Global governance, as Lawrence Finkelstein notes, »is doing internationally what governments do at home.« The undisputed responsibility for global governance was long in the hands of the institutions of the UN system. But even in the 1970s there were signs that these institutions would, in the long run, no longer be up to the task of coming to grips with global problems. With a view to compensating for the UN system’s frequently low level of effectiveness when it come to solving pressing world problems, representatives of a great variety of governments came together – in particular in the wake of the Cold War – to form a growing number of groups, forums, clubs, and coalitions. These »G world« groupings – be they, as on the side of the industrialized countries, referred to as G7, G8, G20 or, as in the case of the countries of the South, as G20+, G33, G77, G90, G110 – may work on a formal or informal basis, with direct reference to the un system or in parallel to it, toward the end of regulating global politics and solving international problems. However, the appearance on the scene of new, self-appointed actors necessarily leads to a fragmentation and informalization of the landscapes of international relations, heightening the complexity of multilateral negotiation processes, which are in any case difficult.

In the present issue of INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND SOCIETY Thomas Manz traces the process which led, in the course of the negotiations devoted to formulating and shaping the world trade regime, to the formation of groupings and negotiating coalitions of countries of the South. It is a long time since the relevant bargaining arenas were dominated by the old industrialized countries, and what we have now is a set of highly differentiated structures designed to represent the interests of the parties engaged in these negotiations. The countries of the South have become increasingly articulate and now have substantial bargaining power, which they deploy in pragmatic ways, and without questioning today’s liberal world trade regime. On the other side, the industrialized countries are seeking, in their own groupings, to correct the asymmetries that have, in particular since the rise of various emerging nations to the status of world powers, proven to be a growing handicap to efforts to find joint and consensual solutions to international problems and to create universally accepted rules and regulations. However, the global governance system is still far removed from coming up with any definitive solutions to the efficiency and legitimacy problems that continue to beset it.

In his contribution, Thomas Fues takes a close look at the chances and the limits of the G8, focusing in particular on incipient approaches to reforming the architecture of both groupings and summits. One of the most important of these, and one envisioned in particular by Tony Blair, is the G8+5, i. e. a G8 enlarged to include the five weighty anchor countries Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa. Another reform model that has attracted attention is the L20 (leaders 20) propagated by former Canadian prime minister Paul Martin. It may be seen as an attempt to link a new and »executive« multilateralism with what has become known as the »new« regionalism. This model would, for the first time, deprive the old industrialized countries of the prevalence they have traditionally enjoyed. The G25, the »International Task Force on Global Public Goods,« and the L27, an initiative launched by Kofi Annan, are of lesser significance in this context.

Of the rising new world powers, China is certainly the country whose perception of its own role is going to have the heaviest impact on the future system of global governance. While it is true that Beijing is eager to avoid confrontation and conflict in those parts of the world in which China finds itself in competition with the old industrialized countries, the country’s uncompromising pursuit of its own interests and noninvolvement in numerous multilateral arrangements has led to uncertainty and concern among the OECD countries. In his contribution on Beijing’s energy and raw materials policy, Heinrich Kreft shows that China has very little choice but to engage in a resolute and forceful energy and resource procurement policy if it is not to jeopardize its economic development and social stability. Yet this neomercantilist approach, whose aim is to achieve control over external oil and gas reserves and to divert resource flows to China, stands in marked contrast to the Western idea that it is only functioning markets that can guarantee sufficient supplies for all.

For the case of Angola, Sabine Fandrych’s analysis provides us with a glimpse of what repercussions China’s resource policy may have for the international order. Following years of civil war, China, with a generous cooperation agreement, made it possible for Angola to sidestep the Western conditionalities normally imposed for the provision of reconstruction aide; Angola is now China’s most important oil supplier. China has shown itself to be generous in other parts of Africa as well. The contribution by Kretz, Roll, and Sperling, taking the opportunity of the China- Africa Summit, takes a close look at the present state of and prospects for China’s relations with Africa. The credits China provides in Africa, without linking them to any conditionalities, including environmental and good governance standards, have boosted its popularity there. The fact seems not to bother anyone.

Supplementing the focal issues of the present release of our journal, Hans-Joachim Spanger presents some thoughts on the perspectives of Russian–EU relations. Schetter, Glassner, and Karokhail make a case for a more differentiated view of Afghan warlords. Alfred Pfaller presents a number of insights into the economic and social transformations that Romania is undergoing. And Hans-Jörg Albrecht explains the international linkages of economies of violence in crisis regions, taking a critical look at the approaches used to deal with the latter under criminal law.