavy toll is when they are
suddenly withdrawn. As the withdrawal causes a slump, it also acts
to reduce national savings given the fact that growth has been shown
to precede and cause savings (Carroll and Weil, 1993). Table 2: Pre- and Post-Crisis Savings in Selected Asian
Countries %
of GNP
Source: World Bank, IMF, Bank of Thailand, Bank Negara
Malaysia. The numbers presented
in Table 2 and Table 3 help explain the concerns about the fickle
nature of foreign savings and the painful impact of their withdrawal.
Except for the Philippines, the Asian countries most affected by the
crisis had saved during 1990-1996 30 per cent or more of their
national income. In Malaysia and Thailand, foreign savings added another
6-7 per cent during that period, leaving 40 per cent for
capital accumulation. As foreign savings turned wildly negative after
the crisis and as domestic savings dropped as well, the funds available
for investment tumbled down to around only 20 per cent of GNP,
in Indonesia even to not much more than 10 per cent. Just when
foreign savings were badly needed, they turned a cold shoulder. Note,
however, that reduced disposable income and lower government savings
as a result of efforts to recapitalise local banks took a heavy toll
on national savings as well. Table 3: Growth, Consumption and Short-Term Debt in
Selected Asian Countries
Source: World Bank, IMF, Bank Negara Malaysia, Rodrik
and Velasco, 1999. The bankers’ adage
that it is not speed that hurts, but the sudden stop was more than
validated in Asia. High pre-crisis per capita growth turned to a severe
slump in 1998. Guillermo Calvo (1998) analysing the mechanics of sudden
stops in international capital flows, emphasizes that negative swings
in foreign savings may result in widespread bankruptcies, destroy
local credit channels and make human capital obsolete (as a complementary
input to lower physical capital). Assuming that consumption is more
non-tradable-intensive than investment, he argues that the negative
output effects of a cut in capital inflows are likely to increase
the higher the share of consumption in a country’s aggregate demand.
To the extent that cuts in domestic absorption are focused on tradables,
there is less need for a lower real exchange rate to restore payments
equilibrium. The larger the real devaluation, the deeper will be the
ensuing financial turmoil. For the same reason, Rodrik and Velasco
(1999) maintain that greater short-term debt exposure is associated
with more severe crises when capital flows reverse. How then do these
benefit and risk channels relate to specific types of capital flows?
It is often maintained that distinguishing between types of flows
generates little policy insight, for essentially two reasons. First,
capital flows are said to be fungible. That would imply, for example,
that we cannot discern a differentiated impact of foreign direct investment
or short-term debt flows on private or government consumption. Second,
it has been argued that capital-flow labels have become meaningless
in the presence of derivatives or efforts to circumvent capital controls.
These claims, however, ignore a large body of empirical, if not analytical,
evidence. First, while there
is ample evidence (Masson et al., 1995; Edwards, 1995; Ffrench-Davis
and Reisen, 1998) that the offset coefficient between foreign savings
and domestic savings is generally round one half, the offset coefficient
hides strongly different consumption responses for FDI flows and debt-creating
flows. Cohen (1993) finds for a sample of 34 developing debtor countries
that benefited from renewed access to foreign bank credit in the 1970s,
capital accumulation was less than for other developing countries.
This observation was not explained by endogenous factors — the
initial output per capita and the initial stock of capital. Rather,
much of the debt-creating flows had leaked into consumption. Also
aid flows have been found to stimulate consumption, namely government
consumption (Boone, 1996). FDI flows, in contrast to debt-creating
flows, have been found to stimulate domestic investment, rather than
crowding it out by competing in domestic product markets or financial
markets. The complementarity of FDI and domestic investment is explained
by the complementarity in production and by positive technology spillovers. The second claim,
namely that capital-account labels do not reveal useful information
for policy purposes, is based on an influential paper by Claessens,
Dooley and Werner (1995). Using quarterly balance-of-payments flow
data for changes in net claims of FDI, portfolio equity, and „long-term“
and „short-term“ debt flows, they find that labels do not provide
any information about the volatility of the flow. The paper, however,
does not address reversals of foreign savings on a large magnitude.
Moreover, while FDI once made is hard to reverse because of its sunk
cost nature, the resulting time series for FDI flows will appear to
be temporary as it comes in large bits and is often discretionary.
The confusion introduced by the former paper has been rigorously settled
by Sarno and Taylor (1999). They measure the relative size and statistical
significance of permanent and temporary components of various categories
of capital flows to a large group of Latin American and Asian countries
during the period 1988-97. They find relative low permanent components
in bond flows, equity flows and official finance, while commercial
bank credit flows appear to contain quite large permanent components
and FDI flows are almost entirely permanent. If a large portion of
the variation in the time series is explained by movements in the
temporary components, then the flows under consideration indicate
a higher degree of potential reversibility. Short-term foreign
debt (liabilities to non-resident banks, debt securities, suppliers’
credit, domestic debt held by non-residents, deposits of non-residents
in domestic institutions) in relation to official foreign exchange
reserves has been identified as the single most important precursor
of financial crises triggered by capital-flow reversals. As the level
of international trade does not seem to have any relationship with
level of short-term debt, short-term trade credit seems to play an
insignificant role in driving short-term flows (Rodrik and Velasco,
1999). The upshot of these
studies is that FDI, long-term bank lending (often long-term project
loans in syndicated lending) and short-term trade credits are less
reversible than portfolio and short-term bank credit flows. Moreover,
the more stable flows are mostly tied to particular investments and
users, financing real assets. Short-term bank lending and portfolio
flows, by contrast, constitute only an indirect link between foreign
savings and domestic investment (Turner, 1996). A cost-benefit analysis
on specific types of capital flows from the perspective of the recipient
developing countries should then consider the following elements: · Foreign direct investment has been found to
stimulate investment, to raise the recipient economy’s efficiency
(under certain conditions) and to be forthcoming during financial
crises, hence helping smooth consumption levels. Borensztein, de Gregorio
and Lee (1998), in their study on the growth effects of FDI, explain
the complementarity of FDI and domestic investment by the complementarity
in production and by positive technology spillovers. However, the
technology spillover requires a sufficient level of human capital
in the host economy. The fact that FDI displays little reversibility
and even acts as the predominant form of foreign savings to liquidity-constrained
developing countries during financial crises has been explained by
their sunk-cost nature (Sarno and Taylor, 1999) and by the absence
of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders that plague
other forms of capital flows and generate herd effects (Razin, Sadka
and Yuen, 1999). More research is certainly required with a breakdown
of FDI into mergers and acquisitions, raw material versus other sector
orientation, and the role of distortions such as trade restrictions
in the exploration of growth effects of FDI (Nunnenkamp, 2000). · Portfolio equity flows have played an important role
for external firm finance in developing countries. The static benefits
of portfolio equity flows have been documented in numerous studies;
Claessens (1995), for example, finds that increases in equity flows
have been associated with significantly lower cost of capital and
slightly higher per capita economic growth. Increasingly, in view
of recent US and European experience, it is argued that deep stock
markets (and they are deepened by free equity flows) facilitate capital
re-allocation from low-return to high-return activities and the incubation
of new start-ups. To what extent higher equity flows are associated
with asset price inflation, is yet to be researched more thoroughly:
on the one hand, the imbalance between a small domestic asset supply
and a large global asset demand potential may favour such hypothesis;
on the other hand, higher liquidity and strong international integration
of stock markets should dampen asset price volatility. High liquidity
and low transaction costs — the outcome of higher stock market
integration —suggest, however, a high degree of reversibility
of portfolio equity flows. · Debt flows: There is very little literature
which emphasizes the benefits of debt-creating flows (essentially
portfolio bond flows, long-term and short-term bank credit). The theory
of sovereign lending (Eaton and Gersowitz, 1981; Cline, 1995) has
focused on the benefits of consumption smoothing to countries with
alternating good and bad years. This may surprise as debt transfers,
unlike equity finance, have a compensation rule independent of the
borrower’s fortune. Debt is serviced independent of the borrower’s
income stream, while equity finance shares into the borrower’s earnings
on investment. It can thus be argued that equity finance provides
the benefits of lower fluctuation in the borrower’s consumption, but
that the potential incentive for borrowers to invest (rather than
consume) is higher under debt- than under equity-financed transfers
(Corsepius, Nunnenkamp and Schweickert, 1989). Short-term debt, except
for trade credit, can be particularly inspired by consumption smoothing,
however, weakening the case for the higher incentive effect of debt
finance. To the extent that debt finance carries higher public guarantees
than does equity finance, there is also a higher risk of it being
allocated to distorted sectors with little social return. Short-term
bank credit and portfolio bond flows have been shown to be very susceptible
to bouts of creditor panic, making these flows highly reversible (e.g.
Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). Table 4 provides
a summary of the above discussion on potential benefits and risks,
giving some priors to the empirical analysis reported in the following
section. Table 4: Potential Benefits and Risks of Specific Types
of Foreign Capital Inflows
Note: X denotes a strong, (X) a weak presumption that the considered case applies. See the discussion above for further details. New Evidence on the Benefits of Specific Types of Capital
Inflows In the aftermath
of the Asian crisis, the proponents of open capital markets have been
criticised for having offered more „banner-waving“ than hard evidence
on the benefits that developing countries can derive from free capital
flows (Bhagwati, 1998). Indeed, unlike for the benefits of free trade
in goods and services, the empirical evidence that economists have
been able to establish on the costs and benefits of foreign savings
has been very sketchy and contradictory indeed. That failure can be
easily explained: A rigorous attempt to quantify the gains that countries
have realised from international capital mobility would require a
fully-articulated model in which the counterfactual of no capital
movements could be simulated. Moreover, the time series for private
capital flows to developing countries, except for foreign direct investment,
are not yet long enough to draw strong conclusions as they started
in earnest only at the end of the 1980s. Finally, studies which focus
on (the absence or presence of) capital controls cannot allow for
varying degrees of intensity in the operation of capital-account restrictions. Evidence on the
growth effect of specific types of private capital flows exists so
far only for foreign direct investment. For instance, Balasubramanyam,
Salisu and Sapsford (1996) show that FDI has been more effective in
promoting growth in export-oriented developing countries than in countries
promoting import-substitution strategies. Borensztein, de Gregorio
and Lee (1998) find that FDI positively affects growth only in those
poor countries which have overcome a threshold in human-capital accumulation.
De Mello (1999) finds a positive impact on FDI on output growth; in
OECD countries the positive impact is largely due to higher efficiency
(total factor productivity), while in non-OECD a dominant impact is
observed for the effect on capital accumulation. All these studies
are based on the Summers-Heston data set and thus do not go beyond
observations in 1990. But at least the emerging markets are now operating
under sharply different global financial conditions than those prevailing
before the end of the 1980s. Only since then are the emerging markets
really integrated into the global (private) financial markets. There
has been a strong rise of FDI and portfolio flows to these countries
from negligible levels since the late 1980s. The period witnessed
the resolution of the Latin American debt crisis through the Brady
bond deals and the effective opening of Asian and Latin American capital
markets. Evidence based on prior observation periods is history, offering
only limited help for drawing policy conclusions. Another reason to
explore the flow-growth nexus over a more recent observation period
is the importance and reversibility of short-term bank credit flows
(which were crucial in triggering the Asian crisis). Short-term bank
credit has often been underreported when it was based on debtor reports,
for example in the World Bank data sources. Data published by the
Bank for International Settlements, by contrast, are based on creditor
sources, and generally held to provide the most reliable data set.
The BIS series on short-term bank credit flows start only in 1985,
hence constraining the observation period. A recent study at
the OECD Development Centre (Soto, 2000) has explored the growth effect
of various categories of private capital flows in a sample covering
44 countries over the period 1986-97. The country choice was
dictated by data availability for OECD non-members in 1986 (except
for Turkey which was included as an emerging market for its low per
capita income level). Roughly half of the countries in the sample
belong to the middle-income developing-country group (in the World
Bank classification), a third to the middle-upper income group, one
to the high-income group, the rest to the low-income group. The results
are thus not applicable to OECD countries or to very poor countries. As expected, foreign
direct investment — with a lag of one year — exerts a positive,
significant effect of per capita income growth in the recipient economy.
However, the positive impact was found to be somewhat lower than indicated
by earlier studies (e.g. de Mello, 1999; Borensztein, de Gregorio
and Lee, 1998). To raise short-term per capita income growth by one
per cent would require a rise of ten percentage points in the FDI-GNP
ratio. In addition, it can be computed that a ten percentage point
rise in the FDI-GNP ratio would increase the long-run steady-state
income level by three per cent. The most important
growth impact, according to the Soto study, flows from portfolio equity
flows. It cannot be totally excluded that the highly positive and
significant parameter value associated to portfolio equity flows is
due to their superior predictive power as these flows try to exploit
anticipated developments in the real economy. But the positive growth
impact of portfolio equity flows can also be rationalised as follows:
These flows loosen constraints imposed by local financial conditions,
which may spur growth in the presence of high productive capacity
in fast-growing industries. Equity flows also stimulate the liquidity
of domestic stock markets, easing resource allocation and lowering
capital cost to high-return activities. Bonds, by contrast,
did not produce any significant impact on growth in the Soto study. In contrast to the
positive growth impact of foreign direct and portfolio equity flows,
Soto finds that today’s foreign bank lending — both short and
long term — is negatively associated with tomorrow’s per capita
income growth in the recipient country, unless local banks are sufficiently
capitalised. This result confirms both theory and prior evidence:
Undercapitalised banks tend to engage in excessive risk taking in
a gamble to earn their way out of difficulties; or, to stem the decline
in risk-weighted capital ratios, banks will increase their exposure
to government liabilities or other zero-risk weighted assets. Good
risks, by contrast, remain underfinanced and growth prospects undermined.
As shown by McKinnon and Pill (1997), foreign bank lending intensifies
these distortions. In a downturn, the resulting misallocation of resources
and weak bank balance sheets will intensify credit slumps and widespread
bankruptcies. The interaction
of foreign bank lending with a local bank capitalisation ratio, however,
has a significant positive growth, according to Soto’s study. The
capitalisation ratio — bank capital as a percentage of bank claims —
is based on different weights for bank assets that aim to mirror different
degrees of riskiness. Soto assigns a 0 per cent weight for bank
reserves held at the central bank and for claims on government and
government-related entities; 50 per cent for claims on foreign
debt; and 100 per cent for local private-sector claims. His results
indicate that the growth impact of foreign bank lending turns positive
once the capitalisation ratio reaches a certain threshold (21 per
cent for long-term, 14 per cent for short-term bank credit flows). While much of Asia has been praised in the past for its outstanding saving
performance, Soto’s findings suggest also that higher national savings
are not uniformly associated with higher growth. Above a certain threshold,
national savings will run into negative marginal returns in contribution
to growth as the local absorption capacity for productive investment
is limited. This result would hold in particular where domestic localisation
requirements prevent domestic savings to be invested abroad. Moreover,
it has been noted that in some Asian countries very high savings were
partly covered by investment which represented ill-accounted consumption
items, such as expensive pictures bought for office use (Corsetti,
Pesenti and Roubini, 1999). Nevertheless, Soto’s results contrast
sharply with the positive correlation between savings and growth typically
obtained in growth regressions. Conclusions Theory and new evidence
presented in this paper suggest that post-crisis Asia should not solely
rely on national savings but encourage (certain forms of) foreign
savings if the region wants to stimulate long-term growth prospects.
This is in stark contrast to the dominant advice that emphasises domestic
savings to finance development and that downplays the benefits of
foreign savings. As far as domestic
savings are concerned, some Asian countries produce a less reliable
and stable pool for finance than is often assumed. More importantly,
excessive national savings can be negative for growth. Promoting national
savings jointly with policies to keep these savings at home is bound
to run into diminishing capital returns. As higher growth precedes
savings, rather than the reverse, and as reform policies aimed at
raising efficiency and promoting growth may lead to a temporary drop
in savings, authorities have to consider a non-trivial policy trade-off
(Hausmann and Reisen, 1998). Important reform policies, such as bank
recapitalisation or import liberalisation, tend to reduce government
savings, resp. private-sector savings; they lay the foundations for
future growth, but there may be a substantial lag between the implementation
of the reforms and the arrival of higher output. A way out of this
policy dilemma is to rely on foreign savings. This paper advances
our information about which flows to promote to maximise the net benefits
of foreign savings. Essentially, these net benefits can be derived
by substracting the risks connected to foreign flows — reversibility
and amplified misallocation of resources in the presence of domestic
distortions — from the benefits that the flows carry — capital
deepening, efficiency enhancement and consumption smoothing. Recent
evidence on the reversibility of various types of capital flows and
new evidence presented here on the specific growth effects of these
flow items lead to the conclusion that equity investment should be
preferred over debt instruments. Both FDI and portfolio equity investment
have been found to exert a significant impact on growth. Moreover,
FDI flows generate relatively little macroeconomic complications as
their reversibility is low. By contrast, portfolio equity flows can
add to asset price inflation, hence they require more regulatory attention
with respect to bank system exposure, corporate disclosure and accounting
standards and liquidity requirements for market makers. Finally, foreign
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