Israelis and Palestinians: Towards a New Chapter of the
Conflict[1]
Mahdi Abdul-Hadi
Palestinian-Israeli negotiations for a peaceful
settlement of a hundred years of conflict officially began,
under international guidance, at the Madrid Conference in
October 1991. This was the starting point for what became
a series of multi-track negotiations based on the twin formulas
of land-for-peace and the implementation of United Nations
Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967. The two parties,
however, reached the essential point of mutual recognition
not out of any identification with or acceptance of the
other’s historical, political or cultural narrative, but
rather out of a submission to the pressures of the respective
Realpolitik of their situation. In the hope of ensuring
their own internal political interests and of overcoming
mounting external pressures, each side assumed the necessary
positions of mutual accommodation.
The
Political Dynamics of Frustration in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories
The Israelis realized that they could not
simply maintain an endless policy of control and occupation
vis-à-vis the Palestinians, nor could they rid themselves
of the “problem” by conducting a mass transfer policy against
them. In addition, they had finally recognized their failure
in manufacturing a malleable Palestinian leadership, which
could replace the popular PLO and had begun to fear a further
“Islamification of resistance”, which had emerged in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) during the first
Intifada (1987-1993).
Meanwhile, the PLO establishment, with its
headquarters in Tunis, – often referred to as the “outsiders”
– was weakened, isolated and facing imminent political and
financial bankruptcy in the wake of the Gulf War. Further
“threats” to the tenuous nature of their leadership lay
in the rapid growth in popularity of the Islamic resistance
movements in the territories and the long-standing desire
of the Israeli establishment to remove them from any future
scenario, focusing instead on the “insiders”, i.e., the
local political elites and activists in the OPT. The US
invitation to the Madrid peace conference exposed this de-facto
crisis of leadership and competition for the first time
as Palestinian disagreement grew over who should be represented
by whom, and who exactly should eventually attend to negotiate.
Questions of legitimacy, mandate and representation were
raised as the Palestinian political establishment, both
“inside” and “outside” sought to resolve under what banner
or “umbrella” Palestine would be officially presented.
It was the “insiders” - active on the ground
in both confronting the occupiers and drafting proposals
for an interim period - who convinced the “outsiders” to
go ahead and overcome the humiliating conditions that the
Israeli Government had imposed on the Palestinians with regard to the Madrid Conference. The
PLO, worried about the future role of
the “insiders” and their potential to become future alternative
leaders rather than loyal negotiators, eventually decided
to appoint a delegation acceptable to Israel and composed
of “insiders”, not least to avoid marginalization
and prevent the “inside” from becoming a emerging Palestinian
leadership.
Thus,
at Madrid itself, different, and not wholly compatible,
forces drew the Palestinian and Israeli sides forward, while
their respective long-term goals were equally opposed and
they continued to hold utterly contradictory perceptions
of each other’s national movement. Israel sought to finally
secure official recognition of the Jewish state, amounting
to a Palestinian endorsement of Zionism and its pre-1967
political achievements. However, in addition they set out
to procure Palestinian acceptance of “sharing”, through
a limited autonomy, the 22% of what was left of historic
Palestine, i.e., the OPT, including East Jerusalem.
On
the other hand, the Palestinians had, through their daily
confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces and the
long-standing hardships of their living conditions become
painfully aware of the Israeli intention of maintaining
the “Jewishness” of Israel. Nevertheless, they changed their
claim to all of Palestine and proclaimed for the first time
in a Ten-Point-Program of 12 June 1974 the possibility of
a two-states solution, with the intention of establishing
a democratic, secular state in any liberated part of Palestine.
The first Intifada of 1987-1993 endorsed this concept further
calling for a two-states solution based on an end to Israeli
occupation and the creation of an independent Palestinian
state in the remaining 22 percent of their homeland that
was known as OPT.
The negotiation process went through many
phases in its different tracks for many years and with few
satisfactory results. It did not end the Israeli occupation
but rather divided the OPT into three areas: “Area A” (the
six main Palestinian cities), under limited Palestinian-control,
“Area B” with joint patrols, Palestinian civil authority
and complete Israeli security control (a patchwork of Palestinian
villages), and “Area C” (Jewish settlements and the remainder
of Palestinian territory), where Israel retains the occupation
in its absolute form. Consecutive Israeli governments, despite
their varying political persuasions, have maintained a consistent
strategy based on maintaining maximum control over the land
and containing the Palestinian leadership by way of an unending
track of negotiations, with the clear aim of foreclosing
any possibility of the emergence of a viable independent
Palestinian state.
Indicative
of the extent of this concerted policy, is the fact that
today – ten years after the Oslo Accords were thought to
have recognized the human necessity of bringing the conflict
to an end - Israel’s settler population in the OPT has doubled
and the society appears more right-wing than ever. Five
different Israeli governments can be seen to have shared
the goal of rendering peace according to the agreed formulas
as complicated as possible, if not inconceivable. In the
same period and in addition to the torturous re-negotiations
and endless postponements, Israel succeeded in limiting
their withdrawal commitments and thus too the area of autonomy
afforded the Palestinian Authority (in Area A), leaving
the West Bank territory controlled by the Palestinians today
at a mere 17.2 percent, which is less than four percent
of historic Palestine.
Despite
Israel’s perpetual procrastinations and avoidance of the
numerous agreements, which accumulated through the Oslo
process, the Palestinians retained their hope that withdrawals
would take place and progress towards ending occupation
would be made. In accordance with the timetable stipulated,
and in the face of the clear reticence of Israel to withdraw
as pledged, the Palestinian leadership demanded the implementation
of unfulfilled Israeli commitments – these making up the
framework intended to govern the initial transitional phase
– prior to entering the final phase of permanent status
negotiations.
During
this transitional period, unilaterally extended by Israel,
it became apparent that not only was Israel complying with
neither the spirit nor the text of the Oslo Accords, but
that the transformation of the PLO leadership, from “a national
resistance movement in-exile” to a “state-building institution”
in the OPT remained painfully far from realization. The
Palestinian Authority had swiftly been revealed as a cosmetic,
administrative body which was acting, in many ways, as an
unwilling (if not unwitting) “agent” for Israel which retained
effective and overall control throughout the OPT. The Palestinians,
knowing international law to be fully on their side, were
increasingly frustrated, angry and helpless in the face
of mounting Israeli intransigence. Their sense of despondency
was exacerbated by the marked absence of any pressure from
world leaders, including those in the Arab world, to bring
Israelis into compliance with signed and (re-)negotiated
agreements or with international laws and ratified conventions.
Israel’s “Red
Lines” on a Solution
In May, 1999, Ehud Barak’s
government illustrated - under the banner of a “united Israel”
- the parity between his left-wing Labor and the right-wing
Likud agendas vis-à-vis the Palestinians, when he laid out
his “red lines” on a negotiated solution to the conflict.
These comprised his four NOs:
·
No to return to the 1967 borders - as required by UN Resolution 242,
·
No to the return of Palestinians refugees - as required by UN Resolution
194;
·
No to any withdrawal from east Jerusalem or to accepting any Palestinian
sovereignty over it – as required by both Resolutions 194
and 242;
·
No to dismantling or “freezing” Jewish settlement in the OPT – in line with
UN resolutions and international calls for them to be ceased,
as illegal “obstacles to peace”.
In recalling this “quadri-negative”
position, with which Ehud Barak soothed the Israeli voter
before embarking on his doomed efforts to enforce it upon
the Palestinians, it is worth noting that, nearly two years
on, in March 2001, the subsequent Israeli coalition government
headed by Ariel Sharon, in spite of its many contradictions
and the conflicts amongst its members, is setting out to
develop another “unified Israeli position”. It is oriented
at Sharon’s guiding agenda of reaching a long-term transitional
arrangement with the Palestinians, rather than any more
comprehensive solution. Sharon’s NOs comprise:
·
No to dismantling a single settlement;
·
No to withdrawing from the Jordan Valley;
·
No to any compromise on Jerusalem,
·
No to the right of Palestinian refugees to return,
·
No to any compromise on border issues.
Surveying the past decade,
it can be surmised that its consecutive Israeli governments
have never held a strategy geared towards reconciliation
or peaceful “coexistence” and equal rights, but rather have
been absorbed by the shifting internal dynamics and nuances
of the modern Zionist movement, especially with its current
crisis of definition and purpose in the region. As a result
of this inadequate and exclusively introspective political
approach to the realities of the occupation, the hegemony
and control of the established regime has not been challenged
and continues to define the parameters of political discourse
both in Israel and between the two sides. Such a costly
lack of political vision finds its most obvious expression
in the no-positions of both Labor (Barak) and Likud (Sharon).
Indeed, it is immediately apparent
that the vanity of power with which Israeli has approached
the peace process over the years is indicative of an absolute
refusal to consider the notion of peace with the Palestinians
as anything more than an “option” which ceases to be attractive
the instant it can no longer be shaped according to their
every need and whim. This disturbing perspective, which
implies a willingness to live indefinitely in a state of
war and occupation, was succinctly expressed by Netanyahu
when he declared: “If I have to choose between peace and
[absolute Israeli sovereignty over all] Jerusalem,
I will choose Jerusalem....”. As long as the choice of thus
occupying “eternally” an Arab Palestinian people, their
land and holy sites is placed above that of peace in the
region for all its peoples, the Palestinians can and must
seriously question the readiness of their “partner” to resolve
the conflict.
Amongst the more recent and most dangerous
examples of the disingenuousness of both Israeli leaders’
agendas was the proposal made by Barak’s team at the Camp
David summit of July 2000, which – in a reflection of the
unbending mindset of the occupier – they considered “generous
and of historic significance”. Israel’s final status positions
“offered” the establishment of a Palestinian demilitarized
state on 90-95 percent of the OPT, though not in a single
contiguous territorial unit but rather in separate “cantons”
defined, contained and controlled by Jewish settlement blocs,
military bases and bypass roads, and excluding Jerusalem.
On the issue of Jerusalem, the Barak proposal
did not even broach the question of the city in its entirety
(East and West), but limited it to a formula of “sharing”
East Jerusalem in the boundaries illegally and unilaterally
expanded by Israel in 1967. The Israeli proposal denied
the fact that East Jerusalem is not only geographically
and demographically an inseparable part of the West Bank
but the capital of the future state of Palestine. It attempted
to even further fragment its Arab neighborhoods, while illegally
annexed West Jerusalem remained a non-issue. Regarding the
holy sites, Israel has made no secret of its intention to
“share” - if not take over completely - the holy Al-Aqsa
compound. Such a scenario follows the Hebron model and will
remain unthinkable, impracticable and thoroughly unjust
for Palestinians, who continue to insist that no party should
have exclusive sovereignty over the city nor control the
society or administer the city at the expense of the other
party, particularly with regard to holy sites, whose status
quo they demand be protected and maintained.
As for the refugees, Israel’s ill-founded
and arrogant demand was that the Palestinians forgo their
fundamental inalienable right of return, accepting only
Israel’s “offer” to let a selected number (no more than
ten thousand) of refugees return. It is quite impossible
to think that there will be a Palestinian leader who would
close a deal at such high price, conceding, for so little,
the rights of the dispossessed two-thirds of the Palestinian
people. The Palestinian position has and always will be
based on the inalienable right of return as defined by UN
Resolution 194, which calls unequivocally upon Israel to
recognize the right and agree upon a plan for the implementation
of such a return.
In
exchange for such “generosity” on the part of the Israelis,
the Palestinians were expected to declare “an end to the
conflict.” Needless to say that this was out of the question
as every point of the above contradicted their “red
lines”, or basic positions as it were.
Firstly,
Palestinians had already made a huge and painful concession
on the land issue by recognizing the state of Israel on
78 percent of their homeland and thus limiting their political
demands to the remaining 22 percent of the land, i.e.,
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in their pre-1967 borders.
To compromise even further on these territories was, and
is, unacceptable not only because it is unjust and accommodates
a dangerous Israeli dissatisfaction with what they conquered
in 1947-49, but, more vitally, because it embodies an Israeli
insistence on the de-facto maintenance of the occupation.
On the issue of settlements, the Palestinians ask for nothing
more than the implementation of international law, which
prohibits the transfer of any population to occupied territory
and the annexation of such territory and which leaves no
doubt that settlements are without legal validity.
Similarly,
the absolute and unconditional right of return – manifested
in UN Resolution 194 – per se is non-negotiable for the
Palestinians, who consider the refugee question sacred and
at the core of the conflict.
To
further stress the absurdity of the Barak “offer” one should
recall that whatever deal might have been struck between
the two teams, it was subject to the majority approval of
the Knesset, where the failing Prime Minister led an embattled
minority and was facing the no-confidence votes which would
shortly see him resign. Thus, it would have been an act
of political naiveté, if not suicide, for the Palestinians
to have even considered bending to the wholly unacceptable
proposals described above; yet another recorded concession
without gain.
Throughout
the Camp David Summit and the later (January, 2001) Taba
talks, and despite the obstinately “closed” Jerusalem and
refugee files, the negotiators on both sides showed a readiness
to consider the idea of land exchanges. Intended to enable
Israel to incorporate three large settlement blocs adjacent
to the Green Line in return for granting the Palestinians
land from Israel of equal potential and value, these talks,
too, were persistently undermined by an indefatigable Israeli
will to secure yet another exchange which distinctly favored
them. This time it was in terms of the land swap ratio and
the qualitative differences they sought to exploit in literally
offering the Palestinians sand dunes in exchange for fertile
agricultural and residential West Bank land.
Needless
to say, the advent of Ariel Sharon with his patently racist
and hawkish cabinet and their “offer” of a demilitarized
state on 42 percent of the West Bank after a prolonged transitional
period, represents a giant stride backwards from Barak’s
own calamitous proposals. One can see in Sharon’s approach
a disturbing shamelessness that was lacking in the deception
of the internationally hailed efforts of Barak. Both, for
example, held similar views concerning settlements (Barak
presided over the hugest settlement expansion period in
Israel’s history), yet while Barak’s “offer” of annexing
Palestinian land sufficient to afford an eventual five-fold
increase in current settlement housing was lauded by the
international community as “generous and courageous,” Sharon
received few laurels when he stated quite clearly that the
settlement program south of Jerusalem is being conducted
with the specific purpose of “preventing Palestinian contiguity”,
adding, “that’s clear and natural.” With such parity
of purpose and yet polarity of presentation, Sharon and
Barak exemplify the entirely cosmetic nature of the so-called
hawk-dove division and cast revealing light on the source
of Palestinian frustration with Israel’s political posturing
over past years.
One might be forgiven for despairing
because the responsibility of governing a region and steering
its people clear of disaster lies with such leaders. With
the obsessively proclaimed “red lines” of successive leaders,
settlements expanding apace and armed settler militias controlling
swathes of the Palestinian West Bank, it is hard to envisage
what the future could offer, yet we may examine certain
possibilities.
Emerging Scenarios
The present circumstances in
the political arena represent a continuation of the long-established
status quo, with Israeli military superiority meshing with
Ariel Sharon’s “doctrine” to define a state of “limited
war” and enforce an apartheid-style separation policy upon
the weaker party. Sharon’s agenda outdoes those of his recent
predecessors in its clear aim of not only obstructing and
distancing the inevitable Palestinian state but of weakening
and discrediting Yasser Arafat’s power, if not stripping
him and the PA of all authority in the OPT altogether. Naturally
this is being carried out in conjunction with concerted
international and domestic efforts to portray the Palestinian
people as either unable or unprepared to govern themselves
and to portray their leadership as the obstacle in the
face of progress towards peaceful negotiations.
Sharon’s unchanged military
approach, with its focus upon crippling Palestinian society,
dismantling its economy and de-legitimizing its leadership,
can perhaps be best understood and its potential direction
appreciated when his concentrated diplomatic efforts to
redevelop Israel’s security alliance with Jordan are taken
into consideration. The Sharon-Peres government appears
to assume that Arab states can be made to feel obliged and
even willing to accommodate and smother the urgent socio-economic
pressures of Palestinians if persuaded to do so by the US
and EU and given the chance to thereby overcome their own
economic crises with appropriate material and strategic
support.
Arabizing the Search for a
Solution
In a signal of what may be
a process of re-Arabizing a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, Arab leaders and Islamic states have realized
the need to translate their verbal support and financial
pledges into concentrated political action based on their
own stated acknowledgements that peace in the region is
a process directly relating to their own national and regional
strategy.
A Jordanian-Egyptian initiative,
which materialized during the March 2001 Arab summit in
Amman, represents a first clear manifestation of this developing
Arab mediation role. The initiative covers four areas, stressing
first the need to take “steps to end the current crisis
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority [by implementing]
the understanding reached at the Sharm Esh-Sheikh summit
in October 2000”. Secondly there is an emphasis on “confidence
building measures… to restore trust through the faithful
implementation of their commitments as agreed…in the signed
agreements”. Only then does the initiative broach the “rebuilding
[of] the negotiating process on all items on the agenda
for the permanent status negotiations including Jerusalem,
Palestinian refugees, borders, settlements, security and
water.” Finally, “it is proposed that the sponsors of the
peace process: the EU, Egypt, Jordan and the UN Secretary
General shall monitor this implementation and its progress.”
Thus far, Israel has reduced
its blanket rejection of the initiative to what they describe
as a few “reservations”; one being the setting of a timetable
for the attainment of a final agreement, the second being
that the plan lacks a clause requiring the cessation of
“violence” (by which they would like to infer Palestinian
responsibility) prior to the renewal of negotiations, and
the third being that the initiative expects Israel to freeze
its settlement policies forthwith. Despite these reservations,
Israeli diplomatic maneuvers have begun making use of the
initiative as a tool by which to distract from a climb-down
on their position, thus enabling them to save face whilst
resuming security and political talks despite having
so vociferously ruled this out. Israeli Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres, accordingly said “it is important that there
is an attempt and an effort to move things forward. The
initiative can serve as a basis, but the details need to
be worked on.” Sharon then delegated
Peres to discuss, if not negotiate, the terms of the initiative
with leaders in Cairo, Amman and Washington. Peres immediately
manufactured a curious and intriguing political storm in
the region by leading the Egyptian President to believe
and announce that the initiative had been accepted and was
already to serve as the agreed basis for a “cease-fire”,
while negotiations would commence in four weeks. The immediate
repudiation of any such agreement emerged from Ramallah
but Amman maintained a no-comment approach to the statements
and left commentators asking whether Israel was making a
deliberate attempt to publicly compromise, enrage and thus
distance the Egyptians from the initiative and thereby elevate
the primacy of their preferred Jordanian ally.
On the other hand, the Palestinian
leadership has long been demanding an intervention from
the Arab states, though this has now materialized as a mere
mediation move rather than a more assertive one which would
have been preferred; a strong move toward partnering the
Palestinians and defending them in their conflict with Israel.
The EU has quickly welcomed the initiative and encouraged
the Israelis to accept it, while the US has resumed its
facilitation of security talks between the Palestinians
and Israelis at the American Embassy in Tel Aviv and State
Department statements have clearly favored the initiative.
European Union foreign policy
chief Javier Solana has confirmed that the EU is “taking
it seriously because it is the only document at the table
now that may help us out of the vicious circle.” Whether or
not as a consequence of their support for the initiative,
Washington has dispatched its former ambassador to Jordan
to the region for consultations. Further to this move, President
George W. Bush has already received three Arab heads of
state at the White House; the Egyptian, Jordanian and Lebanese
leaders, while word has recently emerged from the US concerning
the imminent nomination of a special envoy to the region.
The likely candidates can be said to be specialized in Syria
and Jordan, and any appointment to the post would seem to
confirm the US’s intention to “Arabize” the solution to
the conflict either through Jordanian-Israeli security arrangements
or through a Syrian-Israeli non-aggression pact. In any
case, Washington cannot afford to maintain a hands-off approach
to the conflict in the Middle East, nor the current crisis.
The Jordanian Umbrella?
Jordan’s motivation for joining
Egypt as a regional mediator for negotiation between the
Palestinians and Israelis stems from a need to capitalize
on the current opportunity to arrest what are serious and
potentially devastating deteriorations in the Jordanian
economy as well as to contain mounting frustration and
anger with Israel in Jordan. Strong anti-“normalization”
forces in Jordanian society are challenging the regime to
abrogate its peace treaty with Israel and a black list has
been circulated naming those who have had “inappropriate
contact” with Israel. The Hashemite Kingdom, with its enormous
Palestinian refugee population, is most at risk should the
possibility of the Intifada spreading regionally be realized.
There have, alongside these
pressures, been arguments amongst the Jordanian ruling class
favoring the development of a mediation role in the conflict
for Jordan ever since King Abdullah II became head of the
Arab Summit for the coming year. Egypt, which has more recently
held the position of regional “shepherd” in Palestinian-Israeli
negotiations, has endorsed Jordan’s “open” shuttle diplomacy
between Israel and the PA, sharing mutual strategic interests
not least with regard to Jordan’s economy, which, should
it collapse, would have devastating regional effects. Other
underlying factors for Egypt’s advocacy and support of Jordan’s
role are the concern about the effects of the US decision
to severely reduce its military presence in the Sinai Peninsula.
Egyptian anti-“normalization” forces, including the Islamists,
have long called on the regime there to challenge Israel
rather than limit themselves to the “war of (empty) words”.
It comes as no surprise then that the Egyptian leadership
is pleased to encourage another regime willing to absorb
a part of these popular pressures. Egypt has gone so far
as to knock on the doors of EU capitals (including Berlin)
and the administration in Moscow, asking for their support
in its newest difficulties. It received the blessing and
endorsement of both EU and Russian parties for the Egyptian
leadership and the initiative in particular.
Jordanian-Israeli relations
are notable in many respects. Both countries share a peace
treaty which has, so far, been respected to the letter.
In stark contrast to many noises being made elsewhere in
the region and abroad (as well as within the Israeli political
community), King Abdullah II, during a press conference
on his April 2001 visit to Washington, assured his American
and Israeli counterparts of his friendship with and trust
of Ariel Sharon, referring to his father, the late King
Hussein’s advice to do so. The King’s policy towards Israel
has been rapidly reflected by his ministerial staff, the
trade minister announced the renewal of the Jordan-Israel
trade agreement for the coming year, covering $150 million
in trade between the two states. Meanwhile, the Jordanian
foreign minister met Prime Minister Sharon in Jerusalem
to formally present the Jordanian-Egyptian initiative, though
under the shadow of the Israeli raid on a Syrian post and
the Israeli army’s reoccupation of PA areas in Gaza. The
US has demonstrated its support for elevating Jordan’s position
in the region by transferring $75 million in urgent economic
aid and $35 million in military aid as well as by the President’s
request for Congress to approve the US-Jordan trade treaty,
which has been on ice for some time.
Ariel Sharon explains Israel-Jordan
relations and his lobbying for US aid to the kingdom by
saying “Jordan today, or rather the Hashemite monarchy,
is a stabilizing factor, just by its presence. It stands
between Israel, the PA, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq to
the east. We have an interest in strengthening them economically
and militarily. In today’s situations, they are important
to us.“
The Palestinians, as so often
before, risk finding themselves trapped between the militarily
enforced agenda of a Sharon government and the machinations
of an Arab political maneuver which ultimately serves that
regime’s priorities and commitments at the expense of Palestinian
rights and aspirations. If this initiative, as outlined
above, is to shape the direction of a new chapter of the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Chairman Arafat can be expected
to, as he is so accustomed, adapt his tactics accordingly
and accommodate the latest Jordanian-Israeli security arrangement.
The Palestinian leader will be found most adept at playing
one side’s internal pressures off the other’s political
characteristics and vice-versa ad infinitum. Having relied
upon this art when last in Jordan, developed it in Lebanon
and, arguably, mastered it from his Tunis base, Chairman
Arafat can now be expected to capitalize on his position
in the middle to exert the maximum domestic and diplomatic
pressure on Israel. In addition to exploiting Arafat’s ability
to play a role as the potential “spoiler” for any further
normalization between Jordan and Israel, the Palestinian
leadership will demand that the Egyptian role be clearly
felt throughout, in the hope that it will counterbalance
the anticipated Jordanian connivance with Israel. At the
same time the Palestinians will be able to put some effort
into re-establishing a joint political agenda with Syria
- the opportunity for which was signaled at the Amman Arab
Summit and which has yet to be followed up by either side.
A Qatari
Umbrella?
The Jordanian-Egyptian initiative
makes specific reference to the role of the international
community in monitoring the implementation of agreements
and the Palestinians have accordingly called upon the EU
and the UN Secretary General to take up an unambiguous stance
in accordance with that component of the initiative. Similar
calls upon the international community have been emanating
from the Palestinians throughout the current crisis, though
response has come too slow and has been limited. One regional
response has been signaled in the unexpected statement of
Qatar’s foreign minister, following his unscheduled meeting
with Shimon Peres in New York.
Following the Israeli Foreign
Minister and US President Bush’s joint statement agreeing
to “work very closely with Egypt and Jordan,” the Qatari
foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani,
was reported to have suggested in a late-night meeting with
Peres that Arafat and Sharon might find Doha a suitable
venue for further discussions based on current initiatives.
However, it is likely that this is far less a response to
the call of the Palestinians upon the international community,
than a response to the strategic openings sensed by the
Qataris. In recognizing the approach of the US and the opportunity
it affords to any Arab state willing to become directly
involved in the process of hosting and “shepherding” peace
talks, the Qatari decision reflects an awareness that they
are already aligned economically and politically with US
regional agendas. As such, they would have less to lose
than other states in becoming a venue or springboard for
peace talks. In hoping to wrest some of the focus from Egypt
and Jordan, the Qatari aim will be to consolidate and extend
US economic and military assistance, of which they are already
a beneficiary, while hoping to increase their standing in
the Arab world by taking a role in the effort to contain
the conflict.
It would appear that, in one
shape or another and to a greater or lesser degree, this
initiative will be the next likely juncture in the path
of the conflict. All parties concerned will, naturally,
attempt to use and manipulate the process from the outset
in order to best serve their needs. Israel will, accordingly,
set its probable formula for conditional acceptance of any
such new chapter in the negotiations based on wresting maximal
normalization while yielding minimal concessions, either
to Jordan, the Egyptians, the Gulf States or the Palestinians.
Subsequent relations between these Arab nations and Israel
will be underpinned by the efforts of the Israelis to render
them as dependent as possible upon Israel in order to gradually
be able to commensurately increase the weight of their expectations
from their “partners” in terms of the latter’s containment
of the Palestinians.
During this period most parties
will be looking towards a post-Arafat and post-Sharon era,
formulating their alliances and political contacts accordingly.
There is no reason to suggest that the Arab leaders will
be naïve to this tact and so, from the other side, we will
see them joust diplomatically to preserve the benefits of
the strategic arrangement while avoiding, as best they can,
falling totally into Israel’s pocket and being left to pick
up the pieces of a post-Arafat Palestinian political meltdown.
Some ground for hope, on the
part of the Palestinians, may lie with the fact that the
Arab umbrella for future negotiation - if successful – can
be made to develop towards the birth of the Palestinian
sovereign state within the “Arab House” and with greater
likelihood of eventual Israeli acceptance.
An Israeli Solution?
Another possibility in terms
of emerging scenarios would appear to revolve around Israeli
party politics and popular malcontent with the Sharon agenda.
That said, and as noted earlier, the Israeli political establishment
has not shown sufficient political will, energy or vision
in past years for one to pin hopes on its overnight reform.
In fact the rise to power of a Sharon government, coming
after a ten-year seesaw period of right-wing-left-wing coalitions,
would appear to point at once to the singular lack of political
maturity that Israel shows for a democratic state, and the
“optional-extra” attitude which Israeli leaders and, as
a result, voters hold towards the issue of peace and reconciliation.
What is desperately needed then is an awakening of the Israeli
popular awareness and political will, which is a prerequisite
for constructing a valuable negotiation process.
Nonetheless, given the dearth
of other initiatives and in acceptance of the fact that
Palestinians have no choice but to deal with their occupier
“as served”, there remains hope, albeit slight, for significant
shifts in the current political scenery. If the Intifada
goes on to become a way of life and presents more and more
episodes of painful Palestinian suffering, Israeli public
opinion may start to reflect the realization that Sharon’s
style of government will not bring about the promised security
and calm, but rather is implementing an accelerated apartheid
system which promises only more hatred and confrontation,
even if with certain tranquil periods in between. Such a
hoped-for change in public awareness, while seemingly far-fetched,
did gradually occur to some extent during the prolonged
and pained years of the first Intifada. If the Labor party,
currently obediently playing the “good-cop” role in the
coalition for the benefit of Sharon’s international critics,
faces such a shift in public opinion, it will be obliged,
for the sake of its own survival to seek a way out and to
play an effective role in resuscitating Israel’s dormant
political left. Activists within the peace camp might consequentially
be driven to renew efforts to shake both their society and
their leaders into maturing their attitudes towards the
future of their own state and the Palestinians by recognizing
the need for comprehensive peace and the mutuality of rights.
Calls for settlement activities to be ceased in Israel would
be the minimum sign of understanding Palestinians would
hope to see emerging from a reborn peace camp, but far more
progressive and comprehensive attitudes would have to be
formulated before societal and political change on the scale
needed could be achieved. In the event of such a change
in Israeli public opinion, however unlikely it may seem
at this point, general elections will become inevitable.
Whether
or not Sharon is brought down from a split in his broad
coalition, a shift in the national consensus or in fact
lasts out his short term of office, Israel is set to go
to the polls relatively soon and certain questions will
then be answered. Foremost amongst these will be whether
or not Sharon’s doctrine has been irreversibly imposed upon
the region. Certainly it would seem that Sharon will leave
office content if he manages to
use his military threats and power tactics in the region
to create a situation that will, as an inherited de facto
status, represent as immovable a challenge as possible to
those who follow. In this regard, it is not the length of
time he spends in office that concerns Ariel Sharon but
rather the extent to which he manages to follow through
this program. Chairman Arafat, on the other hand has already
stated that the yardstick of “success” in the current crisis
will be his leadership’s ability “to survive the battle”!
Conclusions