Politik und Gesellschaft
Online International Politics and Society 1/2001 |
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Eric Teo:
The
Emerging East Asian Regionalism
A new paradigm of regionalism is emerging in East Asia. Within ASEAN, an appeal was heard to re-consolidate in order to face the challenges of its enlargement and of globalisation, and to cooperate more closely with Northeast Asia. Further north, a new triangular rapprochement appears to be emerging amongst the three North-East Asian protagonists (Japan, China and South Korea), thanks to converging internal and external factors - the process of Korean reunification, the post-Asian Crisis context, ASEAN’s promotion of “East Asian regionalism”, the assertiveness of American policy in Asia, and domestic considerations in both China and Japan with regard to their respective roles in the 21st century. Triangular
Rapprochement in Northeast Asia
The
historic Korean Summit between Seoul and Pyongyang on 13-15
June 2000 has clearly brought an air of rapprochement to
Northeast Asia. The five-point June joint declaration on
reconciliation and peace had led to a reunion of separated
families on 15 August 2000, bilateral meetings of Ministers
of Economy and even Defense at Cheju Island, the re-establishment
of a defunct railway (Kyongui Line) as well as a road link,
the march-past of Korea as a “combined” team at the recent
Sydney Olympics, the setting-up of a joint committee to
promote economic cooperation and trade, and the eventual
establishment of a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline. These can be
regarded as “major signs” of a political breakthrough. The
nominal North Korean Head of State, Kim Yong Nam is set
to visit Seoul in Winter 2000/2001, ahead of a “return”
visit of Pyongyang strongman Kim Jong II to Seoul. China
has indeed played a key role in the success of the Summit
and Korean rapprochement. In March 2000, Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji had reportedly played a critical role in encouraging
Pyongyang to open up to the outside world, whilst President
Jiang Zemin hosted Pyongyang leader Kim Jong II in Beijing
a week just before the Summit. Seoul has come to realize
that China’s support is primordial in “softening” Pyongyang’s
hardline regime and prodding it towards compromise and reason.
Much of President Kim Dae Jung’s political credibility
and legacy (notably, his bold “sunshine policy”), will now
depend to a huge extent on Beijing’s services as intermediary;
China-South Korean relations should therefore continue to
improve significantly in the months to come. Kim Dae Jung
has been given the Nobel Peace Prize for 2000 for his peace
efforts on the Korean Peninsula. On the other hand, North
Korea is now poised to get re-integrated into the region
and will seek China’s guidance even more, as Pyongyang officially
joined the ASEAN Regional Forum in July last year, welcomed
Russian President Vladimir Putin (also in July), re-embarked
on crucial rapprochement talks with Tokyo and hosted American
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to Pyongyang
in September 2000. In another ground-breaking move, Jo Yong
Park, the second man of the North Korean regime (after Kim
Jong Il) was received by President Clinton in the White
House before Madeleine Albright’s visit. There is also now
some possibility that Pyongyang may be joining the Asian
Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund in the coming months, and hence re-entering the international
financial circuit. China, fully aware of its crucial intermediary
role, has hence emerged as the big power broker for both
North and South Korea, as well as for Japan and even Western
powers. Japan and South Korea have also found new reasons and a renewed impetus
to come together. The Asian crisis saw Tokyo rushing to
the assistance of a much-humbled Korea, but also from a
Japan itself still mired in crisis since the early 1990s.
Both countries are inevitably opening up to the brave new
world of globalization. They therefore see much of their
own future and that of the region well intertwined, one
of the fundamental lessons they had learnt from the Asian
Crisis. In three phases since 1998, Seoul has symbolically
lifted a historic ban on most Japanese film, video games
and pop music, which constitutes a powerful cultural détente
between Japan and South Korea. In this regard, Tokyo and
Seoul, who will symbolically co-organise the 2002 Football
World Cup, are now negotiating a Free Trade Agreement, although
discussions are still bogged down in the sensitive agriculture
and telecommunications sectors.
Although China-Japan relations are still tenuous and the most difficult to patch up, a new raison d’etre for rapprochement seems to be dawning there too. Bilateral relations are mired in an emotional past, as amply demonstrated by Jiang’s last official visit to Tokyo in December 1998, when the issue of Japanese apologies for past atrocities crashed into an unfortunate diplomatic impasse. Chinese claims (from individuals and not the State) of Japanese war reparations and war compensation will further complicate Beijing-Tokyo relations. Although the Asian crisis has brought about a new sense of mutual vulnerability and a greater need for interdependence, mutual suspicions of each other’s potential roles and threats in the region still exist, as clearly exemplified by the ongoing debate on the American Theater Missile Defense (TMD) scheme and the Taiwan issue. But curiously, the greatest key to Sino-Japanese rapprochement may lie in Washington’s policy in this part of the world. Perceived to be increasingly brash and even “arrogant”, the United States’ policy towards Japan may inexorably push the Japanese to a fundamental reassessment of relations between Tokyo and Washington. A wide range of issues, which could lead to a certain distancing of Japan’s relations with the United States, would include continuous American-Japanese trade frictions, the growing anti-US-bases mood in Japan (just like in South Korea), American reservations about keeping the yen from surging (which is detrimental to a sustainable Japanese recovery), strong American resistance to the concept of a Japan-led Asian Monetary Fund, and the lack of public support for Japan’s “Third Opening” (as contained in the Okuda Report) instead of Japan being systematically hiding under the American security umbrella. Furthermore, the spat early last year between the world’s two largest economic powers in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was perceived by Tokyo as an American attempt to “constrain” Japan’s leadership role in Asia. On the other hand, China, rhetorically critical of American hegemonism (and irked by constant American “reminders” to China of its poor human rights record), yet much dependent on its technology and capital, has theoretically every reason to encourage the Tokyo-Washington rift so as to enhance its own emerging superpower status. Timid signs of a certain rapprochement between the two Asian giants have thus emerged. For example, Beijing has been fully appreciative of Tokyo’s unequivocal support for its entry into the WTO, and Japan in turn is thankful for clear Chinese support to the “regional currency swap mechanism”, which was adopted in Chiengmai in April 2000. In another sign of further rapprochement, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited Japan in October last year to try to mend “strained” ties between the two powerful neighbors, although the results left much to be desired. Added to this dimension is a much larger regional game in the making - the concept of “East Asian regionalism”. ASEAN, in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis and because of the painful realisation of its own institutional and geo-political weakness, has now understood that the region would probably be much stronger and influential if the three major Asian powers up north could be eventually brought into its regional picture. ASEAN at the crossroads
ASEAN
is clearly at the crossroads. Its Foreign Ministers met
in Bangkok at the end of July 2000 for its 33rd annual meeting,
followed by the ASEAN+3 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (bringing
together the ten ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South
Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN-10 clearly
took stock of itself. The association is currently faced
with domestic tensions in most of its ten member countries,
some internal discord amongst themselves and external pressure
from outside Southeast Asia, as compared to the optimistic
signs of rapprochement and an emerging regionalism further
north. Domestic political uncertainties abound in major ASEAN countries. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid is still struggling against the open challenges of parliamentarians, hostile political opposition leaders, disruptive elements in the Army, some more radical Muslim circles, separatists, student leaders and trade unionists. Thailand’s Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai faces an uncertain future as his coalition is fast losing ground and not certain of being returned to power at the elections of January 2001. Vietnam is in a state of semi-paralysis, as its leadership prepares for the next Party Congress some time in spring 2001; major economic decisions could no longer be taken whilst waiting for an upcoming leadership consolidation. Domestic
situations seem to have also deteriorated in the Philippines,
Laos and Malaysia in 2000. Bombs have gone off in both Manila
and Vientiane. The “Muslim problem” in the Southern Philippines
has once again highlighted the religious tensions in the
country and put a serious dampener on foreign investment
and economic development, not to mention the political crisis
over the impeachment procedures mounted against President
Joseph Estrada. Philippine-Malaysian
relations will continue to be thorny, even after controversies
over Sabah and Abu Sayef are resolved. Laos has blamed the Hmong resistance and some “rouge
elements” in dissident groups for trying to create fears
and unrest in the country, and has even cast a suspicious
eye at Thailand. Malaysia’s tribulations with the Muslim
Al Ma’unah cult has brought into sharp focus again the discontentment
of its Muslim Malay majority vis-à-vis the Mahathir Government,
who is losing its grip over the Malay electorate in the
country. Race and religious issues could become a passionate
arena of political debate and maneuverings in the coming
two years. Brunei witnessed an unprecedented trial against
one of the members of its royal family for fraud and embezzlement,
a rather traumatizing experience for this rich sultanate! Economically,
ASEAN, which is recovering from the Asian Economic Crisis,
is clearly not out of the woods. Furthermore, with the current
political and social uncertainties and tensions, its economic
woes would be further compounded and foreign investments
less forthcoming. Indonesia’s flagging rupiah and political
uncertainties will not necessarily plunge Southeast Asia
into another bout of financial crisis as with the baht in
1997, but Indonesian financial weakness and the quasi-bankrupt
state of its economy will definitely dampen prospects for
a sustainable recovery in the whole region. The drop in
the values of regional currencies and the rise of oil prices
in Thailand and Philippines will make conditions of economic
growth and restructurings even tougher in the foreseeable
future. Investors have already fled Indonesia, Vietnam and
the Philippines, as the ASEAN region as a whole expects
a major slow-down of foreign direct investment while other
regions of the world, like Latin America, Europe and even
Northeast Asia siphon it off.
ASEAN, as an institution, has also laid bare its fundamental
weaknesses during the Asian Crisis. No warning or coordinating
mechanisms exist or had functioned. ASEAN was lost and was
conspicuously absent during the Crisis. Each ASEAN country
fought individually for its own economic survival. With
the expansion of ASEAN to ten, the institution is clearly
facing growing strains of impotency in dealing and coordinating
the diverse political, economic and social models, especially
with wealth being concentrated in its two smallest states,
and with its three biggest states being badly fractured
politically, socially or economically, owing to domestic
uncertainties. ASEAN must therefore change and adapt quickly,
otherwise, it may become totally ineffective, hopelessly
irrelevant or a mere “sunset organization”! However, some ten years after the failed Mahathir-inspired East Asian Economic Caucus, the “ASEAN+3” concept is making some headway now, very much championed and encouraged by ASEAN. In fact, ASEAN leaders and their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea now meet after the annual ASEAN Summits and their Foreign Ministers consulted after the last ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok in July last year. The ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers first met in Chiengmai in 2000 and their Economic Ministers in Yangon, Myanmar, as if to send a clear signal of defiance to the West! A second time the Economic Ministers then met in Chiangmai and the Finance Ministers in Prague (during the IMF/World Bank gathering) in autumn 2000. Their Foreign Ministers met again, just before the ASEAN+3 Summit in Singapore towards the end of November 2000. Hence, ASEAN’s future success may now depend on rapprochement in Northeast Asia and enhanced cooperation further north. This appears to be the new emerging trend! Challenges to East Asian Regionalism
Although the triangular rapprochement in Northeast
Asia is clearly creating a greater sense of regionalism
in this corner of Asia, which in turn could bolster ASEAN
and thus an emerging East Asian regionalism (encompassing
both Northeast and Southeast Asia), numerous challenges,
and even obstacles, remain on the path of an eventual East
Asian entity taking off. These would include current internal
strains within ASEAN, the economic validity of such a future
East Asian entity, some lingering uncertainties in the “triangular
rapprochement” now taking place in Northeast Asia, the “Taiwan
political wild-card”, American policy towards Asia (notably
in security and trade), the emergence of Russia under President
Vladimir Putin and the domestic debates on China’s and Japan’s
roles in this region. ASEAN’s political, economic
and social transformation and reforms are clearly posing
enormous strains on the organization. Now, expanded to ten
members, ASEAN countries openly acknowledge a growing socio-economic
disparity amongst themselves, as well as within each member-state;
this disparity are set to grow with globalization. Cracks
are also opening up in the officially recognized two-tier
ASEAN, or the divide between the old and new ASEAN members.
Perceptions of ASEAN being ineffective (and a “sunset organization”)
became manifest in Bangkok and calls to restore international
confidence in ASEAN rang out loud. Its institutional and
geopolitical weaknesses, as seen during the Asian Crisis
and in its current politico-social upheavals, have added
real urgency for ASEAN to look for a new impetus, which
could now perhaps be found in the creation of a bigger East
Asian grouping. But fundamentally, the more basic question
is whether ASEAN can even hold together to wether the current
internal storms sweeping through the association. It is also unclear
if ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea all see an economic
raison d’etre for an eventual 13-nation grouping in the
future, even if it is based on open regionalism. ASEAN countries
certainly see the advantages of grouping together with the
larger and more powerful economies in the north, but it
may not be apparent for Japan or China, which are in the
midst of serious reforms, to see more rapid economic overtures
to ASEAN, especially in the trade sector. ASEAN may also
fear being “swamped” by Northeast Asian products and service
providers should they liberalize their trade with the bigger
economic powers. The crucial issue of mutual advantages
and economic benefits must thus be worked out by all concerned. Furthermore, despite spectacular
rapprochements up north amongst Seoul, Pyongyang, Tokyo
and Beijing, some fundamental uncertainties still remain.
Firstly, there is no guarantee that the Pyongyang-Seoul
rapprochement would continue to proceed smoothly, given
the fundamental differences of ideology, society and politics
which have separated the two Koreas for more than 45 years.
Some sectors of South Korean society already feel that their
Government had conceded too much and too fast to Pyongyang,
with no clear guarantees of security and lasting goodwill.
China’s intermediary role between the two Koreas could thus
come under stress if Korean reconciliation unravels. Japanese-Korean
ties will hinge primarily on what Tokyo expects and can
ultimately get out of Pyongyang for its war reparations,
especially in security assurances against Pyongyang’s arsenal
of missiles and unaccounted-for Japanese nationals kidnapped
by North Korean agents in the past. Although the last round
of Tokyo-Pyongyang talks in late August 2000 did not produce
significant results, the Japanese Government agreed to donate
500,000 tons of rice to Pyongyang in early October last
year. Lastly, China’s relations with Japan are far from
stabilized, given their lingering mutual suspicions and
what Beijing sees as sporadic outbursts of Japanese “far-right
nationalism and reactionary forces”, the most significant
recently being Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s remarks
on Jiang, whilst in Taipei for Taiwanese President Chen
Shui-bian’s inauguration. Taiwan is undoubtedly
the political wild-card in the ASEAN+3 equation. China’s
stance of no longer tolerating any delays in settling this
“internal” issue and its regular tirades against the United
States and Japan for supporting Taiwan’s “split” from the
Mainland is of geo-political concern. Depending on how Chen
maneuvers via-à-vis Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul would have
to walk a diplomatic tight-rope as both have powerful democratic
lobbies, which generally favour Taipei over the “autocratic
regime in Beijing”. Eventual Beijing-Taipei hostilities
and the thorny issue of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD),
which China vehemently opposes, could polarize regional
sentiments and pulverise the nascent East Asian regionalism.
Washington’s policy on Asia would ultimately be put to the
test, especially with Washington’s announcement of a proposed
1.3 billion dollar weapons sale to Taiwan. China has come
out strongly to oppose such a sale. The surprise resignation
of Prime Minister Tang Fei (a Mainland-born Kuomintang “old
guard”), apparently over major differences with President
Chen and his Democrat Progressive Party (DPP), and the succeeding
new “DPP government” have created further uncertainties
within Taiwan and in its precarious relations with Beijing.
But so long as Japan and South Korea feel insecure with
China looming over their horizon and a militaristic North
Korea at their doorstep, the American security umbrella
will remain in the region, thereby dashing hopes for any
East Asian grouping! Another factor, which may
impact on East Asian regionalism, is undoubtedly a resurgent
Russia under Vladimir Putin, who has less qualms than his
predecessor in challenging Washington for world influence.
Russia’s enhanced partnership with China (to openly oppose
Washington’s TMD proposal), its new strategic partnership
with India, a more active diplomacy in both Koreas and a
renewed effort to settle the “four islands dispute” with
Japan could pose a direct challenge to the United States.
Russia could thus either inadvertently contribute towards
Northeast Asian cooperation and regionalism by helping to
“steer” the traditional allies of Washington away from the
United States, or eventually thwart it out of fear of seeing
a new bloc (championed by powerful China and Japan) emerging
on its Eastern and Southern flanks, thus rendering the future
geo-political situation in this region more intricate and
complex. Furthermore, a lot would
also depend on domestic politics in the two big Asian powers.
China is in the initial stages of a leadership transition,
when the next Communist Party Congress in 2002 would decide
if the Jiang-Zhu team should make way for new emerging leaders
like Hu Jintao or Zeng Qinghong. Based on the latest annual
Beidahe summer 2000 meeting of the Chinese leadership, it
can be hoped that the political transition would be smooth
in China. In Japan, the 25 June 2000 polls have given the
country a weakened coalition government, the Liberal Democratic
Party lost its majority in the House. But after a “lost
decade” in the 1990s, Japan today can ill afford weak political
leadership, especially since its economic recovery is still
nascent and the country is in the process of re-assessing
its own political, economic, financial and security role
in Asia. Domestic politics in China and Japan will thus
have far-reaching implications for the whole region and
the future of East Asian regionalism. Conclusion
East Asian regionalism can
only succeed if both Northeast and Southeast Asia find peace
and security within their respective regions, and a converging
economic need to link up together. Forces of rapprochement
are certainly at work in Northeast Asia and further consolidation
can be expected in ASEAN. The institutionalization of the
ASEAN+3 prove that there are converging needs for a pan-Asian
economic grouping in these uncertain times, following the
collapse of the Seattle WTO talks in November 1999. But
it remains to be seen if the economic raison d’etre for
such an East Asian regionalism is strong enough for the
countries of the region to overcome their own security fears
and the other obstacles addressed above in order to come
together under one roof.
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© Friedrich Ebert Stiftung | net edition malte.michel | 1/2001 |