conflict in „dysfunctional states“ implies rebuilding „failed states“, strengthening democratic institutions and improving governance systems. By providing institutionalised mechanisms to resolve disputes and channel discontent, democratic institutions prevent crises of governance from escalating into violent conflict. The promotion of democratic governance thus becomes an important tool for preventing, managing and resolving political crisis and, in extreme cases of political instability and violent conflict.

While it acknowledges the destabilising effects of state disintegration in conflict-ridden and war-prone countries, the Commission’s approach fails to recognize that democratization  itseflf can generate sources of conflict. In fact, hasty transitions towards democracy and premature elections can destabilize fragile peace processes. While democracy and modernization  generate political stability, the process of democratising and modernising often breeds instability (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; ICG 2001). In some extreme cases, it is increasingly believed that benign authoritarianism may be preferable to hollow and corrupt façade democracies.

It is increasingly recognised that democratization  processes are highly volatile. Democratization  does not follow a natural, orderly and linear sequence of positive and progressive political transformation. More often than not, it is an irregular, erratic and sometimes reversible process, taking place in highly fluid environments. It can go backwards and sideways as much as forward. Moreover, the resurgence of democracy since the late 1980s has not produced a clear-cut division between democratic and non-democratic countries, but rather a wide spectrum of semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes with an extensive „grey area“ in between (Carothers 2000). Increasingly, the term democracy is used with adjectives to capture the reality of „hybrid regimes“ struggling to consolidate (Collier and Levitswky, 1997).

Ultimately, these considerations question the intellectually elegant assumption of a linear „democratization  continuum“, from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. Some scholars have questioned the usefulness of the very paradigm of democratic transition and consolidation to comprehend the dynamics of democratization  and guide policy (Schedler 1998 and 2001; Carothers 1997, 2000 and 2002; Santiso 2001a). Rather than assessing evaluating particular situations along a democratization  continuum, policy-makers should focus on the wide template of democratising regimes. Particularly tricky is the transition from crisis to conflict. Often, democratic regressions and crises of governance lead to the suspension of EU development assistance, thus neutralising its ability to „project stability“.  

Strengthening Governance and Preventing Democratic Decay

As far as the quality of democratic governance is concerned, the nature of the political regime of democratising states often lies somewhere in between genuine democracy and overt autocracy. Many new and restored democracies possess the formal attributes of democracy while the mode of governance exhibits resilient autocratic features.

At the conceptual level, these considerationsthese considerations question the international community’s ability to assess the nature of democracy as well as the trajectory of democratization  in specific countries. Assessing whether semi-authoritarianism is a stable condition resulting from a blocked transition, a temporary stage in a gradual process, or a different trajectory to democracy represents tremendous challenges. But evaluating the nature of political dynamics is of critical importance for devising appropriate assistance strategies. The concept of „politically fragile countries“ (ECDPM 1997 and 1999) encompasses a wide variety of situations, with varying degrees of willingness and capacities to democratise.[6]

The policy challenges are equally great. Dealing with „dysfunctional states“ (ECU 1997a:16) requires a savant subtle dosage of both positive and negative incentives. It entails assessing the extent to which leaders have the political will to democratise. Promoting democracydemocratic governance  in faltering democracies such as Zimbabwe or Haiti often involves a difficult choice between a confrontational approach and an accommodating strategy, both unsatisfactory responses to crises of governance. The challenge for the international donor community is then to devise assistance strategies with a rightthe right mix of positive and negative measures built in long-term, coherent and consistent strategies.

The Difficult Art of Conditioning Aid

Negative and Positive Incentives

The overarching ECU democracy assistance strategy has been and continues to be one of „constructive engagement“. Its overall objective is to encourage political change and policy reform in a non-confrontational manner, based on dialogue and partnership with governments. However, while the importance of ownership for sustaining reform and increasing the effectiveness of aid is now well established (Santiso 2001b), the EU recognises that, in some cases, a genuine commitment to democratic governance and the rule of law may be weak or lacking. In this case, it may be appropriate to make financial assistance conditional on the receiver recipient country’s political performance (ECU 2001a). This raises the question of how to design and apply conditionality in order to really further democratization.

The notion and practice of political conditionality have spawned intense controversyies (Stokke 1995; Nelson and Eglington 1992, 1993; Burnell 1994; Killick 1998). Defined as „a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts of financial assistance“ (Killick 1998:6), aid conditionality represents an attempt to use aid as an incentive for reforming the policies and institutions of developing countries. Two important features of this type of political conditionality are its ex-ante nature and punitive character: predetermined conditions are set in advance to access development financing and failure to meet them precludes the disbursement of aid.

By now, the failure of conditionality to attain its desired objectives and bring about sustained economic and political development is widely recognised. Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997) have found that there is no direct relationship between aid flows and policy reform. This finding is substantiated by a recent study on Sub-Saharan African countries which shows

that aid cannot buy reform and that the conditionality attached to adjustment loans did not successfully induce policy change (Devarajan, et al. 2001). Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson (1997:10) argue that „aid is only effective in promoting growth in a good policy environment, and on the whole, it has not succeeded in leveraging good policies.“ More recently, Craig Burnside and David Dollar (1997) have found that there is no direct relationship between aid flows and policy reform and Paul Collier (1997:57) concludes that ‘aid has simply not brought reform’. This finding is substantiated by a recent study on Sub Saharan African countries which shows that aid cannot buy reform and that the conditionality attached to adjustment loans did not successfully induce policy change (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holgren 2001).Conditionality cannot substitute or circumvent domestic ownership of and commitment to reform.

Furthermore, aid tends to free -up budget resources, which can then be allocated to alternative purposes. As a result, it becomes critical to assess and influence the quality overall government spending, rather than focus on sectoral spending.

Another type of indirect democracy assistance strategy is a „positive“ form of political conditionality: aid selectivity, or what Nelson and Eglington (1993) term „allocative conditionality“. This strategy ties aid rewards to the direction of change, rather than the perceived level of democracy (Nielson 1999:3). Aid selectivity is a particular form of ex-post conditionality establishing a positive link between aid allocations and country performance. Of course, selectivity-based approaches to political conditionality require establishing rigorous monitoring mechanisms to assess the dynamics of democratization  and the direction of governance reform.

Aid practice so far does not make much use of „“incentive conditionality“” (Youngs 2001). Other political considerations remain important in determining aid flows, especially for large donors and multilateral institutions. A recent study of ECU aid towards ACP countries found that the performance of a country in terms of political rights and civil liberties plays only a minor role in the allocation of ECU aid and factors such as the degree of openness and human development play no significant role (Wolf and Spoden 2000). In general, donors have not effectively tailored their assistance to the specific country and to the specific phase of the reform process (Devarajan et al. 2001). More even, better policies and improving performance often lead to decreasing levels of assistance (Collier and Dollar 1998), sending the wrong signal.

To the ECU, rHowever, aid adical strategies of aid selectivity are largely not availableunavailable. As long as it adheres to an aid policy of global reach, it cannot discriminate among aid recipients. The principle of selectivity can only be applied to the scope and amount of aid, not to its direction. Still, the „tranching“ of aid into several components and the introduction of phased programming could be used to reward democratising countries.

More fundamentally, governance conditionality and selectivity strategies beg the original questionconcern that spurred the current shift in policies: how can external agencies promote good governance, especially in poor performing countries? After all, unsatisfactory performance is often a sign of lacking weak institutional capacity and state failure.

Making European Development Aid More Selective

The ECU is increasingly relying on incentive conditionality to complement its complement positive measures of direct support. The co-operation between the EU and the so-called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries, which was established in 1975 and which is often cited as a model of development partnership (von Meinjenfeldt et al. 1999, ECDPM 2001 a and b), incorporated in 1995 elements of governance conditionality. Article 366a of the revised fourth Lomé Convention provided for appropriate steps to be taken in the event of serious and persistent human rights violations or interruptions in the democratic process. Non-compliance with article 5’sthe „essential elements“ of article 5 could lead to a suspension of the co-operation, considered as „a measure of last resort“. The revised convention also allowed for de-facto suspension owing to „special circumstances“. It failed, however, to clearly define such circumstances, thus giving a certain leeway to the EU in its use, in particular to „transpose“ foreign policy decisions under the „second pillar“ of the EU into development aid policies.

The Cotonou Convention of 2000, building on the legacy of the fourth Lomé Convention, reinforcesintegrates  elements on the elements of governance conditionality and aid selectivity. Articles 9 and 96 replicate the provisions on the „essential elements“ and the „suspension clause“ contained in the previous agreement. Articles 9 and 33 also include positive measures for promoting human rights, strengthening democratic governance and consolidating the rule of law, including support for political, institutional, and legal reforms, the fight against corruption, assisting the reform of the state and the modernization  of the public sector, promotinge political, administrative and financial decentralization , and building capacity of non-state actors.

The inclusion of good governance into the agreement proved to be a particularly controversial issue.[7] As a compromise solution, the EU and the ACP agreed to include good governance, defined as „the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purpose of equitable and sustainable development“ (article 9.3), as a „fundamental element“ of the partnership, subject to regular monitoring. The commitment to good governance does not posses the legally binding nature of the “essential elements” and failure to uphold it does not lead automatically to the initiation of the suspension mechanism enshrined in the convention. Nevertheless, serious cases of corruption, including bribery, are now grounds to suspendfor suspending the co-operation (article 97).

Peace-building policies and conflict prevention and resolution are also dealt with in the convention. The principles of article 11 and the provisions of article 8 provide for political dialogue as a means to prevent conflict and its recurrence in ACP countries.

As the previous agreement did, theThe new convention provides for a consultation mechanism in the event of a serious breach of the terms of the agreement. This constitutes an important „signalling instrument“ through which the EU can respond to regressions or interruptions of the democratization  process, persistent violations of human rights, and endemic corruption. It also constitutes a tool for influencing the course of events. The party accused of violating the founding principles of the convention is invited to hold consultation with the Commission „at the level and in the form considered most appropriate for finding a solution“ and „the

consultations shall begin no later than 15 days after the invitation and shall continue for a period established by mutual agreement“, but shall not last longer than 60 days (article 96). The article states further that: „if the consultation does not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation is refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have disappeared.“ It also allows for the „special urgency“ procedure of the previous convention.

However, the consultation procedure remains largely unregulated and the „appropriate measures“ are atto the discretion of the EC. While this uncertainty provides for flexibility, it can and does also generate misunderstandings and frictions, between the EU and its partners and within the EU itself, as illustrated by the disagreement between France and the Commission during the Fall of 2001 over the resumption of aid to the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates. More fundamentally, the process by which a country qualifies, disqualifies and re-qualifies for ECU support remains to be specified. Once a country has been sanctioned, there must be greater clarity on how it will re-qualify and how the rehabilitation process will unfold.

Another innovation of the Cotonou Convention is the introduction of performance-based management and the simplification of instruments (ECDPM 2000). Co-operation instruments have been reduced from ten to two, a grant facility and an investment facility. The agreement also tries to end of „aid entitlements“ according to which countries were allocated fixed and locked amounts of aid regardless of their performance. Instead, it introduces a performance-based allocation system within a broader country strategy. An assessment mechanism, the contours of which have yet to be defined, shall regularly adjust aid flows in light of performance.

Strategic planning is also being reformed. A single Country Support Strategy (CSS) is to guide the programming process for each ACP country, based on the country’s own development strategy. Performance reviews will allow to modify the volume of resources allocated in response to evolving needs and performance. This will not affect the core, „base case“ element of aid allocations, but provisions for a „high case“ element in aid allocations are to be used to reward particularly well-performing countries. The introduction of country strategies constitutes a positive, yet ambitious, development in the management of EU aid. If well conducted, it will significantly enhance the coherence and consistency of aid strategies. However, „the devil is in the details“ and the main challenge resides in implementing these demanding provisions, in particular in how considerations over the quality of democratic governance will be integrated and monitored.

The Commission’s endorsement of country strategic frameworks echoes the World Bank’s approach, including in terms of contents (Santiso 2002b, 2001b, 2000a and b). This alignment is reflected for instance in the ECU strategy for poverty reduction, which has become the overarching objective of ECU development policy (CEU 2001, EC 2001d). In recent years, the World Bank has amended its operational guidelines to give good governance greater importance in adjustment and investment lending operations (Kapur and Webb 2000; Santiso 2000 and 2001b). The Bank’s Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and the World Bank/IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) now integrate considerations over the quality of governance and, since 1999, the Bank has been conducting Institutional and Governance Reviews (IGR). However, the alignment of the ECU with the approach of the international financial institutions (IFIs)IFIs has its limits, because – contrary to the apolitical mandate of the IFIs – ECU aid now has explicitly political objectives. Tensions surfaced, for instance, in the recent review of the poverty reduction strategies organised by the IMF and the World Bank in January 2002 (IMF 2002). As the World Bank and the IMF are to embark on debt relief for conflict-affected countries under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, thisis tension iss are likely to gain greater prominence. The Commission emphasises that debt relief should be conditional on governance performance and enhanced commitment to strengthen democratic governance and that it could be suspended in cases of democratic regressions or breakdowns (Nielson 2000). However, conditions for debt relief are limited to economic reform and a relatively narrow range of good governance issues. As the World Bank and the IMF are to embark on debt relief for conflict-affected HIPC-eligible countries, this tension is likely to gain greater prominence. Since the ECU has mainly been a „follower“ in the process of the redefinition of aid strategies and governance conditionality since the late 1990s the stated objectives of ECU aid run the risk of being diluted.

Case Studies

Suspension of aid for non-respect of democratic principles and interruption of the democratic occurred in eleven cases, including Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo, Cameroon, Haiti, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Liberia and more recently Zimbabwe. Aid was also de facto suspended in countries in conflict such as Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The four case studies exclusively focus on instances where the consultation and suspension mechanisms of the last two EU-ACP agreements have been resorted to. As the revised fourth Lomé Convention adopted in 1995, it will focus on cases that occurred thereafter.

The cases reviewed here focus on instances where the consultation and suspension mechanisms of the last two EU-ACP agreements have been resorted to. They reflect common shortcomings in the management of political dialogue and the suspension mechanism in its three stages: at its inception (consultation procedure), implementation (suspension of aid) and conclusion (resumption of aid). The cases reveal a learning curve, in particular in the way in which the consultations are conducted, as the Commission EU has gradually incorporated the lessons from experience, albeit mainly in an ad hoc manner.

Niger

In January 1996, a military coup led by Colonel Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara overthrew the first democratically elected government in Niger. The coup happened in a context of a profound crisis of governance resulting from the stand-off between the President and the Parliament over the nomination of the Prime Minister.

The European Council decided, by unanimity, to suspend its development co-operation under the basis of article 366a of the fourth Convention of Lomé (Koulaïmah-Gabriel 1998). Humanitarian aid and aid benefiting the poor were excluded from the decision. This is the first time article 366a had been used but the ECU resorted to the „special urgency“ clause to immediately suspend Niger on the grounds of a sudden and abrupt interruption of the democratization  process.

The period of suspension was established at six months, after which a new decision had to be taken to prolong the suspension. In the absence of such a decision, co-operation could resume. That is precisely what happened as France vetoed the re-conduction of the suspension in July 1996.

Baré won the highly contested presidential elections of July 1996 and the opposition boycotted the subsequent legislative elections of November. The political crisis continued and democracy further eroded. Following a gentlemen’s agreement in July 1998, local elections were held in February 1999 and subsequently annulled by the Supreme Court in early April. On 9 April, President Baré was murdered by his own presidential guard in a bloody military coup lead by General Wanké. The Parliament was suspended and replaced by a National Reconciliation Council which promised to hold elections in the following nine months, by 31 December 1999.

The ECU suspended, once again, its co-operation on the basis of „special urgency“ and invited the de-facto authorities to initiate consultations. These were conducted in May and June 1999 and concluded on 29 July. A transition calendar was agreed upon, leading to the adoption of a new constitution by referendum in July and the holding of presidential and legislative lections in October and November under the supervision of an independent electoral commission. Tandja Mamadou was elected President. The EU resumed its co-operation gradually as progress in the transitional process was observed.

Haiti

The Haitian case constitutes a dramatic illustration of the difficulties of cooperating with dysfunctional democracies and failed states.

Since June 1997, Haiti has been in a state of institutional paralysis, experiencing democratic decay and recurrent crises of governance. Following several postponements, the first round of the general election was held in May 2000. However, in June, the Organization  of American States (OAS), which had been observing the elections, declared the results of the senatorial elections flawded and called on the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to address these shortcomings and adhere strictly to the provisions of the electoral law in the second round. The Haitian authorities interpreted this injunction as „interference“ and pressured the CEP to proclaim the results as they stood. On 18 June, under intense pressures, two of the CEP’s nine members resigned and its chairman fled to the United States. The remaining six members officially announced the results, unchanged, provoking an outcry within the international donor community. On 7 July, the OAS Electoral Observation Mission announced that it would not be observing the second round because the results adopted by the CEP were „incorrect“. The second round was nevertheless conducted on 9 July.

On 25 July, the Commission asked the Council to initiate consultation with Haiti under article 366a. Nevertheless, presidential and senatorial elections were held on 26 November, resulting in the re-election of former president Jean Bertrand Aristide. These elections were preceded by a wave of violence and intimidation of the opposition. The EU deplored the unwillingness of Haitian authorities to establish a genuinely independent electoral commission and resolve the disputes arising from the May elections. Ultimately on 31 January 2001, the ECU, exasperated, suspended its much-needed co-operation (including the second „tranche“ of the National Indicative Programme of the eighth FED, amounting to 44.4 million Euro and direct budgetary aid). The country further slipped into crisis, with a series of failed attempted coups d’Etat in July and December 2001. Relations between the EUU and the government of Haiti are now marked by acriymony and mutual distrust and dislike.

Côte d’Ivoire

The way the consultation process was conducted in the case of Côte d’Ivoire in 2000 has beenwas more rigorous and was able to influence the political situation to a certain extent. Ultimately, however, EU pressure was not enough.

On 22-23 December 1999, long-time President Kona Bedié was deposed by a military coup led by General Robert Guéi. The constitution was suspended and democratic institutions dissolved. A National Committee of Public Safety was established to restore the authority of the state and to „create the conditions necessary for the restoration of democracy and the organization of free, fair and transparent elections“. The coup was unanimously condemned (including by France, the United Kingdom and the United States).

The EU consulted with Côte d’Ivoire on 7 February on the basis of articles 5 and 366a of the Convention of Lomé. The de-facto authorities in Côte d’Ivoire pledged to restore democracy and agreed to an electoral timetable leading to the holding of presidential, legislative and local elections by 31 October 2000 at the latest. The EU decided not to suspend co-operation but to adopt „appropriate steps“ including „the pursuit of co-operation on a gradual and conditional basis, focusing during the transition period on measures in support of the rapid and full restoration of constitutional democracy, the rule of law, good governance and civil society, and, should the need arise, humanitarian aid“. The European Commission would monitor compliance with the electoral timetable and the adoption of measures to guarantee the impartiality and credibility of the elections.

The October elections were supposed to bring a relatively smooth restoration of democracy, but things went terribly wrong. In July, a new constitution was adopted and approved by referendum but controversies regarding electoral and citizenship laws tainted the electoral process. The Supreme Court told the two most popular opposition parties that they could not present candidates and Alassane Ouattara, a former Prime Minister, was excluded from the race on the grounds of its contested nationality. It progressively became clear that General Guéi would not allow free and fair elections and wanted to retain power. and Tthe EU consequently suspended its electoral assistance. Ultimately General Guei was forced out of office by protests in October after he refollowing his refusal to fused to step down despite losing the elections to Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the oldest opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI).

Another round of consultations took place on 15 February. Open and transparent local elections were held in 25 March. On 29 May, the Commission proposed to resume aid on a „gradual and phased“ basis, focusing in particular on institutional support. On 25 June  the Council of the EU decided to gradually restore co-operation with Côte d’Ivoire to accompany the positive developments. However, the EU demanded a national and multiparty dialogue, national reconciliation and legal proceedings concerning human rights abuses. The resumption of full co-operation would depend on the progress achieved, pending a further review in January 2002. Eventually, the ECU normalized its cooperation. In March 2002, it increased its macroeconomic support to 56 million euros and adopted a 264 million euro five-year program covering the period 2002-7.

Fiji

On 19 May 2000, a group of armed men stormed the Parliament, taking hostage its members, the Prime Minister and forty members of the government. The group led by George Speight demanded a decisive governmental role for ethnic Fijians, who make up 51% of Fiji’s population. On 29 May, the head of the army, Commodore Frank Bainiramara, with the consent of the President who stepped aside, assumed executive power and repealed the 1997 multi-ethnic Constitution. On 6 June, the military government outlined a plan to restore civil order, which appeared to accede to the demands of the coup plotters for the restoration of the supremacy of ethnic-Fijians in government.

The armed insurrection was immediately condemned by the Presidency of the EU. Consultations under articles 9 and 96 of the Cotonou Convention were held with the de-facto government of Fiji. While deploring the interruption of the democratic process, the EU noted the commitments made by Fiji’s interim government, including a timetable for constitutional review, the holding of democratic elections within 18 months, and the bringing to justice of the coup plotters. It demanded four benchmarks to be met: the multi-racial contents of the constitution (by the end of June 2001), the adoption and promulgation of a new constitution (not later than the end of December 2001), the holding of general, free, and fair elections (not later than the end of June 2002), and the initiation of judiciary procedures against George Speight and his associates. Nevertheless, the Council EC suspended all investment projects under the European Development FundEDF programs until free and fair elections were held and a legitimate government hads assumed office. New aid commitments would be conditioned upon the progress made towards the restoration of democracy, as assessed by compliance with the benchmarks. The Council would revoke these measures when democracy is was fully restored.

Tensions between ethnic Fijians and ethnic Indians continued to escalate, however. Traditional chiefs gathered to find a peaceful resolution to the standoff and appointed Josefa Iloilo, a candidate favoured by  the rebel leader, to the presidency. In July 2001, the EU threatened to tighten its sanctions. In late August-September 2001, parliamentary elections were held and judged relatively free and fair by international observers. Mr Chaudhry’s party won 27 out of 71 parliamentary seats, while Mr Qarase’s nationalist Fijian People’s Party won 31, failing to secure an outright majority. However, and despite the provisions of the 1997 Constitution, Prime Minister Qarase excluded Mr Chaudhry’s party from the coalition government he formed in September, with the blessing of President Iloilo. In October 2001, Fiji’s new Parliament was sworn in, but tensions between ethnic-Fijians and ethnic-Indians did not recede. The situation remains fluid, making it particularly difficult to assess the real quality of Fiji’s „restored democracy“.

Progress Ahead?

The Limits to the Consultation Cum Aid Suspension Procedure

The four cases illustrate the difficulties of conducting political dialogue in a consistent and systematic manner. They clearly demonstrate that the operational mechanisms within the Commission to manage these instruments have not been sufficiently been clarified. They also indicate that there is only a narrow range of circumstances in which the consultation procedure of the suspension mechanism can be invoked.

The consultation and suspension mechanism has proven to be more effective in responding to cases of breakdown of democracy, such as coup d’états (Côte d’Ivoire or Fiji), than to flawed elections (Togo or Haiti). In the former, the de-facto authorities seek to legitimize their rule by agreeing on a calendar for the return to constitutional rule, which can be aptly accompanied by the EU’s incentive measures. In the latter cases, such as Zimbabwe, the semi-authoritarian regime resists and resents having its legitimacy contested by outside actors. The increasing acrimony and confrontation between the regime and the EU makes it particularly difficult to apply a positive approach of support and inducement as long as the autocratic leaders remain in power. For instance, President Eyadéma of Togo has never recognised the electoral fraud in 1992. Negative measures and aid sanctions tend to be the only available recourse, until the regime credibly re-commits itself to return to the democratization  path. For these reasons, credible international observation of elections is critical to assess the regime’s autocratic tendencies.

However, the legitimacy of European electoral observation is often criticized as undue interference in domestic affairs. For instance, on 29 October 2001, the Council decided to launch the consultation provided for by article 96 of the Cotonou Convention vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, after months of stalemate over political violence and the deterioration of the rule of law ahead of presidential election in March 2002. Exasperated at the expulsion of the Head of its Electoral Observation Mission, the EU imposed „smart sanctions“ on Zimbabwe’s ruling elite on 18 February 2002, which was criticized by the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity as interference in the country’s domestic affairs. 

It becomes thus urgent to devise more legitimate processes of international electoral observation, based perhaps on existing multilateral arrangements and involving existing regional organizations.

The Limits to EU Policy Formulation and Implementation Capacity

Clearly, while progress has been made in recent years, ECU democracy assistance policy still lacks clarity, coherence, and consistency. Within the Commission itself, responsibility for encouraging democracy abroad remains fragmented and divided between several directorate generals, in particular external relations, enlargement, and development assistance. The creation of the Europe Aid Co-operation Office may well enhance the management of aid but may also further complicate the translation of broad policy goals into consistent operational strategies. Tensions s.[8] Tensions and contradictions between the first and second pillars of European integration remain an additional stumbling block for the application of coherent democracy assistance strategies and governance conditionalities.

Paradoxically, the current reform of external relations and development co-operation tends to „depoliticise“ foreign aid, converting it essentially into a technical activity to be evaluated in terms of the efficiency of aid delivery and the quality of aid programmes, rather than their political thrust. Indeed, most changes have tended to focus on procedural improvements, while limited progress has been made on the far more important issue of linking resources to strategic objectives. The Ddirectorate Ggeneral for Eexternal Rrelations, where a Unit for Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and ACP Political Issues  as well as a Unit for Human Rights and Democratization  have been established, has become the main focal point for democracy promotion. However, long-term democracy assistance work more often takes places within the realm of development co-operation. And as Clare Short suggests, there may often be a „clash between the perspective of foreign affairs ministers and development ministers“.[9]

At the operational level, there remain thorny issues. The new system of performance-based programming process is likely to be more demanding than ever, and the EU Ddelegations are likely to bear the heaviest burden. Moreover, conducting structured political dialogue and organising broadly based consultations will inevitably lengthen prolong programming. Although this may ultimately increase the effectiveness of aid, the articulation of country strategies, the monitoring of government performance and the regular review of the quality of democratic governance are particularly challenging endeavours requiring sustained efforts and specialised skills.

In order to assess democracy and governance in partner countries, the ECU is increasingly relying on quantitative performance indicators. Less attention has been given to the manner in which performance indicators are identified, specified and monitored. The process by

which quantitative and qualitative indicators are defined greatly influences their legitimacy and thus their operationality (Santiso 1999; ECDPM 2000). The method is as important as the indicators themselves. This implies establishing a clear and agreed-upon framework to assess democratic governance (assessment criteria), measure progress in democratization  and good governance (performance indicators), and evaluate the impact of the interventions by the international community on these processes of change (evaluation criteria and impact indicators).

Four Modest Proposals 

Strategic planningin the area of democracy and governance assistance should be strengthened, ideally within the directorate general for development. The strategic planning department would support country delegations in the design of country assistance strategies and ensure the consistent application of policy guidelines.

A Democracy and Government Governance Unit should perhaps be established. It would be responsible for assessing policies and revising strategies, cCapitalizing the Commission’s recent experience with political dialogue and aid suspension, it would coordinate the consultation process and guide the suspension mechanism across countries. It would provide critical institutional support to the country delegations, which remain the central locus for conducting political dialogue in specific countries, as each case is unique. The unit would work out methods to assess democratic governance and identify the performance indicators for monitoring progress or detecting regress. The Governance and Institutions Department of the British Department for International Development (DFID) and its Governance Advisory Group constitutes a promising model to mainstream governance concerns in regional and country operations.[10] It combines both a central departmental unit responsible for designing governance policies and ensuring consistency in its application, as well aswith a decentralised group of associated experts advising field offices on the articulation of country strategies and operational programmes.

Policy research and evaluation capabilities should be dramatically enhanced. The ECU aid apparatus still lacks the research capacities of institutions such as the World Bank and encounters difficulties in setting its own agenda and having its voice heard in multilateral forums. The need for more coherent aid policies and strategies should not lead the EU to adopt the agenda of the International Financial InstitutionsIFIs, but rather to influence it and challenge it. After all, the identity of ECU aid is founded on its distinctively political character and approach. But challenging the intellectual monopoly of the IFIs on aid polices and the predominance of economic approaches to development will require the ECU to enhance its credibility as an innovator and leader in development thinking. The establishment of the Quality Support Group (QSG) is evidence of the current efforts at enhancing the quality of programming, but fails to address the central question of strategy and the translation of general objectives into coherent policies and consistent programmes.

A systematic review of the suspension mechanism since 1995 should be conducted. Political dialogue and the consultation process provided for by the Cotonou Convention are likely to become the ECU’s principal instrument to deal with faltering democracies and crises of governance. It is thus essential to have a critical look at how it can be improved to better manage these politically sensitive processes.

References

Bossuyt, Jean, Terhi Lehtinen, Anne Simon, Geert Laporte and Gwénäelle Corre. 2000. Assessing Trends in EU Development Policy. An Independent Review of the European Commission’s External Aid Reform Process (Maastricht: ECDPM, Discussion Paper 16)

Burnell, Peter, ed. 2000. Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass).

Burnell, Peter. ‘Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality’, Democratization, vol.1, no.3, pp.485-503.

Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 1998. Aid, the Incentive Regime, and Poverty Reduction (Washington, DC: The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 1937).

Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 1997. Aid, Policies and Growth (Washington DC: The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 1777).

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, vol.13, no.1, pp1-21.

Carothers, Thomas. 2000. ‘Struggling with Semi-Authoritarians’, in Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass), pp.210-225.

Carothers, Thomas. 1999. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: CEIP).

Carothers, Thomas. 1997. ‘Democracy Assistance: The Question of Strategy’, Democratisation, vol.4, no.3, pp.109-132.

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