

At the beginning of the 1990s Samuel P. Huntington, then advisor to the US Department of State, coined the phrase »clash of civilizations.« His thesis was grounded on the notion that the dynamics of international relations did not derive from economic, political, or ideological differences, but from the conflict of cultures, in particular Christianity and Islam. As a consequence, many considered the attacks of September 11, 2001 as evidence not only of a confrontation with Islam but that it had dramatically intensified. Contemporary opinion polls show that in many countries in the Christian West large parts of the population are convinced that there is a profound conflict between the »Christian West« and the »Islamic world.«

The identification of the Muslim world with extremist variants of Islamic fundamentalism leads to entrenchment and polarization, which are both unnecessary and dangerous. In this issue of *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND SOCIETY* Amitai Etzioni recommends that, instead of rejecting moderate Islam, we attempt to engage it as a partner in an alliance for peace. Even if its notions of human rights and democracy do not coincide with those of the Christian West on all points there is consensus on one essential issue: moderate Muslims, who constitute the majority worldwide, reject violence, intolerance, and terrorism every bit as much as the moderate majority in the West. In particular, advocates of the clash of civilizations and pragmatists cannot agree on what stance to adopt in relation to the moderate Islamic regime in Turkey. Etzioni warns against valuing commitment to a secular state more highly than commitment to democracy in the conflict between the secular opposition and the AKP government, because the secularism of the non-religious parties and the army has unmistakable authoritarian features – and not only in Turkey.

The conflict between the secular opposition and the moderate Islamist government also characterizes a central area of Turkish foreign policy, its policy towards Iraq – more precisely, its policy towards Kurdish Northern Iraq – which is taken up by Leyla von Mende in her contribution. On the one hand, the government is under pressure from anti-Kurdish hardliners in the secular opposition and the military who are urging a get-tough policy, including military intervention. On the other hand, the government is supported in its pragmatic policy towards the Kurds and its inclination towards dialog with Northern Iraq by the business sphere, which would like to expand its lucrative activities there. The situation is further complicated by differences with the USA and the Iraqi government. Turkish policy towards Iraq has therefore become a balanc-

ing act in which the government sometimes loses its balance, for example in February when the Turkish army entered the Northern Iraqi retreat of the Kurdish workers' party the PKK. However, there is reason for hope that in future such radical measures will be nipped in the bud. As Fahri Türk's contribution shows, economic ties between Turkey and Northern Iraq have reached such a level that soon no political actor will be able to ignore them.

It is not only Turkish foreign policy that can be misinterpreted if one fails to take account of domestic policy developments and situations. Peter W. Schulze depicts how in Russia the conditions for an interest-led foreign policy were laid down during Putin's two periods of office. As a result, the state has regained its power to act, the political system has been consolidated, and the political leadership can rely on considerable popular support. The post-Soviet era, in which Russia was the plaything of Western policy, is emphatically at an end. The new power elite seeks international recognition as a great power and desires to shape the new world order on equal terms with the USA and Europe.

Developments in Russia cannot be ignored in Europe because they concern us directly. Cambodia is an altogether different story. There is almost no interest in the country in which between 1975 and 1979 the Khmer Rouge killed almost a quarter of the population – the old elites and whole occupational groups, as well as ethnic and religious minorities – and compelled the rest of the population into forced labor in the countryside. Cambodia was the scene of political, class, and ethnic »genocide.« According to some, this amounted to genocide against the country's own population. Only now, after 30 years, are criminal proceedings finally getting under way. Thomas Hummitzsch explains why this has taken so long and also why the Cambodian tribunal, which comprises a majority of national and some international judges, represents an innovation in the context of international criminal jurisdiction.

Also in this issue: Jeffrey Laurenti criticizes US plans for a League of Democracies. Ditmar Staffelt outlines Germany's energy foreign policy. Dietmar Dirmoser analyzes the reasons for the oil price shock and its contested interpretation. Patrick Berg shows that the conflicts in the Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic tri-border area have become closely interwoven and that no solution that fails to take all three countries into account has any chance of success.