

WOLFGANG MERKEL:**Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results:****The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe**

In 1990 and 1991 two extremely influential essays appeared outlining a fundamental dilemma for the young post-communist democracies.

According to the so-called »dilemma of simultaneity« (Jon Elster, Claus Offe) the transformations of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe differ categorically from all regime changes of the first and second waves of democratization. The main difference lies in the fact that two, if not three transformation processes were occurring simultaneously: political (transition from dictatorship to democracy), economic (the switch from a command economy to a market economy), and, in some instances, governmental (the founding of nation-states). Their specific developmental logics are mutually destructive. The compelling conclusion is that democracy's consolidation is more precarious and much more attenuated in Eastern Europe than it was with the capitalist regime changes in Southern Europe or Latin America. If the new democracies are to survive at all, the argument ran, their consolidation will take a long time.

By the end of the 1990s, however, many of Eastern Europe's new democracies had been consolidated. In 2004 and 2006, ten countries culminated their consolidation with membership of the European Union (EU). The new democracies consolidated more quickly than countries in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece) had done, not to mention those in Latin America or Asia.

The »dilemma of simultaneity« overlooked four factors that in the end facilitated the rapid consolidation of the young democracies in Northeast and East Central Europe: (i) The communist regimes left a strong state and state bureaucracy that was easier to reform democratically than to rebuild from scratch, which has often proved necessary in Africa and East Asia. (ii) The communist regimes also left a well-educated population. The educational level was much higher than in most other new democracies, for example in Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa. And education is the most important »driver« of democratization. (iii) The EU turned out to be a very effective external democratizer. The offer to become a member of the European Union was a powerful incentive for the

young democracies to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and to implement the »acquis communautaire«. (iv) The good democratic neighborhood. The new democracies bordered on consolidated democracies in the West. Good neighborhoods help to stabilize young democracies.

The »dilemma of simultaneity« turned out to be both empirically wrong and theoretically weak, not least because it neglected the influence of structural elements (the state) by focusing too much on the rational actions of collective and private actors.

WINFRIED VEIT:

Break or Bluff? French Foreign Policy under Sarkozy

French president Nicolas Sarkozy came to office in May 2007 with the promise that he would »break« with the policy of his predecessors, above all that of his immediate predecessor, Jacques Chirac. A close analysis of his first year in office, however, reveals somewhat mixed results in the area of foreign policy. Sarkozy is to a considerable extent attached to the structures of the Fifth Republic that have, on the basis of the president's tough stance, created a »domaine réservé« especially in foreign and security policy, over which the National Assembly has little influence. Sarkozy's foreign policy is also strongly influenced by the Gaullist legacy, characterized by national sovereignty and a structurally conflictual relationship with the USA.

In the latter area in particular there are signs of a new policy, however: Apart from France's fundamentally critical stance on the Iraq issue, under Sarkozy there has been a rapprochement with Washington. This is not merely a matter of atmosphere, but rather an indication of agreement on important global issues (Iran, Afghanistan), not to mention Sarkozy's clear efforts to return to NATO's military command structure. The French president, in contrast to almost all his predecessors, also sees no contradiction between European defense and NATO, but considers the former as important as the North American pillar. Alongside the emphasis on a common European defense policy Sarkozy has, by means of the European »mini treaty« that he initiated, retrieved France from the European blind alley into which the country got itself after the Constitution referendum defeat of May 29, 2005.

On the other hand, Sarkozy wholeheartedly adheres to the Gaullist tradition of national sovereignty, above all in the area of industrial policy. With the creation, which he actively instigated, of a big national energy group through the merger of Gaz de France and Suez he is continuing the policy of »economic patriotism« he instigated as minister of trade and industry, leading to constant unrest in the European arms and aeronautic group EADS. The European partners also regard the project of a »Mediterranean Union« with mistrust, by means of

which Paris clearly wishes to create a counterweight to the German »Eastern orientation,« and in this context also the arrogant way in which France is selling nuclear technology, above all to the Arab countries. The early promise, personally associated with Foreign Minister Bernard Koucher, to place human rights at the center of foreign policy has given way, particularly in relation to the great powers China and Russia, to traditional Gaullist »Realpolitik«, together with robust business interests.

HANS-JOACHIM SPANGER:

Power without Purpose –

George W. Bush's Failed Policy towards Russia

At the end of George W. Bush's term of office relations between Washington and Moscow are back where they started: in the »Cold War,« after supposedly having attained their historic peak – for both states – in the aftermath of 9/11. The attributions of guilt being flung around in public may be divided into authoritarian-*étatist* Putinism and the overbearing arrogance of an energy bully on the Russian side, and Bushism and its militarized efforts to form the world in its own democratic image on the American side. What is decisive, however, is the sole constant of the Bush administration: the neglect, even ignorance of Russia, which in turn is increasingly regarded there as malign neglect.

While Russia originally sought to dispel Washington's casual unilateralism and the associated indifference towards its needs by means of demonstrative support in the common »global war on terrorism,« since 2006 it has reacted with indignation under the influence of its growing weight. Moscow has developed a geostrategically motivated line that represents nothing less than a multipolar challenge to US global dominance, underpinned by increasingly aggressive rhetorical skirmishes.

This growing mutual distrust has been stirred up by differences of perception, at the center of which stands the Russian withdrawal from the democratic path of American virtue on the one hand, and the American inability to come to terms with Russia's renewed self-confidence on the other. The key to these different narratives lies in perceptions of the 1990s: For Russia it was the period of Russia's secular decline, halted by Putin, while for the USA in contrast it represented a time of new hope, which with Putin has become lost in an authoritarian no-man's-land.

These differences in mutual perception are so fundamental that cosmetic adjustments will achieve nothing. Rather the coordinates of American policy towards Russia must be realigned. This is not merely a matter of holding together relations that are collapsing due to diverging values by means of residual common interests. Rather the widening gaps in the core area of mutual foreign and

security policy interests must be closed up. This poses a considerable challenge to the coherence of the twofold strategy, which involves the common pursuit of two legitimate and rational aims: democratically influencing conditions in Russia and making use of relations with Russia to solve common problems. The minimum condition is a de-ideologization of democratic peace in the US administration's official discourse, as well as a decoupling of democracy promotion from US geostrategy and its military instruments of regime change. This also includes reminding Russia of its international obligations, however, because in Moscow there is still a marked gap between demonstrative posturing and practical problem resolution.

FALK HARTIG:

The Development of the Chinese Communist Party

The Communist Party of China (CPC) is currently in the process of turning itself into a Chinese-style people's party. Since the beginning of the policy of openness and reform in 1978 the Party has acted in a sphere fraught with contradictions between decision-making sovereignty and objective constraints. In this way it is undergoing in the global dimension a highly unusual learning process that is serving as a basis for effectiveness and power retention. In the socio-political transformation process overall the role of the CPC is an essential factor in gradual systemic change.

In the course of this learning process the Party is transforming itself from a revolutionary party into an administrative people's party. This transformation can be recognized on the one hand in the fact that the Party no longer restricts itself to the class of workers and peasants, but rather is increasingly integrating new social strata. The increasing diversification of the membership structure requires new mechanisms of personnel management. On the one hand, the Party controls its members by means of modern Western methods (evaluation), while falling back on Maoist control methods, too. In addition, the Party is trying above all to strengthen mechanisms of intra-party democracy in order to come to grips with increasingly varied ideas within and demands on the Party. The focus on intra-party democracy shows clearly that democracy in the liberal-democratic understanding is not a reform aim for the CPC. Rather a »sinoized« concept of democracy is being developed to ensure the Party's monopoly of power and leadership.

Similar tendencies can be discerned in the incessant modification of Party ideology. Since the original guiding ideologies (Marxism, Sino-Communism) are no longer considered adequate or up to date, and an orientation towards liberal Western values and systems, such as multi-party democracy, are strongly rejected by the Chinese, they are turning increasingly to genuine Chinese values and ideas and harnessing certain historic elements of Chinese culture.

These organizational-structural and ideological-theoretical adaptations show clearly that the Chinese political leadership is seeking an independent Chinese development path that – so it appears at the moment – will not involve any kind of democratization in the Western sense. With its transformation into a Chinese-style people's party the CPC seems for the time being to be maintaining one-party rule. Given China's increasing global economic and political significance the development of the CPC, which for the foreseeable future will guide the country's fortunes, should receive a lot more attention in the West.

SZENARIOPROJEKT CHINA 2020: Scenarios for Chinese Foreign Policy in 2020+

In an increasingly complex world future developments will become more and more difficult to predict, while at the same time the question concerning the future will become more and more important for decision-makers. The scenario method offers the possibility of the analytical-creative production of plausible models of the future detached from contemporary thought patterns. On the basis of an accurate analysis of contemporary factors of influence on Chinese foreign policy abstract models of the future can be derived from a communication based process. Starting from these models the development path can be traced backwards from 2020 to the present day.

By means of this method three different and alternative futures can be developed for Chinese foreign policy in 2020. The »Harmless Dragon« scenario describes an economically weak China in the middle of a democratization process and closely cooperating in international affairs with the USA and Japan. Cooperation and active integration in existing international regimes and organizations characterize the foreign policy of the People's Republic, in which it will be actively supported, particularly by the USA. The »Hissing Dragon« scenario depicts a future strongly characterized by crises and not by cooperation and integration, as in the first scenario. China finds itself in a war with Russia and becomes isolated internationally, which will in turn lead to a decline in the international order. Unilateral action in international affairs and a mercantilist form of raw materials protection are characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. »The Dragon Awakes« describes a far more positive alternative future for China, whose economic development sets new records. In this future China is the driving force in the establishment of a new supranational organization that will revolutionize global regulatory policy in accordance with Chinese views. This organization will be called the »servant of humanity« and bring together economically relevant actors from politics and the economy throughout the world to form a kind of world government to guarantee lasting growth in prosperity. Concrete implications can be drawn from the three scenarios that can help in the contemporary development

of long-term strategic concepts. Such implications can be normative, in which case an attempt can be made by means of targeted measures to promote the development of a specific future and at the same time to prevent the development of another. Pragmatic implications, on the other hand, are supplied by mini-max strategies that aim at realizing one's own interests in each of the alternative futures and obtaining the maximum benefits at minimum cost. The benefit of scenarios is to demonstrate the most varied connections and to make people break with old patterns of thought.

HANS-JOCHEN LUHMANN / WOLFGANG STERK:
Environmental Targets – Should They Be Met at Home
or Where It Is Cheapest?

The Kyoto Protocol's emissions trade mechanisms permit individual industrialized countries, instead of reducing emissions on their own territory, at least partly to purchase reductions in other countries and count them towards their own Kyoto emissions targets. Originally conceived as a limited safety valve for overburdened industrialized countries the emissions trade has in the meantime come to be regarded by many as the central mechanism for North-South financial transfers, and one which should be extended. The developing countries, that is, have to be integrated in the environmental protection obligations that are to be met worldwide. From the perspective of their clearly smaller historic responsibility for climate change and their clearly weaker economic and technological capacities it is unreasonable to expect them to achieve the requisite environmental protection results by themselves. The idea that support should be provided primarily by means of the emissions trade, however, is questionable on a number of points.

In terms of its implementation hitherto, substituting domestic reductions as far as possible with purchases from abroad, the emissions trade option conflicts with environmental requirements in two ways. First, it undermines the framework conditions necessary for the requisite environmental innovations. The argument underlying the emissions trade – the greatest possible cost efficiency – reflects a static understanding of efficiency that does not go far enough. Only the (predominantly) domestic fulfillment of emission reduction obligations by industrialized countries can form the basis for technical advances there that can then be distributed in the developing countries, and promises to generate the rapid transformation needed to limit anthropogenic climate change. Second, the stemming of climate change requires, not only in the North, but also in the South, considerable emissions *reductions* by 2050, not merely restrictions. The question therefore arises, how it can be achieved, in the longer term, that the South, alongside its own reductions, continues to satisfy the North's considerable demand for emissions rights. In essence, the conclusion follows that the emissions trade must

be tailored in such a way that there is still sufficient pressure for innovation. Only then will there be any prospect that the concept of »environmental industrial policy« will achieve what it is capable of. That is, if support for Southern states is to be organized by means of the emissions trade market it must, in contrast to previous measures, take place *in addition to* domestic reductions in order to maintain the pressure for innovation. Even if one allows for the fact that the South should make a contribution in accordance with its economic capacities the North still has to meet emissions targets far beyond what is currently on the political agenda.

MARTIN STÜRMER:

The International Raw Materials Boom

Most industrialized countries are dependent upon the world market for their supply of critical metals. It is true that metallic raw materials are not in short supply physically, but they are unevenly distributed in regional terms. As a consequence, the trade policy regulation of these markets within the framework of GATT/WTO has acquired great significance.

Consumption of metallic raw materials has increased enormously with industrialization in developing countries, such as China and India. This has given rise to new challenges for multilateral trade policy. First, China represents a new and decisive actor that is not one of the classic Western industrialized countries. India is poised to become an equally important actor. Second, China, and partly also India, has reacted with raw materials protectionism and state investment. This has led to major trade distortions and has unleashed fears amongst the classic importing states. The multilateral world trade system of the WTO has only limited possibilities to counter this, however. Third, market power has shifted in the direction of the producer states. Fourth, there is no regulation of the environmental and social challenges of increasing consumption of metallic raw materials.

The multilateral world trade system has not evolved to deal with the new challenges from the increasing raw materials consumption of developing countries or the growing competition for raw materials. Reforms are urgently required in order to prevent raw materials protectionism, facilitate discrimination-free investments and lay down environmental and social standards. The fact is that a new balance must be found between producer and consumer states.

JOSEF BRAML:

America's New Energy. US Energy Foreign Policy after Bush

The economic and environmental costs of its current energy foreign policy, as well as those arising from maintaining security of supply, will lead the USA to the production and trade of more efficient and renewable energies.

US energy consumption has increased almost threefold since the 1950s. Since domestic production has remained constant over the last five decades, and imports from the Western hemisphere have been unable to satisfy increased demand, dependency has increased on oil imports from unstable regions, such as the crisis region of the Middle East. Since as early as the end of the 1990s the related costs and risks for national security of energy supply have created a first and important incentive for a reorientation of American energy policy.

On the other hand, due to its dependency on petroleum imports the USA is confronted by serious trade, monetary and so also national economic challenges. Energy imports account for a third of the immense growth in the trade deficit in recent years. Thirdly, Americans' growing sensitivity towards the health, economic, and security policy problems due to environmental pollution and climate change has increased the political pressure on their government to find a solution. In particular there are calls for the development of bio-fuels and to find alternatives to antiquated branches of industry that rely on fossil fuels.

These three problems should provide US political decision-makers with every incentive to switch the US economy to the lowest possible consumption of fossil fuels (»low carbon economy«). In the political debate, however, the so-called »national interest« is not always decisive in determining American policy, but rather the influence of different personal, regional, institutional, or economic interests. Particular interests and path dependencies of the political system have so far stood in the way of a renewable energy foreign policy in the USA.

Nevertheless, the reorientation in public opinion and the repositioning of economic interests are also opening up opportunities for political »pioneers« to bring about a change of course. Instead of competition with developing powers for ever diminishing fossil energy resources America could put itself in a stronger position as the supplier of coveted resources: What would lead the way in this respect would be cooperative and lucrative arrangements to meet the growing international demand for renewable energies and new technologies.

German and European policy could step in here and promote environmentally friendly energy security by means of a transatlantic environmental and energy partnership within a multilateral framework. In order to promote trade in cost-efficient bio-fuels and the expansion of growth industries, in particular in developing countries, the transatlantic partners would first have to renounce protecting their own national economies. Together with the USA Europe should, within a multilateral framework, provide for the free trade of ethanol and other »environmental goods« in order to make the energy security policy of the twenty first century more environmentally friendly.