Politik und
Gesellschaft Online International Politics and Society 3/2001 |
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Ron PundakThe Price of Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians:
the Price of Peace
The
years of bitter conflict between Israelis and Palestinians,
of undiscriminating Palestinian terrorism on the one
hand, and on the other of occupation and humiliation
imposed by the Israelis on the Palestinians, did not
improve the positions of the two sides. Eventually,
both parties understood that their respective interests
could only be achieved at
The
first chapter of negotiations ended with the Oslo
Agreement, which was signed on September 13, 1993,
and culminated in the mutual recognition between the
PLO and the Israeli government and in the handshake
between Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. The Agreement
stated that the time had come to end the conflict;
to strive together to live in peace, coexistence,
mutual respect and security; to reach a comprehensive,
permanent and fair agreement; to achieve an historic
conciliation; and to accomplish all these goals through
negotiations. The two sides therefore began the negotiations
on a permanent status between Israel and the PLO,
which was expected to lead to a peace agreement between
the State of Israel and a Palestinian State. Previously,
the relations between the two peoples had been based
on mutual hostility, with each side trying to attain
achievements at the expense of the other side. Every
victory won by one side was considered a defeat for
the other, according to the principles of the zero-sum-game
theory. In contrast, “Oslo” was, from the start, guided
by efforts to abandon this approach, and to achieve
as many win-win situations as possible, notwithstanding
that the balance of power was tipped in Israel’s favor. In the past months, a violent confrontation has
occurred between Israel and the Palestinians, in which
each side has grossly breached the agreements signed.
These events have created a mirror image based on
which each side is convinced that the other side is
responsible for the deterioration of the situation
and that the other side is not prepared to reach an
agreement based on concessions. At the same time,
the reality of the peace process has proven to be
stronger than the forces countering it. Many of the patterns and facts on the ground
that were created since 1993 continue to operate,
and the objective of the two publics remains identical:
to reach a peace agreement based on the principles
of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and the two-States solution. This paper will examine the Israeli-Palestinian
issue in an historical perspective, looking beyond
the violence which erupted in September 2000. In doing
so it will view these events as an element within
an overall process which will not hinder the final
objective of reaching a permanent status agreement
between the two peoples and peace between the State
of Israel and a Palestinian State. The “Price” of an Agreement
The problematic nature of negotiations with the
Palestinians lies in the fact that a majority of the
Israeli public believes that it
is required to pay the higher price. They believe
that the Palestinians are receiving more and more
land and sovereignty without having to pay a significant
price in return. The high price paid by the Palestinians
(even The Israeli public has become convinced that the
Palestinian
Authority (PA)
is turning a blind eye to terrorism, and perhaps even
encouraging it and employing it to satisfy its own
ends. This approach had ostensibly been supported
by: the terrible terrorist attacks which occurred
after the beginning of negotiations; the terrorism
against Israelis and within Israel by proxies of the
PA during the last few months; the release of jailed
terrorists by the PA (including those who had executed
the most bloody attacks against Israeli civilians)
and the Israeli sense that the PA is unwilling to
effectively combat terrorism; and the virulent and
incessant anti-Israel incitement. In the pursuit of peace both sides will pay a
high price – concessions which are viewed as extremely
difficult by their constituencies – even while each
remains unaware or unprepared to recognize the high
price paid by the other. The threat this situation
represents for the future of the peace process cannot
be underestimated. Peace and reconciliation cannot
be achieved if the two peoples do not recognize the
price which the other side is willing to pay in exchange
for a better future. At this juncture, the negative image each side
has of the other continues to feed the traditional
hate-filled stereotypes. These stereotypes are accompanied
by suspicion and lack of trust that only increase
as a result of the difficulties encountered during
negotiations, the socio-economic gaps, and the threat
of terrorism which is employed by extremist groups
interested in undermining the peace process. This
constitutes a vicious circle in which suspicions rise
and the willingness to advance the process of trust-building
and reconciliation diminishes. In their absence, the
negotiations become increasingly difficult and the
support for the peace process decreases among the
two peoples. This is an extremely destructive situation The Israeli Perspective
The price that Israel – as the side which holds
most of the cards - is expected to pay for peace,
is relatively clear. However, by presenting it, one
grasps just how meaningful and problematic it is to
many Israelis. First and foremost, one must understand
that all concessions are filtered through a deeply-rooted
fear that the strategic aim uniting the Arab world
is to see the State of Israel disappear, or at the
very least to destroy the State of Israel as a Zionist
entity. It is possible and even necessary to argue
against this basic assumption, but nonetheless, it
should be understandable that a people that had experienced
the Holocaust may have certain paranoia. The primary concession for Israel is territorial.
For over thirty years the Israeli public was educated
to believe that the area between the Green Line (prior
to the 1967 war) and the Jordan river is strategically
essential to Israel’s security, and that the Jordan
Valley is Israel’s primary line of defense in the
east. In practice, this approach was relevant to the
1960s when Israel occupied the West Bank, but this
doctrine has since ceased to be pertinent to any future
war, especially if it is assumed that the future Palestinian
State will be non-militarized. Nevertheless, the basic
fear of many Israelis, that the withdrawal of the
Israeli armed forces from the territories will bring
the “enemy” close to home, cannot be easily discounted.
The issue of territorial concessions is also vital
from an ideological-religious point of view to many
Israelis, who believe that the areas of the West Bank
and Gaza are part of the biblical promised land. A second price demanded from Israel is the removal
of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. This is
not the place to discuss the legality of the settlement
enterprise, but the fact is that there are currently
over 200,000 Israelis living in approximately 150
communities, which have been established by the State
or with its assistance. Some of the settlements number
only several dozen families, but others are inhabited
by thousands, and those with over 15,000 inhabitants
are considered – for all purposes An additional “price” is the delicate issue of
Jerusalem. Following the Six-Day War, the western
part of the city was expanded towards north, south
and east. This area was annexed to Israel and declared,
by all the subsequent Israeli Governments, as an indivisible
part of the Capital. Every Prime Minister since then
has declared that Jerusalem is a united Israeli city,
which will never again be divided, and Israel’s eternal
Capital. As a result of this policy, the various governments
took a number of steps, including the establishment
of Jewish neighborhoods within and around Arab-populated
areas in the city. During the years, the Israeli public
and Government alike, ignored the important role played
by Palestinian Jerusalem (Al Quds) as the administrative,
cultural and religious center for the Palestinians
in the West Bank. At the same time, they disregard
the fact that the 200,000 Arab inhabitants of the
city consider themselves as Palestinians and do not
want to become Israelis or live under Israeli control.
With time, Israelis became aware that the Arab neighborhoods
do not constitute an integral part of the Israeli
capital. This realization was eventually adopted by
Prime Minister Barak, who consented during the Camp
David negotiations to the division of Jerusalem between
Jews and Arabs, between Israel and Palestine. The solution to the problem of Jerusalem should
follow President Clinton’s proposal – i.e. the Arab
parts to the Palestinians and the Jewish areas to
the Israelis – and the price paid by Israel should
be to transfer the sovereignty over the Arab areas
to the Palestinian State. The most delicate issue
with regard to Jerusalem is the status of the holy
site within the old walled city, known to the Jews
as the Temple Mount (Har Habayit) and to the Palestinians
as the Haram-ash Sharif. In the final event, Israelis
will have to accept the difficult fact that this site,
which according to Jewish belief was the site of the
holy temple until 2000 years ago, has for over 1 Yet another “price” involves the issue of the
Palestinian refugees. This problem is both a symbolic
and national issue and a material one. The Zionist
narrative The Palestinian Perspective
The first and most meaningful “price” paid by
the Palestinians is the loss of their historic dream
for a large Palestinian State established on the entire
area of mandatory Palestine. The shattering of the
dream entails the acceptance of the new partition
plan and a territorial concession. The future Palestinian
State will be established only within the borders
of 1967, leaving the Palestinians with less than a
quarter (22 The issue of the refugees represents the second
area in which the Palestinians will pay a price. From
the Palestinian perspective, the 1948 war had devastating
consequences: the national leadership collapsed, the
Palestinian State which was to be created beside Israel
was not established, and the territories intended
for it were taken by Israel, Egypt and Jordan. Moreover,
over half of the Palestinian population (approximately
700,000) became refugees, and were dispersed among
neighboring Arab countries, destined for a life of
humiliation, poverty and destitution in crowded refugee
camps. These events are viewed by the Palestinians
as their national catastrophe. This paper will not enter the discussion of what
caused the refugee problem – whether the refugees
freely left, fled or were expelled. However, it is
clear that the decision by the Israeli Government
after the 1948 war, to seal the borders and to prevent
the Palestinian inhabitants from returning to their
homes, contributed greatly to perpetuating and determine
the refugee problem which has since plagued the Arab-Israeli
conflict. This decision, which is undoubtedly very
problematic from a moral point of view, can however
be justified as a legitimate national policy in the
face of the genuine threats to Israel’s existence
during the war, and due to the fact that Israel at
the time received hundreds of thousands of Jewish
refugees from Arab countries where their lives were
in danger. Be it as it may, from a national and an historical
point of view, the refugee issue became the dominant
feature of the Palestinian collective discourse and
has become the central and unifying element of the
Palestinian narrative. The Palestinians placed the
blame squarely on Israel, and this in turn fed the
conflict and hatred in the decades following the war.
In entering upon an agreement with Israel, which will
obviously have to determine an agreed-upon solution
to the problem, this narrative will have to be transformed
into accepting the new realities of peace and reconciliation
with Israel. Such a solution, if it is to be acceptable
to the Israelis, will be far from the declarations
made over the years by the Palestinian leadership
to its refugee constituency, and will be based more
on an objective view of the chances for the future,
rather than on the realization of past hopes. The third area in which the Palestinians are expected
to pay “the price of peace” involves combating terror
and particularly Islamic terrorism. The Islamic opposition
– which uses terrorism to hurt Israel, the peace process
and in the final event to oust the PA and establish
an Islamic State – presents the PA’s struggle against
terrorism as benefiting Israel exclusively. In practice,
the relentless struggle against Islamic terrorism
is in fact one area on which the PA and Israel have
total agreement. Senior PA officials understand that
the Islamic opposition represents a genuine threat
to Arafat and to the national-secular movements (Fatah,
Popular Front, Democratic Front etc.), and view the
terrorism which the Islamic movements espouse as a
danger to peace and stability in the territories and
the region as a whole. An effective struggle against
terrorism requires such fierce measures as to be seen
by Palestinians as verging on a war between brothers.
Previously, there was a great deal of cooperation
(intelligence and operational) between the Israeli
and Palestinian security forces on the issue of combating
terrorism. This professional and effective model should
be renewed as a basis for a joint struggle against
terrorism, but its continuation is contingent on progress
made in the negotiations and in the sense of partnership
with the Palestinians. However, once the Palestinian
authorities renew this cooperation, they will be criticized
again for “collaborating” with Israel against Palestinian
brothers. A
fourth sphere in which the Palestinians feel they
are paying a high price for peace is the stamp of
legitimacy which they gave Israel in its relations
with the international community and the Arab world.
While in Israel the positive change in the attitude
of the Arab countries towards Israel was taken for
granted as part of the negotiations for peace, on
the Palestinian side any recognition of Israel prior
to the signing of a permanent status agreement is
seen as undermining the struggle of the Palestinian
people. In practice, the Jordanian delegation in Washington
signed the protocol for the negotiations with Israel
on the day after the Oslo agreement was signed with
the PLO, leading to the official signing of the peace
agreement with Jordan one year later. The signing
of the protocol and of the peace agreement with Jordan
were a direct product and consequence of the agreement
with the Palestinians, and would not have happened
had the Oslo Agreement not been signed. The new legitimacy
given to Israel by the Palestinians also brought diplomatic
and trade relations with Arab countries in the Persian
Gulf and North Africa which had previously recognized
Israel. These relations collapsed with the advent
of the violent events starting in September 2000 and
will probably be re-established when Israel Towards a Permanent Status Agreement between Israel
and a Palestinian State
The Oslo Approach
The
Oslo approach was based on the understanding that
the negative history between the Israeli and Palestinian
peoples represents an almost insurmountable obstacle
for conventional-type negotiations. Its goal was to
work towards a conceptual change which would lead
to a dialogue The basic aim of the Oslo Agreement was to initiate a
process which starts with an Interim Period and leads
to a Permanent Status Agreement between Israel and
the PLO as a means of bringing the two sides to peace,
coexistence and a decrease in the probability of violent
confrontation and war. The Agreement was in fact a
Declaration of Principles which mainly outlined the
formula for the Interim Period as well as the pending
issues to be dealt with in the permanent status negotiations
(i.e. Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements,
borders, relations with other neighbors, water and
economics). The Oslo Agreement did not
spell out the concept that the Permanent Status Agreement
will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State.
Nonetheless, until October 2000, when violence erupted
between the Palestinians and Israel, the establishment
of a State in the territories of the West Bank and
Gaza seemed to be only a matter of timing: a question
of when a State would be established, rather than
if it would be established at all. Why
a State?
In the not too distant past, the prevailing consensus
in the Israeli public denied the right of the Palestinian
people to a State. The Oslo process changed this.
Today, the Israeli public at large, even in right-wing
circles, acknowledges that a Palestinian State will
eventually be established. Nonetheless, there are
political leaders in Israel who still view the establishment
of a Palestinian State as the first stage in what
they perceive as a predictable process whereby this
State will become a strategic threat to Israel. Recent
events strengthened the position of those in the Israeli
public and government who view the Palestinian State
as a black box that transforms tactical threats into
strategic ones. Within this black box, they argue,
the Palestinians will have the capacity to intercept
civilian airplanes at Israeli airports, to own missile
launchers that can be used to attack Israel, and to
establish an alliance with Iran and Iraq, thereby
allowing Iranian and Iraqi soldiers to threaten Tel
Aviv. This threat exists only as a “worst-case scenario.” Since
the establishment of the Palestinian State is predicated
on the conclusion of a Peace Agreement with regional
implications, the probability of the actualization
of the “worst-case scenario” is relatively low. The
easiest way, however, of obstructing a political process
which aims at resolving the Israeli-Arab conflict,
is to tout the extreme and threatening scenario and
to label those searching for a balanced and reasonable
solution as misperceiving the reality of the Middle
East. The withdrawal from Sinai in the framework of
the Peace Agreement between Israel and Egypt was originally
presented in this way – as an existential threat to
Israel because it involved conceding Israel’s strategic
depth to the Egyptians. This is how the establishment
of a Palestinian State is presented today. It is perceived
as posing a strategic threat to Israel, although its
establishment will be carried out in the framework
of a Peace Agreement that will stipulate a non-militarized
Palestinian State and a ban on
Statesmanship often involves taking calculated risks.
The establishment of a Palestinian State – as part
of an agreement with Israel – presents a clear example
of such risks. This was also the case when the Menachem
Begin’s Government decided to withdraw from all of
Sinai as part of the peace agreement with Egypt, despite
the apparent advantages that the Sinai Peninsula presented
in terms of strategic depth. If and when the course
of events leads to compromise and peace with the Palestinians,
Israel should clearly have an interest in the establishment
of a Palestinian State, and an obligation to take
this calculated risk. The State is the most acceptable
form of political entity. It is preferable for Israel
to have as neighbor a sovereign entity that, by definition,
will have to abide by recognized international obligations.
The alternative would be a neighbor of unclear status
and unfulfilled national aspirations. The establishment of a Palestinian State will fulfill
Palestinian national aspirations and will demonstrate
the advantages of a peace agreement with Israel. Moreover,
it will clarify the price of any additional confrontation,
which could shatter the Palestinian national dream.
Societies and countries tend to preserve achievements.
It is therefore expected that the Palestinian leadership
and public will act accordingly and will endeavor
to consolidate the achievement of an independent State
rather than undermine and endanger it. Consequently,
the motivation to initiate hostile confrontation against
Israel will decrease. In the current and near-future
equation, the nascent Palestinian State will probably
stand Israel could score points against the Palestinians –
and perhaps even prevent the establishment of a State
– but this will ultimately sabotage the potential
success of the Peace Process and undermine Israel’s
security. The intensive Israeli preoccupation with
symbols of Palestinian sovereignty is both excessive
and essentially irrelevant, since the Palestinian
Authority currently fulfills most of the functions
of a State, and has achieved near-State standing in
the International Community. Guidelines for a Permanent Status Arrangement
The aim of a Permanent Status Agreement is peace between
the Palestinian and the Israeli people on the basis
of coexistence, mutual respect and good neighborly
relations, using cooperation and coordination on a
vast number of issues, with an emphasis on security
and the fight against terrorism. The following set
of principles regarding a possible Permanent Status
Agreement represents the author’s position. However,
it is based on Israeli-Palestinian track II understandings
that were drafted and updated from These understandings are underpinned by the working assumption
that a demilitarized Palestinian State will be established
between the From a security standpoint, the sides will have to agree
on arrangements that allow Israel to hold a limited
military presence, in time and scope, in the territories
of the Palestinian State, without compromising the
sovereignty of the latter. The Clearly, the refugee issue is extremely sensitive to
the Palestinians. We, as Israelis, must understand
and address it as such. On the one hand, any solution
proposed to the refugee issue that Jerusalem should not be divided as a result of an agreement.
The city, or at least its Holy Basin, should continue
to serve as one open city and as the capital of both
States. Two sovereign areas should be defined – one
Israeli, one Palestinian – based on demographic-geographic
considerations (i.e. all the Jewish neighborhoods
will be under Israeli sovereignty and all the Arab
neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty). A third
area, that should be limited to the region of the
Holy Basin, should be supervised by a special joint
regime. Two separate municipalities should supervise
and manage the day-to-day activities in the City,
based on their sovereign areas of jurisdiction. Above
these municipalities, a joint coordinating body should
be established to manage and coordinate activities
at the level of the municipalities, relating for example
to issues of heavy infrastructure, zoning and city
planning, and joint city regulations. What Went Wrong?
The uprising, which began the morning after the visit of the then opposition leader and now Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on September 28, 2000, did not begin with the first rock thrown by a Palestinian youth, or shooting by a “Tanzim” activist. The rock and the rifle, and in particular the demonstrations and clashes of Palestinians with Israeli forces, are tied to the events of the past seven years since the signing of the Oslo Agreement. Sharon’s visit, and the killing of worshippers on the plazas of Jerusalem’s mosques on the following day, was the match that ignited the powder keg which had been threatening to explode for years. From the moment when the five years of the Interim
Agreement period expired and a Permanent Status was
not even visible on the horizon,
the clock began to tick towards the explosion. For
Israel, the only way to prevent the detonation would
have been to effect the agreements signed with the
Palestinians rapidly and seriously and to embark promptly
on intensive Permanent Status negotiations. Prime
Minister Ehud Barak failed to understand this. Indeed,
his error was twofold: he decided not to implement
the third redeployment, which represented the single
most important element in the Interim Agreement; and
although he entered into negotiations on Permanent
Status earnestly and in goodwill, he did so on the
basis of faulty assumptions which caused their collapse. The
tenure of former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu
(1996-1999) made it clear to the Palestinians that
an elected Israeli Government might actually not be
interested in reaching a peace agreement on the basis
of the principle of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242 (land for peace). This, together with the immense gap between the expectations
raised by his successor Ehud Barak and the grim reality
(the continuation of accelerated settlement activities,
having to live After
September 2000 the peace process paradigm collapsed.
The second Palestinian Intifada left both publics
deeply shaken and led to Barak’s downfall as well
as to the breakdown of Permanent Status negotiations.
This is first and foremost the result of a double
misperception. The Palestinian side reached the mistaken
conclusion that the Israeli public and Barak were
not prepared to pay the price necessary for a genuine
agreement and peace. Both the Israeli public and the
Prime Minister were in fact willing to go the necessary
distance, on the condition that the Palestinians expressed
publicly the conciliatory positions which they had
stated privately and that they demonstrated non-tolerance
and determination in combating terrorism. The Israeli
side, for its part, reached the mistaken conclusion
that the Palestinians did not want peace, and were
instead bent on destroying the Zionist State both
from within and from outside. Israel concluded that
there was no partner for peace on the Palestinian
side, or at least not one who had the ability or the
will to pursue it. In reality, the Palestinians had
not altered their basic position held since 1993,
calling for a sovereign non-militarized Palestinian
State along the borders of 1967 and with a pragmatic
solution to the refugee problem. Conclusion
In the past seven months, a new reality has unfolded
on the ground. The two sides have moved from a peace
process to a low-intensity armed conflict. Although
both still have the interest of moving back from conflict
to political process the hurdles will probably be
too high to reach A thorough analysi The
Oslo Agreement, which brought about an historic The
foundation of this process began to form under Barak’s
government, but it was distorted. This did not result
from a lack of willingness of the Israeli and Palestinian
publics to reach an agreement, but from poor management
of the process. If the two sides are able to recognize
their mistakes and learn from them it will be possible
to renew the negotiations and to reach a Permanent
Status agreement which, in turn, will represent the
first step on the long and difficult journey to reconciliation
between the two peoples and peace between their two
States. |
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© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | net edition malte.michel | 7/2001 |