Internationale
Politik und Gesellschaft Online International Politics and Society 3/2002 |
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The fight against islamist terrorism has enhanced U.S. presence in a highly unstable region. Authoritarian rulers try to enlist American support to consolidate their power at home and to extend it in the region, while Russia, China and Iran are becoming weary of growing U.S. influence. Popular aspirations for prosperity and liberty might have to step aside. |
The term ‘Great Game’ was originally coined by R.Kipling to label the 19th century Anglo-Russian rivalry for hegemony in Central Asia. After the demise of the USSR, this buzzword has been liberally exercised by analysts and observers of the region to describe the great powers’ various endeavors to fill the strategic void, and ranging from their military ventures to mere competition for its energy resources and pipelines. After the Afghanistan war, writers have discovered that the age-old ‘Great Game’ is entering a new and more dangerous phase. They warn that the intrigue continues today, with new powers skirmishing over the ‘fabulous’ oil and gas wealth of the Caspian Basin, with new intimations of Islamist violence, and no one willing to openly concede defeat. But only a few scholars try to explain what specifically is the real Central Asia today.
In his 1920 “Letter to the Communists of Turkestan”
(as the Russian part of Central Asia was known at that time), V.I.Lenin
asked them to investigate how many national republics would be established
there and what they should be named. 82 years ago, the idea of sovereign
ethnic-based states was alien and exotic for the local Muslim population.
The concepts on ethnic division of Turkestan were as vague then as they
are now in the contemporary multi-ethnic Afghanistan. The Bolsheviks applied
to V.Bartold, the renowned scholar on Central Asia, with the question
how they should divide the region. He warned them that Central Asia had
no historic experience of the paradigm of an ethnic state, and it would
be a great mistake to divide the region along ethnic lines now. Nevertheless, the present boundaries and infrastructure were designed by
the USSR based on a strong belief of the ‘unbreakable union’ of fifteen
Soviet republics. As a result the borders, in some cases disputed (with
the most intricate maze of border patchwork being the Fergana Valley),
were never delimited or demarcated.
The imaginary frontiers of Soviet times have now become real. Now the 5
independent ‘stans’ are able to communicate with some
of their own parts only across the territories of neighbors. The new fragmentation
of Central Asia is a painful process, which has become a serious impediment
for cross-border migration of labor and trade. Some locals face real national
borders for the first time in their lives, like the women from Uzbekistan
crossing borders to collect cotton in Tajikistan, or the families from
Kyrgyzstan going to work on tobacco plantations in Kazakhstan. Another
tool of the “cold peace” among Central Asian neighbors is the imposition
of customs and visa duties. Their corrupt law-enforcement and customs
officers have turned the borders into a new source of illicit income.
Since the latest war in Afghanistan, extra security measures have caused
new problems for ordinary people: each Central Asian country started to
expel visitors from neighboring states, afflicting the poor and seasonal
workers. During the ongoing Operation Migrant, for example, Kazakhstan
has deported more than 50 thousand CIS citizens. Security measures in
Uzbekistan resulted in the shooting of Tajik, Kyrgyz and Kazakh citizens
along the Uzbek frontier. There are many cases of Uzbek border guards
moving their posts deep into the Kyrgyz and Tajik territories in order
to punish the real or imagined rebels. Uzbekistan’s decision to mine its
border with Tajikistan has led to numerous deaths of seasonal migrant
workers.
A new heated discussion is taking place now between the Central Asian countries.
The downstream Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan demand more water
for irrigation from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are located upstream
in the region’s river system. Both upstream countries have hydropower
stations on rivers flowing to Uzbekistan, southern Kazakhstan, and eventually
into Turkmenistan. The two main rivers Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya provide
three quarters of the region’s water. There is a competition for the Syr-Darya
water between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan’s ambitions
to expand its irrigated land exacerbates tensions between Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over shares of the Amy-Darya water.
The USSR constructed in the 1980s two major hydropower stations, Toktogul
in Kyrgyzstan and Nurek in Tajikistan, with 19.3 and 10.5 billion cubic-meter
reservoirs respectively. The dams allowed for the accumulation and regulation
of water to support the downstream republics. Electric power generated
by these two stations had been distributed through the Central Asian energy
network. Uzbekistan was the main producer of cotton for the Russian textile
industry and its irrigation needs were considered to be the priority issue.
Under these circumstances, priority was given to water accumulation in
upstream reservoirs rather than to demand for electric power in upstream
republics. Kazakhstan, a major producer of coal, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,
the suppliers of natural gas, followed instructions from Moscow and provided
for the energy needs of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while all fuel prices
were regulated and were much lower than those on the world market.
The management of water and energy resources has dramatically changed since
the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. The transition to market
economy demanded a new horizontal cooperation between the newly independent
states as the downstream countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
have no significant reservoirs able to accumulate an adequate amount of
water for seasonal regulation.
The water problem has become a serious threat to the natural environment
of Central Asia. Dependence on cotton cultivation and the irrational use
of water and energy greatly contributed to the rapid evaporating of the
Aral Sea, once the fourth largest lake on earth, which is now becoming
a deadly desert.
The main disagreement between the upstream and downstream countries stems
from the fact that the latter require water mostly in the time of cultivation
for irrigation purposes, whereas Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need water
mainly for electric power production during the winter season, when their
electricity consumption increases twofold. In addition, Uzbekistan frequently
halts gas supplies to the upstream smaller countries during winters, making
the heating problem most sensitive there. To survive in wintertime, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan have to increase the use of electric power generated by
their hydropower stations by discharging water from their reservoirs.
As a result, in summer, the reservoirs are not able to deliver an adequate
amount of water for irrigation in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Uzbekistan, the world’s fifth largest cotton producer, earns 75% of all
its hard currency from the export of cotton.
Many experts believe that water-related tensions could partly be resolved
if water were used more efficiently. Central Asia consumes 110 to 120
billion cubic meters of water annually, which is several times more than
in the Middle East. The efficiency of irrigation systems here is low.
An estimated 60% of water is wasted due to irrational use and ineffective
irrigation. In Uzbekistan alone, 20 billion cubic meters of water is wasted
every year. This is equal to the amount of water that Soviet planners
intended to divert from the Irtysh river in Siberia to Central Asia to
save the Aral Sea.
The Fergana Valley, divided presently between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, is the very heart of Central Asia. At the same time, Fergana exhibits the most vivid example of the Islamic evolution taking place throughout the region and exposes Afghanistan’s ideological impact on Central Asia. This is a hard, rural place, with cotton fields worked with sweat and picked by hand. The people are desperately poor. They see little that the new national governments have done to help their lives. Dissatisfaction is high, the lure of Islam as an answer to their dreary existence is strong.
When Central Asia was surprised by the collapse of Soviet authority in
1991, lawlessness filled the void. Assaults and robberies became rampant.
A Fergana man named Juma Namangani and his companions became vigilantes,
collaring crooks and administering beatings as punishment, according to
local residents. “I’m not saying I supported them,” said an old Namangan
teacher. “But when they were here, they were disciplined, and they kept
peace in the streets.” The man who headed the group remains a mystery.
There are only a few blurry photos of him, he did not give interviews.
Today, his mother’s house is watched by spies and cameras. His old mosque
is closed to the public. People in his home town of Namangan shift their
eyes and mumble that they really didn’t know Juma Namangani. They have
good reason. The government of Uzbekistan considers this crony of Osama
bin Laden to have been the country’s number one terrorist threat, and
any hint of association with him can land a person in prison.
Juma Namangani was born Jumaboy Hojiev and graduated from local agricultural
vocational school before he was drafted into the Soviet army in 1987.
His service in the airborne corps in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation
gave him a tough-man image when he returned home in 1989. Here he studied
with an Islamic scholar and took on radical Islam as his politics. With
a like-minded partner, Tahir Yuldash, and a nom
de guerre taken from his home town, Namangani began working to replace
the government’s rule in the Fergana Valley with law based on his political
interpretation of the Koran, and eventually founded the Islamic Movement
of Uzbekistan (IMU), considered by the government, and now by Washington,
to be a terrorist organization.
When G.W.Bush mentioned the IMU in his September 20 speech to a joint session
of Congress, it was a nod to Uzbekistan to gain its cooperation in the
campaign against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban movement that sheltered
him. But the IMU has the credentials to earn a mention on its own merits.
In 1997, members of the group assassinated corrupt regional Uzbek officials,
leaving the head of one of them on the gate of the home of the Namangan
internal affairs chief. In 1999 and 2000, armed IMU squads made sallies
from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, vowing to replace the
governments with a unitary Fergana Valley Caliphate. In February 1999,
the group set off bombs in Tashkent that killed 16 people and narrowly
missed President Karimov. In August 1999, the IMU kidnapped four Japanese
geologists, receiving several million dollars for their return two months
later. The next year, they seized four American mountain climbers in Kyrgyzstan,
though the hostages escaped after six days.
Uzbek authorities also said the IMU was involved in heroin and arms smuggling.
In the valley, however, people do not think so. “The government uses the
threat of the Islamic fighters just to keep their power and keep the people
under pressure,” said an unemployed brick maker. “The government has made
them into extremists.”
The paths of Karimov and Namangani crossed only once in 1991 when Karimov,
Soviet Uzbekistan’s Kremlin-appointed chief, was campaigning for president
in this country’s first post-independence election. It was a brief period
of political freedoms, which were crushed by Karimov after he won. In
the fall of 1991, he came to Namangan. Told there would be a march of
opponents, Karimov agreed to meet them. He was joined on the speakers’
platform by Namangani, who challenged the country’s iron-fisted boss,
and someone videotaped the session. “At one point, you could see Karimov
blanch,” said a Tashkent academic who has seen the tape. “The crowd was
clearly hostile, and Namangani could have done anything he wanted with
Karimov at that moment.”
The unnerving encounter apparently did not sit well with Karimov. After
his election in December 1991, doubly alarmed by the Islamist militants’
civil war breaking out in neighboring Tajikistan and student demonstrations
at home, he cracked down on political opponents and those he deemed Muslim
radicals. Namangani had been sentenced to death in absentia by the Uzbek
courts, and Karimov is widely quoted as offering to “shoot him in the
head” himself.
Namangani and Yuldash left the valley and fought for some time with Islamist
rebels in the mountains of Tajikistan. They reportedly passed through
Afghanistan and stayed for a while in Peshawar (Pakistan). There they
are believed to have made lasting connections with both Osama and the
Taliban.
At the age of 32 Namangani became a top officer in Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban militia and one of its most feared, along with another local Uzbek warlord (and Karimov’s protégé) General Dostum, who was fighting against the Taliban. Like Dostum, he had a reputation for cruelty: if any soldier defied his orders, the whole squad was shot, according to stories from the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif, the center of Afghanistan’s Uzbek part, besieged by Dostum’s Uzbek forces. After the fall of the city, the fate of Namangani and his men is unknown. Uzbekistan kept closed its Friendship Bridge across the Amu-Darya into Afghanistan, largely out of fear that Namangani will try to cross it. And it unexpectedly allowed US troops to use the nearby air base of Hanabad in hopes that the Americans would demolish the IMU.
There exists a misunderstanding about the relationship of Central Asian
states to the war on terrorism. The leaders of Central Asian republics,
in their eagerness to accommodate the American forces, have different
motives for encouraging US troop deployments. We hear about their cooperation
with the USA, as if they are doing a favor that should be rewarded. Nothing
could be further from the truth. For a decade, the Central Asian states
have faced the threat of Islamic radicalism, terrorism and drug trafficking.
All of the Central Asian states have identified these issues as their
main security threat, and Afghanistan as the locus of the threat.
To address this threat, Central Asian governments have arrested countless
suspects. But we must be careful in levying charges on them. When we demand
that Musharraf, Arafat or Mubarrak crack down hard on Islamic Jihad groups,
Palestinian terrorists and Muslim brotherhoods, are we not asking them
to do exactly what we criticize Central Asian governments for doing? Now
the situation is changing, thanks to the US military intervention, which
ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan, and expending billions of dollars to
address a threat that hangs over these countries.
Uzbekistan has agreed to the deployment of American troops at its Hanabad
air base. In return, the USA will be providing Uzbekistan $160 million
in aid in 2002, which is an increase of $100 million over earlier figures.
Washington is providing the additional funds in spite of its criticism
of the Uzbek government’s record on human rights and democracy. Two days
before the visit of US Secretary of State C.Powell in December 2001, the
Uzbek parliament voted to offer Uzbekistan’s ruler Islam Karimov the presidency
for life.
Karimov has clearly attempted to get economic assistance, security guarantees,
and overall American support for his ambitions to be the regional hegemon
in Central Asia. Nowhere is new American presence more visible than in
Tashkent. Groups of uniformed though unarmed American soldiers can be
seen walking around the airport, waiting for chartered busses to transport
them to downtown hotels. The troops do not mingle with Uzbek citizens,
but the appearance in streets of many athletic-looking Americans, clad
in civilian attire, suggests the build-up is steadily continuing.
The United States is also engaged in a rapid military build-up in Kyrgyzstan.
At the Manas airport near the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek, the US is building
a 37-acre air force base. This base will also serve as administrative
headquarters and contain warehouses to store munitions. Manas is suitable
for both military and relief flights, able to accommodate fighter jets
as well as large cargo and refueling planes. The United States is planning
to relocate fighter jets from Pakistan to Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Construction
of the US base at Manas airport should establish Kyrgyzstan as a hub for
reconstruction operations in Afghanistan and for Central Asian stabilization
efforts.
Favorable terms have been secured for the soldiers who will serve in Kyrgyzstan. They will be free to enter and leave the country, to wear uniforms and to carry weapons. They will also be immune from prosecution by the local authorities. Washington also has signed basing agreements with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which provided airport facilities for the war in Afghanistan, and is discussing a similar arrangement with Kazakhstan.
The local public opinion on the American military presence appears to be
mixed. Many residents -- especially in the Fergana Valley -- disapprove
of the anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan. In Tashkent, on the other hand,
a large majority of those questioned expressed approval for the anti-terrorism
campaign. Nearly all the people I spoke to there, though, did not believe
that current conditions necessitated the construction of an American base
in Kyrgyzstan. They presume the Americans’ real motive is to supplant
the Russian influence in Central Asia.
Given that the US build-up is coming at a time when anti-terrorism operations
in Afghanistan are moving into the reconstruction phase, it appears likely
that the US military is settling in for an extended stay in Central Asia.
Local analysts say that with Russia’s grip on the region loosening, the
United States is aiming to check the expansion of Chinese influence in
the region. Besides, both the two smaller states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
are hoping that Western engagement will successfully overlay intra-regional
tensions, specifically those caused by Uzbekistan. The possibility of
extending the oil and gas pipelines to southern Asia may also tempt the
US to maintain some sort of security presence east of the Caspian Sea.
1) Without exception, all Central Asian governments have justified their
concentration of power in the hands of the executive, the avoidance of
elections, the retarded development of participatory government, and their
curtailment of civil liberties in terms of national security. The authoritarian
governments of the region hope that American patronage will deflect international
criticism of their human rights records and failure to democratize. They
also hope to obtain American military support in their battle to suppress
Islamist rebel groups based in and around the Fergana Valley.
Karimov has justified his political repressions by the threat posed by
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Now that its leader Juma Namangani
is presumed dead, Karimov says his regime is threatened by another Islamic
movement known as the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, or Party of Islamic Liberation,
which advocates the creation of a Caliphate in the Fergana Valley. Although
party members claim they want to attain their political objectives by
peaceful means, they are being harassed by authorities in Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and even in Azerbaijan. Human rights groups believe
that Karimov still holds an over 7000 political prisoners.
When I was in Tashkent in January, the Uzbeks voted overwhelmingly in favor
of extending the presidential term in office from five to seven years
in a referendum that also created a bicameral parliament, which currently
has one 250-member chamber. Officials said only 9 percent voted against
extending the tenure. The decision will come into effect at the next presidential
election in 2005. The polls were monitored by 125 observers from 33 countries.
However, both the USA and the OSCE refused to send monitors.
This is not the first time in his political career that Uzbekistan’s 63-year-old
president has changed the length of his tenure. In 1995, a referendum
made him president until 2000, averting the need for reelection in 1996.
When elections were held in 2000, he won the right to retain his position
for another five years. Karimov has now been the leader of Uzbekistan
since 1989, when he was appointed first secretary of the Communist Party
of Uzbekistan. International human rights organizations argue that Karimov
is following the example of Turkmen president Niazov to make himself president
for life.
Turkmenistan is one of the most tightly controlled places on the planet.
Its former communist party boss and incumbent self-styled President ‘Turkmenbashi’
(Chief of the Turkmen) Saparmurad Niazov has constructed a personality
cult rivaled only in North Korea and is squandering the country’s mineral
wealth on sprawling palaces and rotating golden statues of himself.
Only two days after the Uzbek referendum, Karimov was invited to visit
the United States. On 12 March 2002, Karimov had a White House meeting
with G.W.Bush. The centerpiece of his trip was the signing of a five-point
“Declaration on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework.” The
document obliges the USA to provide aid that encourages ‘civil society
development’ in Uzbekistan, which in turn reaffirms a commitment to implementing
democratic reforms.
The situation is reminiscent of the Cold War, when the USA supported anticommunist
countries however poor their human rights records might have been. Proponents
of the current stance say the end justifies the means and that Washington’s
new containment policy might work against terrorism just as they believe
it did against communism.
2) But the security arrangements and political reforms hectored from Washington
will not survive without economic development. The deepest source of internal
instability throughout the region is neither religious extremism nor ethnic
conflict but poverty. Widespread throughout the region, poverty is particularly
acute in the vast mountain zones defined by the Karakorum, Hindukush,
Pamir, Tienshan, Kohibaba, Alatau and Altay ranges. It is no accident
that these lands have been the venue for most armed conflicts in the area.
Take a typical Uzbek family in the Fergana Valley where 70% of the population
live on the minimum salary, which can practically buy only 100 loaves
of flat bread a month, excluding other expenses. The traditional Uzbek
family consists of 6 or more persons, and they usually consume at the
very least 5 breads a day. This example is a basic indicator of the real
state of Uzbek society.
The most pressing needs of economic development are surprisingly simple:
to enable Central Asians and Afghans to feed their families and create
jobs for themselves and others. Until these needs are met there will be
no end to opium production and drug trafficking. Until they are met there
will be no peace in the region.
This will not be accomplished through the vast infrastructure projects
proposed at the Tokyo international conference on rebuilding Afghanistan
or a Central Asian Marshall Plan. Instead, the focus should be on village
level agriculture, small businesses and farms, and the removal of impediments
to entrepreneurship at all levels. It is therefore important to open the
ancient trade routes that linked Central Asia and Afghanistan to their
natural ports and trading partners in Iran and Pakistan.
3) Although Uzbekistan remains the strategic pivot of the region, each
state has its own agenda. Kazakhstan’s long border with Russia and its
substantial ethnic Russian population ensures that it cannot break with
Russia. However, President Nazarbaev’s struggle for regional supremacy
with Karimov dictates that he cannot stand by and allow him to forge a
close strategic partnership with Washington. Nazarbaev’s trump card in
diversification of his security options is the considerable Western investment
in his country’s oil industry.
Tashkent’s ambitions to be the regional hegemon in Central Asia are well
known. It has seized disputed lands from neighboring states, refused to
pay for water from Kyrgyzstan and violated the gas-for-water agreements.
The Uzbeks are fond of reminding that they are selling gas at about half
of the prevailing global prices and do not conceal their greater regional
ambitions. Uzbekistan is a complex and volatile state, which persistently
behaved in a heavy-handed way.
Uzbekistan has gradually slipped out of Russia’s security orbit over the
last three years and now seeks outside support from Washington for both
the regime’s internal security and its more expansive designs. If it becomes
involved in an armed conflict with a Central Asian neighbor, what then
would be the American role?
In this context, Washington may encourage expectations upon which it cannot deliver and also lead to tensions among the Central Asian rulers who want to perpetuate their authoritarian regimes and gain outside support for themselves and their regional ambitions. There is no simple way to resolve all these tensions peacefully and amicably. It is hence unlikely that we can expect true stability in Central Asia anytime soon, even under conditions of American leadership.
Central Asia has been transformed from a strategic backwater to the crucible
of international diplomacy and, in this new geopolitical environment,
Washington remains opaque about its ultimate intentions and exit strategy.
Some American foreign policy planners hold that after destruction
of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan the USA should leave the post-war
stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger
of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from Afghanistan.
The United States is quickly building up its military capacity in Central
Asia, and soon could be in a position to back tough words with actions.
The US air force has established a presence at Afghan bases in Baghram
and Kandahar, as well as at Hanabad in Uzbekistan and Manas in Kyrgyzstan.
These facilities can help the US military gain air superiority throughout
Central Asia, and even into the Middle East. This expanded and deepened
US presence in Central Asia involves an intensification of the rivalry
with Russia, China and Iran in the so-called ‘New Great Game.’
As a consequence, Russia’s role as Central Asia’s principal security manager is under threat. Moscow was happy to see the destruction of the Taliban, and President Putin has scored some important diplomatic gains in return for Russian cooperation, most notably a more understanding attitude in the West to Russian military operations in Chechnya. But if there is no timetable for the departure of American troops from Central Asia, Moscow is likely to perceive the US response to terrorism as little more than an excuse to extend American military presence into the region, which Russian strategists have portrayed since the end of the 19th century as the country’s soft underbelly.
Russian policy-making elite is divided over how to respond to the geopolitical
shift that has occurred in Central Asia. The sudden arrival of US forces
in Central Asia has prompted some analysts in Moscow to accuse the government
of ‘losing’ Central Asia. Hawkish statements are coming from such leading
figures as the State Duma speaker G.Seleznyov, who said during his recent
tour of the region: “Russia will not endorse the emergence of permanent
US military bases in Central Asia.”
In addition, Russian security officials claim there is a score of top secret
Russian military facilities in Central Asia that the USA and NATO are
keen to gather information on. In Kazakhstan, there is the Sary-Shagan
anti-missile launching site and the radar station, which is part of Russia’s
early-warning system. In Kyrgyzstan, there is a Russian navy long-distance
communications center, and a testing site for the nuclear submarines’
rockets on the lake Issyk-Kul. There is also a space surveillance station,
located at Nurek in Tajikistan.
China also initially acquiesced in the US action in Afghanistan not least
because of evidence that Al Qaeda was training Muslim separatists operating
in the Xinjiang Autonomous Province of western China. Beijing has generally
deferred to Russia in Central Asia on security issues, preferring instead
to focus on expanding trade links across the region. China now states
publicly and unapologetically that it views the US presence as a hindrance
to its strategic objectives in the region. In the Chinese opinion, the
American basing rights in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are part of the broader
strategy to contain the expansion of Chinese influence.
The Chinese diplomats have alleged specifically that the USA was seeking
access to an air base near Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan, the old site of
Soviet nuclear tests. The base was designed by the USSR specifically to
support possible strategic operations against China. Kazakh officials
dispute the Chinese claims, saying that Washington has asked for access
to military bases in southern Kazakhstan, but not in Semipalatinsk to
the north. The bases under discussion were at Taraz and Chimkent.
The Sino-Russian response strategy was unveiled at a meeting in Beijing
in January 2002. It consists of the transformation of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), created in 1996 as a forum for border demilitarization
and trade promotion, into a regional security structure capable of conducting
‘joint anti-terrorist operations.’ As all the Central Asian states (bar
Turkmenistan) already belong to the SCO, this should be viewed as a direct
attempt to reduce the rationale for a Western security presence in the
region.
China sent its delegation to Central Asian republics in January. The delegation
announced in Tashkent a Chinese economic assistance to Uzbekistan in the
amount of $600 million (compared to the $160 million pledged by the USA).
Thus, Uzbekistan has managed to attract assistance from both the United
States and China.
Kazakhstan also has friendly relations with both China and the USA, and
the government does not appear eager to make a choice between the two.
Since 1991, Kazakhstan has pursued a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy that
seeks strong relations with Russia and with China. In addition, Nazarbaev
has fostered amicable ties with the USA, especially in the sphere of energy
development.
The anti-terrorism campaign has increased the pressure on Astana to abandon
its ‘multi-vector’ policy, and settle on one strategic partner. Local
observers believe that the government is inclined to align itself with
the United States, given the US ability to develop and pay for Kazakhstan’s
natural resources. However, from the start of the anti-terrorism campaign,
Nazarbaev has proceeded cautiously, offering words of support for US actions,
but hesitating on the implementation of concrete cooperation measures.
President Bush has signaled that he reserves the right to extend the war
on terrorism to other countries. Iran, Iraq and North Korea were the three
named by G.W.Bush in his “State of the Union” address in January as future
potential targets. While the harshest words were reserved for Saddam Hussein,
the language on Iran was unambiguous: “Iran aggressively pursues… weapons
of mass destruction and exports terror, while an unelected few repress
the Iranian people’s hope for freedom.”
Thus, the president addressed the Iranian nuclear program built around
the Russian nuclear power reactors at Bushehr, as well as Iran’s ballistic
missile program. Only recently, the former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani
threatened to use nuclear weapons against Israel. US intelligence agencies
have spotted scores of Iranian intelligence and military personnel deep
inside Afghanistan working to destabilize the pro-American government
now in place in Kabul.
These operations are prompting heightened worries inside the Bush administration because of the fragility of the interim government in Afghanistan. The Iranians’ objective appears to be destabilizing Afghanistan so that it rejects the presence of Western military forces and obstructs the mission of Afghanistan’s former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, who returned in April 2002 from exile in Italy. The Islamic regime in Tehran fears that the return of the king will inspire pro-monarchist sentiments inside Iran, where a power struggle is under way between reformers and Shiite fundamentalists. The Shah of Iran was ousted in 1979, leading to the Islamic revolution.
US special envoy for Afghanistan Z.Khalilzad has repeatedly charged that
hard-line elements around Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
are helping to arm and finance groups within Afghanistan in a bid to establish
pockets of influence and discourage cooperation with the government in
Kabul. He said their purpose is to create what he termed centers of Iranian
influence in Herat (80 kilometers from the Iranian border) and in surrounding
provinces. In northern Afghanistan, Iranian agents reportedly are arming
ethnic Uzbek warlord A.Dostum’s faction operating around the strategic
city of Mazar-e-Sharif. Khalilzad also said that the Revolutionary Guard
Corps had helped members of Al-Qaeda escape from Afghanistan to Iran and
were helping the fleeing fighters to travel on from Iran to other destinations
abroad.
After the failure of five Caspian littoral states to reach an agreement
on delimitation of the Caspian Sea at their April 2002 presidential summit in Ashgabat, the Iranian president M.Khatami toured Central Asian
capitals to discuss two issues: energy routes and the American presence.
He called for Central Asian leaders to step up exports of oil and gas
through Iran as the shortest route to world markets. At the same time,
he sharply criticized progress by the USA in developing a military presence
in the region for its war on terrorism. Referring to Washington, Khatami
said in Almaty: “One must not get entrenched on this or that territory,
setting up bases under the disguise of an antiterrorist campaign. This
is sheer humiliation for our nations that have the right to resolve their
problems on their own and decide themselves what is good and bad for them.”
US-Iranian tensions over Afghanistan and Central Asia are high for several
reasons. One is their continuing rivalry on the world stage as Washington
accuses Tehran of supporting terrorist groups in the Middle East and seeking
nuclear weapons. That rivalry has now been exacerbated on the regional
level by the presence of American troops in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan. Tehran sees the deployments as a threatening buildup of American
military power in what Iran has historically considered its backyard with
high expectation of Islamic revolutions and governments based on Islamic
law.
This prospect is the reality that the Central Asian states must face if
the USA precipitously withdraws from their region once the military campaign
in Afghanistan has achieved its goals. It requires that the United States
develop and implement a longer-term strategy or doctrine for regional
security in Central Asia. Such a strategy is essential for the viability
and sustainability of the states of Central Asia. No less, it is essential
for the United States’ own long-term interest in helping build a stable
world.
Thanks to the Soviets, Central Asia is ruled by secular governments.
But it is also left with a heritage of authoritarianism, corruption and
disrespect for law and human rights that persists to this day. We are
only gradually coming to appreciate the seriousness of the birth defects
present in Central Asia. It is important that we recognize this, and apply
the same standards to all, rather than selectively, according to who happens
to be in favor in Washington at the moment. Bluntly, we cannot nod at
authoritarianism in Central Asia and preach against it in Russia. Critics
believe that the Bush administration is prepared to turn a blind eye to
human rights abuses in Central Asian countries in return for their loyalty.
Why should Washington not start to make the case for democracy
in Central Asia? Plainly, it cannot afford to push this idea too fast.
Such a change could be counter-productive. For this reason, American policy
in Central Asia has been governed by Realpolitik. Like the Russians before them,
the Americans have preferred stability to uncertain experiments with democracy.
Doesn’t stability have to be paramount in a region that contains so much
mineral and energy resources? And who is to say that democracy suits Central
Asians anyway? They appear to have rubbed along happily without it for
long enough. But, like a lot of conventional wisdom, it may not be so
very realistic at all.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 pointed to the danger of depending on military
bases and the friendship of autocratic regimes. Propping up such regimes
can have the paradoxical result of weakening them by making them seem
less legitimate. The average citizen in Tashkent or Almaty enjoys fizzy
drinks and soap operas no less than the average citizen in Atlanta or
Chicago. But something else that they may want has so far been denied
to them: a chance to choose their own leaders by holding proper elections,
just as westerners do. Might democracy one day become a unifying ideal
both can share?
The despots who run the Central Asian republics dismiss this as a dangerous
fantasy. That is no surprise: most have much to fear from genuine elections.
More surprising is the existence in the West of a whole industry of intellectuals
and diplomats dedicated to exposing the preposterousness of the very idea.
These experts invoke sophisticated reasons why the Central Asians are
unsuited to democracy.
All the ‘stans’ that emerged from the Soviet empire
inherited borders that owed less to a well-shaped sense of nationhood
than to the administrative convenience of Moscow. In such countries, people
identify strongly with their tribe or clan, and with a wider Islamic fellowship,
but only weakly with the state. Holding such a state together therefore
requires a strong and usually repressive power at the center. These things
may complicate the growth of democracy in Central Asia.
If Islam is inimical to democracy, somebody should tell the Turks and the
Iranians, who in markedly different ways are exercising the muscles of
pluralist politics. Those who consider Central Asian democracy a fantasy
should ask how long the existing system can last. As I made certain at
various points of my trip, the appetite for politics is keen on all levels
of local society. The obstacle has not been religion or tradition, but
the refusal of those in power to accept the people’s verdict. With ballot
boxes blocked, no wonder opposition flows towards the mosque, the only
institution no Central Asian regime dares ban.
America cannot change Central Asia at a stroke. It will not risk knocking
the legs away from standing allies such as Karimov and Nazarbaev. In the
Cold War, great powers have collected allies where they can, without too
much scruple. But the struggle against the forces unleashed by Osama bin
Laden is a most unusual war. It is in large part a struggle about values.
The West must loudly declare that liberal democracy is a universal ideal
that should be applied to Central Asia too.