

# Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector

Wilson O V Ijide  
July 2020

→ Predicated on the stance that ability predicts performance, the study investigated the ability of security institutions in the country.

→ The key security stakeholders' and contemporary issues discoursed revealed underperformance that results from systemic ability failure.

→ A comprehensive reform to attain performance requires capacity and capability building that incorporate good governance principles.



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# Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector

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This analysis titled *Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector*, written by Dr Wilson O V Ijide, is number 3 of 6 analyses. The other analyses of this series are:

**Analysis 1:**

*Inclusive Participation in Nigeria's Security Sector: Trends and Opportunities* by Dr Iro Aghedo

**Analysis 2:**

*Towards an Accountable Security Sector in Nigeria* by Dr Abdulwahab Ademola Lawal

**Analysis 4:**

*Non-State Security Sector in Nigeria: Trends and Challenges* by Dr Ndubuisi N Nwokolo

**Analysis 5:**

*Nigeria's Security Architecture for the Future: State of National Security Agencies' Coordination and Cooperation* by Brig Gen Saleh Bala (Rtd)

**Analysis 6:**

*Policing, Police and the Feasibility of Their Reform in Nigeria* by Dr Chris M A Kwaja

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The rising intensity of insecurity challenges in Nigeria necessitates the quest for effective and efficient security. The ideal expectation is that the country reflects the findings of the analytical discourses in its security reform as evidence-based decisions.

**Ulrich Thum**

Resident Representative,  
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July 2020



# Institutional Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Sector

## Abstract

The study examined the problems of capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions. This was done concerning the ongoing security challenges in Nigeria over the past two decades. The study sought to explain why it has been difficult to have a sustained strategy of containment of Nigeria's security challenges. The conceptual framework of the study was based on the theory that capacity predicts performance. Consequently, the study adopted the stakeholders' perspectives in its methodology of data collection. Key security institutions were purposively selected for the study. Secondary sources were used for the main data for the analysis. The findings revealed that the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions are affected by a multiplicity of factors. Among the factors are insufficient funding, workforce challenge, lack of up-to-date equipment, corruption and poor Security Sector Governance (SSG). Furthermore, the study noted that over-centralisation of security by the federal government and the establishment of many agencies with overlapping functions, like those of the Nigerian police and the army, impact negatively on the capacity and capability of the security sector. The study's main recommendation among others is that the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) should embark upon a deliberate and broad-based Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme that is focused on developing the security sector's capacity, legislative oversight and improved professionalism of security agencies.

**Keywords:** Capacity, Capability, Security Institutions, Good Governance, Nigeria  
Security Sector, Conflict and Peacebuilding

## 1 Background

The threat to peace and security has remained a major focus of discourse in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as academics and security experts around the world seek to develop the right capacity and capability to deal with emerging challenges. The International Peace Academy (IPA 2004) Report on the seminar titled '*The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*,' is one of the efforts on the pool of researchers and experts in the quest to manage conflict and build peace. According to the United Nations' (UN) Deputy Secretary-General, Amina Mohammed, security threats in Africa have changed significantly over the last two-plus decades, necessitating growing attention to their changing dynamics, including new forms, actors and implications for broader development agendas (Mohammed 2019). Amina Mohammed also noted that today's conflicts are

unconventional, involving a wide range of non-state actors and the conflicts affect huge civilian populations, especially, women, children and the elderly.

The security sector in the modern state is therefore predicated on the nature of real and perceived threats to peace and development, recognising that the strength and ability of a public institution to perform its statutory role, satisfactorily, lies in its capacity and capability. To this end, countries may review their security strategy to deal with emerging threats. The United States (US) for instance, established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002, which involved combining 22 different federal departments and agencies into a unified, integrated Cabinet agency in the aftermath of the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 (DHS 2018). Some ways a country can hope to address the

challenges of the security sector include having the right security strategy in place, which involves a holistic appraisal of the nature of threats, developing an adequate force structure with a high level of professionalism and a sustainable security sector budget among others.

Nigeria has been facing unprecedented security challenges over the past two decades, ranging from criminalities such as pipeline vandalism, hostage-taking and kidnapping for ransom to ethno-religious threats in forms of riots, demonstrations, agitations for resource control by the Niger Delta militants, herdsman attacks and violent extremism epitomised in the Boko Haram (BH) insurgency that is ongoing in the north-east of the country. The growing trend of insecurity expectedly poses a serious challenge to economic development as it scares away foreign direct investment with the attendant problems of poverty and unemployment that result in a cycle of violence. Nigeria's security institutions are constitutionally responsible for dealing with these challenges. In this regard, the performance of the country's security agencies in dealing with the growing spate of insecurity has remained worrisome, making it necessary to interrogate the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2016) report on the challenge of military reform in the country captured in its Executive Summary that "Nigeria's military is in distress," noting that "once among Africa's strongest and a mainstay of regional peacekeeping, it has become a flawed force."

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) 2018 report on the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Nigeria ranks third among 10 countries most affected by terrorism (IEP 2018). The country accounted for 10,000 (8 per cent) of total deaths from global terrorism in 2017, thus ranking the third highest beyond only Afghanistan and Iraq (IEP 2018). BH remains the deadliest terrorist group in the country, ahead of bandits and kidnappers. The group claimed

responsibility for several violent attacks on aid workers and security forces in 2018. Going by the report of United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF 2018), children have been the most vulnerable to the challenge of insecurity in Nigeria, since 2013, over 1,000 children have been abducted by BH in north-eastern Nigeria while 1,400 schools have been destroyed. Every day, the citizens are afraid for their lives and scared to travel because of kidnappers and terrorists who have continued to abduct people at random and terrorise society. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) report put Nigeria's unemployment rate at an all-time high of 23 per cent in 2018. The growing population of unemployed youths is likely to escalate the already high level of insecurity, and in turn, stretch an already weary security sector. In 2014, the then President, Goodluck Jonathan, appealed to the US for military aid to the country to fight the jihadists' insurgency (Abubakar and Agoi 2014). The Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Lieutenant General Buratai, recently called for spiritual warfare against the BH insurgents, which suggests the apparent state of vulnerability the security forces have found themselves (Tribune 2019).

The ICG (2016) identified resource allocation as a challenge to Nigeria's security institutions in terms of inadequate budgetary allocation, hence, security agents lack adequate equipment and tools to discharge their duties. It is further observed that there are wide skill and knowledge gaps among security agents. These gaps exist in different dimensions with different priorities ranging from workforce, IT, budget, training and equipment (Nnabuife 2019). Gaps may also be assessed from the observed and the expected level of services provided by the security institutions; such that gaps in required knowledge and skill have a deleterious effect on intelligence mechanism and coordination among Nigeria's security institutions. Further, Nigeria's security agents lack the expected level of professionalism in terms of the knowledge of their code of ethics and constitutional bounds

among others (Amnesty International [AI] 2018; ICG 2016; Ijide 2016; Abegunde 2013).

This brings to the fore the question of how security agents are being recruited, trained and funded. Nigeria's security institutions are also not up to date with required operational technology and routine maintenance culture to operate effectively in an ever more complex, dynamic and multiple security threats' environment of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

Doctrine is a different problematic issue that affects the performance of Nigeria's security institutions in terms of the necessity for joint operations. According to the Nigerian Network on Security and Democratic Governance (NINSED 2016), there is an overbearing bureaucracy and its personalisation, as well as clientelism and corruption as a major setback in implementing security operations. These inadequacies and gaps constitute major hindrances incapacitating Nigeria's security agencies to effectively address the growing spate of insecurity in the country. The inadequacy of workforce or poor management of it in addressing the multiplicity of threats also poses yet another major challenge in terms of the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions.

Against this background, this study seeks to address the identified gaps in Nigeria's security sector with a focus on institutional capacity and capability. It will equally proffer some workable solutions to address these gaps.

## 1.1 Objectives

The general objective of the study is to seek how to improve the performance of the security sector. With performance having capacity and capability as its attributes, to achieve the general objective as the outcome of the study, the specific objectives are structured to identify and analyse the issues surrounding the challenges hindering the capacity and capabilities of Nigeria's security institutions. Thus, the specifics are;

### 1.1.1 Specific Objectives

- a. Identify and analyse the challenges affecting the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions,
- b. Analyse the gaps in security personnel to citizen ratio in connection to the efficiency of civil security relations,
- c. Identify the shortcomings of capability in Nigeria's security sector compared to international standards,
- d. Explore the adequacy of the ongoing training and capacity building effort within the security institutions and assess their adequacy,
- e. Explore how an effective and efficient security sector will aid development in Nigeria, and
- f. Assess the democratisation of the security sector within Nigeria's political framework.

### 1.1.2 Expected Outcome and Relevance

Nigeria is a country in need of a rapid economic and social development to meet the needs of her rapidly growing population. The inability of her security institutions to stem the tide of general insecurity would be a recipe for unwanted consequences. The country could become a failed state if the security challenge is not addressed holistically and decisively. The study is therefore relevant to the extent of identifying the gaps in Nigeria's security institutions that make it difficult to deal effectively with the general worrisome trend of insecurity in the country. More importantly, is that the study provides several realistic and workable solutions to address the challenges of institutional capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions. The findings and recommendations of the study will be useful in the formulation of a holistic policy on Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Nigeria. It will also add to the body of knowledge on institutional capacity and capability in the security sector. Finally, the study provides a catalyst for future research in this area.

## 2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for the study is based on the notion that capacity predicts performance; low capacity accounts for low performance, while high capacity is a precursor of high performance. The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2013) defined capacity as "the total amount or number of things or people that something can hold." Hence, the total workforce and other requirements the security sector can absorb to perform well or meet its challenges of defeating insecurity is its capacity. Capacity, according to Isaza, Kit, Herrera, Mendez and Balanzo (2015), however, is a multidimensional construct that can be measured and hence provides a basis for analysis as it plays the role of a catalyst in policy formulation. Isaza *et al.* (2015) also observed that capacity seeks at a theoretical level to ask salient questions about capacity for what, for whom, where and when. Isaza *et al.* (2015) argued that capacity can link actors and institutions by providing insights into gaps that are found in those institutions, their implications and how they can be addressed. Viewed in this way, capacity is important in development studies as its enquiries are focused at three entities, namely institutions, organisations and individuals. The focus provides emphasis on where capacity is deficient and needed. The approach, depth and focus of capacity investigations as seen by Isaza *et al.* (2015) depend on the purpose and context.

Hence, the literature explains capacity as a function of different possible capabilities; the capacity of a given institution is dependent on other various possible capabilities. Terms like state capacity, organisational capacity, institutional capacity and individual capacity help to describe the focus of interest as well as their mutual interdependence. This study focuses on Nigeria's security institution based on the escalating trend of insecurity and the apparent state of vulnerability.

The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF<sub>1</sub>) on Security Sector Governance (SSG) pointed that the Security Sector definition that is compatible with SSR comprises the state structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management and oversight of security provision (DCAF<sub>1</sub> 2015). The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF<sub>2</sub>) defined the Security Sector as "all security sector institutions and structures whose duty it is to protect the society from crime, disorder and violence," (DCAF<sub>2</sub> 2020). This includes the armed forces and their civilian staff, law enforcement agencies (community police, investigations, border management services, penitentiary services) and intelligence services, as well as their civilian staff, educational and training establishments, and corresponding logistical services. The objectives are that the security sector is responsive to public needs and provides security as a public good (DCAF<sub>2</sub> 2020). Therefore, the inability of the security sector to achieve the stated objectives of providing security to the citizens as exemplified in recurring threats to lives and property indicates the existence of gaps and challenges, which must be identified as a necessary step towards proffering solution. In this conceptual framework, we see the importance of political, economic and psycho-social factors in terms of how they contribute to the challenge of capacity and capabilities of Nigeria's security institutions.

### 2.1 Nigeria's Security Landscape

Nigeria has a relatively vast land mass, air space and maritime environment with an estimated population of 203,452,505 million people (Global Firepower Index [GFI] 2019). The country has its security bodies, collectively, referred to as the Armed Forces of the Federation, which comprises the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Navy (NN) and the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), with the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as its part with other branches as the State Security Service (SSS) nicknamed the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS),



Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) and private security outfits (PSOs).

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) mandates the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) to coordinate the activities of the security institutions while the National Assembly (NASS) exercises democratic control through its oversight functions. The Constitution has the NA, the NN and the NAF saddled with the responsibility of defending her territorial integrity against external aggression and internal insurrection. Also, the Constitution provides for a police force, the NPF, tasked with the responsibility of maintaining law and order. The Constitution also provides for an early warning apparatus in the country's security architecture made up of a system of security committees at the three tiers of government. However, the desired functions of the key security bodies and their apparatus' support are underperformed presently.

## 2.2 Contemporary Security Issues and Operations in Nigeria

Criminal acts come in various forms (see *Table 1*). They offend, threaten, harm and cause insecurity to people and property. Not stretching so far into the history but concentrating from the country's return to a democratic rule in 1999, which is also the year of its latest amended constitution, there have been varying but mostly rising security breaches most of which are criminal acts (*Figure 1*, *Figure 2* and *Table 2*). However, the most common ones to the laypersons are armed robberies, oil and gas pipelines vandalism, cybercrimes (*the yahoo boys*), fund syphoning and unaccounted government funds, herdsmen and farmers clashes, communal skirmishes and clashes (Odi and Zaki-Biam incidents) and terrorism (suicide bombings and the kidnapping of 'schoolgirls' and other individuals).

*Table 1* summarises, especially reported criminal offences and their definition. What makes up crimes may also vary with time and a country's law. Some crimes overlap as committing some of them will have one committing a series of some others. For instance, cybercrime, which is not listed on the table, often has forgery, false pretence (impersonification) and theft as its elements. A terrorist might have to launder money; abduct, traffic and enslave people; illegally possess humans, arms and property; murder people and commit suicide. Terrorism is also not in the list on the table, however, the GTI statistics on the Background Section of this work (4<sup>th</sup> paragraph) and right before this paragraph show its nature, its effect of displacement and death of people with its rising rate in the country. It is also a worldwide problem.

With the data, *Table 2* compiled from NBS and Nigeria Data Portal, on crime statistics, *Figure 1* and *Figure 2* are the graphs of *Table 2* showing the fluctuations in the individual and total crimes' levels, respectively, over the years. From *Table 2*, while for the years 2010 compared to 2011, murder and armed robbery showed over 50 per cent drop (from 22,689 to 9,220 and from 19,507 to 9,193 cases respectively), unlawful possession of property more than doubled (from 3,221 to 8,010 cases). Abduction has mostly an increasing trend from 353 to 591, to 2,187 to 3,287 cases in the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, respectively, before falling to 2,325 cases (about 1 per cent fall) in 2011.


The NBS (2018) and the Nigeria Data Portal Crime Statistics: Reported Offences in 2017 has 134,663 reported offence cases in 2017, which is an increase by 3,131 and 8,873 cases compared to 2011 and 2016 records, respectively. Of the reported offence cases, the offences against property recorded the highest number of cases with 68,579 cases. On reported offence against persons, 53,641 cases were recorded while offence against lawful authority has the least with 12,443 cases recorded (*Table 2*). The data supplied by the NSCDC and verified

Table 1 Crime Statistics Definition


Crime	Definition
Murder	Intentional killing of human being by another person
Man Slaughter	Unintentional killing of human being
Attempted Murder	An attempt to kill someone but not yet carried out
Suicide	The act of killing oneself
Attempted Suicide	The attempt to kill oneself but not yet carried out
Grievous Harm/Wounding	A crime in which one person does physical injury or harm to another
Assault	An act of inflicting physical harm or unwanted physical contact upon a person
Child Stealing	Stealing of a child
Slave Dealing	Selling of human being for slavery without the person's consent
Indecent Assault	Sexual assault that does not involve rape
Kidnapping	Unlawful carrying away and confinement of person against his or her will
Unnatural Offence	A form of sexual offence punishable under the law e.g., sodomy
Offences against Persons	A crime which is committed by direct physical harm or force being applied to another person
Armed Robbery	A crime of theft by force or by threat of force
Wounding/with Menace	Causing serious physical injury
Theft/Stealing	Taking someone else's property without such person's permission
Burglary	Illegal entry of a building with intent to commit a crime, especially theft during the night
House Breaking	The act of using physical force to gain access to, and entering, a house with an intent to commit a felony inside during daytime
Store Breaking	The act of using physical force to gain access to, and entering, a store with an intent to commit a felony inside during daytime
False Pretence and Cheating/Fraud	Acquisition of title from a victim by fraud or misrepresentation of a material past or present fact
Forgery	Making of a fake document, the modification of an existing document or the unauthorised signing of a signature without authorisation
Receiving Stolen Property	The offence of acquiring goods with the knowledge that they have been stolen, extorted, embezzled, or unlawfully taken in any manner
Unlawful Possession	Illegal possession of substances or items (such as drugs or guns) for which criminal sanctions exist
Arson	The criminal act of deliberately setting fire to property
Source: NBS (2018): Crime and Statistics Reported Offenses 2017	



Figures 1 and 2 Selected Crime Statistics



**Figure 1**  
Selected Crimes Record (2007 and 2011)  
Source: Nigeria Data Portal, Crime Statistics



**Figure 2**  
Selected Crimes Record Total (2007 and 2011)

**Table 2** Table of Figures 1 and 2 Selected Crimes and Crimes Total Record (2007 to 2011) and Selected Crimes and Crimes Total Record (2016 to 2017)

Units (Year)	Murder	Unlawful Possession of Arm	Unlawful Possession of Property	Offences against Native Law	Economic Sabotage	Human Trafficking	Abduction	Armed Robbery	Total
2007	10,467	3,523	2,420	2,988	3,377	4,939	353	10,774	159,418
2008	11,058	1,841	4,104	1,807	117	35	591	17,517	130,784
2009	11,419	3,482	3,845	2,825	1,905	1,890	2,187	14,682	156,351
2010	22,689	2,178	3,221	1,919	1,238	3,315	3,287	19,507	171,881
2011	9,220	3,876	8,010	3,296	1,586	3,533	2,325	9,193	131,532
*Note: The crimes are selected. However, the total includes those not selected to give the figures of the years' record. Source: Compiled from Nigeria Data Portal, Crime Statistics									
			Offences against Property	Offences against Lawful Authority and Local Acts					Total
2016	45,554	---	65,397	14,893	---	---	---	---	125,790
2017	53,641	---	68,579	12,443	---	---	---	---	134,663
*Note: Offences against persons are offences against human beings e.g., murder, manslaughter, infanticide, concealment of birth, rape and other physical abuse Source: Compiled from Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, Crime Statistics									

by the NBS reported that 828,504 people were recruited in the private security in 2018. The report showed that 791,210 people were employed by 1,058 registered PSOs in 2017, while 771,478 were employed by 964 registered PSOs in 2016. Also, the report showed that 772,401 people were employed in 2015 by 902 companies, while 601, 528 were employed by 859 companies and 578,056 employed by 802 companies in 2013 (Punch 2019a).

There is increasing use of private security bodies, including vigilantes in most towns of the country, the sharia police and other communal security such as the *Amotekun* regional security established by six south-west states, installation of surveillance cameras and the intimidating presence of the police and the army on the country's highways and streets' roads, cases on fraud, embezzlement and corruption abounding. The varying types of security challenges and increasing measures to secure lives and property are indications of the failure of the security apparatus. Hence, the need arises to investigate the failure and points to question the capacity and capability of the country's security sector in handling the aspects of the security issues that are their responsibility. The study seeks to deal with the challenges and capability of the institutions.

### 3 Methodology

The study adopts a qualitative analysis approach which reviews the relevant literature from published articles in appropriate journals, books, official documents, unpublished materials from reputable libraries and reliable internet sites. The key security institutions of focus are the NA, the NN, the NAF, the NPF, the NSCDC, the DSS and the NIS. These security institutions were purposively selected because of the relevance of their core mandates to the challenge of insecurity in the country; the immigration service is included specifically because of its expected role in curbing the problem of porous borders and terrorists' infiltration.

Additionally, the study also utilises key informant interviews (KII) with some personnel of the selected security institutions and identified security experts to validate the information gathered from a review of the literature. The data is analysed using both qualitative and quantitative methods in discussing the challenges to proffer solutions to them.

### 4 Challenges Affecting the Capacity and Capability of Nigeria's Security Institutions

The challenges affecting the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security sector became increasingly disturbing following the abduction of 276 schoolgirls from their hostel in Chibok on April 14, 2014. Of course, with their ages (early teens), their gender (girls), the one incident of taking away (in audacity with no interception) such number (276 people) and where they were kidnapped from (school hostel), it must be a harrowing scare in the minds of the children, their parents and the history of the nation. The incident depicts the obvious security gaps in the country.

The kidnapping was one reason among other cases of insecurity that led the NINSED to organise an experts' meeting to identify the gaps in the security sector in Nigeria in 2016 for proffering solutions. The meeting held at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Plateau State, on August 30, 2016, identified some challenges which can be classified into recruitment, training, workforce, equipment, doctrine, technology, strategic communication and funding among others. The identified challenges are discussed in this section.

**a. Recruitment and Training:** Recruitment and training are the primary areas that pose some challenges to the capacity and capability of Nigeria's security institutions; they are essential in determining the capacity of security agents since a faulty recruitment and training process can seriously affect the performance of security agents.

**i. Recruitment:** Recruitment into Nigeria's security institutions is believed to be one of the factors that have negatively affected the capacity and capability of security agents (NINSED 2016). The recruitment process and practices into Nigeria's key security institutions is believed to have been often compromised through acts of favouritism and other vices which make people without the appropriate potential and mental disposition to be recruited. In one of the interviews, a key informant reported that "some unsuitable candidates are recruited into security institutions through 'the back door', whereby interviews are mere formalities." According to the same informant, "there have been occasions of pressure from higher authorities to favour some candidates while others who may have performed better are dropped."

The consequences of poor recruitment standards through acts of godfatherism, a corrupt influence against due processes by corrupt, mostly prominent, people termed 'godfatherism' in Nigeria, extend to protecting the favoured security agents along the rung of ascendancy, a shot at capacity and capability, decrying merit. However, recruitment is the point at which undesired applicants are expected to be screened out. Therefore, it must be carried out professionally. An efficient recruitment process is expected to help build capacity and capability by ensuring that only the best out of a pool of candidates with the required potential for the security duties are selected. In the long run, an efficient recruitment process would be cost-effective as it is expected to reduce the number of misfits that could pose danger to society if not screened out at the point of entry.

**ii. Training:** Related to recruitment is training. The ICG (2016) reported that the military's "training institutions are short of facilities and instructors, lack training modules, and because they are largely focused on conventional operations, somewhat outdated." The report noted further that "personnel are under-motivated due to low pay, poor welfare services

and bleak post-service prospects." Al (2018) also indicated that Nigeria accepted six recommendations to prevent and reduce human rights violation by security forces, including through training.

Inadequate training resulting in skills and knowledge gaps may be responsible not only for low capacity but also for job stress and high casualty among security agents, including cases of accidental discharge. Job stress may also result in burnout, acts of indiscipline as well as other deleterious consequences, hence, the need for effective training which must imbibe the principles of realism. Realism demands that training situations or scenarios are designed to approximate real-life situations for individual forces' personnel to be familiar with the sight and sound characteristics of actual operations (Watson 1978). A key informant who was interviewed on this subject revealed that realism in training also "requires investment in the procurement of training aids and equipment, be affected by the required duration and practical periods needed to imbibe appropriate skills and abilities." The informant noted, for example, that "an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) driver must have driven and manoeuvred the APC successfully for a given period over different types of terrains under different simulated operation situations, which contrasts the situation in Nigeria's security institutions whereby some personnel may not be trained for the required duration due to lack of or inadequate funds."

There may hardly be enough time to cover every aspect of training, but the emphasis must be on the aspects that are of priority to situations. Risk management and soft skills development are as essential as physical training; hence, critical and creative thinking, reflective reasoning and leveraging technology are some aspects of training that can enhance the capability of Nigeria's security personnel (Hickey 2007).

**b. Doctrine:** Doctrine is a set of principles that guide actions and dictate how various security

institutions must work together harmoniously to achieve the overall purposes of national security (Posen 2016). The need for an approved and practice principles of cooperation and coordination have long been an issue of concern among the armed forces as reflected in Nigeria's Defence Policy (NDP 2006). Global Security (2020) observed that the NA's Responsive Offensive Doctrine (ROD) was premised on the consideration that Nigeria's neighbours would always be the aggressors, and if attacked, the NA would carry the battle into the enemy's territory. The deployment pattern of the NA to cover Nigeria's borders, according to Global Security (2020), facilitates the doctrine. However, the doctrine was not tested as it became obvious that the army was not designed to fight in isolation; nevertheless, it popularised and sensitised the importance of doctrine in the NA as an institution. It also aroused consciousness on the need to have a joint doctrine that will dictate how all services of the armed forces could operate together.

Nigeria's Niger Delta presented an opportunity for application of a Joint Task Force (JTF) operation with its headquarters originally in Warri, Delta State, but later moved to Yenagoa in Bayelsa State. In 2009, the federal government reconstituted the JTF, which hitherto existed in Rivers and Delta states, and tasked it principally to defeat militancy which had threatened the nation's economic survival (Global Security 2020).

It was observed that the 2009 amnesty granted to the country's Niger Delta militants significantly reduced attacks on pipelines and other petroleum facilities and increased oil production from 700,000 barrels per day (BPD) at the peak of militancy to 2.4 million BPD today (Global Security 2020). One of the major challenges of the task force as revealed by a senior army officer interviewed for this study was the lack of a practice operational doctrine. The lack of operational practice and doctrine, the senior officer said, undermined the performance

of the task force in terms of operational harmony and effectiveness among the different components. The officer also observed that "even the ongoing operation against terrorism in the north-east of Nigeria is yet another occasion where the absence of a joint doctrine is hampering the capacity and capabilities of Nigeria's security institution to deal effectively with the situation." Aiyede (2015) opined that the joint operations doctrine provided in the NDP 2006 was not practicable because of the lack of centralised control. Aiyede argued that the structural issues that underlie this lack of centralised control are the obvious ambiguities in the provisions of the Armed Forces Act 2004, which gave operational direction to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) without corresponding powers as it relates to the Service Chiefs. In effect, this means that the CDS is merely an adviser to the President and Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Armed Forces of the Federation.

### c. Equipment

Nigeria's security institutions have what is known to be a Table of Equipment (TOE) that provides information about types and quantity of equipment as approved by the establishment as provided in Nigerian Army Order of Battle (NA ORBAT) in 1999. The be-battle-ready recommendation for a command requires it to have a minimum of 75 per cent of its holdings in personnel and equipment in a serviceable state. According to information on Global Security (2020), as of the year 1999, considerable discrepancies are found in the equipment holdings of the country's armed forces. For example, there were 79 serviceable APCs as against the 528 APCs by establishment to equip the six Mechanised Battalions (222, 65, 165, 3, 19 and 93) in the NA. This figure represents about 15 per cent of the unit's requirement to be combat-ready. Similarly, at that time there were 136 tanks serviceable in the six (221, 223, 211, 212, 232, 231) tank battalions as against the 216 tanks by establishment. This figure

equally represents about 63 per cent of the battalions' requirement to be combat-ready.

Given the equipment serviceability state in the inventory of the NA, Global Security contended that it will be absurd to assume that the structure of the NA could be combat effective. The report further emphasised that the NA's TOE in the year 1999 could better be described as impressive on paper, as most of the equipment in the inventory is obsolete, unserviceable/not overhauled or in some cases, not available. Twenty years after, Nigerian troops continue to complain about the challenge of obsolete equipment as noted in the Punch Newspaper report titled "We need better arms to fight Boko Haram - Military commanders," (Fabiya, Onuba, Ajaja, Aluko, Alagbe and Idowu 2019). The discrepancies are both in terms of established figures versus actual holding, as well as in terms of their actual state of serviceability or condition as captured by Global Security (2020). Deficiencies in the approved scale of equipment suggest that security institutions cannot function at full capacity. For example, the Nigerian troops fighting insurgency in the north-east of the country have repeatedly argued that their inability to defeat the insurgents is because of the dearth of adequate and sophisticated weapons. The claim of the Nigerian troops was subsequently confirmed as reported in the Financial Times article (Munshi 2018) when President Buhari admitted that he was working to ensure troops were fully equipped and better paid. Hence, inadequate and obsolete equipment remain major challenges to the capacity and capabilities of our security institutions.

#### **d. Workforce**

The challenge of workforce in the security sector was put in perspective in the statement by ICG (2016) that "for a country of over 170 million people, facing several security challenges – from an Islamist insurgency in the north east to a resource-based conflict in the Niger Delta – a

military numbering less than 120,000 personnel (all services) is clearly inadequate."

The ICG further emphasised that "understaffing reflects poor planning and faulty recruitment system." From this, it can be said that the challenge of workforce is a serious one that affects the performance of the military.

Going by the NA ORBAT, 1999, it is important to equally emphasise that Nigeria's security institutions are organised into various specialised units some of which provide administrative support, meaning that the size of an institution does not automatically translate to available workforce to be utilised for operations. Thus, out of an army's 95,000 workforce, only about its quarter carries out the task of fighting insurgents in a given situation (GFI 2019). Aside from this observed deficiency, Global Security noted that although the NA strength is estimated at 80,000 for all the ranks as of the year 2000, this is not absolute as no factual figure had been ascertained. It added that some soldiers who are dead, deserted, dismissed or went on voluntary discharge were still on the strength of NA for pay and allowances purposes. These anomalies (over establishment/under establishment) do not allow for an accurate strength of the NA to be determined (Global Security 2020). It is, however, important to observe that with the introduction of the Integrated Personnel Payment Information System (IPPPIS), the problem of inaccurate workforce figures may soon be overcome.

#### **e. Technology**

NINSED (2016) identified technology as one of the areas affecting the capacity and ability of security institutions in Nigeria. One obvious manifestation of the technology gap is in the fact that kidnappers can hold their victims in captivity for several weeks in the country while negotiating for ransom through phone calls, and without being promptly and effectively intercepted through tracking devices and other technological aids. It is a failure of technology or

some compromise in its use that would make a caller not tracked.

Lending credence to the challenge of technology, Mr Arese, a former Inspector General of Police (IGP) remarked, during the commissioning of a forensic laboratory in 2016, that “unfortunately, the Nigeria Police Force has over the years, been grappling with a weak forensic capacity which has been a major factor in our inability to manage complex criminal situations.” The IGP emphasised, “today’s event which augments the facility in Lagos is designed to bridge this capacity gap in the Force in relation to forensic assets of the Force.”

Gaps in technological advancement are, therefore, some areas of challenges in the capacity of Nigeria’s security sector, which are however as effective as the human factor behind it. As noted by Ijide (2016), Nigeria has scientists at home and abroad who can be challenged to produce the right technology for her peculiar needs in the security sector. The Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) established in 1964, ought to meet the needs of the security sector in the area of appropriate technology but has unfortunately been unable to acquit itself in that regard mainly for lack of funding and patronage.

#### **f. Strategic Communication**

Strategic communication is an idea that encompasses various other concepts such as media operations, psychological warfare, psychological operations and propaganda (Cornish, Lindley-French and Yorke 2011). Security institutions in the 21<sup>st</sup> century must be ready and adaptable to the efficient deployment of these tools as a means of enhancing their capacity to succeed in carrying out assigned missions and roles. From both literature and practical perspectives, Nigeria’s security institutions are lacking in this area of capacity building as evidenced in the handling of information pertaining to the operations against the extant BH insurgency. Thus, Aiyede (2015)

noted that poor information management has been at the root cause of wild speculations in the local media, that some personnel may be complicit in supporting BH insurgents with equipment and funds. In a conversation with a senior public relations officer in the military, it was disclosed that “one of the reasons for poor strategic communication in Nigeria’s counter-insurgency operation is as a result of squabbles between the Defence Headquarters (DHQ) and National Orientation Agency (NOA) as to which of them should handle the media campaign.” Consequently, while such unnecessary inter-wrangling goes on, BH insurgents appear to use media outlets such as Al Jazeera, Cable Network News (CNN), Reuters and the social media to effectively manipulate the hearts and minds of the civilian population and international community showing the vulnerability of Nigeria’s security agencies.

#### **g. Challenge of Professionalism**

Professionalism has been identified as one of the challenges to the capacity and capability of the security sector in Nigeria. The challenge is typified by the attitudes of those in charge of Nigeria’s security architecture in their response to strategic and operational failures, hence, Page (2019) pointed out that there are considerable efforts aimed more at defending human rights abuses and providing excuses than a proper interrogation of causes of lapses to the extent that citizens have become accustomed to the extortion by police officers and road safety officials at roadblocks with an attitude of entitlement while government and citizens turn a blind eye. Page (2019) also observed that the army has become permanently involved in police roles without any attempt by the government to redress the trend. As Page (2019) further remarked, the army and the police top hierarchy officers are highly politicised to the extent of being unable to distinguish between professionalism and the lack of it.

These remarks give an idea of the challenge of professionalism among security personnel in



Nigeria, mainly from the perspective of corruption and violation of human rights. Another aspect of gaps in professionalism, however, is the question of subordination of the forces and other security institutions to democratic control. Aiyede (2015) noted in this regard that the legacy of the country's extended military rule post-independence has inflicted great damage on the psyche of both the civilian and military itself, hence, the need for demilitarisation of civil space.

#### h. Funding

Funding for the defence and security sector in Nigeria has been a subject of discourse among scholars and citizens over the years, with the emphasis on whether it is underfunded or overfunded. Aiyede (2015) observed that Nigeria increased the defence budget from ₦100 billion (\$625 million US Dollar (USD)) in 2010 to ₦927 billion (\$6 billion USD) in 2011 and ₦1 trillion (\$6.25 billion USD) in 2012, 2013 and 2014. In 2019, the budget for the Ministry of Defence was ₦435.62 billion and for the Ministry of Interior was ₦569.07 billion, which total ₦1.03 trillion was the highest sectoral allocation for the year. A report by ICG (2016) suggested that the military was under-resourced with low budgets disbursed irregularly and unpredictably. ICG stated that from 2000 to 2008, its budget was less than 3 per cent of overall government expenditure, while from 2009 to 2014, it increased to an average of 7.2 per cent of government spending (\$5 to \$6 billion). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed that military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in Nigeria has been rather volatile. According to the SIPRI data published in the Global Sentinel-funded research by Iroegbu (2019), military expenditure fluctuated between \$2,099 million in 2010 and \$1907 million in 2018 with the highest figure of \$2,337 million in 2011. Military expenditure was \$2,059 million in 2012, \$1,979 million in 2013, \$1,800 million in 2014, \$1,755 million in 2015 and \$1695 million in 2016. A comparison of the military budget

and military expenditure reveals that there is a considerable gap in the amount of budgeted and actual expenditure. For instance, while the defence budget was \$6.25 billion in 2014, the military expenditure for that year was only \$1.8 billion. It is also important to note that the budget for defence in 2019 which was ₦435.62 billion translated to only \$1.4 billion. This comparison is quite remarkable in assessing the capacity and capability of the security sector as it is not certain that the entire budgeted amount may be released.

These trends in budgeting for the armed forces, SIPRI remarked, portend substantial challenges for effective planning and equipment maintenance, among others. The report indicated that the average GDP percentage is below the UN's recommended defence GDP of between 1.5 to 3.3 per cent.

On the part of the police and in his defence of the 2019 budget proposals before the House of Representatives Committee on Police Affairs, the IGP, Mohammed Adamu, laid the blame for the NPF's poor state on staff strength deficiency and meagre funding (Punch 2019b). Adamu's immediate predecessor, Ibrahim Idris, told the NASS in 2018 that the force required ₦1.3 trillion annually for its operations. But in 2016, the NPF received ₦10.02 billion out of a capital appropriation of ₦16.1 billion. For overheads, it got ₦6.34 billion from a vote of ₦9.25 billion. It had proposed to spend ₦331 billion and ₦90.6 billion on capital and overhead costs respectively, that year. Adamu told legislators that from a capital budget estimate of ₦342.9 billion for 2018, the force received only ₦25.2 billion (BudgetIT 2018; Punch online 2019b).

Although lack of funds has been given as part of the justification for low capacity in the security sector, there is an emerging argument by Transparency International (TI) and Civil Society Legislative and Advocacy Centre (CISLAC 2018) that the security funds in billions of dollars are rather wasted because of inefficiency and the opaqueness in the allocation of security budget,

especially the 'camouflaged cash', that is unaccounted for and named 'security vote'. The ridiculous waste amid rising insecurity in the country and gross underperformance of the sector calls for reforms in the sector.

## 5 Analysis of Options for Improving Capacity and Capabilities of Nigeria's Security Institutions

This section focuses on the options that are available to the government of Nigeria for enhancing the capacity and capability of its security sector. The options are worked out following the earlier identified gaps that are manifest in Nigeria's security institutions. The options are drafted in SSR and good governance approaches.

### a. Security Sector Reform

Nigeria recognises her enormous security challenges with regards to building capacity but has only made some haphazard efforts at redressing it. It is not surprising that after the NINSED 2016 meeting to identify and close gaps in security following the Chibok schoolgirls' kidnap, there was another kidnap of schoolgirls, the Dapchi schoolgirls on February 19, 2018, following army deployment lapses (Searcey and Akinwotu 2018; Ogunmade, Akinwale and Akinloye 2018), though they were later rescued with one, Leah Sharibu, still in captivity. The Dapchi schoolgirls' kidnap and other insecurity instances show that, over the years, reforms in the security sector have been carried out without a centrally coordinated authority (Aiyede 2015; ICG 2016). The Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre's (PLAC) analysis of various bills sent to the 8<sup>th</sup> NASS showed that some of the bills effectively responded to concerns in the security sector while others were at variance with broad SSR framework (PLAC 2018). More significantly is the fact that Nigeria's approach to reforms in the security sector has been so stereotyped at the establishment of alternate outfits with parallel functions to traditional security institutions (PLAC 2018).

SSR framework provides an alternative which Nigeria needs to embrace if her efforts at mitigating the country's security challenges would be successful. SSR governance principles are designed to achieve the purposes of good governance, which is an approach to a government that is committed to creating a system founded on justice and peace; that protects individual human rights and civil liberties (Caparani 2004). The IPA Report (2004) pointed out that good governance efforts that strengthen state institutions and enhance their capacity to provide security and development are essential for sound conflict management.

### b. Good Governance

According to Rothstein and Teorell (2008) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN-ESCAP 2009), the principles of good governance are founded on eight major characteristics, namely participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability.

These principles ought to be sought by Nigerian government and Nigerians because it is observable that Nigeria and her security institutions are used to violations and abuse of human rights, a situation likely heightened due to long years of military rule as pointed by Nzarga (2014) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report (2018).

### c. Security Sector Reform and Good Governance

A combination of SSR with good governance principle presents a unique alternative on how to improve the capacity of Nigeria's security institutions through institutionalising of SSG. In line with SSR/SSG principles, Page (2019) opined that merging or consolidation of institutions that are found to have unnecessary duplication of functions is an option that Nigeria needs to embark upon. Consequently, it is recognised that a comprehensive concept of SSR/SSG



should comprise four dimensions namely: the political dimension that ensures democratic and civilian oversight; the economic dimension regarding the allocation of resources to the security sector; the social dimension that concerns guaranteeing the security of all citizens; and the institutional dimension of establishing institutions that can fulfil their functions (Page 2019).

In line with SSR/SSG, the DSS, NSCDC, EFCC and National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) can be integrated with the police to provide a more manageable and cohesive security sector. Furthermore, with SSR/SSG, Nigeria should be able to imbibe the rules of accountability and transparency in the allocation of resources to the security sector. This will allow funds to be used for the purposes for which they are meant and eliminate observed widespread corruption in the system while ensuring the efficiency of security institutions. The Premium Times (Ogala 2018) special investigation report showed that Nigeria's security institutions are plagued by widespread corruption given the number of top military officials and those in the higher management of the security architecture that are currently under investigation by Nigeria's anti-corruption agency, the EFCC. The Premium Times report (Ogala 2018) further observed that "for a number of high-ranking government officials in Nigeria, stealing public funds through contract inflation is a way of life." Considering the number of cases and the enormous amounts involved in the allegations against corrupt security officials, there is little wonder why there is a considerable gap in capacity and capability of the security sector.

#### d. Budget for the Security Sector

Consistent with SSR, Nigeria needs to embark on a transparent security sector budget and procurement procedure as opposed to what is currently in existence where according to Page (2018) and corroborated with TI and CISLAC report (TI Defence and Security 2018), there is so much lack of clear rationale, transparency,

accountability and oversight, leaving room for corruption and abuse of functionality. Page (2018) study in collaboration with TI and CISLAC observed that one of the obvious aberrations in both the federal and state governments' budgetary allocation is the so-called security vote, which takes a significant percentage of the fund for the security sector. This item in the budget is said to be unaccounted for, open to unmitigated corruption and abuse, hence, not in accord with good governance practices of transparency and accountability. On May 28, 2018, TI and CISLAC report raised the alarm that security vote spending was one of the most durable forms of corruption in Nigeria. The report estimated that security votes in Nigeria total \$670 million (~~₦~~241.2 billion) annually and more than:

- the NA's annual budget,
- the NAF's and NN's annual budget put together,
- 70% of the NPF's annual budget,
- nine times the US security assistance since 2012 (\$68.6 million), and
- 12 times the United Kingdom's (UK) promised (\$53.5 million [£40 million]) counterterrorism support to the country from 2016 to 2020.

Further statistics published by the two organisations showed that:

- 29 states in Nigeria spend an average of \$580 million (~~₦~~208.8 billion) annually as security votes,
- The federal government's security votes increased by \$4.5 million between 2016 (\$46.2 million [~~₦~~9.3 billion at the time]) and 2018 (\$51 million [~~₦~~18.4 billion then]), and
- \$15 billion estimated amount stolen from Nigeria's defence sector by former security chiefs.

Corroborating the above, a former Director of Finance and Administration (DFA) at the Defence Headquarters remarked: “agreed that funding of the security sector is not sufficient, but how is the amount released utilised?” The question shows the apparent lack of transparency in the security sector spending. It is no surprise therefore that poor management of the security sector budget is responsible in part for the low capacity and capability of Nigeria’s security institutions.

#### e. Stakeholders Analysis

There are different stakeholders in the analysis of the capacity and capability of Nigeria’s security sector. The key stakeholders are the security sector institutions, the FGN, the people of Nigeria, CSOs, private security outfits, the media and the international community. These stakeholders are involved in different ways in affecting and shaping the course of the discussion regarding the challenges and needed solution. The stakeholders can be classified into different institutions such as the police, private security, military, federal and state governments, international actors and CSOs.

#### i. The Police

Section 214 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria provides for the establishment of the NPF while Section 215 (3) states that: “the President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the Inspector General of Police such lawful directions with respect to maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, ....” The police, therefore, can be regarded as the primary security institution charged with the maintenance of law and order by virtue of Section 4 of the Police Act (Cap. P19, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004).

The NPF has a 371,800-staff strength to police about 200 million people, and a total land territory of 923,768 square kilometres (km<sup>2</sup>) (GFI 2019). The police’s strength as reported on the

Punch online (2019b) translates to one police officer to police 662 citizens, a ratio lower than the UN’s recommended ratio of one police officer to 400 citizens (GFI 2019). Comparing Nigeria’s police to civilian ratio with countries such as Singapore with a ratio of 1:137, Egypt 1:186 and South Africa 1:366, as indicated in the UN statistics, it can be said that Nigeria is grossly under-policed. Apart from the low ratio of police to civilian, there is a lack of adequate technology provision and adaptation such as fingerprint equipment, reliable national database and closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs).

According to the provision of Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution, there shall be no other police force established for the federation or any part thereof other than the NPF. The federal government has, therefore, refused calls for the creation of state police while at the same time it has created many other bodies whose functions are not different from that assigned primarily to the NPF. These bodies include:

- Department of State Security Services (DSS), created under the National Security Agencies Act 1986 (Decree 19);
- Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), created under the EFCC Act 2004, to combat economic and financial crimes;
- Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC);
- Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), established under the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act 2004;
- Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), established by the Federal Road Safety Commission (Establishment) Act 2007; and
- Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), established by the Nigeria

Security and Civil Defence Corps Act 2007, to inter alia assist in the maintenance of peace and order in the protection and rescuing of the civil population during emergency; inspect the premises of private guard companies and their training facilities; maintain twenty-four hours surveillance over infrastructures, sites and projects of the government at the federal, state and local levels.

Despite the multiplicity of such security outfits created by the federal government, the level of security in Nigeria is a far cry from an ideal situation (Ogundana 2018). The idea of creating these separate bodies with similar functions as the police's was due to public perception of pervading corruption and inefficiency in the NPF. However, rather than solve the problem of corruption, capacity and capability of the NPF, Nigeria is caught in the middle of inter-agency rivalry due to lack of trust, role conflict, struggle for allocation of resources among different security outfits (Ogundana 2018), rising corruption cases in the security sector and insecurity in the country.

From the SSR perspective, the federal government needs to revisit the argument for the creation of state police as obtains in most modern and advanced societies. By the same consideration, Ogundana (2018) opined that there is the need to integrate the motley of security institutions presently performing police roles. In agreement with this view, the Just Landed Report (2003-2019) suggested that Nigeria can benefit from the US model where there is a federal, state, and county police aside several police agencies. In the US model, police forces include city police (possibly with separate departments to deal with schools, traffic and even refuse), county police, transport police, sheriffs' departments, state police (state troopers) and highway forces such as the California Highway Patrol (Just Landed 2003-2019). In addition to regular full-time police

officers, as reported in Just Landed (2003-2019), many towns have auxiliary, part-time police officers, special duty and volunteer sheriffs (which assist sheriffs' offices in some areas) while city police are concerned with local crime, and offences outside their jurisdiction are usually dealt with by state police or federal investigators, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Similarly, the UK, though not a federation, has devolved police functions to 43 constituent forces (Punch online 2019b).

## ii. Private Security

PSOs possess certain advantages over government law enforcement agencies which make them important actors in the security sector (Bamidele, Akinbolade and Nuhu 2016). Hence, PSOs are commonly used globally to augment government security agents. The general trend has increasingly become that of outsourcing certain security functions to PSOs because of the flexibility in mobilising and deploying them without the logistic challenges common among the NPF and other government law enforcement officers (Bamidele *et al.* 2016). Leveraging on this trend, Nigeria only needs to improve on the enabling environment for PSOs to function in collaboration with traditional public security institutions without let or hindrance.

## iii. The Military/Armed Forces

The armed forces of the country was created under Section 217 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) as amended. Section 217 (2) of the Constitution states that the federation subject to an Act of the NASS made in that behalf, equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for:

- defending Nigeria from external aggression;
- maintaining its territorial integrity and land, sea or air;

- suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly; and
- performing such other functions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly.

Organised for its constitutional role, the country's armed forces have a staff strength of 181,000 military personnel, according to the GFI (2019), out of which 124,000 are active while 57,000 are reserved. The country ranks 43rd in the global military firepower index and 4<sup>th</sup> in Africa behind Egypt, Algeria and South Africa (GFI 2019). With the above staff strength, the Nigerian military is tasked with defending her vast expanse of land and a coastline of 853 km, waterways that span 8,600 km<sup>2</sup> and shared border of 4,477 km (GFI 2019). In addition to its primary responsibility of defending the territorial integrity of Nigeria, the army is also saddled with and indeed involved in various police roles such as mounting roadblocks on Nigeria's highways. The COAS, Lieutenant General Buratai was widely reported in many media outlets to have announced in October 2019, that the NA will embark on a nationwide military operation as from November 1 to December 23, 2019. The announcement underscores the point made often that the NA is yet to imbibe the norms of democratic governance as it poses to be a usurpation of the police's role provided for in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It did not come across as Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA), which in any case must conform to appropriate legislative standards and procedure. The deployment of the army on a nationwide operation/exercise mirrors the propensity of the security sector to abuse human rights through the establishment of checkpoints and molestations of citizens.

Since 2011 to date, the NA and the NAF have been engaged in the fight against BH insurgents

in the north-east of Nigeria. The conflict has taken a huge toll on the country's armed forces' personnel in terms of casualty, combat fatigue and morale (AI 2018). The toll necessitated the establishment of the 7<sup>th</sup> Division of the NA and Civilian Joint Task Force (C-JTF) in 2014. The NAF has continued to train more pilots in support of the military operations against the insurgents. The NN continues to defend the maritime environment against illegal bunkering and sea piracy. However, these efforts appear to have not been able to guarantee the much-needed security in the country. There is every indication that the Nigerian military is overstretched and vulnerable; it has also been accused of becoming politicised by the pronouncements and actions of its leadership (Page 2019). This raised the need for a professional military that is apolitical and conscious of its responsibility to the citizens and democratic institutions.

#### **iv. The Federal and State Governments**

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) states at Section 14 (2)(b) that "the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government." This means that the security and welfare of citizens must be prioritised and given utmost attention by the federal and state governments, above every other consideration. Where the security and welfare of the citizens cannot be guaranteed, it would be assumed that the government has failed in its primary responsibility. For this reason, it is the responsibility of the FGN as a major stakeholder to ensure that the capacity and capabilities of its key security institutions are given urgent and comprehensive attention.

However, the structure of the FGN is a major hindrance impinging on the effectiveness of the country's security sector (Abegunde 2013). Presently, Nigeria is a federation comprising 36 states and a federal capital territory. The task of securing the federating units is vested solely on the federal government which controls the armed forces and other security institutions

(Constitution of Nigeria 1999). Whereas the state governors are designated as the Chief Security Officers of their respective states, they have no control over these federal security apparatuses. Nevertheless, many state governments like Lagos (through its Security Trust Fund), Enugu, Borno, Ogun and Cross River allocate huge funds to support the police (Punch 2019b). Similarly, corporate organisations and individuals support and fund the police. Notwithstanding the support and intervention, largely, the capacity of the NPF fails in the effective discharge of its responsibility.

The significant percentage of the security sector budget allocated to the state governors as security votes, which TI and CISLAC (2018) identified as an obvious anomaly, requires a holistic constitutional review. As noted in Adeyemi (2001), Nigeria is a heterogeneous society comprising diverse ethno-religious groups. The diverse groups are divided in views, mostly by politicians, contributing to making security such an intractable issue as obtains to date in the country. The idea of having one omnibus police outfit for the entire federation has been pointedly observed as contributing to the lack of effective policing and inability to fight crimes since the personnel of the police with little or no knowledge of their area of primary deployment tend to be more disposed to abuse of the fundamental rights of the citizens (Adeyemi 2001); they are hence perceived more as agents of occupation rather than law enforcement officers. The federal government cannot afford to continue to treat such observations with disregard.

#### **v. Civil Society Organisations, Traditional Institutions, Religious Leaders, Youths, Women and the Media**

Security institutions are subject to the rule of law because they are funded by the state and should be accountable to the people. Therefore, it is the role of CSOs to act on behalf of the people to ensure that security sector actors are accountable and professional in fulfilling the

objectives for which they are established (Caparani 2004). In Nigeria, the CSOs played a crucial role in the restoration of the country's democratic governance and have continued to help in preserving it. Presently, their focus must be aimed at consolidating Nigeria's democracy and SSG as there is still some evidence of resistance among security sector agencies to operate by the rule of law as frequently reported in the media. They are required to report incidents of violations of human rights and corruption in keeping with their constitutional role as the watchdog in a democratic society. Working with international partners, the CSOs in Nigeria must continuously advocate for good governance, particularly in the security sector. Their roles include monitoring and reporting on activities of the government to make governance more responsible. In doing so, they must also ensure due decorum in order not to raise unnecessary alarms that could be counterproductive to the security of the populace.

Traditional and religious institutions' leaders also have roles to play in contributing to improved security system in the country. As leaders of communities and religions, they often command respect from their followers. They can contribute by cooperating with other security institutions, sharing relevant information on security and supporting in creating security awareness to the people under their leadership.

Women and youths need to be actively involved in ensuring that the government is focused on their security and welfare. They must be given a voice in all SSR programmes and their contributions must be given attention. Enlightenment of the youths is paramount as they are often the most vulnerable to be recruited into criminal behaviour that stretches the capabilities of Nigeria's security institutions.

The media have continued to play their role of informing the public but there is still much room for improvement in investigative journalism and factual reporting of information with security

content. The media must avoid the temptation to act in ways that become beneficial to terrorist groups in the country while negatively affecting the morale of security agents and the general population. The media should display professionalism in their practices.

#### vi. International Actors

International actors are stakeholders in the quest for Nigeria's SSR by virtue of the country's membership to the UN, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). These organisations have a commitment to the principles of good governance and SSR. The immediate neighbours of Nigeria namely Cameroon, Chad and Niger share in the burden of the ongoing fight against the BH insurgency which has necessitated the establishment of a multinational JTF comprising these states (African Peace Facility [APF]2018). The challenges of small arms and light weapons trafficking across the West African sub-Region make it necessary for collaboration in dealing with such cross-border crimes and violence.

According to Moulaye and Niakate (2012), instability in Nigeria is capable of spiralling into the rest of Africa and beyond. Thus, the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) countries, the UK and the US among others, have a stake in the ability of Nigeria to deal with the growing incidence of insecurity in the country considering that Nigeria with a UN projected population of 206,139,589 million people by mid-2020 promises to be a large market for multinational organisations as well as a destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

Moreover, SSR is a global initiative to promote democratisation process and good governance, particularly, among emerging democracies, implying that international stakeholders' commitment is therefore aimed at a far-reaching transformation of the security sector to promote professionalism, encourage submission to civil authority and ensure that security agencies are

accountable for their actions (Moulaye and Niakate 2012).

On its part, the UN is a major stakeholder in global counterterrorism strategy since the organisation's plan of action includes measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build state capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN system in this regard; and finally measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (Agbede 2012). By such a plan, the UN is certainly a body which Nigeria can partner with in building its capacity to achieve the lofty aim of the UN's global strategy on terrorism.

#### 6 Conclusion

The discourse concludes that the growing security challenges in Nigeria are the manifestation of several factors culminating in the lack of capacity and capability of her security institutions. Poverty and unemployment make the youth vulnerable to violent crimes which overstretch the capabilities of security agents. There is a proliferation of security agencies with overlapping functions that are the constitutional responsibility of the NPF. Likewise, there is an unconstitutional usurpation of police functions by the military resulting in the militarisation of public space coupled with ineffective use of the early warning apparatuses of Nigeria's security architecture made up of a system of security committees at the three tiers of government. Akin to coordination inefficiency is the perceived lack of adequate interface between local government authorities and their communities.

Poor SSG and absence of a holistic SSR agenda impact negatively and result in widespread corruption in the defence and security budgetary process and implementations. Inadequate and ineffective oversights of the security sectors also provide opportunities for human rights abuses. Unhealthy institutional conflict accounts for



ineffective oversight function of the NASS and the judiciary in a manner akin to a subversion of the democratic space.

Although Nigeria is a member of several international organisations that are stakeholders in state capacity, there is an ineffective collaboration with such bodies within the framework of SSR and SSG.

## 7 Recommendations

Based on the findings, this study recommends that:

- a. The FGN should embark upon a deliberate and broad-based SSR programme that is focused on developing the state's capacity and legislative oversight and improving security agencies' professionalism. Hence, a cohesive security sector needs to be considered seriously. The possibility of merging security agencies with overlapping functions, like those of the police duplicated with the DSS, NSCDC, EFCC, NDLEA and any other agency that is a duplication of police role, is paramount in this regard.
- b. Considering the challenge of funding, the federal government should establish a security trust fund to bridge the gaps in budgetary allocation to the security sector. Funding for the security trust fund could be by a special tax or donor support, which should be in line with international best practices. This should be a short-term measure until the economy can sustain the security budget.
- c. Security votes as constituted in the existing budgetary allocation should be abolished, and the funds allocated to the security sector institutions that are constitutionally saddled with providing security.
- d. The FGN should embark upon decentralisation of the NPF in line with her federal structure as well as international best practices. By this, there should be federal, state and local government police.
- e. The presidency should ensure that the oversight functions of the NASS are given the required support in the interest of peace and security of the country. This should be done to avoid a display of contempt by the hierarchies of the security sector institutions. The NASS should on their part be professional in carrying out their oversight functions with the security sector but must remain resolute in demanding accountability, while the CSOs should continue to hold the FGN and key security institutions accountable to the people.
- f. The state and local governments should hold regular security meetings to remain on top of emerging threats.

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