The populist deficiency of European social democracy
René Cuperus
Social democrats and right-wing populists fish in the
same electoral pond. The latter take advantage of the
real and psychological dislocations which are caused by
profound social and economic changes and which modern
social democracy fails to address. A left-wing populism
is needed to defend civilized democracy against the advance
of authoritarian and xenophobic right-wing populism.
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It
is only when leftists and liberals themselves talked in populist
ways – hopeful, expansive, even romantic – that they were
able to lend their politics a majoritarian cast and help markedly
to improve the common welfare.
Less than six years ago, the vast majority
of European Union member states were run by
center-left governments. The average EU summit
was a „red“ or „pink“ affair. However, the
European political landscape would soon look
completely different. Social democrats lost
ground, with parties of the center and right
winning elections. Particularly striking in
this rightward shift was the rise of a new
family of political parties, the right-wing
populists. Italy, Flanders, France, Hungary,
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands – everywhere
they stormed the political stage.
These parties can be called populist because
they claim to represent „the people“ and to
be mobilizing them against a domineering Establishment.
And they can be classified as right-wing because
they claim to be defending national or cultural/ethnic
identity against „outsiders“ or external influences.
One could call this new populism, as espoused
by Haider, Berlusconi, Orbán et al., a „third
way of the right“, a middle road between the
democratic and the undemocratic right, between
traditional conservatism on the one hand and
the antidemocratic extreme right of the past
on the other.
More recently, the right-wing populist parties in countries such as Austria
and the Netherlands have lost considerable
ground. Both the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
and the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) have
fallen prey to internal conflict when given
the chance to participate in government. Both
have experienced an implosion, as a result
of which they lost a large number of their
parliamentary seats in recent elections. But
does this mean that the meteoric rise of right-wing
populism will appear, with hindsight, as no
more than a brief, hysterical episode? Are
political conditions now „normalizing“, with
the traditional political parties regaining
their power?
This article is an attempt to show that nothing could be further from the
truth. The „populist moment“ – that specific
constellation of conditions under which populism
is able to thrive as a political force – may
well have passed, at least for the time being,
but its underlying causes most certainly have
not disappeared. First and foremost, right-wing
populism in Europe must be regarded as a response
to a social crisis. Almost by definition,
populist movements react to the downside of
modernization. They are a response to current
social friction and turbulence which for many
people – objectively or subjectively at the
conscious level – go hand in hand with an
apparently impending crisis and an actual
or feared collective loss of identity. In
addition to dynamism and new opportunities
for prosperity, the processes of globalization
– including immigration – individualization,
meritocratization and post-industrialization
which have for some time been at work in Western
society also breed resentment, frustration
and unease. And these, under certain circumstances,
can lead to a political eruption.
Looked at in this way, populism is a backlash against a world in flux:
an anxious, angry cry to preserve a familiar
way of life and identity. It is a protest
against threats from outside, and at the same
time an alarm signal that the existing political
and social system is failing to represent
people. And it is that signal, far more than
populism’s political power as expressed in
parliamentary representation, which deserves
to be taken seriously – not least by social
democrats.
This article concentrates upon the difficult
relationship between social democracy and
populism. To put that complex relationship
in a real-life perspective, it begins with
an examination of the topical case of the
so-called „Fortuyn Revolt“ in the Netherlands.
How could the Dutch political system, and
social democracy in particular, have been
caught unawares by the late Pim Fortuyn’s
mass movement? Where do the causes lie? What
is the background? And who is to blame?
The Fortuyn revolt: a textbook case of populism
In retrospect it is obvious: the Pim Fortuyn
„revolt“ in the Netherlands came straight
from the pages of Populism
for Beginners. Anyone who flicks through
the theoretical literature on the new populism,
describing the breeding conditions, the requirements
and the characteristics of the recent wave
of right-wing populism in Europe, will realize
– again, it must stressed with the wisdom
of hindsight – that a de facto paradise was
being created for it in the Netherlands during
the 1990s. The periods of „Purple Coalition“
government (1994–2002), in particular, inadvertently
paved the way for Pim Fortuyn. So what happened?
Most leading theoreticians
of populism, such as Taggart, Betz and Kitschelt,
set out from the fact that in our type of
society there exists a large and growing reservoir
of dissatisfaction, protest and frustration.
This arises out of massive transformation
and turbulence, in particular, globalization
and the transition from an industrial society
to a post-industrial „knowledge society“.
Such processes produce winners and losers,
and it is the latter – known in the German
debate as „Modernisierungsverlierer“
or „modernization losers“ – in whom we largely
find the fear and frustration. It is these
„losers in contemporary societies, unskilled
and semi-skilled workers, people with little
cultural capital“ who form the potential electorate
of the right-wing populist parties. A change
in their political preferences can be empirically
established: a shift towards right-wing authoritarian
ideas.
According to the theorists, this repressed
frustration and desire to protest will, under
specific conditions, lead to political mobilization
and expression in the form of right-wing populist
parties. The following conditions for the
rise of right-wing populism can be distilled
from the research literature: (i) a post-industrial
economy; (ii) dissolution of established identities,
fragmentation of culture, multiculturalization;
(iii) growing salience of the dimension of
socio-cultural cleavage; (iv) widespread political
discontent and disenchantment; (v) convergence
between the established parties in political
space; (vi) popular xenophobia and racism;
(vii) economic crisis and unemployment; (viii)
a reaction against New Left or Green parties
and movements; (ix) proportional representation;
and (x) experience of a referendum which cuts
across the old party cleavages. Not all these
conditions need to exist, but a combination
of a number of them will often lead to the
formation of right-wing populist parties and
so they are usually cited by academics as
the explanation for this process.
The "populist
moment" – that specific constellation
of conditions under which populism is able
thrive as a political force – may well have
passed, at least for the time being, but its
underlying causes most certainly have not
disappeared.
It does not take much effort to evaluate the
„Fortuyn Revolt“ against these criteria. According
to the “political” explanation of Pim Fortuyn’s
success,
its key cause was the fact that the differences
between left and right in Dutch politics had
disappeared. This in turn was due to the fact
that the two main parties, which had previously
confronted one another across the left–right
divide, each excluding the other from power
– the social-democratic PvdA and the conservative,
pro-market VVD – had started to work together
during the early 1990s in the so-called „Purple
Coalition“. The void created by the disappearance
of the left–right confrontation was, in effect,
filled by another fundamental political cleavage:
the characteristic opposition of populism,
political outsiders against the established
order.
The reasons why this populist definition
of politics – the idea of an inward-looking
political establishment divorced from the
electorate – found fertile ground in the Netherlands
are, first and foremost, political and sociological.
The Fortuyn Revolt has with some justification
been called „the Revolution of the Excluded“.
Those excluded or unrepresented citizens fell
into two very different groups. On the one
hand, those with „new money“ – such as entrepreneurs
in ICT, the law and property – who feel misunderstood
by society and do not form part of the organized
business community which has a formal stake
in the so-called „Polder Model“; and on the
other hand, misunderstood and neglected native
Dutch residents of run-down, so-called „multicultural“
urban working-class neighborhoods, who felt
unable to express their dissatisfaction with
turbulent cultural changes – the spread of
foreign languages, customs and habits, and
Islam – and crime in their immediate living
environment without being branded as racist
by the politically-correct „chattering classes“.
So the Fortuyn Revolt was an almost unholy
alliance of frustrated emotions, ambitions
and expectations on the part of two groups
which felt unrepresented by established politics.
A second reason for the populist momentum
was the disappearance of ideological confrontation
in politics and the creation of a generally
depoliticized climate during the 1990s. Many
factors contributed to this: from postmodernism,
through Fukuyama’s „end of ideological history“,
to the international debate on the „Third
Way“ with its transcendence of traditional
left–right positions. To this must be added
the centripetal force of a middle-class society,
divorced from its traditional social, political
and religious affiliations, increasingly gravitating
towards the center, as a result of which all
political parties shifted towards the electoral
middle ground in order to win votes.
A third reason which could be posited to explain why an „anti-Establishment
frame“ fell upon fertile ground in the Netherlands
can be linked to Max Weber’s theory of „Herrschaft“
(„mastery“ or „rule“). This states that, after
a long period of dominance by a bureaucratic
style of government which is regarded as incapable
of solving what are seen as pressing social
issues, it will be replaced by a phase of
charismatic authority. And it does have to
be said that the rise and impact of Pim Fortuyn
can quite convincingly be described as such
a case of charismatic authority.
To be sure, a technocratic administrative
style had come to dominate the Netherlands
under the Purple Coalitions. Fortuyn caused
an earthquake in the country’s political system
of alliances and Polder models simply because,
before he emerged, politicians had been used
to solving the issue of primacy during the
Dutch welfare state’s period of adaptation
to globalization and European economic and
monetary union through „wheeling and dealing“
between employers and the labor movement,
through off-stage policymaking by interest
groups and civil servants, and through a trade-off
between the conflicting interests of the PvdA
and the VVD in the form of the Purple Coalitions
led by Wim Kok. The citizen-voter was left
simply standing on the sidelines and looking
on.
The void created by the disappearance
of the left-right confrontation was, in effect,
filled by another fundamental political cleavage:
the characteristic opposition of populism,
political outsiders against the established
order.
Alongside this populist attack on the self-absorbed,
bureaucratic political class, Fortuyn’s rapid
rise can also without doubt be attributed to
the burning social issues of immigration and
integration, which he addressed head on. In
this respect, one could with equal justice associate
him with Haider’s anti-Establishment populism
and describe him as a radical defender of Western
liberal culture. As a matter of fact, political
significance must be attached to his homosexuality.
It is no coincidence that in the supposedly
progressive, libertarian Netherlands – with
its tolerance towards sex, drugs, rock ‘n’ roll,
and euthanasia to boot – it was a gay man who
climbed the barricades to take up the struggle
against the notion of the multicultural society
and unchecked immigration.
At least, that is one way of looking at it.
Fortuyn considered it his task to sound the
alarm „against
the Islamisation of our culture“, as
the title of a book he published in 1997 put
it. Fortuyn’s criticism of the multicultural
society arose out of his fear of such „Islamisation“:
of a culture in which there would be little
place for individual autonomy or freedom for
women and homosexuals. He wanted to defend hard-won
Western liberal and democratic freedoms – such
as gay and women’s rights, the separation of
Church and State, and freedom of expression
– against Islam, which he called a „backward
culture“. Muslim immigrants, particularly those
from a fundamentalist background, could threaten
those Western values. For that reason Fortuyn
also attacked the West’s cultural relativism,
which he viewed as dangerous and threatening,
given the anti-democratic nature of Islamic
regimes. This Islamophobic discourse not only
became less controversial following the terrorist
attacks against the United States on 11 September
2001, but it could also count upon more support
in the Netherlands. As elsewhere, a fear of
political Islam and of Muslim fundamentalism
gripped the country.
There was something else, too. Particularly
since the Dutch publicist Paul Scheffer had
intervened with a ground-breaking article entitled
„The multicultural drama“ in the newspaper NRC
Handelsblad, the debate on multiculturalism in
the Netherlands had been dominated by notions
of failing integration, adaptation, assimilation
and cultural integration. This instead and to
the detriment of the previous discourse, which
had been about multiculturalism or „interculturalism“:
actively stimulating people to learn to accept
one another’s differences.
We can now say that
Pim Fortuyn simply managed to transfer, using
provocative and radicalized language, the public
and intellectual debate already being conducted
in the opinion columns of the newspapers onto
„the street“ and into relatively run-down city
neighborhoods, particularly those of Rotterdam.
Places where members of ethnic minorities grouped
together in large numbers, not to form ghettos
in the socio-economic sense but certainly creating
segregated communities in the cultural sense.
The other main issue in the 2002 general election
campaign was the public sector. Political discontent
and disenchantment in the Netherlands focused
upon government performance in its delivery,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, of public
services. Health-service waiting lists became
the symbol of that dissatisfaction, along with
alarm about increased and "multicultural"
crime. The political program of Pim Fortuyn
and his LPF, as set out in his book De
Puinhopen van Acht Jaar Paars („The ruins
of eight purple years“), was mainly concerned
with the so-called decay of the public sector.
The neglected public sector was also the main
target for Jan-Peter Balkenende’s Christian-Democratic
CDA, which in its election manifesto promised
a „post-Purple reconstruction“, and of the radical
socialist SP, which accused the PvdA in particular
of „neoliberal betrayal of the public sector“
and even talked of the „clearance sale of civilization“.
The coalition partners were unable to defend
themselves convincingly against such a mass
attack. The question remains, however, whether
this image of a totally collapsed and crumbling
public sector represents reality, or is merely
a perception, perhaps even a manipulated one?
To summarize, it
is striking just how much the criteria defined
in the political science literature concerning
the rise of right-wing populist movements seem
to apply to the Netherlands of the 1980s and
1990s. The extensive convergence of the main
political parties, the evaporation of the left–right
divide and the replacement – once the problem
of mass unemployment had been solved – of a
socio-economic cleavage by a socio-cultural
one; the slow breakdown of the taboos imposed
by political correctness, enabling the exposure
of more and more critical problems in the integration
of ethnic minorities and high levels of dissatisfaction
with the „multicultural society“; and disinvestment
from and strong negative perceptions about the
public sector.
Just as the rise of populism went by the book, so too has its recent fall
in both the Netherlands and Austria. The implosions
of both the LPF and Haider’s party follow a
pattern which proves that populist movements
are usually extremely unstable internally. The
populist aversion to institutions and representation,
and hence its allergy to the formation of parties
along traditional lines, means that it lacks
powerful political machines built around „cadres“
and with some degree of continuity and consistency
in their programs. Instead, it often seeks refuge
in charismatic or authoritarian leadership.
It goes without saying that a populist party
which loses its undisputed leader through a
tragic murder on the eve of a general election
is going to find itself with major problems,
especially if it is set to participate in the
new government. And governing always has been
the Achilles heel of and main source of conflict
within populist protest movements. Just as leadership
conflicts are endemic to them – as in the Haider
case, for example. Right-wing populist parties
are much better at being an alarm-sounding protest
movement than a stable partner in government.
Populism is a backlash against a world
in flux: an anxious, angry cry to preserve a
familiar way of life and identity. It is a protest
against threats from outside, and at the same
time the alarm signal that the existing political
and social system is failing to represent people.
One could say, in fact, that their power lies in that ability
to signal, to agitate and to raise issues. And this, too, goes
entirely by the book. Regardless of their actual political power,
populist parties have a great ability to affect the political
debate. In other words, right-wing populism as a body of thought
can exist and propagate itself without requiring the lasting
presence of populist parties, particularly when the political
mainstream in a country adopts or even internalizes parts of
the populist agenda, thus effectively making right-wing populism
part of the mainstream.
In this respect,
the situation is more or less a mirror image of the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s, when social democracy was by no means in government
all the time or everywhere, but particularly in the countries
of north-west Europe certainly set the political tone with its
paradigm of the social welfare state. The right-wing populist
agenda, on the other hand, focuses upon the following themes
and issues: the social upheaval caused by the ongoing process
of modernization; the „illusion“ of the multicultural society;
crime and insecurity, and the restoration of standards and values,
order and authority; abuses of power by governing political
elites and the established „cartel“ of political parties; shortcomings
of democratic representation in today’s parliamentary party
democracies; the apparently unstoppable European integration
and expansion being imposed by elites; leftist tolerance (political
correctness, libertarian permissiveness); and the „crisis“ in
the public sector caused by government’s failure to perform.
This agenda does encompass real problems and it mobilizes difficult-to-ignore
discontent. The rise of populism sometimes even assumes the
guise of a „Citizens’ Revolt“, evidently based upon a great
unease about society and liberal democracy, the causes of which
are more cultural and socio-psychological than socio-economic.
The obvious question, then, is: what are the deep-seated roots
and causes of this right-wing populist revival in Europe? What
explains this huge yet unexpected explosion of dissatisfaction
and desire for change amongst the European electorate?
Populism: a revolt against the modern age
Ever since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution,
the modernization of Western society has been one continuous
story of detraditionalization, demystification and rationalization.
This process of technical, rational and material „progress“
has always been accompanied by fear and criticism, countermovements
and protest. In their most extreme variants, these manifest
themselves as religious fundamentalism and Fascism; in milder
forms, as democratic conservatism, intellectual cultural pessimism
and archetypal populism.
Let us look as this
last phenomenon. In the late nineteenth century it was Russian
peasants („Narodniki“) and American farmers who formed
populist movements to resist modernity. Both, in their own way,
turned against a capitalist modernization and rationalization
of „their“ agriculture. The American version of this populism
arose out of resistance by small farmers who felt threatened
by the expanding railway system. The Populist Party which emerged
as their representative exploited the farmers’ distrust of professional
politicians in Washington, and of lawyers, bankers and big business.
These personified the „bulldozer“ of modernization which was
destroying their land, life and traditional economy.
Just as those American
farmers resisted the relentless advance of the railway system
and all that came with it – uncontrollable modernization, the
technical and scientific rationalism which was filling, disrupting
and dominating their lives – so one can understand the basic
motive behind the new populism which emerged on the threshold
of the third millennium. What the arrival of railways and banks
meant to small farmers in America over a century ago is – although
the parallel is rather forced – what globalization in all its
forms means to large groups of people today.
As for the most
fundamental cause underlying the rise of right-wing populism
in Europe today, Betz and Kitschelt state that "the emergence
of populist parties is a consequence of a profound transformation
of the socio-economic and socio-cultural structure of advanced
Western European democracies."
The virus of "plebiscitary democracy" advances
insidiously, with the culture of democratic debate between equals
being replaced by personalized leadership with a "democratic"
mandate.
So it is about far-reaching social turbulence and such processes
as globalization, post-industrialization, individualization,
immigration and meritocratization which, particularly during
the closing decades of the twentieth century, led to accelerating
economic, social and cultural modernization. Since the 1950s
Western economy, society and culture have been „hypermodernizing“,
which has led to new and intense forms of „detraditionalization“,
real or perceived: fragmentation, differentiation, individualization,
splintering communities and collectivities, disrupted identities.
Above all else, (right-wing) populism must be regarded as a
manifestation of the „downsides“ and „flipsides“ of that hypermodernization.
The new populism is resistance against a changing world, a retrospective
desire for the lost world of the past (which sounds more romantic
than it should: that desire can easily manifest itself in xenophobic
or racist ideas which result in a horrible social and political
climate).
It seems, too, that the rise of right-wing populist movements changes not
only the political color and themes, but also the political
style („Us against the Establishment“ and „plain language“ rather
than official, technocratic verbosity). The tone of this movement
is classically populist, anti-Establishment and classically
nationalist, for maintaining national identity and against further
European integration, sometimes mixed with xenophobic ethno-nationalism.
In the wake of the rise of parties of this kind, the very nature
of democratic legitimacy also seems to change. The virus of
„plebiscitary democracy“
advances insidiously, with the culture of democratic debate
between equals being replaced by personalized leadership with
a „democratic“ mandate. A tendency which is reinforced by the
logic of the prevailing media democracy, which demands extensive
„personification without consultation“.
As already stated,
processes of social transformation create winners and losers
– plus a vulnerable group between the two. Flexibility, adaptability,
resilience and susceptibility are distributed unequally amongst
individuals and groups of people. The most common explanation
of the rise of the new right-wing populism is that it is, above
all, a revolt of the „Modernisierungsverlierer“.
All the forces bearing upon society also bear upon people, their
communities and their identities. The knowledge-intensive, dynamic
market and media society into which the West has been transformed
requires an enormous ability to be flexible and adaptable, plus
considerable social and cultural capital. Just as some people
are better than others at coping with upheavals in their way
of life, so the current social transformations are creating
winners and losers. This has been called a „new class society“,
in which the criteria for upward mobility are intelligence and
education, and those without them form a „meritocratic underclass“.
„The advantage“, writes Ultee, „is that everyone ends up where
they should. The drawback is that people at the bottom are left
without hope.“ In particular, they are those employed in disappearing
unskilled or semi-skilled factory work. The jobs in the service
sector which are replacing that often require social and communication
skills which have not necessarily been mastered by members of
the traditional working class.
Those affected are
not just unskilled workers and the unemployed, but also private-sector
professionals, members of the middle class and small businesspeople
who fear social decline and loss of status. Empirical research
has confirmed that these groups are heavily – and increasingly
– over-represented amongst the grassroots and potential electorates
of the new populist parties. This has been called the „proletarianization“
of right-wing populism. In recent years the populist parties
in Europe have been developing more and more into workers’ parties.
For example, 45 per cent of unskilled and semi-skilled workers
and 48 per cent of skilled manual workers voted for Haider’s
FPÖ in the Austrian general election of 2000. More than half
the electorates of both Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National in
France and of Pia Kjaersgaard’s Folkeparti in Denmark are made
up of the unemployed, manual workers and those with few or no
educational qualifications.
But right-wing populism
appeals not only to the poorly educated. It also attracts middle-class
and „nouveau riche“ groups. And this was particularly so in
the case of Pim Fortuyn. Research by the Netherlands Institute
for the Social Sciences (SISWO) into social discontent in Rotterdam
and in Almere – a new town founded during the 1970s on reclaimed
land to house people leaving Amsterdam’s inner city – identified
two groups as the main harborers of dissatisfaction with society.
The „stragglers“ were those who had failed to benefit from the
„seven fat years“ of the Purple Coalitions in terms of increased
prosperity, employment and social mobility. They lacked the
abilities needed for the new jobs and had not moved to the modern,
out-of-town housing estates built during the period. Educationally
disadvantaged, on low incomes and often literally left behind
in the deprived problem districts of cities like Rotterdam,
with their rising crime rates, disturbance, declining social
cohesion due to very high rates of population turnover and the
influx of ethnic-minority newcomers, this group can be classified
as the Netherlands’ own victims of modernization. And they voted
in huge numbers for Pim Fortuyn, as shown by the election results
from across such „problem areas“ – including the former eastern
coalfields of Limburg.
But there was also
support for Fortuyn in suburban, apparently flourishing towns
like Almere, Purmerend and Capelle aan den IJssel. According
to the SISWO research, this came from the „social climbers“
– people who have done well materially during the past decade,
with better jobs, better houses and better cars. But the survey
found that this group, often people living on new owner-occupier
estates in places like Almere, increasingly felt dissatisfied
with society – sometimes with a xenophobic dimension – because
the inner-city problems from which many had fled seemed to have
followed them in the form of disturbance, crime, insecurity
and "foreigners". And there is a third group, much
smaller but highly visible in the upper ranks of the LPF: the
"nouveaux riches", a new class of entrepreneurs from
the worlds of ICT, property and the law who feel insufficiently
represented and appreciated by the current sociopolitical system.
But sometimes even
progressives have been receptive to the new right-wing populism,
particularly in respect of its anti-globalist sentiments: the
defense of Dutch national and social identity in the face of
Europe and globalization. Many „liberals“ also share Fortuyn’s
abhorrence of anti-gay, anti-women Islam. Betz even goes so
far as to describe the new right-wing populism as not merely
a popular resistance movement but also the standard bearer for
an alternative model of Western European identity designed to
maintain a common identity in the face of the threat from multiculturalism
and globalization. He writes of a populist politics of identity
with components drawn from the left and the right, which allow
it to appeal not just to „modernization losers“ but also to
middle-class groups.
To explain why it
was that right-wing populism become such a force during the
final decade of the twentieth century three factors can identified.
First, the theme of immigration increasingly appeared on the
journalistic and political agenda in Europe. Not only because
of the increasing numbers of immigrants, but also due to the
realization that the right to asylum was being used more and
more by „economic migrants“ – and by organized people-smugglers
– as a way into Europe. This was coupled with the fear, particularly
in countries like Austria, of massive waves of immigration from
Central and Eastern Europe as a result of EU expansion. And
there was something else, too. The issue of multiculturalism
and integration, the „new social question“, became an ever-more
important aspect of the political debate in the Netherlands
and elsewhere. Ever since alarmist analyses of the failure of
immigrant communities to integrate began to appear the debate
has been dominated by notions of failing integration, adaptation,
assimilation and cultural integration. This last aspect is regarded
as ousting and working to the detriment of the previous discourse,
which had been about multiculturalism. That, however, is now
regarded, pejoratively, as „politically correct“. In some countries
more than in others, the idea of the new right-wing populism
as a „third way“ between the democratic and the far right has
come to be viewed as acceptable as an outlet for "multicultural
frictions".
Second, the 1990s
were the decade of „the ideology of change“. „Embrace change“
became the slogan of the New Democrats under Bill Clinton. At
a summit in Lisbon, Europe officially declared its intention
to win the global race with the United States and Japan by becoming
„the most competitive socially-inclusive knowledge economy in
the world“.
The apparent determinism and inevitability of processes such
as globalization, ICT, deregulation and the creation of a new
post-industrial knowledge economy have even been declared subject
to the „TINA“ principle – „there is no alternative“. First,
right-wing governments and later the more or less social-democratically
inspired „Third Way“ administrations like those of Britain’s
Tony Blair, Holland’s Wim Kok and Germany’s Gerhard Schröder
fell in line with the neoliberal „Washington Consensus“ of the
IMF and the World Bank, with its ideology of a world in flux,
a world of permanent change, all of it in the same direction.
Much more than people realize, this has created a climate of
huge uncertainty in which, for example, individual unemployment
is regarded as a punishment for not being sufficiently flexible,
mobile or willing to take risks. Harsh processes of selection
and meritocratization in education and the labor market have
come to be dominated by this theme: „Don’t miss the boat to
the New World.“
Third, and as a natural extension of the above, there is the
fact that social democracy has more or less disappeared as a
counterweight to and buffer against the prevailing social dynamic.
First – certainly in the case of Germany’s SPD and the British
Labour Party – because of a long, forlorn period of opposition
and then, once finally back in power, a desire not to force
a sudden change of policy direction but instead to „ride the
wave“ of dynamism with the world in flux. This was the „Third
Way“ as an ideology of adjustment to the new global knowledge
society, „beyond left and right, beyond state and market“. This
ultimately left a vacuum which right-wing populism – the cultural
revolt of the „little man“ against social change – eagerly filled.
The predicament of social democracy
Right-wing populism can in many respects be regarded as the
competitor, the foe or the antithesis of social democracy. The
populism which emerged in Europe after the Second World War,
in particular, can be defined as a reaction against the social-democratic
welfare-state consensus of mixed economies, the Beveridge Plan
and Keynesianism; a consensus which also embraced other institutional
arrangements, such as a strongly interventionist bureaucratic
state, a representative democracy based upon mass parties and
collective bargaining between employers and workers.
Populism – which by nature is anti-institutional and anti-representational
– rejected this post-war consensus, viewing it as counter to
the real interests of „the people“, if not a form of self-enrichment
for special interests and corrupt party elites. Populists regard
the sociopolitical system as a whole, and certainly political
parties such as the social democratic „machines“, as a corrupt
filter separating „the rulers“ from „the people“.
It is no coincidence that right-wing populism has most prospered in social-democratically
inclined nations like Austria, Denmark and, to a lesser extent,
Belgium, the Netherlands and France, where it has concentrated
its wrath against various models of consensus democracy: the
„Church of the Left“ in the Netherlands, „concordance democracy“
or „proportional democracy“ in Austria and „cohabitation“ in
France.
For this reason alone populism throws down the gauntlet to social
democracy, which it accuses of betraying the people and which
it portrays as a corrupt component of the high-handed Establishment.
For a mass party which considers its raison d’être to be „social
justice for all“ and equal rights, achieved by challenging the
prevailing elites of capitalism, this is nothing less than a frontal
political assault. Something like this attacks the progressive
social-democratic principle of an open society. In terms of both
internationalism and international cooperation – European unification,
world citizenship – and, culturally, in terms of tolerance and
liberal values; certainly since it embraced new social movements
and „liberated“ intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s, social democracy
and the progressive left have represented a libertarian, cosmopolitan
and post-material ideal of citizenship built upon the values of
ecological sustainability, feminism, international solidarity
with the Third World and multiculturalism or cultural relativism.
Social democracy has refused to side with the anti-globalization
movement, yet it has also failed to develop its own model of
globalization which differs substantially from that favored
by neoliberalism
On this point, in particular, right-wing populism
can be viewed as an attack upon the very culture of social democracy.
The populists counter the progressive values of social democracy
with the argument that they threaten cultural, national and even
ethnic identity. This, they say, is the „dark side“ of those values,
the price to be paid for modernization and immigration.
In Austria, the fuel for populist resistance against "Konkordanzdemokratie" ("concordance
democracy") was the equal distribution of power across
the entire social and political system between the main social
democratic and Christian Democratic milieus.
The form in which populism appears is highly dependent upon
the national context. In Scandinavia it is about resistance
to the "extravagant and paternalistic welfare state",
with as core issues the excessive tax burden and – formerly
– cosmopolitan immigration policy. The trigger in Belgium is
the federal constitution, with the „Flemish card“ being played
against the supposedly favored Francophone provinces. The system
of patronage and clientism endemic within the established parties
also plays a role there, as does immigration policy („Our people
first“). In France there was the Poujadist movement of small
shopkeepers opposed to Parisian centralism, from which Le Pen
would eventually emerge. In the Netherlands, much later, Pim
Fortuyn would insist that „the Netherlands is full“ and fulminate
against the „ruins of the Purple years“, the imperious „Polder
Model“ and the bureaucratic „manager state“.
Social Democracy as the Establishment
So, whilst the national contexts may vary, virtually everywhere
social democracy is in the dock, facing a whole list of charges.
The first is that, much more than its own self-image would like,
social democracy is an integral part of the Establishment in
the Western liberal democracies. Since the 1950s it has been
a standard bearer for the European model of the welfare state,
alongside Christian Democracy in its role as a traditional movement
of actual or potential government. It is this friction between
being part of the „ruling Establishment“ on the one hand and
the „party of the common man“ on the other which is the Achilles
heel of social democracy, making it highly and increasingly
vulnerable to populist attack. As a result of growing political
cynicism, better education and people’s greater assertiveness,
the tension between political elites and the public which has
long been an integral part of representative democracy has,
if anything, increased, whereas the technocratic-consensus politics
of social-democratic governments has tended to point in a different
direction. Government has sometimes so stifled democracy that
in Austria, for example, social democrats have been branded
„Haidermakers“: their style of and attitude
in government was such that they effectively brought right-wing
populism – in this case, Haider’s success – upon themselves.
Ideological Inertia
Second, there is an ideological and policy problem. The political
project of social democracy can be defined, in a few words,
as „to organize capitalism according to standards of justice
and emancipation so as to achieve full citizenship“. But social
democracy has recently aroused the suspicion, at the very least,
that impotence has caused it to abandon this project, unable
as it is to organize the ideological and political process of
globalization and shareholder capitalism at world level. Not
only does social democracy rightly no longer think in terms
of an alternative to capitalism since the total collapse of
Communism, but now it also seems unable to adjust capitalism
on a global scale even to the extent of humanizing it or tempering
it socially. Social democracy has refused to side with the anti-globalization
movement, yet it has also failed to develop its own model of
globalization which differs substantially from that favored
by neoliberalism. The idea of presenting the European social
model as a blueprint for the world as a whole has not yet really
taken off, to put it very mildly. Indeed, it is still not even
clear whether the „Rhineland“ or corporatist model of capitalism
could be globally competitive in the long term. That will depend
upon the prospects for economic renaissance in Germany or Japan.
The Third Way philosophy is a perfect illustration of the ideological dilemmas
facing social democracy. This was originally a refreshing criticism
of social-democratic „etatism“ – addressing the failures of
government as well as those of the market – and provided a useful
recognition of the importance of an active welfare state and
a dynamic private sector. But it eventually became far too much
of a reconciliation with the dominant Anglo-American neoliberalism
of the 1990s. Here, sadder but wiser, I would like to share
an observation made by Werner Perger, „Third Way correspondent“
of Die Zeit. „That
the large traditional parties increasingly resemble one another“,
he writes, „is probably due in part to the “majority strategy”
adopted by the social democrats – the much vaunted “Third Way”.
In the age of globalization, left politics seems to consist
mainly of cuts, labor-market reforms, benefit reductions and
deregulation. Perhaps these were unavoidable, but it is difficult
to view them as anything other than neoliberal revisionism in
a “light” form. Whatever the case, the new revisionism has failed
to impress the traditional grass roots of the governing leftist
parties… As soon as the impression set in that only foreigners
and marginal groups were still profiting from the slimmed-down
welfare state, the authoritarian face of “worker culture” appeared.“
This seems to be a crucial factor. According to many people, the welfare
state no longer offered – or was perceived as no longer offering
– a safety net. And what security remained went – or was perceived
as going – to those with no right to it: undeserving recipients
of long-term disability benefits, recent immigrants, tax exiles,
and so on. As a result, the alliance between social democracy
and its traditional supporters in the educationally underprivileged
low-income groups – whose link with it was the protective, reliable
welfare state – was put under strain.
But beware! It would be wrong to think that the Purple Coalitions and the
associated „Third Way“ route adopted by the PvdA was the most
risky option it could have taken. It is certainly possible to
strongly criticize the pragmatic „strong and social“ (a party
slogan) middle way chosen by Dutch social democracy during the
1990s, just as there is much in that course which is defensible.
But those seized by nostalgia for the „true left“ and the old,
trusted ideological certainties forget that the left-wing credentials
of, for example, the PvdA during the 1980s – prior to it becoming
a party capable of government under Wim Kok – were based largely
upon such themes as nuclear disarmament, the environment, feminism
and the Third World – a program that simply did not appeal to
ordinary people in ordinary neighborhoods. During the 1980s
the PvdA in the Netherlands – like the SPD in Germany and the
Labour Party in the UK – became so unelectable precisely because,
amidst economic crisis, mass unemployment and a welfare system
bursting at the seams, it decided that it should be concentrating
upon post-materialist issues like nuclear missiles, nuclear
energy, the environmental apocalypse and the unconditional basic income. However unsatisfactory
it may be in so many respects, the Third Way was a reaction
against that attitude and should therefore be considered as
a return to the socio-economic bread-and-butter issues, and
as a necessary acknowledgement of the process of globalization
and the appearance of the post-industrial service-based economy.
The Cultural, Political and Sociological Fault Line
The third reason, therefore, that social democracy has been
put in the dock by populism is its political program in the
area of „post-materialist“ issues. For example, its internationalism
in terms of European integration, foreign policy and development
cooperation, and its ideal of an open society at the global
level. In principle, social democracy resists economic and cultural
protectionism. All this rests upon a so-called progressive view
of humanity and the world, one which is rather cosmopolitan,
culturally relativistic and „politically correct“, and dovetails
with a generally progressive stance in terms of libertarian
tolerance, pluralistic democracy and respect for individual
human rights.
It is here that a clash occurs with the rightist populism defined by Taggart
as „the politics of the heartland – a backward utopia, a justification
for the exclusion of the demonized – which accounts for the
inward-looking nature of populism. Internationalism and cosmopolitanism
are anathema to populists.“
By „the demonized“ can be meant everything which threatens the
„heartland“: the old, trusted world and identity of the past.
In the case of right-wing populism that includes, and not unemphatically,
foreign influences – in particular, the influx of immigrants
and foreigners.
But, and this complicates the matter, this is a clash which cuts right
across social democracy, too. Or, at any rate, does not pass
it over. Research shows that social democracy’s electorate divides
into two sharply-defined groups: materialists and post-materialists.
And the dividing line between them largely coincides with the
cultural split which is defined by educational level, between
those with few qualifications who feel insecure and vulnerable
and the well-educated who, armed with social and cultural capital,
are consciously working to carve out their place in the world.
This fault line passes right through social democracy far more
than it divides any other political party or movement.
And that fact conceals a whole story about the sociological basis of social
democracy and what groups it can and does represent. Historically
speaking, the alliance within social democracy between the proletariat
and the professionals, between the working and middle classes,
between the intellectuals and the managers has never been an
easy one, particularly during the post-war period. At the time
of its ideological reorientation during the 1930s, a debate
raged within social democracy about whether it was a workers’
movement or people’s one: class-based versus nation-based social
democracy. This discussion was conducted against the menacing
backdrop of advancing Fascism, which portrayed itself as both
anti-capitalist and anti-socialist and which proved highly attractive
to farmers and the petty bourgeoisie who had fallen victim to
the economic crisis of capitalism. So the revisionist debate
within social democracy was also about „deterring the petty
bourgeoisie and the workers from extremism – read: Fascism and
Communism – by generating prosperity“.
This extension of social democracy’s ambitions beyond the traditional
boundaries of the proletariat and the working class would later,
after the Second World War, become permanent.
Ever since it was founded, the Dutch Labour Party has attempted to forge
an electoral coalition of the working and middle classes;
of those with some way still to go towards gaining full membership
of society in the face of deprivation and discrimination, and
of those who support social democracy from a more comfortable
position. The sociological links between the party and its electoral
grassroots have become much looser in the structural sense since
the 1970s, driven by the breakdown of traditional religious
and sociopolitical affiliations in favor of individualization.
This phenomenon is in turn linked to that of political parties’
own estrangement from their grassroots. The close links between
society and politics, between parties and their rank and file,
have largely been broken. The structure of our society itself
has changed significantly, and that of representation no less
so. Voters have become floating voters, their behavior considerably
more capricious than only a few decades ago. Ideological loyalties
and class identification have become less and less significant.
In an increasingly meritocratic society, lifestyle and cultural
identity profile have gained ground.
The type of individualism practiced by today’s citizen is difficult to
reconcile with attachment to a collective entity such as a political
party. And the modern media landscape has further encouraged
the loosening of ties between citizens and parties by giving
the business of politics a new logic and dynamic, and by taking
over traditional party functions such as socialization, communication
and the dissemination of information. This means that not only
has the relationship between voters and parties changed, but
also that between parties and their own members.
Politics has become a marketplace in which political entrepreneurs
compete for the votes of citizen-consumers and the traditional
mass parties have extensively rationalized and professionalized
themselves, with, as a result, even more drastic social deracination
and the further expansion of the state’s influence. The party
organizations are centralized. Especially when a party is in government,
its center of gravity shifts to the corridors of power. The logic
of the media has stimulated more plebiscitary elements within
the organization – the personalization of a politically mediagenic
leadership – and turned internal debate and differences of opinion
into an electoral liability. In the shadow of power, the party
organizations have withered. In general, the political leaders
of the parties have shown little interest in fundamental policy
debates. Their maxim in running their party has been risk management;
they have shied away from more open, intellectual debate. In practice,
when in government a pragmatic middle way has prevailed and the
party’s political profile faded.
In its style, communications and program, social democracy
should dare to be more "populist", in a leftist way,
if it is to combat and compete with right-wing populism.
As a result of all this, the „natural“ rank and file of social
democratic parties such as the PvdA has become highly fragmented.
Large sections of the traditional working class have become
part of the broad middle class. From the 1970s on, the PvdA
became in many respects a „party of the collective sector“:
for teachers, nurses and civil servants. And new groups have
appeared, mainly as a result of immigration. The increased heterogeneity
of what a social democratic party wants to regard as its electoral
base is a breeding ground for different and difficult-to-reconcile
interests. Traditional working-class bastions alongside free
thinkers and the new knowledge workers, the traditional intelligentsia
and immigrants. And, for fear of alienating groups within its
electoral base, the party has suppressed the growing frictions
between them.
Just whom the PvdA does represent and wants to represent was therefore
one of the main questions following its May 2002 general-election
defeat. The modernization of social democracy in Europe – the
so-called „Third Way“ or „Neue Mitte“ – has been a conscious
attempt to break further into the sociological middle ground,
including those working in business and commerce. At the same
time the social democrats still counted the remnants of the
old working class, and in a more general sense those at the
bottom end of the labor market amongst their core support. But
not only did they fail to represent those diverse groups simultaneously
in a credible way, but they have also not adequately acknowledged
that problem.
Herein lies the new representational dilemma for social democracy,
including the issue of the multicultural society and all that
is projected onto and around it. The election outcomes in several
European countries may possibly have brought to the surface
a more structural change within the electorate, a change which
could confound social democracy for a long time to come. It
could well become more difficult for the left to forge successful
and robust alliances between the well-educated and the less
well-educated, between rich and poor, and between the middle
class and less privileged groups.
Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the
Fortuyn revolt and the success of similar political movements.
First, the Fortuyn Revolt was a natural consequence of the comprehensive
convergence of the main streams in Dutch politics which occurred
during the closing decades of the twentieth century. With the
participation of supposed arch rivals, the free-market liberal
VVD and the social-democratic PvdA, in a series of so-called
„Purple Coalitions“ the traditional left–right divide in mainstream
politics all but disappeared and existing processes of de-ideologization
and technocratization were accelerated. At the same time traditional
socio-economic fissures disappeared with the successful solving
of the mass-unemployment problem, but this opened the way for
non-materialistic issues such as immigration and integration
to take center-stage and allowed the culture of political correctness
which had grown in this area to be smashed.
The second conclusion is that the Fortuyn Revolt was an integral part of
the wider pattern of rising right-wing populist movements in
Europe. This indicates that, as well as its cyclical and specifically
Dutch origins, that revolt also had more structural causes.
And that they were part of a bigger international phenomenon.
It is argued that right-wing populism is a resistance movement
against a world in flux and an alarm signal for dysfunction
in the representative political system.
Third, right-wing populism hits social democracy particularly hard. The
new populism which developed in Europe after the Second World
War can be characterized as the arch foe of the post-war welfare-state
consensus, à la Beveridge and Keynes, which was largely colored
by social democracy. That consensus rests upon a mixed economy,
collective bargaining through employers’ and workers’ organizations,
the bureaucratic institutions of the welfare state, a representative
democracy built upon mass political parties and, finally, a
culture of liberal – sometimes libertarian – freedoms and international
co-operation.
All this is complicated by the fact that, both electorally and in their
sociological background, social democracy and right-wing populists
are partly fishing in the same pond – that of the "little
man". In places their electorates overlap: educationally
underprivileged working and lower-middle-class groups from the
cities and their suburbs. The result of this is that a populist
„revolt of the little man“ highlights the long-standing divide
within left-wing and progressive social-democratic parties between
the well-educated and the less well-educated, between so-called
„materialists“ and „postmaterialists“. Looked at in this way,
could right-wing populism be the cultural revenge of the „working
class“ against the intellectual elites within what are supposedly
„workers’ parties“?
If, despite everything, social democracy still regards its historic task
as being „to keep society together“, to face up to the disruptive
and destructive powers which are acting upon society to the
detriment of liberal democracy and the social constitutional
state (Rechtsstaat), then it should start by paying far more
attention to the darker aspects and unsettling effects of the
hypermodernization which has gripped world society in recent
decades. Social democracy must show more courage in making use
of the political room for maneuver which this apparently deterministic
process still allows. As Michael Ehrke puts it, „Politics in
the Age of Globalization appears to be subject to a process
of progressive desubstantialization: it is being reduced to
making minor adjustments to inevitable processes and managing
crises. The lack of fundamental options is undermining political
competition and forcing politicians to dramatize the most minimal
of differences or to substitute them altogether with symbols
and media events.“
Are competing political options for globalization possible? Can a global
social capitalism be developed as a competitive alternative
to the Anglo-American model, and what alliances and global agreements
will this demand of European social democracy – if we can even
say that it exists?
As a „force of political moderation“, social democracy must in essence
keep the so-called „modernization losers“ away from right-wing
populism and even worse forms of extremism and radicalism. This
means both that the forces of modernization need to be tempered
and steered as far as possible and that its economic, socio-psychological
and cultural impact has to be cushioned as much as possible.
This on pain of entering an „authoritarian century“, as the
Anglo-German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf recently warned us,
if we do not succeed in solving the crisis of democracy in the
Western sociopolitical system.
Put simply, if social democracy wishes to reduce resentment in
society – socio-economic, democratic, cultural and multicultural
discontent – and thus remove the breeding conditions for socio-economic
marginalization or the polarization of communities along ethnic
lines (the so-called „Antwerp scenario“), then its program, style
and communications must make concessions to its educationally
underprivileged constituency – if necessary, at the expense of
its other constituency: the well-educated intellectuals. This
is the painful dilemma facing European social democracy amidst
a situation of social turbulence, unfavorable political conditions
and attacks from a right-wing populism which promises to protect
„the little man“ as „a bulwark against real or imagined global
forces“.
A civilized democracy can survive in the long term only
if the political moderates sing the best tunes, and keep on
doing so. That it is an end which justifies many means.
I must make it absolutely clear that I am not calling here
for „Haidering“ – adoption of the rhetoric and program of right-wing populism
for strategic reasons – in any shape or form. What I am appealing
for is that the underlying causes and reasons for the rise of
that populism in Europe be taken very seriously; and for a populist
discourse and style as the „language of true reality“ to be
taken more seriously alongside, against and in confrontation
with the „language of policy reality“ used by politicians, political
parties, experts, observers and technocrats. As Michael Kazin
formulated it for the situation in the United States, „The desire
to transcend populism is shortsighted. It ignores the very persistence
of the language, rooted in the gap between American ideals and
those institutions and authorities whose performance betrays
them... At the core of the populist tradition is an insight
of great democratic and moral significance… We should not speak
solely within the terms of populism, but, without it, we are
lost“.
In its style, communications
and program, social democracy should dare to be more „populist“,
in a leftist way, if it is to combat and compete with right-wing
populism. Even if this risks creating major existential problems
in the long term: the cleaving of social-democratic parties
along cultural lines.
„Left-wing populism“
entails: (i) acknowledging the „dark“ sides of the current process
of modernization and the forces which directly affect people’s
lives far more than is done at present; (ii) prioritizing the
plight of those who have been left behind by the process of
economic and cultural modernization as it has accelerated (specifically,
through a generous program of compensation for the residents,
black and white, of deprived and decaying inner-city districts),
as well as making crime-fighting and prevention policy more
effective and immigration and integration policies more coherent,
as a matter of urgency, in order to check the tendency towards
social disintegration; and (iii) disengaging as far as possible
from technocratic and bureaucratic complexes so as to „repoliticize
politics“. The cozy, introverted and isolated world in which
political power is concentrated needs to be smashed. Through
better political communication, greater respect for common sense
and increased politicization – fewer technocratic inevitabilities,
more political freedom of choice – the gap, be it perceived
or real, between debate-defining, decision-making elites and
ordinary citizens should be closed as far as possible. A civilized
left-wing populism is necessary if the wind is to be taken out
the sails of a right-wing populism which is rooted in authoritarian
and xenophobic sentiments, if not worse things.
A civilized democracy can survive in the long term only if the political
moderates sing the best tunes, and keep on doing so. That is
an end which justifies many means.
With thanks to Frans Becker
for his lucid comments.
Cf. Michael Ehrke, Rechtspopulismus
in Europa: Die Meuterei der Besitzstandswahrer, Friedrich
Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis Unit, p.
3.; also Meindert Fennema, Populist Parties of the Right (IMES Paper,
23 July 2001).
See Paul Taggart’s
clear introduction to the phenomenon of populism: Paul Taggart,
Populism, Concepts in the Social Sciences (Open University Press, 2000);
and Pierre-André Taguieff, L’Illusion
Populiste. De
l’archaïque au médiatique (2002).
P. Taggart,
Populism (2000); H. Kitschelt, The Radical Right
in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis (1995); H.G.
Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (1994).
Mentioned by
the Swedish sociologist Jens Rydgren in his paper Why not in Sweden? Interpreting radical right populism in the light of
a negative case (ECPR Paper, 2001).
See R. Cuperus,
“From Polder Model to Postmodern Populism. The Fortuyn Revolt
in the Netherlands”, R. Cuperus, J. Kandel and K. Duffek
(eds), Migration, Multiculturalism and European Social Democracy (forthcoming
2003), I analyse five explanations of the Dutch „Citizens'
Revolt“ in detail. I have classified and defined these as
follows: (i) the political explanation; (ii) the multicultural
explanation; (iii) the public-sector explanation; (iv) the
media-democracy explanation; and (v) the sociological explanation.
Adri Duivesteijn, „De revolutie der buitengeslotenen“, Socialisme & Democratie, no. 5/6 (2002),
pp. 60–67.
„After two Purple Coalition governments“, wrote Fortuyn,
„the public domain and the collective sector are in a disastrous
state. They have minded the shop, but nothing more. Health-service
waiting lists are unjustifiably long, education is in an
alarming state, public security is too low, the public administration
has lost its credibility, and so on and so forth“, Pim Fortuyn, De Puinhopen van acht Jaar Paars (2002), rear flyleaf.
This has been called the „Haidering“ of the political system as a whole. Perger writes: „the
importance of right-wing populist parties lies first and
foremost not in the party-political arena, as expressed
in election results and parliamentary representation, but
above all in the discursive arena. Populist right-wing politics
is part of a new, postmodern political debate centering
on the question of political culture.“ Werner Perger, „Vorwort“,
ZEITdokument: Populismus in Europa (2002),
p. 4.
For this parallel, see Helmut Dubiel, „Die Stunde der Verführer“, ZEITdokument: Populismus in Europa (2002), pp. 10 et seq.
See Bart Tromp, „Het virus van de plebiscitaire democratie“, Socialisme & Democratie, no. 12 (2002),
pp. 31–34, and J. Raschke, „Die Zukunft der Volksparteien
erklärt sich aus ihrer Vergangenheit“, in Matthias Machnig
and Hans-Peter Bartels (eds), Der rasende Tanker, pp. 19 et seq.
At the very least, it can be said that there was a rhetorical
dramatization of the Great Divide, as expressed in the New
World ideology of the information gurus and the new-economy
hype, and all massively reinforced by the dramatic power
of the modern media. As Michael Ehrke rightly states, it
is mainly the mass media, the economists and the consultants
– the „rhetoricians of upheaval“ – who in recent decades
have incessantly been telling nations, state welfare systems,
companies and individuals alike to „adapt or die“, Michael Ehrke, op. cit., p.27.
The
most shocking example of the dominance of post-materialist
over materialist themes which I ever witnessed in social
democracy was at a conference of the German SPD in Mannheim
in 1991, shortly after reunification, when the topic „The
economy of the former GDR“ was scrapped from the agenda
so that a debate on the gender distribution formula for
appointments to party bodies could be extended.
F. de Jong Edz., „De Nederlandse sociaal-democratie en de dreiging van het
fascisme 1930–1940“, Socialisme
& Democratie, no. 6 (June 1984), p. 198. See also
Annemieke Klijn, Arbeiders- of volkspartij. Een vergelijkende
studie van het Belgische en Nederlandse socialisme 1933–1946
(Maastricht, 1990).
The following
passages are partially drawn from the report of the PvdA’s
„De Boer Committee“. With many thanks to Frans Becker.
Ehrke, op. cit., p. 19. See also Susanne Falkenberg, Populismus und Populistischer Moment in Vergleich zwischen Frankreich,
Italien und Österreich, Elektronische Dissertationen,
Universitätsbibliothek Duisburg (2003), www.ub.uni-duisburg.de/diss.
Ralf Dahrendorf, Die Krisen der Demokratie
(Beck, 2003).
Michael Kazin,
The Populist Persuasion,
An American History (1995), pp. 282–84.
René Cuperus *1960;
political historian; Senior Research
Fellow, Wiardi Beckman Stichting, Amsterdam;
rcuperus@pvda.nl
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