

Documentation of the expert workshop

**New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping**

organised by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Berlin, 7 July 2011

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## Core Insights and Points of Discussion

While the New Horizons Process has resulted in broader discussions than before and has led to conceptual and strategic progress, the translation into operational changes on the ground requires ongoing efforts.

As recent developments do not suggest that major progress on the remaining big political issues is likely to be achieved in the near future, pragmatically it would be advisable in the meanwhile to optimise existing structures and to focus on operational questions.

Multinational institutionalised mechanisms which could provide rapid deployment capacities either do not match expectations or have not yet achieved operability. Until further notice, rapid deployment is dependent on committed lead nations, for multilateral ad hoc arrangements as well as for the core of institutionalised arrangements of regional organisations.

The enduring division of labour between financial contributors, troop contributors and the permanent members of the Security Council remains precarious and poses significant risks for the future of UN Peacekeeping.

The range of actors willing to participate actively in the further development of UN peacekeeping is widening. A challenge for the future will be to include and encourage the newer member states in this open circle and also to make sure that the UN retains its central role in peace and international security.

## Background: Towards New Horizons

**Brahimi Report.** UN peacekeeping has expanded in two dimensions over the past twenty years. First, it expanded quantitatively in several surges, in terms of both financial and personal resources expended, and the total number of missions mandated. Second, the quality of peacekeeping has changed in relation to the complex tasks caused by highly diverse – and often dangerous – conflict environments. This expansion in conjunction with the problems involved in dealing with them is referred to as *peacekeeping overstretch*. After the fiascos in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s had indicated serious shortcomings in the UN peacekeeping missions' ability to fulfil their mandates – at least in the way their often general formulations were commonly interpreted – the UN undertook reform measures which led to the landmark *Brahimi Report* (A/55/305–S/2000/809). Some of the recommendations have been implemented, while many more have largely remained proposals, even though vigorously recommended by scholarly experts and practitioners.

*Note: This documentation of the expert workshop »New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping« is a personal reflection of the author. It does not necessarily coincide with the views of FES or the resource persons of the workshop.*

One example of the latter was a central recommendation concerning effective deployment. First, the Security Council (SC) should make sure that the resources necessary to enable a mission to fulfil its mandate are provided. Second, such well-appointed missions should be able to deploy rapidly to execute the SC's decision in a timely manner. Apart from a number of exceptions, UN peacekeeping missions too often lack the necessary resources (not only in terms of military assets), and such resources as are made available are in many cases deployed too slowly.

**New Horizons Process.** The latest chapter of the reform efforts, continuing the work begun with the *Brahimi Report*, is the so-called *New Horizon Process*, based on a non-paper which was issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) of the UN Secretariat in 2009. This reform process consists of four main areas: policy development (clarifying the critical roles and responsibilities of peacekeepers and developing practical guidance in specific areas like robustness and protection of civilians), capability development, global field support strategy and finally, planning and oversight. Altogether, they shall lead to a renewal of the peacekeeping partnership between the different stakeholders, especially the SC, the troop contributing countries (TCC), contributors of financial resources and the Secretariat.

The FES workshop »New Horizons and Old Problems for UN Peacekeeping« was part of a series of FES events dealing with current challenges for UN Peacekeeping and a follow-up to a conference held by FES New York from 2009, which focussed on »Coping with overstretch: Realigning capacities to fit peace and security challenges in a time of political fatigue«.<sup>1</sup> The workshop sought, first, to balance the progress and shortcomings of the latest reform efforts during the past two years. Furthermore, the issue of rapid deployment was discussed in a wider perspective, including experiences of other actors, such as the EU. Finally, the discussion was opened to the public with a focus on the SC, against the background of the current German membership of this UN body (2011/2012).

### **Panel I: »New Horizons, Progress after the First Two Years«**

The first panel showed an interesting phenomenon. While the main task – evaluating the progress of the New Horizon-process – rather pointed to an analysis of mere technical details, the discussion was dominated by policy issues, such as the protection of civilians or the robustness of UN peacekeeping. At the same time, a shift was observed away from doctrinal questions towards implementation questions (for example, what common standards UN peacekeepers have to maintain to ensure protection of

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<sup>1</sup> A report from that conference is available at: <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/06238-20090331.pdf>

civilians in a given situation) in the global discussion about UN peacekeeping, which to some extent is contradictory.

**Protection of Civilians.** The protection of civilians (PoC) in general was one of the most intensively discussed among the political issues. It was seen predominantly as being successful in terms of doctrinal and procedural development. While some years ago there was no explicit understanding of what PoC meant, it is now acknowledged as a mission-wide task. That includes a comprehensive approach that goes far beyond a physical – or military – understanding of protection. Moreover, the multifaceted setting of contemporary integrated UN peacekeeping missions fit well in a broader concept of security. At the decision-making level, PoC has also come to be a central task that bestows meaning on the practice of peacekeeping. This might be seen in recent documents such as the Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan (S/2011/314), as well as in the fact that the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34 Committee) now regularly discusses PoC, which it refused to do some years ago. Furthermore, the C34 Committee asked the DPKO to develop a mission-wide operational framework to provide practical guidance for UN peace operations; this work was recently completed. Another reason mentioned for being confident that PoC will remain a high priority is the stated interest of the current US administration in this topic.

**Peacekeeping–Peace-building Nexus.** The abovementioned complex understanding of protection leads to another policy or doctrinal issue: the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. There was a consensus during the discussion on the conceptual level, recognising the two as elements of one continuous spectrum of activities. However, the reasons for malfunctions in the institutional framework for the coordination of peacekeeping and peace-building issues were disputed: the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was perceived to have a »rocky relationship« with the DPKO, while other participants stressed the need for clarification of the roles of the SC and the PBC. Member states should therefore strive to make the two organs more complementary.

**Robustness of UN Peacekeeping.** Two other political questions under discussion which are often closely connected are, first, robustness and second, the consent of conflicting parties. In case of the former, there exists consensus on the surface – missions must be prepared to deter attacks on themselves and the mission mandate – but the details, especially the capability requirements and the limits on the use of force are still contested. Some actors try to evade this impasse by alluding to the importance of more technical aspects such as common standards for contingents and improving their quality as parts and as a composite force. Remarkably, the discussion revealed a greater willingness on the part of African states to act robustly than is often suggested: these countries are usually cited as examples of *sovereignty outweighs effectiveness*.

**Consent of Conflicting Parties.** The last political question concerning the consent of conflicting parties to a given intervention or action of the UN was, not surprisingly, also discussed against the background of sovereignty. Participants underlined the positive impact of well-functioning UN peacekeeping missions on restoring state authority (even and in particular when the mandate is robust, for example, the fight against criminality in Haiti being waged by MINUSTAH). However, there was broad consent that UN peacekeeping practically cannot act without the basic consent of the conflicting parties. Not only because it is a noble principle necessary for continued acceptance in the international community, but also because UN peacekeeping is generally not suited for enforcement in technical-military terms.

It also turned out that (evanescent) consent in particular might become a problem when the international presence shifts its emphasis to peace-building. At this stage, there are less short-term benefits for new governments in the concerned states. Before that, peacekeepers are helpful in ending hostilities and stabilising the new government. But what the international community understands as a starting point for further peace-building activities is often more than enough for the winning former conflicting party. In the second phase of consolidation and reconstruction, the UN can come to be perceived – by an unwilling government – as a demanding taskmaster who keeps calling for reforms which are often politically difficult and generally uncomfortable.

**Capacity Building and Force Generation.** A further important reform activity is capacity building and force generation. Here, considerable progress has been observed by the panel. Especially in the long neglected field of civilian capacities, the establishment of rosters for experts by many member states, alongside increased training efforts and the constant exchange of best practices, is seen as a success story. This also applies to Germany and its Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF). On the UN level, the so called *Civ Cap review* (A/65/747–S/2011/85) can be highlighted as an important step. Despite these positive developments, however, there is still a high vacancy rate for civilian experts in the field. This gap, caused not least by the complex tasks of modern peace operations and the consequent quantitative and qualitative need for experts, leads to impatience in conflict-affected regions and needs to be tackled vigorously.

In the military sphere, standardisation and improving interoperability and readiness in general also need ongoing efforts. One lesson could be learned from ECOWAS where regular visits to contingents preparing for a common peacekeeping deployment have proven to be a helpful instrument. In the case of ECOMOG, this was done by officers from the common headquarters. Focussing on the quality of designated peacekeeping contingents was considered a very reasonable effort because – even if the dictum *size matters* is still valid – observers note a trend from a number-driven to a capability-driven approach in peacekeeping affairs.

**Cooperation with Other Organisations.** A central issue in the attempt to strengthen the peacekeeping partnership is cooperation with other organisations, such as the AU, the EU or NATO. The most promising of these approaches seems at present to be the cooperation with the AU. Consequently, Africa and the AU were recurrent issues on the panel. While the increase in consultations between the AU and the UN, as well as the attempts of the AU to establish the African Standby Force (ASF), which shall be operable in 2015, are considered a success, some things are still in a state of disorder. Only two of the projected five regional brigades which the ASF will consist of (all of which have to be ready before the ASF as a whole can be declared operable) are ready for action. However, financial constraints – among other things due lack of support from Western states, caused by the financial crisis – make it questionable whether the ASF will be ready to deploy in 2015. Within the AU, it is disputed whether the brigades which are already operable should be deployed if needed before the rest are ready or not.

**Division of Labour.** When it comes to the question of partnership, the division of labour between TCCs, financial contributors and decision-makers, namely the SC, came under discussion. One strand of the discussion claims that, if this division is to be maintained, the Western countries in particular should show more commitment to their roles. However, it turned out that a stronger financial engagement in the near future was considered unrealistic: on the one hand, the EU member states are keeping an eye on the UN as they all are facing huge domestic budgetary challenges. The US, on the other hand, was assessed to be more willing in financial terms because it is more dependent on a strong UN to reduce their even more expensive deployments in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The other strand of the discussion on peacekeeping partnership asks for more balanced burden-sharing. Most notably, the Western countries are being asked to increase their contribution of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. But this question ultimately points to a recurrent theme of the whole discussion: the participants observed a lack of political commitment to the cause of UN peacekeeping (because sending troops can be seen as an indicator of priority-setting). Consequently, a request was made to manage the expectations of the member states more realistically – in short: tell them what they can realistically achieve with one dollar spent or one soldier sent in a given conflict – and to shift from a political to a more technical discussion: the New Horizon process is composed of incremental steps and not a *big bang* reform, simply because more is not achievable with the current level of political commitment.

## **Panel II: »Rapidly deployable and robust«**

While the first panel had a single input which was commented by the other panellists, the second panel, with its focus on rapid deployment,

consisted of several inputs. As already mentioned the imperative of this panel's topic – the capability of peacekeepers to deploy rapidly – was not contested. The reasons given were numerous: at the outset of a peace operation, an early mission setup not only shows the strong will of the international community with regard to spoilers and other potential troublemakers, but it also might keep such adversarial actions to a minimum. Furthermore, it provides security for all other reconstruction efforts and creates leeway to tackle the origins of conflict. Moreover, an early peace dividend can act as a catalyst for all other stages of reconstruction and reconciliation.

From the discussion it emerged that a chronological division of labour in this context has proven possible and useful. It is not necessary (and not possible) to make all potential peacekeeping forces rapidly deployable. But fairly small contingents serving as bridging missions at the outset of a mission – for example, to secure a port or an airport as entry point or a safe haven for refugees – are valuable, as are highly mobile rapid reaction forces serving as backup beyond the horizon for peacekeepers already deployed in the field.

Despite these advantages, many problems remain which make sound rapid deployment capacities scarce. This is true in particular for multinational forces. The political frameworks are often characterized by the absent of pooling or earmarking of designated troops. Deployments generally depend on single case decisions, often by both governments and parliaments. The technical problems are huge, especially in terms of enabling assets such as logistics. Beyond that, establishing interoperability remains a difficult task, even more so if there are not only different national contingents to coordinate, but also different organisations, such as the UN and the EU. Finally, it is not clear what *rapid* really means: the Brahimi report states 90 days, the projected ASF 14 days and the first elements of the Battlegroups (BG) of the EU are supposed to be in theatre within 10 days – keeping in mind the different geographic starting points.

**SHIRBRIG and EU Battle Groups.** Existing multinational rapidly deployable forces, such as the EU Battle Groups (BGs) or the multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) – which in the meantime was disbanded in 2009 – have offered a number of good lessons. Even though neither of the two mentioned formations have ever been deployed as a whole, the common training experiences, as well as the military services they can or could provide – for example, field headquarters or capacity-building measures – have been lauded by participants. The discussion also showed that force transformation or making national contingents operable for international operations is an important but rarely mentioned quality of multinational formations.

**Lack of Available Rapidly Deployable Contingents.** Nevertheless, in the presentations and ensuing discussions it turned out that there are many reasons why multinational rapidly deployable forces are not routinely available for UN peace operations. Some problems are similar to those of

*regular* UN troop contributions: numerous national operational caveats, the requested (and asserted) prerogative to decide upon deployments of national contingents on a case by case basis, in some cases a reluctance because of bad examples set by SC members and other powerful states who do not show enough commitment to UN peacekeeping, and other reasons. More specific with regard to multinational standby forces are difficulties in coordination; together with the UN and the troop contributing states, the situation could be described as a decision-making triangle. A further problem is public diplomacy: in a multinational force, the national flag becomes paler over the years. In a short-term perspective, therefore, ad hoc cooperation between the UN and member states seems to be more efficient and more prestigious for member states.

***Focus on Pragmatic Small Steps to Enhance Cooperation Recommended.*** The prospects for the existing formats, such as the BGs, and the follow-up of those that have already ceased to exist (SHIRBRIG) were not regarded optimistically. As long as there is nothing better, participants advised nevertheless to strengthen the available possibilities for common exercises, training and standardisation, pooling and better coordination of existing actors as much as possible and to call on member states in a given crisis to make use of available capacities. While this attempt to optimise the status quo shows again the limited leeway if political commitment is absent, the more frequent deployment of smaller contingents of existing forces, such as the BG or the (ad hoc) creation of bi-national contingents, such as the Irish-Swedish force in Liberia, were voiced as alternatives that should be used more frequently. Other suggestions, such as small inter-regional bi-national contingents, were also put forward. Even without a sophisticated political framework, those arrangements could provide invaluable practical experience, the debate suggested.

The pragmatic course of the discussion in this panel was also expressed by two remarkable non-topics. First, the issue of non-military rapid reaction capacities – both diplomatic tools and civilian experts – was prompted by participants without any significant follow-up (which might also be due to the fact that these civilian aspects had already been systematically addressed in the past two years). Second, there was some regret about the continuous failure to arm the UN with its own rapid reaction capacity, as seriously attempted with SHIRBRIG. Nevertheless, even the proposal of an UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) project, which aims at creating a standing high readiness civil-military peacekeeping capacity for the sole use of the UN, did not trigger a controversial debate. No one really advocated a new attempt, even though there was widespread consent on the need for a standing capacity to be at the UN's disposal.

***AU Faces Similar Obstacles with Regard to Rapid Reaction.*** As was the case in the first panel, a larger portion of the debate was dedicated to developments in Africa. In addition to the aforementioned insights, it appeared that, despite the high speed with which the AU wants to advance, the obstacles are great and in detail very similar to other regional

approaches. Regarding the political leadership of potential ASF missions, the AU wants to take the reins, but the member states and regional organisations insist on their right to make the final decision on deployments. Furthermore, participants discussed the absence of clear leadership on the part of one of the major powers on the continent. Either Nigeria or South Africa is supposed to take that role, but both are considered competing powers within the AU itself. Nevertheless, the implementation of the *Prodi report (A/63/666-S/2008/813)* on AU-UN cooperation in AU peacekeeping operations has already made some progress.

**Indonesia and South-East Asia: Increasing Peacekeeping Ambitions.**

Besides these more familiar theatres, recent developments in South-East Asia point to a strengthening of more rapidly deployable peacekeeping troops. Driven by the coincidence of several propitious political factors in Indonesia, the country is making considerable efforts to increase its own peacekeeping capabilities and those of the region. The latter is being attempted, among other things, by promoting the ASEAN Security Community, which shall be operational by 2015. ASEAN, having had no distinct common peacekeeping record before, might become a peacekeeping hub within the next few years.

**Standby Capacities over the Horizon and the Need for Lead Nation Engagement.**

Another approach which was briefly discussed was the idea of getting the existing TCCs – mainly by assigning them the necessary financial resources in advance – to keep forces on standby. These forces could be used as strategic reserves over the horizon. A strong argument for TCCs providing such backup capacities would be that these forces would be on standby to assist their own national comrades in case of need.

Picking up the issue of expectations raised in the first panel, the different examples presented and discussed in the second made one important point clear: strong and committed lead nations have been and are still needed, be it in ASEAN, in SHIRBRIG (where political support declined over the years) or in the AU. Even the UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS) sees itself only as a first-aid tool that cannot replace the engagement of member states in a traditional UN peace operation framework. It remains to be seen whether the critical stage of first entry in the conflict region, especially under dangerous circumstances, can do without a resolute state or a small group of states willing to lead the operation to success. In the discussion, some cases were named repeatedly – for example, the expansion of UNIFIL, the reinforcement of UNOCI or the Australian-led INTERFET in East Timor – where this decisiveness became visible.

**Parliamentary Proceedings and UN Peacekeeping.** At the end of the panel discussion, members of the German Bundestag joined the session. In the following discussion, the importance of overcoming the division of labour in UN peacekeeping and the need to strengthen German contributions to UN peacekeeping were emphasised as major tasks for Germany as a current member of the SC. For German politics – but of

interest with regard to all parliamentary systems – the question was raised of how mandating processes could be improved to accelerate decision-making about deployments. The Bundestag subcommittee for civil crisis prevention, which was established in 2010, was seen in this context as an opportunity for the parliament to exert more influence on foreign policy at an early stage. This is not only in order to prepare decision-making but also to strengthen prevention capabilities. During the panel discussion, participants criticised the fact that preventive measures in general too often fall behind sanctions and enforcement as options for dealing with conflicts.

### **Public panel discussion: »UN Peacekeeping and the Security Council in 2011«**

The public panel discussion at the end of the workshop, chaired by Ekkehard Griep of the United Nations Association of Germany (UNA), focussed on the SC. The exceptional current composition of the SC, including emerging powers and important TCCs such as India, Brazil, Nigeria and South Africa, provided an occasion to ask what can be expected from the SC to strengthen the peacekeeping partnership. Of course, the current German membership also played a role in the discussion because the event was aimed at informing German policymakers, too.

**South Africa – A »Teenager« in Terms of Peacekeeping.** Anthoni van Nieuwkerk from the University of the Witwatersrand opened the discussion with a presentation of the South African perspective on UN peacekeeping. Compared to the countries represented by the other panellists (China, India and USA), South Africa was in his words a »teenager in terms of peacekeeping, [...] moving from a regional destabilizer to a continental peace power.« As a positive aspect of this analysis, the *idealism of youth* could be seen as a characteristic of South Africa's peace record. It manifests itself in a strong dedication to mediation, preventive diplomacy and continuous negotiations to achieve conflict solutions.

While this mainly historically explained character can be seen as a helpful asset, South Africa also struggles with a plethora of internal problems, including ineffective management, a lack of economic and human resources and poor discipline. Besides these issues, the aforementioned conflicts within the AU of course also apply to South Africa. Furthermore, South African voting behaviour in the SC on the situation in Libya (S/RES/1973), opposing the AU's position, caused a loss of reputation on the African continent. The same applies to the recent crisis in Ivory Coast, which finally led to the French enforcement of UNOCI. According to van Nieuwkerk, South Africa struggled in this situation to gain influence in West Africa and ignored the French interests, which led to the known results.

**China – From Limited Engagement to Ardent Support of UN Peacekeeping.** Cheng Xiaohe of Renmin University continued the debate introducing the Chinese peacekeeping record. In the 1970s, China had no clear approach to UN peacekeeping. But with its political opening up to the world and having gained some years of experience with the UN's principles, rules and procedures, behaviour started to change with the first yes-vote for a peacekeeping operation in 1981. Subsequent further opening was interrupted by the »June Fourth Incident«, better known in Western countries as the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.

The following limited engagement changed in the late 1990s. Cheng cited two reasons: first, the stabilisation of relations with the US after the third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1997, and second, the increased wealth and power of China at this time. This trend continued and currently the People's Republic, which also increased its financial contributions in 2009 from 3.1 to 4.0 per cent, is the biggest TCC among the permanent members of the SC. As Cheng stated, »China changed from a close observer to a half-hearted hesitant participant and then from a half-hearted to an ardent supporter and full-fledged partner in a few years.«

**India – The Old Man of UN Peacekeeping on the Verge of Change?.**

The third presentation by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu from the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) in New York referred to India as »the old man of UN peacekeeping«. Over the years and since the first UN peacekeeping operation, India has sent about 100,000 peacekeepers on over 40 missions. It has troops deployed in nine of the 14 current missions.

The reasons for India's early entry into the UN peacekeeping business were, according to Sidhu, first the fact that India at this time had deployable forces at its disposal, while other countries, such as France and the United Kingdom, had reduced their expeditionary forces. Moreover, traditional UN peacekeeping was not as dangerous as it is today (with some exceptions).

The habitual provision of peacekeepers rendered the contribution of troops to UN missions a normal part of Indian foreign policy, which was why the public generally did not notice these deployments. The people concerned – military officers, for example – considered it an honour to be sent on a UN peace operation. This was echoed by the political feeling that being a reliable TCC wins prestige for the committed country. Finally, the financial benefits also accounted for a positive stance on UN peacekeeping.

Entering the 1990s, Sidhu observed a change beginning in India's peacekeeping politics. Defining its direction, however – more or less engagement – needed closer consideration. »Negative drivers« were first of all the fact that peacekeeping became more dangerous which caused losses and corresponding news coverage. At the same time, Indian peacekeepers lost something of their reputation when reports emerged of poor performance in terms of corruption and even criminality. Of course,

this information found its way into the public debate, too. Furthermore, the prosperous economy alleviated the financial incentives of UN peacekeeping.

On the other hand, there were also »positive drivers« that took effect in the other direction. First, India was aware that its aspirations for a permanent seat in the SC were endorsed due to its impressive peacekeeping record. Second, India developed strategic national interests which needed a stable and secure environment in the areas concerned.

As a consequence, there is now an Indian doctrine of peacekeeping, which did not exist before. According to Sidhu, this development coincides with the breakdown of the old consensus on how peacekeeping operations should be conducted. The venue in which a new consensus is to be negotiated need not necessarily be within the institutions of the UN. Other forums within the framework of formations such as the G20 or the BRIC countries are becoming more and more attractive. If the »old powers« want to maintain the UN's unique importance, they need to bring the new powers, such as India, into the old structures.

**US and EU – Critical But Not Promising.** The current stances of the US and the EU on UN peacekeeping were presented by Richard Gowan from the Center on International Cooperation. Both the EU and the US could in fact be expected to show more engagement, especially in terms of troop contributions, as the envisaged retreat from Afghanistan will free up significant resources. Moreover, both have signalled that they want the UN to play a central role in the coordination of post-conflict management in Libya after the ending of the civil war. This would have two consequences: another decline of NATO framed commitment and an increased need for UN peacekeepers. Again, both would indicate a regrouping of resources towards the UN.

In contrast, the US does not seem to have a real strategy to strengthen UN peacekeeping in general. Although the Obama administration shows much more commitment to the UN than its predecessors – which was expressed inter alia by a high-level meeting convened by President Obama in 2009 – this has not translated into assets such as the provision of drones or a significant increase in personnel contributions.

The prospects for the EU do not look better. It was mainly EU member states that made the rapid and massive reinforcement of UNMIL possible in 2006. But today, the same states, especially the United Kingdom and France, are pushing the secretariat to cut costs. »And one way to keep missions cheap is not actually to give them the soldiers they need«, said Gowan.

This assessment of willingness to commit more financially is matched by the observation that »We don't see much sign that many European countries would consider putting more of their own troops under UN command.« The cynicism that, as a consequence, is spreading at the UN

concerning whether the Western powers really care about the UN must be fought, warned Gowan.

**DPKO Hopes for More Political Coherence in the UN-SC's Peacekeeping Work.** As a final input, David Haeri from the DPKO warned that the SC has still not learned a number of important lessons. The main points of his critique were: the absence in many cases of a thorough political process to accompany peace operations; the lack of political coherence within the SC which too often led to mandates based on the lowest common denominator; and the mismatch of mandates and resources.

The Peacekeeping partnership was considered to be working in general, given the 160,000 people involved in the deployment cycle, but also to be under strain. Among the reasons for this Haeri cited the budgetary problems caused by the global financial crisis and the division of labour between the stakeholders. Both led to obstinate negotiations over the peacekeeping budget, which generally revealed profound differences between what a TCC expects and the financial contributor's willingness to pay.

Haeri also raised the question of where the future centre of gravity of international decision-making will be. He described the increasing participation in policy debates on peacekeeping and peacebuilding of states such as India, Brazil and Indonesia as »very healthy«, but also pointed out that it »reflects a change in what used to be the dynamic.« Europeans therefore should ask »if it's not going to be in the UN, where is it going to be?« If Western powers signal to emerging countries such as India that countries above a certain level do not do UN peacekeeping, India and others are likely to reach the same conclusion.

**Ways Ahead – Taking UN-SC Reform Seriously and Strengthening the Basis of TCCs.** This suggestion was seized on by other panellists. Possible and well known ways of countering moves away from the UN were considered, such as taking SC reforms seriously again or increased troop contributions, even if only as a gesture.

Asked what could be expected of Germany as a member of the SC, a number of different answers emerged. Several times, a request was made to make mandates more effective. Concerning the peacekeeping partnership Sidhu proposed a bridging role between the old members from the West and the new powers which aspire to a stronger role in the SC. He added that Germany has already shown its abilities in this regard in the discussion on NATO's non-first use doctrine at its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary summit.

For Germany's own sake, Gowan suggested that the country should play a leading role in the SC in the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya in order to counter the Western allies' ongoing loss of reputation.

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