

AMITAI ETZIONI:
Turkey: A Crucial Test for the West

The judgment of the Constitutional Court in Turkey has brought only a temporary halt to the conflict between the conservative-Islamic governing party the AKP and the secular opposition supported by the Turkish military. The West's response so far has been contradictory, but it has a great deal at stake: Turkey represents a precedent as regards the Western perception of Islam and how it will respond to it throughout the world.

Advocates of Huntington's thesis of the »clash of civilizations« portray Islam as an inherently intolerant belief system, but this is to deny the tolerance and democratic leanings of moderate Muslims. They associate cooperation with the threat of a step backwards for civilization and creeping Islamization. This view is false, however. It is not that cultures clash, but rather that radical (legitimizing violence) and moderate (rejecting violence) groups come into conflict *within* cultures.

Moderate Islam represents not a danger, but an opportunity for the West. Both in Turkey and across the world moderate Muslims are in the majority. They abjure violence, intolerance, and terrorism just as much as the moderate majority in the West, even if they do not necessarily share all the basic principles of liberal democracy and human rights. This Islam is, first, a potential partner in an alliance for peace and against global threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Should the West opt for cooperation, there is a chance, second, that fundamental democratic conceptions will put down roots in these societies too in the long term.

The West merely plays into the hands of terrorism and fundamentalism when it demonizes Muslims wholesale and refuses to enter into partnership with them. Instead of imposing regime change from outside or cooperating with authoritarian regimes support should be given to moderate and reform-oriented forces in Muslim countries throughout the globe. In Turkey, the West should not sponsor the authoritarianism of a secular opposition which includes the military, but take the side of the AKP, whose democratic legitimacy is broadly based.

LEYLA VON MENDE:

Who's Afraid of Kurdistan?

Turkey's Policy on Iraq between Military Intervention and Efforts towards Dialogue

Turkish policy towards Iraq is strongly influenced by the »Kurdish question.« This was long considered a domestic policy matter by Turkey, but with the Iraq war and above all with the establishment of the Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq and efforts towards further independence the Turkish-Kurdish conflict has taken on an international dimension. Turkey fears that an independent Kurdish state would give further impetus to separatist endeavors on the part of Turkish Kurds. This casts a shadow over relations with Kurdish northern Iraq, but also with the Iraqi government, and hampers the pursuit of Turkey's economic and political interests. A solution to this problem is impeded by a number of other factors: in terms of foreign policy divergent US interests, and domestically the conflict between the military and the secular opposition on the one hand, and the conservative-Islamic governing party the AKP on the other. In the wake of the US invasion of Iraq Ankara's response has been a balancing act, on the one hand attempting to address the domestic situation, and on the other to pursue its interests in Iraq. As a result, Turkish foreign policy has vacillated between the deployment of military force and efforts towards dialogue. When, after a long period of internal discussion and attempts at external mediation, the government led by Tayyip Erdoğan gave the order for a large-scale ground offensive the die appeared to have been cast. However, in the ensuing months it became clear that this would do nothing to settle the matter conclusively. The immediate resumption of political and economic dialogue not only with Baghdad, but also with the Kurdish regional government illustrates the still unresolved dilemma of Turkish foreign policy.

FAHRI TÜRK:

The Economy as a Stabilizing Factor?

Turkish Economic Relations with Northern Iraq

Since the end of the war in Iraq economic relations between Turkey and northern Iraq have experienced a major upturn. Turkish entrepreneurs in particular are responsible for cultivating economic partnership between Turkey and the autonomous region of Kurdistan, which covers most of northern Iraq. Almost half of all goods sold in northern Iraq today originate from Turkey. Turkish companies are present in the oil sector, too. Iraq's new oil law encourages foreign production companies, and the Iraqi government would not stand in the way of the construction of an oil pipeline to Turkey. If the Turkish government established official

relations with the Kurdish regional government in Arbil the number of Turkish firms active in northern Iraq would likely multiply.

Since 2003 Turkish firms have invested USD 2 billion in construction and infrastructural projects. Over the next three years projects worth a further USD 15 billion are planned. In total, 913 Turkish construction and infrastructure firms are active in northern Iraq. They employ many Turks, too, because wages are significantly higher than in Turkey.

Turkish investors, among them quite a number of Turkish-Kurdish politicians, constitute a major pillar of the local economy. They are making every effort to develop economic relations with northern Iraq further and to safeguard them by lobbying. To this end they are cooperating both with the Turkish military leadership and the relevant Turkish ministers, and with the Kurdish regional government. Increasing economic integration could well lead to some sort of political rapprochement, too.

JEFFREY LAURENTI:

Relevance and Realities:

Washington's Flirtation with a League of Democracies

The Bush administration's episodic reliance on the UN Security Council in recent years represents a reprieve for the United Nations system, not a recommitment to it. Proposals for a league (or »concert« or »alliance«) of democracies have steadily gained adherents in Washington policy salons in the past twenty years, among both conservatives with a deep distaste for global institutions and international law, and liberal interventionists frustrated by the thwarting of basic humanitarian values in the United Nations.

The embrace of the league idea by a major-party presidential nominee coincides with Washington's new vocation as the world's prime promoter of democracy. While American presidents of both parties have embraced democracy with growing fervor in recent decades, the current administration's militancy in pressing democracy has perplexed traditional foreign policy realists at home and dismayed traditional allies abroad, not least because of its trail of double standards. Now seemingly divorced from the transnational human rights movement, Washington's promotion of democracy has become associated with military force, covert operations to effect »regime change,« and expansion of America's military bases and alliances.

Liberal interventionists frankly acknowledge that a league of democracies would serve as an alternative forum to the balky Security Council for the approval of the use of force. More sensitive to the American public's disillusionment with overseas military interventions, the presidential candidate proposing the league makes no reference to its authorizing military force; but the speciousness of the

public rationales confirms that its primary attraction is as a legitimator of forceful action.

But the league concept erroneously assumes that similar systems for picking political leaders create a deep community of interest, while developing country democracies tend to see themselves as developing first and democracies second, and are more likely to view conflicts in other developing countries the way China does rather than the way America does. By joining the league, neither they nor the Europeans would gain leverage to restrain Washington from unilateral uses of force they consider inappropriate or illegal, giving them little reason to enlist. And the new entity would pose major risks—financially to countries' treasuries, and politically and legally to the hard-learned global legal regime restraining the use of force.

PETER W. SCHULZE:

Putin's Legacy: Russia's Domestic and Foreign Policy at the Beginning of Dmitri Medvedev's Presidency

Paradoxical though it might sound, the conflict in the Caucasus, like the earlier »wake up call« (Lavrov) by the Russian president at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, has done a great deal to clarify relations between Russia and the USA, as well as with the EU. Both sides must now recognize the real changes that have taken place in international politics over the last ten years in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. More to the point, they will be forced to come up with concepts or strategies for dealing with one another that so far have either been lacking or were no more than empty words. The West should finally acknowledge both that the post-Soviet era, in which Russia was merely the plaything of Western policy, has come to an end, and at the same time that Moscow's often strained efforts to bolster its return to the concert of international powers by means of provocative actions should not be misunderstood as a return to the period of the Cold War.

During Putin's two terms of office the domestic political and economic conditions were established for a politics dominated by interests. The state regained its authority and ability to act, the political system was consolidated, and the political leadership, whether Western politicians or media like it or not, can count on relatively strong support from the Russian people. A diverse post-Soviet power elite has emerged that formulates its political aims self-confidently and relatively unimpressed by Western precepts, but whose power base does not rest primarily on geostrategic weapons, as during the period of the Cold War.

Moscow wants to recover what was lost with the collapse of the USSR: Moscow does not represent a new threat, nor should we fear a relapse into imperial habits. What Moscow does want, however, is recognition as a great power which

is involved in the shaping of the new world order on equal terms with the USA and Europe. This aim points towards a revision of the international order, without the Kremlin having any idea what such a new world order will look like. The only certainty is that the current world order, with the USA as global hegemon, is unacceptable. On the other hand, the USA, though conscious of its own decline, is not prepared to vacate its hegemonic position voluntarily and make concessions. As a result, conflicts, particularly over the parts of Europe in between Russia and the EU, are as inevitable as that the joint responsibility of the EU and Russia for this sphere must become the focal point of their relations.

PATRICK BERG:

A Crisis-Complex, Not Complex Crises: Conflict Dynamics in the Sudan, Chad, and Central African Republic Tri-Border Area

The recent escalation of violence in Eastern Chad and the Northern Central African Republic has been widely interpreted as a spillover from the conflict in the neighboring Sudanese region of Darfur. However, while the violence in Darfur and its consequences, such as increased arms trafficking and massive refugee movements, have certainly contributed to further escalate existing tensions in the region, it is not the main cause of conflict in Chad and the Central African Republic. Both countries have been in constant turmoil since their independence and have been marked by authoritarian elites maximizing their personal wealth rather than the well-being of citizens. Violence has become the means by which political power is conferred, maintained, or challenged. In Chad, domestic pressure on President Deby's reign increased dramatically with his determination to remain in power due to financial windfalls from oil production which commenced in 2003. In the Central African Republic, current President Bozizé seized power through a military coup five years ago and is still facing resistance from both the supporters of his predecessor and the very mercenaries who brought him to power, but who were not sufficiently rewarded for their services. As for Sudan, the conflict in Darfur is not an isolated regional rebellion, but one of many manifestations of a larger conflict between a small elite at the country's center and the majority on the marginalized periphery.

While the conflicts in the three countries each have their own background and history, their dynamics have become more and more intertwined in recent years. The crises in Chad and Darfur in particular have knitted together in the closest possible way and merged into a single crisis-complex, so contributing to their mutual continuance. Both conflicts can now only be solved simultaneously.

The international community, however, has so far failed to acknowledge this complexity and rather focused on the localized conflicts one at a time – without addressing the larger context. In recent years, there has also been a growing

reliance on international peace missions, most of which are trying – and failing – to stabilize the security situation by military means without resolving the conflict's political root causes. The international community will have to learn from these mistakes and change its strategy if it wants to successfully contribute to peace in the region. As a first step, it must recognize the interconnections between the different conflicts and develop a single strategy to address all of them simultaneously. To do so, cooperation between the numerous actors involved must be significantly improved and the primacy of short-term military approaches must be overcome in favor of sustainable political solutions.

THOMAS HUMMITZSCH:

A Criminal Tribunal in Cambodia. Coming to Terms with the Past?

The Khmer Rouge's reign of terror in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 under the leadership of Pol Pot is without doubt one of the greatest political crimes of the twentieth century. Almost a quarter of the population died in the communist experiment to return the country to the Stone Age. Communist thugs murdered the old elites and members of various occupational groups, as well as ethnic and religious minorities, and pressganged the rest of the population into forced labour in a gigantic subtropical gulag. It is still disputed whether this state campaign of extermination amounted to genocide against their own people. However, in contrast to numerous cases of state policies of extermination throughout the world, in Cambodia the fall of the Khmer Rouge did not precipitate the relatively prompt establishment of a criminal court, of whatever kind. Even today, almost 30 years after the fall of the Khmer Rouge the citizens of Cambodia are still waiting for the opening of the first trial to prosecute its crimes. In September 2008 this is finally about to happen.

There are a number of reasons for this decades-long delay in the punishment of the main perpetrators. First, there is the particular historico-political constellation of the Cold War, which shaped international dealings with the Khmer Rouge until the end of the 1980s. Second, the peace treaties negotiated under the aegis of the international community in Paris in 1991 contained substantial defects. They did not envisage criminal prosecution but rather the political and social rehabilitation of the Khmer Rouge. Apart from that, internal political conflicts moved the issue of prosecuting the Khmer Rouge onto the backburner. Only in 1997 did the two ruling Cambodian prime ministers ask the United Nations for help in setting up a criminal court to try the Khmer Rouge. After protracted and difficult negotiations a law was passed on the creation of a so-called »Extraordinary Chamber of Cambodia's Court of Justice« on the basis of which those principally responsible for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979 will be tried.

What has become known as the »Cambodian model,« featuring a multi-chamber tribunal with a majority of national judges alongside a number of international judges, is unique within the framework of international criminal prosecution. It embodies a number of lessons drawn from experience with international prosecution. For example, it is hoped that by embedding the tribunal in the national judicial system the arrest and prosecution of the main culprits will proceed more straightforwardly than in the case of the »outsourced« ad hoc international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Ruanda in the Hague and Arusha, which are dependent upon the cooperation of the governments in the countries concerned. The retrospectively time limited mandate of the International Criminal Court (ICC) means that the crimes of the Khmer Rouge fall outside its jurisdiction, but the cameral structure of the »Cambodian model« calls to mind the multi-level make up of the ICC. And as in the case of the internationalized courts in Sierra Leone and East Timor the national anchoring of the Cambodian tribunal will build up and reinforce existing judicial structures.

It remains unclear how many trials will take place and what charges will be brought and against whom. Given the old age of those under arrest and of possible future defendants the trials will scarcely have a punitive effect. However, they may help to throw as much light as possible on the still obscure crimes of the Khmer Rouge and so contribute to the social reconciliation so urgently needed for domestic peace in Cambodia. One must be skeptical whether the tribunal will be able to achieve this, however.

DIETMAR DIRMOSER:

The Oil Shock: Contested Explanations and Disputed Political Reactions

As long as oil prices were climbing inexorably there was intense debate concerning the reasons. In the meantime, prices have fallen sharply, but the debate remains vital since the crisis is not over. This is shown among other things by the fact that oil is half as expensive again as last year. The annual average price is likely to exceed that of 2007 by 50 percent, and the additional expenditure on energy imports will top 16–20 billion Euros, purchasing power lost to the economy. And not all the effects of the price shock have made themselves felt throughout the system yet. For example, gas prices, that follow the oil price with some delay, may be expected to reach their peak only at the end of the year. But the debate on the reasons for the oil price crisis is also crucial because the question of whether the price explosion is due to supply and demand, speculation, an unfortunate coincidence of various factors, or because maximum production has been reached has far-reaching political implications.

Although it has fallen back somewhat the oil price is pushing up inflation, putting pressure on consumers, increasing Third World poverty, further destabi-

lizing financial markets, and putting a brake on global economic growth. Since energy prices are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future, leading to far-reaching structural shifts in the economy and diminishing affluence across the board, political action is as urgent today as it was a few months ago.

The oil price shock is also further compelling evidence of the urgent need for progress in the reorganization of the industrial system in energy terms through accelerated and more consistent exploitation of possible energy savings, an increase in energy efficiency, and stepping up research and development efforts to create new energy technologies.

In a number of countries measures are in the offing to cushion the effects of the price surge on various groups. Tax cuts, subsidized tariffs, subsidies for particularly hard-hit branches of the economy, a windfall tax on oil companies and other measures are all being considered. What is lacking, however, is far-reaching approaches that combine short-term measures with a long-term energy policy perspective and strategic targets, not only at national level but globally. The possibility of individual nations influencing developments on globalized energy markets was closed off long ago.