Politik und
Gesellschaft Online International Politics and Society 3/2001 |
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|
Years |
2004 |
2006 |
2008 |
Total appropriations for commitments (in millions
of euros ) |
108,317 (106,619) |
116,951 (112,006) |
129,133 |
Costs
of enlargement |
12,637 (12,076) |
22,400 (17,455) |
34,071 |
Preaccession aid 2 |
3,260 |
3,259 |
3,259 |
Financial margin of the EU, as percent of EU´s
GNP |
0.13 (0.14) |
0.12 (0.16) |
0.06 |
Ceiling on resources, as percent of EU´s GNP |
1.27 |
1.27 |
1.27 |
Share of total agricultural expenditures, as
percent of EU´s
GNP (2000 = 0.52%) |
0.50 |
0.50 |
0.48 |
Total expenditures for structural policy, as
percent of EU´s GNP (2000 = 0.41%) |
0.42 |
0.44 |
0.48 |
Expansion costs as percent of GDP |
0.17 |
0.25 |
0.35 |
Enlargement costs as percent of total EU spending
(appropriations for commitments) |
14.68 |
21.9 |
28.91 |
1 All amounts refer to appropriations for commitments.
Usually costs are calculated in appropriations for payments,
as they represent the real flow of money. Normally these
amounts are a bit lower because there is a time lag
between when the commitments are made and when the money
is actually paid. Because of data problems we were only
able to calculate in appropriations for commitments.
2 We assume that the remaining preaccession aid
will be used for Turkey and the Balkan countries.
Sources: European
Commission and authors' calculations
Our calculations suggest that the EU would spend about
nine billion euros less in the time span from 2000 to
2006 than it itself has calculated, mainly because the
enlargement will start later than the EU assumed. However,
the money saved cannot be used automatically for covering
costs in the coming years because the budget is based
on the principle of annual accounting. If we compare
the costs in 2006, the year with the largest amount
of payments during the time span 2000-2006, then in
our scenario enlargement costs are five billion euros
higher than Agenda 2000 estimated (see Table 1).
But the real problems are liable to come up in the financial
period starting in fiscal year 2007. Calculations here
have to consider a broad range of uncertainties. For
example, it is difficult to predict the results of accession
negotiations, especially in the field of compensation
payments for farmers in the new member countries. It
is also hard to imagine what the EU´s agricultural and
structural policies will be like after 2006. Additional
funds for structural changes in agriculture and rural
development might have to be made available for the
accession countries. In the long run, although a "phasing-in"
policy for compensation payments to eastern farmers
would lower EU expenses, the new member states cannot
be denied their due agricultural compensation payments
(or, in the future, income-support payments) and structural
funds.
For the purpose of estimating the EU-15's financial obligations after 2007, we assume average GNP growth rates of 2.5 percent for the EU-15 and four percent for Central and Eastern Europe. We also assume that Romania and Bulgaria will enter in 2008 and will start to receive their structural funds at a ceiling of four percent of their GNP. Our calculations thus render enlargement costs of about 34 billion euros for 2008 (see column three in Table 2). That corresponds to 0.35 percent of the EU´s GNP. If Croatia is included (which is not totally unrealistic), costs would increase to about 36 billion euros in 2008 (0.37 percent of the EU´s GNP). Our estimates imply that the welfare gains of eastern enlargement, which—according to a host of econometric models—do not exceed 0.2 percent of the EU-15’s GNP, would be lower than the costs.
In combination with additional burdens falling on the EU budget (such as the financial fallout from the recent BSE crisis, the costs of the EU engagement in the Balkans and a general upward trend in foreign- and defense-policy expenditures), eastern enlargement well might prove incompatible with the EU spending ceiling established at the Edinburgh Summit in December 1992. But it is unlikely that the net contributors to the EU budget will agree to increase this ceiling in the future. Therefore, before 2007, when the new financial plan is to begin, reforms in the agricultural and structural policies of the EU seem unavoidable. This is all the more urgent as the Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Turkey, with its population of 80 million, also might enter the Union between 2007 and 2013.
In the past,
the agricultural and structural policies of the EU were
shaped more by political bargaining than by rational
decision making. Each enlargement made these policies
more subject to political pressures and consequently
more expensive. This was especially obvious when the
southern countries of Greece, Portugal and Spain joined
the European Community. Now that spending limits are
being approached, the EU needs new policies to deal
effectively with the challenges of eastern enlargement.
The changes in EU decision-making procedures established
at the Nice Summit of December 2000 (for example, extended
majority voting) constitute the minimum of what will
be required for managing the first round of eastern
enlargement before 2006. But they are inadequate for
the years to follow. The voting power of the various
member countries will be utterly incommensurate with
their net contributions to the EU budget. In addition,
the move toward 25 or more EU members will reduce dramatically
the possibility of reaching the qualified majorities
needed for making important decisions. Hence a political
paralysis is a real danger in the enlarged Union (Kirsch,
2001; Baldwin et al., 2000).
If we consider an enlarged EU with up to 27 members by
2008, contributor countries would account for 63 percent
of the EU’s population and 81 percent of its budget.
However, according to the Banzhaf Index (which estimates the relative voting power wielded
by different parties engaged in various types of decisions),
the Nice Summit would give this group only a 45.5 percent
voting power. The discrepancy between contribution and
voting power is especially pronounced in the case of
the biggest net contributors to the budget. Although
a qualified majority of votes (71.42 percent) and a
single majority of states is needed to make important
EU decisions, the relatively large weight of net-receiver
countries could result in their earmarking higher levels
of funding for themselves (see Table 2).
Groups of Countries*
|
Population |
GDP |
Budget |
Votes (Nice) |
Votes (Banzhaf) |
High Net Payers |
23.9 |
32.3 |
33.6 |
17.9 |
17.9 |
Medium Net Payers |
38.6 |
49.1 |
46.6 |
29.3 |
27.6 |
Medium Net Receivers (EU-15) |
13.3 |
11.9 |
12.6 |
16.8 |
17.0 |
High Net Receivers (EU-15) |
2.3 |
1.6 |
1.8 |
4.6 |
5.0 |
Medium
Net Receivers (accession countries) |
4.4 |
1.4 |
1.5 |
9.9 |
10.6 |
High Net Receivers (accession countries) |
17.5 |
3.7 |
3.8 |
21.5 |
21.9 |
Sources: Eurostat; Kirsch (2001); authors' calculations
There is a broad consensus that the EU's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) is too costly and leads to a highly inefficient
allocation of resources. Close to 50 percent of the
EU budget goes into the CAP. The policy of subsidizing
agricultural prices encourages overproduction. The surpluses
are either destroyed or sold on the world market at
dumping prices, which in turn cause endless trade frictions.
In addition, quotas are set for sugar and set-aside
programs established for farmland. Highly intensive
agricultural production requires copious amounts of
fertilizers and pesticides—to the detriment of rural
flora, fauna and soil as well as rivers. CAP price subsidies
tend to benefit large-scale producers most of all. They
keep marginal farmers in production but provide them
with only low incomes.
In spite of its gross and well-known deficiencies, the CAP has proven remarkably resistant against any attempts at reform (see Michael Ehrke’s contribution to this issue of International Politics and Society). Although Agenda 2000 has reduced price supports and put more emphasis on direct income supports for farmers, major market distortions were not abolished.
Further reforms should aim at market prices for agricultural products. They should delink payments to farmers from their productive capacity, make them declining payments and introduce national cofinancing for farm-income support. If such reforms were made in the near future—and then were executed consistently without giving in to political pressure—the EU would be able to integrate eastern agriculture into its income-support system. The EU then should extend financial assistance to the new member countries to promote structural change in agriculture and rural development. This would make much more sense than keeping marginal farmers in production (see, for example, Schrader, 2000).
Altogether, there is no lack of coherent concepts for improving
EU agricultural policy (for a synopsis of different
reform concepts, see von Urff, 1997). What has been
lacking so far is the political will to implement them.
But now several political factors exist that work in
favor of CAP reforms. For one, France may recognize
that it will become a substantial net payer when enlargement
costs exceed the calculated margin. In addition, negotiations
within the World Trade Organization may put pressure
on the EU to enact deeper agricultural reforms (see
Anderson, 2000). Finally, after the elections in 2002,
France and Germany would be free to work together to
overcome the reform blockade they have formed during
the last decades.
As long as reforms are not tackled seriously, the CAP promises
to remain a source of conflict among the EU's existing
15 member states. One of the problems associated with
current negotiations is that it is not clear which sort
of CAP will exist when the new members enter the EU.
Also, once they are part of the EU, Central and Eastern
European countries might prefer not to promote agricultural
reforms at home but rather to live off the CAP’s largesse.
The recent BSE crisis provides a unique opportunity to
reform the CAP, because the agricultural lobby is under
attack as never before. Political pressure by consumers
is increasing (see Ehrke in this edition of International
Politics and Society). Important steps could be introduced
during the review of agricultural policy planned for
2002 and 2003. Still, a breakthrough seems unrealistic
because of the forthcoming elections in France and Germany.
Besides, it is not at all clear that a majority of EU
governments will support further liberalization of the
CAP as demanded by Britain and Sweden. Recent discussions
in Germany on a new agricultural policy focus on improved
food quality and environmental protection—not on liberalization.
We expect that the outcome of the 2002 and 2003 meetings
will be that the CAP will take environmental externals
more seriously. The danger is that this might lead to
a set of policies that spell yet more bureaucratic regulation.
As a consequence, European agriculture might fail to
improve its international competitiveness, thus assuring
that the financial burden to the EU budget remains large.
In addition, it is far from clear that bureaucratic
regulations concerning ecological farming would lead
to better environmental results than would less-intensive
forms of conventional agriculture.
An area where
there is a chance to push ahead with reforms involves
the so-called “second pillar” of the CAP, which is dedicated
to rural development and cofinanced by national governments.
It could well be extended. Although this would burden
national budgets, it would offer relief to the EU´s
net payers if cofinancing becomes mandatory rather than
optional, as it is now.
From a strictly economic standpoint EU regional policy
should concentrate on funding the production of public
goods in geographic locations. Additional projects would
be justified if an adjustment process connected with
the EU's common market is facilitated by transitional
transfers. The latter also would help to mitigate whatever
social tensions might arise. If markets fail and negative
externalities emerge, then public-sector interventions
would prove rational (see Mallossek, 1999).
In the light of these arguments, it does not seem justified
that the EU assigns nearly 35 percent of its budget
to structural funds. However, the thrust of EU policy
goes well beyond such economic arguments. In fact, its
structural policy is designed as a form of redistribution
policy among richer and poorer member states.[3]
The name “cohesion fund” clearly betrays the overriding
political purpose of the transfers. To date, a large
amount of the various “structural” funds was given to
Ireland and the southern countries of Greece, Portugal
and Spain. But richer member states also received a
sizeable share.
Once established, financial redistribution has a strong
tendency to be subject to political horse-trading and
to persist over time even if its original purpose is
outdated (Ireland is a good example). During former
enlargements of the EU, this sort of misallocation of
funds could be shouldered readily by the prosperous
member states. Not so with eastern enlargement. There
will be a major redirection of financial flows.
The most important structural-policy instrument is “objective-one”
funding, which goes to regions with a per-capita GDP
(measured in purchasing-power parity) below 75 percent
of the EU average. As this average experiences a sizeable
decline with eastern enlargement, about 27 regions with
approximately 49 million inhabitants will lose their
transfers because their regional GDP levels will rise
above the 75-percent line. On the other hand, the number
of inhabitants below this line would increase from 71
to 174 million. This is about 36 percent of the enlarged
EU’s population. If the Union accepted Spain’s recent
proposal to retain the existing structural and cohesion
policy in the enlarged EU, expenditures would increase
to an exorbitant amount. Moreover, the less-developed
new member states would get much less per-capita funding
than the old cohesion countries. Clearly, this is not
recommendable. It is now time that the EU members, both
rich and poor, redirect their assistance to the accession
countries.
There is another point to be stressed. Fulfilling the goal
of the Union's structural policy—to overcome income
disparities between EU regions—will be harder to achieve.
This is especially true if we consider regional disparity
as a phenomenon that inevitably occurs in economic development
promoted by economic forces. Therefore, as an enlarged
EU will change from its present character as a rich
men's club to a heterogeneous organization with a large
West-East development gap, structural policy should
give up supporting less-developed regions.
Instead, it should concentrate on promoting the convergence
of member countries. Regional policy should be
left to the competence of the individual member states,
while the reshaped structural and cohesion funds are
allocated toward poorer member countries.
That is to say, the reforms should give member states greater
control over the choice of investment projects. But
to avoid misuse, EU-wide standards for the allocation
of funds should be designed and administered consistently.
The Commission, with its tendency to become overloaded
by administrative details, should be freed from the
ex-ante selection of projects and should
instead concentrate on ex-post
evaluations. If a misuse of money is proved, sanctions
could be implemented (i.e., a country could be penalized
by being allocated less money for the next financial
period). A larger part of allocated funds should be
given in the form of preferential credits and within
the framework of international banking institutions,
such as the European Investment Bank or the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The funds
should be distributed among member states according
to their national GDP per capita, measured in terms
of purchasing-power parity. We suggest that the maximum
amount of funds should be fixed in advance, and presented
as a absolute sum or specified percentage of either
the EU budget or total EU GDP. In support of eastern
enlargement, EU structural policy should concentrate
on the lowest-income countries among the new member
states. Such a concentration is justified by the fact
that the adjustment costs connected with structural
change are much higher for the accession countries than
for the existing EU members.
Many problems would be solved if the EU shifts to some
kind of confederation of states. However, a united Europe
cannot be built following an idealistic blueprint, and
no single European summit can be expected to bring the
breakthrough. European integration is “path dependent.”
Solving step by step the various problems that arise
in the wake of eastern enlargement is as important as
discussing the final shape of the EU. Table 3 presents
a possible road map toward Agenda 2007.
Already the accession negotiations in 2001 and 2002 should
not only establish the terms of reference under which
the new member states will enter the Union but also
determine how the old member states will be affected
by the enlargement. After the elections in many European
countries, especially France and Germany, a realistic
chance exists that the EU´s mid-term review of agricultural
policy will launch major reforms. WTO negotiations in
succeeding years will press for further reforms, which
will allow the EU to incorporate Central and Eastern
European countries under equal terms. With respect to
structural policy, some kind of provisional deal, based
on the principle of burden sharing, has to be made—especially
with Spain—in order to finish the accession negotiations
successfully by the end of 2002 or 2003. Net payers,
especially Germany and Austria, might dig in their heels
if they are forced to give up their priority of a rapid
enlargement and their demand on transitional periods
for the free movement of labor.
The next important step is the Intergovernmental Conference
(ICG) already planned for 2004. It should clarify the
distribution of powers among the different levels of
governance in the EU. The conference could serve as
an opportunity to delegate responsibilities for agricultural
and structural policies to member states. Negotiations
on Agenda 2007 probably will start already in 2005 and
should be finished in 2006. The agenda should not only
address the financial perspective of the years 2007
to 2013 but also a new design of EU policies. In addition,
it should initiate the process of introducing major
reforms in EU institutions, which should lead to more
efficient, transparent and legitimate decision making.
2001-2002 |
Negotiations over eastern enlargement |
2002 |
Elections in many European countries, among them France
and Germany |
End of 2002; beginning of 2003 |
Mid-term review of agricultural policy |
End of 2002; beginning of 2003 |
End of the negotiations over enlargement, important decisions
on the terms of entry for the first round of accession
countries |
2003 |
Checking of cohesion-funds criteria (Ireland probably
will be excluded from funding) |
2003 |
Intensive negotiations in the WTO round on agriculture
and other conflicting issues |
2004 or 2005 |
First accession countries will enter the European Union |
2004 |
Intergovernmental conference on the European Union´s
decision-making structures |
Our proposal: 2006 |
New intergovernmental conference: Agenda 2007, on the
financial perspective for the years 2007-2013
and further institutional and policy reforms |
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* The authors would like to express their thanks to Michael
Dauderstädt, Christian Dahlhaus, Heinrich Hick, Axel
Hörhager, Werner Kirsch, Horst Günter Krenzler, Andreas
Lillig, Rüdiger Leidner, Dietrich Lingenthal, Norbert
Mühlberger, Franz Neueder, Alfred Pfaller, Burkhard
Schmied and Manfred Wegner for their insightful comments.
[1] Alternative scenarios also might be
possible, like a group entry of all eight countries
in 2005. This would cause less friction on such issues
as border control. Cyprus also might be included in a first group if its political problems
are solved.
[2] We used the market-intervention cost
estimates of the Institute in Göttingen, which are
about two billion euros higher than those of the Institute
in Halle.
[3] Besides the regional-policy
instruments, the so-called cohesion funds (established
in 1993) have a similar objective. Cohesion funds
(ten percent of all funds for structural-policy expenditures)
are paid to countries whose per-capita GNP levels
fall below the 90-percent line. Cohesion funds are
used by member countries to help promote transnational
networks and environmental projects.