Report on an International Workshop organised by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, 28 / 29 March 2001 by Stephan Stetter, London School of Economics
Probably the most intriguing features of Israeli politics are the diversity of opinions and cultural orientations which both characterise the country’s political landscape. This plurality is mirrored by the complex and potentially disruptive challenges emanating both from external and internal developments. The linkage between tension, conflict and violence in external and internal affairs, on the one hand, and the wide variety of opinions about how these problems ought to be understood and resolved, has been the underlying theme of the international workshop on ‘The Future of the State of Israel: Internal and External Perspectives’ of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Berlin in March 2001.
The workshop was bringing together almost 20 representatives from Israel to discuss these external and internal perspectives with German experts from political and academic life. The Israeli delegates were a mixed group comprising politicians, diplomats, political activists, academics and artists, and represented the wide spectrum of political orientations, which is so characteristic of Israel. Thus, human rights’ activists and representatives of the settlers’ movement, doves and hawks, Jews and Arabs, religious and secular Jews, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, all made-up this rather heterogeneous group.
The width of issues dealt with during the workshop, the great number of Israeli experts present and the diversity of political opinions they represented, as well as the huge public interest which the workshop was able to attract, all reflected the political significance of this event. This had been one of the rare occasions on which a German audience got the opportunity to acquire such an intimate picture of Israel’s social and political life and listen to so many diverse opinions about the country’s past, present and future. But also for the Israeli participants the workshop had some value, for it allowed them to discuss contested internal and external issues with some distance from the actual location of these various conflicts. Leaving the often painful day-to-day experiences to some extent behind, this climate promoted the willingness for some reflection, dialogue and mutual understanding. The first day of the workshop was devoted to discussions on the external dimension of Israeli politics. The major issues, of course, centred around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the shattered peace process and the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The second day was dedicated to the domestic problems which Israeli society faces, in particular the conflicts between various societal groups and the issue of Israeli identity. The two major themes of external and internal perspectives were intriguingly enriched by two public lectures of the Israeli writer Yoram Kaniuk.
Members of the Knesset
Other Israeli Participants
German Participants
Three dimensions of Israel’s external relations were at the heart of discussion in Berlin, these being the Israeli-German context, the relations between Israel and the EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The participants in the workshop, which was held in the old and new German capital and partly by video conference from Jerusalem, were of course, conscious that this meeting could not be separated from the wider issues of German-Jewish relations and the memory of the Holocaust. This link was addressed from the outset by Dr. Ernst-J. Kerbusch and by the various German politicians participating in the conference. MP Christoph Moosbauer pointed out that there is an overall consensus in German politics, which renders the secure and stable future of Israel in the Middle East a key interest of German foreign politics. MP Gert Weisskirchen stressed that Germany remains strongly committed to being a very close ally of Israel.
It was then Avi Primor who provided a detailed perspective on German-Israeli relations. Primor, a former ambassador of Israel to Germany, is a highly acknowledged and well-known figure in German political life. He presented an inspiring historical analysis of German-Israeli relations recalling that while Germany is today Israel’s closest ally alongside the USA, this has not been the case from the outset. After the Holocaust, in fact, there was a non-relationship between both sides. Most Israelis opposed vigorously the idea of any contacts with Germany or individual Germans. However, initially limited contacts encouraged by political élites in both countries brought about a change in attitude and led to a mushrooming of contacts on the economic and political and later also the societal level. The basis of the relationship, Primor concluded, are today not primarily bilateral treaties but rather the manifold human contacts and friendships which developed over the last decades.
Primor, but also Eli Goldschmidt and MK Roman Bronfman, noted that the future of German-Israeli relations will not just be determined by the historically shaped bilateral frameworks and experiences but increasingly by the political context of the EU. In the EU, Germany is only one of many players – albeit a powerful one. They recalled, that the EU is already today the largest neighbour and biggest trading partner of Israel and that it is most likely to assume an ever increasing importance of the EU for Israel, both in political and economic terms.
Notwithstanding the persistency of the special character of Israeli-German relations, the participants in the workshop referred across the board to the gradual merging of this relationship within the wider framework of relations between Israel and the EU. Two aspects of EU-Israeli relations were at the centre of debates in Berlin. First, the role of the Union in the Middle East peace process and, secondly, the long-term perspectives for bilateral relations. With regard to the role of the EU in the peace process, there was a consensus among Israeli participants that the financial contributions of the EU to the Palestinian Authority, which make the Union the single largest donor of the peace process, are a constructive and helpful instrument. However, they disagreed with regard to the question of how to develop further the political role of the EU in the region. Most delegates expressed the view that there is no space for direct political involvement of the EU in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and that only with regard to a future implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement the EU could provide its good services to foster the durability of such an agreement. Notwithstanding this scepticism, some participants were open to direct involvement in principal, however, remaining sceptical about the viability of such attempts. MK Ahmed Tibi’s observation that the EU is more a ‘payer than a player’ somewhat summarised the overall perspective of Israeli participants – while his view that the EU should put more diplomatic and economic pressure on Israel was not shared by the other Israeli participants. For example, Professor Shmuel Sandler and MK Michael Eitan called upon the EU to make use of its economic weight vis-à-vis the PA and to urge Chairman Arafat to stop violence originating from within the Palestinian Territories. The majority of delegates argued along similar lines, demanding from the Union to link more effectively its financial contributions for the Palestinians with the latter’s stronger commitment to both curb corruption in the Palestinian administration and putting an end to the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
With regard to the long-term perspectives of EU-Israeli relations, Primor made a strong case for further institutional inter-locking between both parties on the basis of the 1994 Essen-Declaration of the European Council which calls for the establishment of a ‘special relationship’ between Israel and the EU. Primor’s demands were later echoed by other Israeli participants, such as Goldschmidt and Bronfman. The latter went furthest when stipulating the idea of a future membership of Israel in the EU. There was, however, consensus that this issue is not yet ripe for the political agenda of neither the EU nor Israel and would in any case depend upon a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Not only for this reason, the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations were the main focus of discussions during the first day of the workshop. In lively debates, which also included contributions from the audience, three main issues with regard to the peace process were brought up. Firstly, reasons which caused the violence of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, secondly, pathways out of the violence-circle, and thirdly, principals for a permanent peace agreement. Bridging political divides, all participants were outspoken in condemning any acts of violence from both sides. Notwithstanding this consensus, however, views diverged significantly when assessing the reasons behind the deterioration of the peace process. When discussing this issue, a left-right divide between Israeli participants became visible. Thus, Eitan and Israel Harel stressed that the violence is a political instrument used by the PA for the achievement of political goals, whereas other, such as MK Colette Avital or Goldschmidt argued that, while there might be some political interest on the side of the Palestinians, violence is primarily caused by the increasing frustration in Palestinian society about the perceived absence of a peace-dividend. The way out of this vicious circle of violent action and reaction was also contested among the discussants. Some delegates demanded a complete stop of violence before negotiations could again resume, while others found an immediate return to the negotiating table alongside a step-wise reduction in violence more helpful.
It was interesting to note that participants agreed in their positive assessment on the political role of former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Sandler was convinced that Barak will enter history books as a highly acknowledged politician, who for the first time spelt out publicly what Israel has to concede if she wants to achieve peace with her neighbours at last. Supporting this argument, the majority of German and Israeli participants were convinced that since there is no viable alternative to political negotiations, Israeli and Palestinians will sooner or later have to return to these ‘historical’ proposals made by Barak in Camp David. On similar lines, Moosbauer and Sandler suggested to adopt a more long-term perspective on the conflict and requested more patience, arguing from political and historical angles, that a conflict as complex as the one in the Middle East, can hardly be solved in some years only.
But how should a final peace settlement, whenever it will be achieved, look like? Views were again divided on this issue – besides the consensus opinion that any agreement demands compromises from both sides. Most delegates supported the concept of a two state solution as the only means to preserve the national interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. In this context, the remarks of Harel, a representative of the settlers’ movement were quite interesting. While stressing the Jewish character of the West Bank and consequently opposing Palestinian rule over this area in principle, he made clear that his movement would for democratic reasons accept a withdrawal from this area, if a majority in the Knesset or a referendum would decide so.
Not less contested than the external perspectives were the discussions on the internal dimensions related to the future of the State of Israel. A very useful underpinning for the workshop was a major project which the Israel-office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation has just recently concluded. The project has the title ‘Israel in the Year 2025 – Scenarios of its Future Development’. This project, which brought together Israelis representing all major political, social and ethnical sectors and which was jointly headed by Dr. Yair Hirschfeld and Israel Harel, came up with four scenarios about the most likely future developments of the State of Israel. Given the diversity of its constituent members, the group disagreed with regard to their preferences about future developments. Nevertheless, they could agree on two major points. Firstly, that any discussion on Israel’s future has to be aware of the fact that the country is today characterised by increasing internal conflicts and, secondly, that out of the vast amount of potential alleys for future developments, a set of four most likely scenarios can be singled out.
Three of these four scenarios are rather pessimistic. The first scenario is based on the assumption that the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to prevail on the political agenda and that, therefore, the antagonism between the Jewish majority and the Palestinian minority in Israel further deteriorates. This would then lead to the establishment of a quasi-dictatorship of Jews over Arabs, thereby undermining the democratic character of the state. The second scenario assumes a relaxation of the external conflict and instead an increasing confrontation between secular and religious Jews over which direction the state should take. This confrontation would bring about a coalition between the Jewish secular and the Arab sector of society vis-à-vis a nationalist Jewish camp consisting of rightist and orthodox groups. The result of this confrontation would be the increasing challenge to the Jewish character of the state. Thirdly, the very character of the state could come under siege, assuming that a relaxation of the external tensions and increasing internal conflicts between seculars, religious and Arabs would lead to the de facto break-up of the state in three autonomous units.
The scenario-group developed only one positive scenario, while at the same time stressing the point that its realisation depends upon the willingness of all major societal groups to communicate with each other and to accept compromises. The fourth scenario assumes that the different groups can agree on a new consensus or ‘social contract’ for Israeli society. That would re-establish the authority of the state as such and consolidate both its Jewish and its democratic foundations. But how could this ‘positive’ outcome be achieved? Participants in the workshop discussed for that purpose the three most crucial of Israel’s internal challenges, these being the Arab-Jewish relations, the religious-secular dimension and, finally, the somewhat wider issue of Israeli identity.
The discussion on Arab-Israeli relations could not conceal the diverging opinions about the future development of Israel dominating within both groups. However, all discussants, Jews and Arabs alike, agreed on their principal willingness to overcome the problems and find a formula for better relations that would be supported by both groups. Jewish and Palestinian discussants repeatedly referred to the urgency of this goal, recalling both the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli police against Arab Israelis last October, when 13 Arab Israelis were shot, and the increasing alienation of Israeli Palestinians from the state, as documented by the solidarity of Israeli Arabs with their Palestinian brethren since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Participants agreed that while Arabs do enjoy the same formal rights as Jews that there is still a long way to go in the attempt to establish equal opportunities and rights in societal life at large. Differences in opinion emerged of how to achieve this common goal. Professor Majid Al-Haj and Tibi demanded as a precondition that Israel relinquishes the Jewish character of the state and establishes a multi-cultural state. This view was heavily contested by Avital and Sandler. Both stressed the fact that it is possible to define Israel as a Jewish state while at the same time allowing all societal groups to fully share rights and obligations within the democratic context of the country.
Not as controversial as the discussion on the Jewish-Arab dimension in Israeli politics, but nevertheless highly contested were the debates on the divide between religious and secular groups in the society. Secular politicians such as MKs Zahava Gal-On and Bronfman argued that there is a struggle nowadays in Israel between those supporting either a liberal or a religious-fundamentalist state. Both called for an ‘Israelinisation’ of the state, arguing that a clear-cut separation of state and religion is the only way of securing the country’s democratic character in the long run. This view was contested by MK Yair Peretz who argued that Jewish tradition and values are so central to Israeli society that the state could not exist without allowing the religious heritage to permeate political life as well. While Peretz underlined the allegiance to basic democratic principles, he urged the secular majority to be more responsive to the political demands and sensitivities of the growing orthodox community in Israel.
Finally, participants in the workshop discussed how, given these conflicts within Israeli society, a new consensus or ‘social contract’ could possibly be achieved. Professor Dan Diner stressed the need to take issues of identity serious and to render them central in the quest towards a unifying concept. This unifying concept must comprise the key values of all major societal groups. Diner pointed out that a new social contract could be achieved and that Israeli identity could be built on the principles of a common territory, the Jewish character of the state as well as the civic-democratic functioning of state institutions. Being sceptical about the likelihood of a new consensus to emerge, Gal-On argued that there rather seems to be an emerging nationalistic consensus between the centre right, the extreme right and the orthodox sector on a territorial definition based on the concept of Greater-Israel. With regard to the issue of cultural identities, Al-Haj and Peretz supported the notion of greater autonomy for the Arab and the orthodox sectors. A different emphasis was put by Bronfman and Goldschmidt, who stressed the need to stabilise over-arching Western-democratic principles, as the only means to ensure that all groups in the ‘multi-cultural’ Israeli society can peacefully live together. Notwithstanding the importance to establish common principles, Diner and Goldschmidt noted that heterogeneity and diversity are not new phenomena to Israel but have rather characterised societal life since the establishment of the state.
Dr Na’ama Carmi and Tomer Feffer provided for an alternative perspective on both the external and internal challenges by discussing the human right’s dimension inherent in both issues. By pointing to several examples which document a neglect of human rights’considerations both in the Palestinian Territories and in Israel, they made a case for making the promotion of human rights’, the strengthening of civil society and the fostering of the rule of law more central in political and societal life. Progress on these issues, they argued, does not necessarily conflict with legitimate security interests.
A fascinating linkage between the external and internal perspectives discussed during the workshop was provided by the Israeli-writer Yoram Kaniuk. From a very personal perspective Kaniuk talked about both Israeli-Palestinian relations and about the development of the state of Israel. He did not conceal his disappointment with the political developments during the last months. He criticised that until today Israelis and Palestinians have not understood to listen to the legitimate claims and the sufferings of the other side. He urged both sides to insist less on their rights but to focus on the common objective of securing peace, in the interest of both the Israeli and the Palestinian people. ‘Only when both sides start to use their heads more than their emotions’ Kaniuk finds it possible to break the perpetual circle of violence. ‘We might have no chance but we have to try’ said Kaniuk and concluded that the only answer to all sufferings and traumas of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the attempt to live a normal, peaceful life next to each other. Nobody knows today if this would lead to more peace and quietness in Israel and the Middle East but it is the only real alternative Kaniuk identified from the ongoing violence. Everybody has to try for oneself to do something for peace, Kaniuk concluded, noting that ‘I have tried at a certain point to be normal, to life normally. I do not know if that has been successful, but at least I have tried.’
Is merely trying enough? What can discussion on these essential issues in Berlin, a city thousands of kilometres away from the external and internal problems of Israel, actually achieve? Maybe little in direct result. Nevertheless, in spite of all differences between Israeli participants, the international workshop made clear that there are common goals despite the diversity of opinions. There was agreement about the wish to live together in the absence of violence and all participants signalled a willingness to make concessions and compromises. However, differences about the way in which all that could be achieved remain.
A sign of hope was emanating from the late night dinner which formally concluded the workshop. The musicians Einat Sarouf and Tamir Harpaz were performing Israeli music. When they started to play the famous song of peace, Shir Ha-Shalom, all Israeli participants, Liberals, Leftists, Orthodox, Arabs and Right-wingers entered the stage and sang together about the wish for peace and the renunciation of violence. This quite emotional sign gave some trust that there is a willingness in Israel and, hopefully, abroad to find, slowly, acceptable solutions to the external and internal challenges which the country faces today.
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