

The enlargement of the EU to 27 member states increased the Community's heterogeneity considerably. It now unites states whose economic strength and state of development are very different. As a consequence, there are more inequalities, nonsynchronisms, conflicting interests, and faultlines than previously, and it has become appreciably more difficult to overcome the tensions existing between the goals of the Community and the positions of individual states. And to the extent that its ability to engage in uniform decision making and to act in unison is called into question the political unity of the Union as such is called into question. Whether, in light of recent experiences, the tensions in a Europe of 35 or more member states might still be manageable is questionable to say the least.

But it does not necessarily follow from this that the European success story has now come to an end. Whether it proves possible to take integration forward and to intensify it will largely depend upon what ideas about the future the politicians will develop for the Community. A number of models have emerged in the debate: a confederation of states, a federal state, a Europe of regions, and variations on »differentiated integration.« The notions of a two-speed Europe and of a Europe with »variable geometry« (also known as Europe »à la carte«) belong in this category. Two-speed Europe is associated with the expectation that after some time the majority of countries now »lagging behind« will once more catch up with the »pioneer group« and all states will be reunited on a common level of integration.

In this issue of INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND SOCIETY Christos Katsioulis and Gero Maß make a strong claim for the pioneer model of a two-speed Europe. The best way of avoiding lasting separation as a result of such differentiation would be the development of a clear goal of a security and welfare union, as well as a new narrative of widespread appeal. The realization of this security and welfare union might be imagined as the creation of a dense network of cooperation and compromise mechanisms and would require that the participants transfer sovereign rights to the Community. It would be an enormous step from current social policy to a security and welfare union because so far social policy has played only a subordinate role in multi-level EU policy, which is dominated by Internal-Market oriented economic policy and determined by the active role and strong position of the European Court of Justice.

European social democracy has precise and well-developed ideas concerning how this might be changed and how to actively shape social

Europe. Martin Schulz, member of the SPD party executive and presidium, and chair of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, presents the central ideas in the form of 10 theses. For this issue of *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND SOCIETY* Kurt Beck, SPD party leader, has compressed into 20 theses what needs to be done – which results from the basic social policy convictions of social democracy – not just in Europe but at international level: globalization must be shaped on the basis of liberalism, justice, solidarity, and sustainability, and for all peoples and countries. This requires a stronger influence on international markets, as well as an efficient system of global governance because global challenges can only be solved together. Unless Europe remains intact global governance simply cannot work.

Social models also lie at the center of Uwe Becker's contribution which examines whether the Scandinavian economic and social model can still serve as an example to others. Although the Nordic countries experienced crises in the 1990s and no longer embody an option beyond capitalism and socialism they still have their successes. When the economy was stagnating elsewhere Scandinavia exhibited robust growth, developed a capacity for innovation which would be hard to beat, attained significant productivity increases, at the same time maintained a high level of publicly financed social services, and once more achieved very high rates of employment. Scandinavia proves that expansion of the low-wage sector and cuts in the social security net are not prerequisites of economic success.

Political parties are primarily responsible for both the development and implementation of political goals in Europe and the member states. It largely depends on the state of the parties whether they can meet the expectations invested in them.

In his summation of the position of the European Left Ernst Hillebrand takes the view that Europe's left-wing parties are insufficiently equipped to meet today's challenges. The politico-ideological cycle of technocratic reform projects has come to an end, and the parties of the Left have yet to make adequate progress with their ideological and cultural *«aggiornamento.»* Among other things, consistent answers must be found to the relative deterioration of the position of dependent labor at European level, particularly the low qualified, the failure to keep the promises of progress entailed by the great education reforms, and new sets of problems, such as social exclusion and the effects of mass immigration.

Complementing the core themes Andrea Schneider analyses the strategies of private military companies; Jens Aderhold develops a new approach to the destruction of terrorist networks; Dries Lesage discusses the prospects of the G8; Andreas Goldthau and Oliver Geden call for a pragmatic energy security policy; and Adrä Gärber outlines ways of overcoming the democratic and development bottleneck in the Middle East.