FROM PAPER TO PRACTICE

Implementation of Uganda's Industrialisation Agenda



FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG

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FROM PAPER TO PRACTICE:
Implementation of Uganda’s Industrialisation Agenda

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December 2019

ISBN No: 978-9970-535-11-8

Published by
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Kampala, Uganda
5B Acacia Avenue
P.O Box 3860
www.fes-uganda.org

Copy Editor: Nangula Shejavali
Design: Ivan Barigye
Cover Images: Daily Monitor

FOREWORD

Industrialisation is crucial for most African countries if they want to utilize the demographic dividend provided for by the continent's very young population.

Yet there is an argument about the chances for developing countries like Uganda to follow the Asian model of industrialisation in the 21st century. In its report "Trouble in the Making - The Future of Manufacturing-Led Development" the World Bank assumes that manufacturing is becoming less relevant for low-income countries.

Others are more hopeful and argue that manufacturing employment has continuously been growing and that new technologies and digitisation offer new pathways for manufacturing, if only African governments tailor their industrial policies and development plans accordingly.

What is clear, however, is that there will be no industrialisation blueprint for the whole continent, but each country will have to search for, conceptualise and steer its own way towards an employment creating and value-adding industrial sector.

The Government of Uganda has understood this need. It has developed - if not ratified - an Industrial Policy in 2008. It has tried to integrate the requirements for industrialisation into its national development plans. It has embarked on an infrastructure offensive building roads, power dams and industrial parks. According to the State Minister for Investment thirty new factories have been commissioned in 2019 alone. In other words, the neo-liberal paradigm has been - if somewhat belatedly - replaced by the recognition that the state has an increasing role to play in creating an enabling environment for partnerships between the public and private sector towards new forms of manufacturing.

Yet the pace of these initiatives seems too slow to keep up with regional and global developments, the restructuring of global value chains and the opportunities of technological change.

In 2017 the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) published a study "Economic Development and Industrial Policy in Uganda" which listed the constraints undermining domestic manufacturing and concluded that the intended economic transformation could not be achieved because of implementation failure.

In 2019 FES therefore commissioned a follow up-study to interrogate the trajectories of those failures by analysing the "Implementation of Uganda's Industrialisation Agenda".

FES-Uganda is proud to be associated with the Makerere University Business School, its Economic Forum and Ramathan Ggoobi as the author of this very concise study. And we are looking forward to a constructive discussion among all the stakeholders - and hopefully application - of its concrete recommendations.

Rolf Paasch

Resident Representative
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Uganda

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD	**i**
LIST OF FIGURES	**iii**
LIST OF TABLES	**iii**
LIST OF ACRONYMS	**iv**
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	**vi**
SUMMARY	**vii**
1.0 INTRODUCTION	**1**
1.1 Background of the study	1
1.2 What is the problem?	2
1.3 Rationale of the study	2
1.4 Specific objectives of the study	2
2.0 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	**3**
2.1 Approach	3
2.2 Data collection and analysis	3
2.4 Scope of the study	3
2.5 Limitations of the study	3
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW	**4**
3.1 What has the world learned from 40 years of implementation research?	4
3.1.1 Approaches to implementation	4
3.1.2 Drivers of successful implementation	5
3.2 What does literature say about implementation in Uganda?	8
4.0 MAJOR FINDINGS	**10**
4.1 Implementation of Uganda's industrialisation agenda	10
4.1.1 Clarity of Uganda's industrialisation strategy	10
4.1.2 Quality of implementation plan for the industrialisation agenda	13
4.2 Where does power in implementation lie in Uganda?	19
4.2.1 Level of power in implementing industrial policy	19
4.2.2 Level of interest in industrial policy	20
4.2.3 Power-interest matrix	20
4.3 Factors that delay or fail implementation in Uganda	23
4.4 The main successes of the industrialisation drive in Uganda	28
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	**30**
5.1 Conclusion	30
5.2 Recommendations	30
REFERENCES	**32**
ANNEXES	**34**
Annex 1: Persons/Organisation Interviewed	34
Annex 2: Interview Guide used to capture responses from KIIs	36
Annex 3: Stakeholder Mapping and Analysis Matrix	38
Annex 3B: Assessment of the level of interest of stakeholders in industrialisation	38

LIST OF FIGURES

Box 1: **Impediments to implementation in Uganda** 10

Figure 1: **Key weaknesses with Uganda's industrialisation strategy** 11

Figure 2: **Key issues about the quality of Uganda's industrialisation implementation plan** 14

Figure 3: **Power-interest matrix of stakeholders in Uganda's industrialisation agenda** 21

Figure 4: **Factors delay or fail implementation in Uganda** 23

Figure 5: **Rank of the main successes of the industrialisation drive in Uganda** 28

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: **Key actors in implementation of Uganda's industrialisation agenda** 19

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
CBs	Commercial Banks
DDA	Dairy Development Authority
DFID	Department for International Development
EADB	East African Development Bank
EU	European Union
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
GoU	Government of Uganda
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPs	Independent Manufacturers/Processors
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry & Fisheries
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MoES	Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Sports
MoEMD	Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning & Economic Development
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development
MoLHUD	Ministry of Lands, Housing & Urban Development
MoTIC	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Co-operatives
MoWE	Ministry of Water and Environment
MoWT	Ministry of Works and Transport
MTAC	Management Training and Advisory Centre
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organization
NEC	National Enterprise Corporation & Subsidiaries
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NOCU	National Oil Company of Uganda
NPA	National Planning Authority
NWSC	National Water and Sewerage Corporation
OP	Office of the President
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PA	Parliament of the Republic of Uganda
PAU	Petroleum Authority of Uganda
PBU	Post Bank Uganda
PM	Pride Microfinance
PPDA	Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets
REA	Rural Electrification Agency
SH	State House
UACC	Uganda Air Cargo Corporation Ltd.
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UCDA	Uganda Coffee Development Authority

UCDO	Uganda Cotton Development Organization
UCIC	National Citizenship and Immigration Control
UDB	Uganda Development Bank
UDC	Uganda Development Corporation
UEDCL	Uganda Electricity Distribution Company Limited
UEGCL	Uganda Electricity Generation Company Limited
UEPB	Uganda Export Promotion Board
UETCL	Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited
UFZA	Uganda Free Zones Authority
UIA	Uganda Investment Authority
UIRI	Uganda Industrial Research Institute
ULC	Uganda Land Commission
UMA	Uganda Manufacturers Association
UNBS	Uganda National Bureau of Standards
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNCST	Uganda National Council of Science and Technology
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRA	Uganda National Road Authority
UPF	Uganda Police Force
URA	Uganda Revenue Authority
URC	Uganda Railways Corporation
URSB	Uganda Registration Services Bureau
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
OWC	Operation Wealth Creation

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study would not have been possible without the generous support and effort of a number of people. To this end, we appreciate the time, expertise and ideas of the individuals who facilitated this research. First, to Rolf Paasch, the Resident Representative Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Uganda, for providing the overall leadership and intellectual input right from the conception to completion of the study. We are equally indebted to Mareike Le Pelley, Rolf's immediate predecessor, who started the journey of FES facilitating the conversations on industrial policy in Uganda.

We thank the various individuals from government agencies, private sector, civil society organisations, and development partners, who enthusiastically accepted to participate in the study as key respondents.
We also thank Nangula Shejavali from Namibia who reviewed and edited the report as well as other in - house editors and reviewers. Special thanks go out to John Bosco Mubiru, the Senior Programme Manager at FES, for keeping the fire in 'kitchen' that eventually enabled timely completion of the study. We are equally indebted to Valentine Kataike at the MUBS Economic Forum for her administrative support to the research team.

Last but not least, we thank Prof. Waswa Balunywa the Principal Makerere University Business School (MUBS) for his visionary guidance and support. While the persons mentioned above, and others not mentioned, significantly contributed to the successful execution of this research study and have done everything possible to improve the quality of the report, the views expressed as well as any deficiencies are the sole responsibility of the author.

SUMMARY

There is a popular saying that Uganda is good at making good policies/plans but poor at implementing them. However, information about Uganda's policy/plan making record, let alone its implementation performance, is scanty. What has informed the verdict that Uganda's policies/plans are good? And what exactly is Uganda's implementation record? Is it as bad as many people believe? If so, what are the key factors behind this implementation challenge? Specifically, what are the different approaches to successful industrial policy implementation that could help to guide the front-line implementers of Uganda's industrialisation agenda to ensure that the intentions of the Government of Uganda (GoU) are turned into results? In short, how can industrial policy failure be avoided?

This study sets out to establish how Uganda is approaching the implementation of its industrialisation agenda. The rationale is to interrogate the country's poor implementation performance, explore approaches to successful industrial policy implementation and guide the implementers of Uganda's industrialisation agenda to achieve sustainable results.

The study adopts a mixed, consultative and participatory process approach. From the literature, lessons are drawn on what the world has learned from 40 years of implementation research and the impediments to implementation in Uganda are highlighted. Key informant interviews among people working in GoU, private sector and development organisations involved in Uganda's industrialisation agenda supplement the study's literature review.

The key findings of the study centre on the following themes: weaknesses with Uganda's industrialisation strategy; issues with the quality of Uganda's industrialisation implementation plan; and where implementation power lies among the actors involved in the implementation process of the country's industrial policy. The study also highlights a few successes that need to be consolidated and scaled up going forward; delineates the factors that play a role in delaying or failing implementation in Uganda; and provides recommendations to improve policy implementation and to ensure that Uganda's industrialisation intentions are turned into results.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of a study commissioned by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Uganda to establish how Uganda is implementing its industrialisation agenda.[1] It unpacks the key factors behind Uganda's poor implementation performance and explores the different approaches to successful industrial policy implementation. The intention of the study is to guide practitioners/implementers to ensure that the intentions of the Government of Uganda (GoU) are turned into results. This section outlines the background to the study, the problem, the rationale, and the specific objectives of the study.

1.1 Background of the study

The GoU has identified industrialisation as one of its top priorities. Both the Uganda Vision 2040 and the second National Development Plan, 2015/16 – 2019/20 (NDP II), target industrialisation as one of the means to transforming Uganda's economy into a middle-income country.[2] The draft strategic direction for the NDP III (2020/21 – 2024/25) aims at "enhancing household incomes and improving the quality of life of the population by holistically focusing on resource-led industrialisation for export-led growth".[3] The aspiration is to increase the industrial sector's contribution to GDP to 31 percent, the share of the labour force in industry to 26 percent, and the manufactured exports as a percentage of total exports to 50 percent by 2040.[4] Furthermore, the theme for the national budgets for the past three financial years (2017/18 to date) has been: "*Industrialisation for job creation and shared prosperity*."

The GoU is currently in the process of reviewing and updating the National Industrial Development Policy, which expired in 2018. Since 2016, FES Uganda has been facilitating the reinstitution of an industrial policy on Uganda's development agenda. It started by examining the main features of Uganda's industrial policy[5], and went on to facilitate a number of dialogues culminating in a high-level meeting with the Office of the President (OP), the Cabinet Secretariat and the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) on May 30, 2018. The meeting resolved that an "Issues Paper" be developed, highlighting the key emerging issues, action points and recommendations to inform the transformative industrialisation and manufacturing activities that will propel Uganda towards the achievement of Vision 2040. On November 20, 2018, FES Uganda, in partnership with the OP and Cabinet Secretariat, organised "an Inclusive Industrial Policy Review Dialogue" where the Issues Paper was discussed.[6] The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MoTIC) was tasked by the OP and the Cabinet Secretariat to integrate the issues raised in the revised National Industrial Development Policy. At the time of taking this study to print, the revised policy draft had not yet been published or shared with stakeholders.

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1 *As a key finding of this study, Uganda's industrialisation agenda is not clear. However, the strategic direction is laid out in the Second National Development Plan (NDP II: 2015/16 – 2019/20) as well as in the Draft Strategic Direction for NDP III (2020/21 – 2024/25). The planners proposed a quasi-market approach to develop three forms of industries: Agro-processing (beef and dairy products, leather products, textile and apparel, wood products, food processing); mineral beneficiation (iron and steel, metal fabrication, fertilizers and pesticides, and ceramics); and light manufacturing (pharmaceutical, electrical and electronic products, petro-chemicals, packaging, paper and paper products). See NDP II pg. 175. The Draft Strategic Direction for NDP III is being designed to operationalize the above strategy.*

2 *See The Republic of Uganda, 2015 and The Republic of Uganda, 2010*

3 *NPA, 2019*

4 *The Republic of Uganda, 2010*

5 *See FES, 2017*

6 *FES, 2018*

Other recent efforts to inform Uganda's industrialisation agenda include a study by the Economic Research Policy Centre on agro-industrialisation,[7] UNECA's (2017) "ABC of Industrialisation in Uganda" study, and the on-going development of an industrialisation master plan 2020–2040 by NPA.[8] The President of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, spent much of the first half of 2019 commissioning factories and/or breaking ground for the construction of new factories across the country. The president, in his State of the Nation Address delivered in June 2019, stated that "Government is prioritising investment in Industrial Parks to support industrialisation and create jobs. So far, there are already 284 new factories in the Industrial Park at Namanve; 11 in Luzira Industrial and Business Park; 10 in Bweyogerere Industrial Estate; 8 in Jinja Industrial and Business Park; 10 in Soroti Industrial and Business Park; 16 in Kasese Industrial and Business Park; and 42 in Mbarara SME Park. The total factories in Uganda today are 4,900."

Policies and plans do not succeed or fail on their own merits. Rather their progress is dependent upon the process of implementation. Within the complex and messy political economy systems, it is unclear how the industrialisation agenda being implemented and how best Uganda can ensure effective industrial policy design and implementation.

1.2 What is the problem?

There is a popular view that Uganda is good at making plans and policies, but poor at implementing them. However, information about both the creation and implementations of these plans and policies is scanty. What informs the verdict that Uganda's policies/plans are good? And what exactly is Uganda's implementation record? Is it as bad as many people believe? If so, what are the key factors behind this implementation challenge? What are the different approaches to successful industrial policy implementation that could help to guide the front-line implementers of Uganda's industrialisation agenda to ensure that the intentions of the GoU are turned into results? In short, how can industrial policy failure be avoided?

1.3 Rationale of the study

Against the background and problem set out above, the main purpose of this study is to interrogate Uganda's poor implementation performance, explore approaches to successful industrial policy implementation, and guide the implementers of Uganda's industrialisation agenda to achieve sustainable results.

1.4 Specific objectives of the study

To establish how the government of Uganda is approaching and/or should approach the implementation phase of its industrialisation agenda.

To examine the factors behind poor implementation performance in Uganda in general.

To present recommendations to ensure that the industrialisation intentions of Uganda are turned into results.

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7 *EPRC, 2018*

8 *FES also facilitated the initial conceptualization stage and zero drafting of the Industrialisation Master Plan 2020–2040 in 2018.*

2.0 APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

This section lays out the methodological design of the study. It highlights the approach, data collection methods and analysis, scope, as well as limitations of the study.

2.1 Approach

A mixed qualitative, consultative and participatory process approach, involving key stakeholders at all stages of the analysis, was adopted for this study. This was important for ensuring ownership of the results and smooth implementation of the recommendations.

2.2 Data collection and analysis

This study was informed by an extensive document review, which included a critical review of key industrial policy documents for Uganda such as the Vision 2040; the National Development Plan II; the national budgets for the period 2015/16 – 2019/20; Trade and Industry Strategic Plan; Budget Monitoring Reports; the Final Draft of the National Industrial Development Policy (2018) and other relevant industrial policy documents. Several academic and policy research papers were also reviewed. These documents were analysed and critiqued to gain the insights necessary to meet the study objectives.

In addition, key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted with key officials involved in the implementation of the industrialisation agenda in Uganda's Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The responding MDAs and organisations included: the Office of the President; Office of Prime Minister; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Bank of Uganda; Uganda Investment Authority; Uganda National Roads Authority; National Planning Authority; Operation Wealth Creation; Uganda Manufacturers Association; Uganda Export Promotions Board; Uganda National Bureau of Standards; Uganda Development Corporation; Standing Committees of Parliament that exercise control over trade and industry: the Committee on Tourism, Trade and Industry (COTTI); the Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation (COSTI); and the Committee on Finance, Planning and Economic Development (COFPED). Interviews were also conducted with key development partners of Uganda: the International Monetary Fund (IMF); United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO); and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Individuals purposively selected to examine implementation performance in Uganda in general were also interviewed. An interview guide was developed and used to capture responses from KIIs (see Annex 2). The data obtained from the KIIs were processed, analysed (using *Atlas-ti* qualitative data management software), and discussed to provide a common body of evidence contained in the findings of this study.

2.4 Scope of the study

This study concentrates on assessing Uganda's policy implementation record. In particular, it focuses on the implementation of Uganda's industrialisation agenda. For emphasis, the study is dedicated to establishing how the GoU is and should be approaching the implementation phase of its industrialisation agenda to achieve results.

2.5 Limitations of the study

The only key limitation of the study is that time constraints prevented additional interviews and other interactions that could have further enriched the study from being exhausted. Despite this, the data gathered was sufficient to provide credible findings.

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section summarises the key themes in implementation research that have guided this study. It highlights lessons learned over the past 40 years in terms of the approaches used and the drivers for successful implementation; and sheds light on the literature on Uganda's policy implementation.

3.1 What has the world learned from 40 years of implementation research?

Firstly, literature notes that implementation research is a relatively new phenomenon. Until the early 1970s, implementation was seriously overlooked in the broader domain of public policy. Research on the "process of translating policy into outcomes"—implementation—emerged (first in the U.S.) in 1973 as a reaction to growing concerns over implementation failure of a wide-range of reform programs.[9] To date, policy implementation has no full-fledged theory, mainly because the discipline is still in its infancy.[10] Much of the research on implementation has been directed towards theory development rather than investigating implementation performance.

Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) are regarded, in literature, as the pioneers of implementation research. Their research, and a series of others that followed, was mainly concerned with describing numerous barriers to effective policy implementation. The second-generation studies focussed on explaining implementation success or failure,[11] marked by the debate on what was dubbed as the top-down and bottom-up approaches/ models of implementation.[12] Researchers have argued that the academic literature on implementation has generally come to an intellectual dead end.[13]

3.1.1 Approaches to implementation

Research shows there are three main approaches to implementation: the top-down, bottom-up and hybrid approaches. The top-down approach looks at implementation as the hierarchical execution of centrally-defined policy intentions. It puts its faith in the ability of decision makers to produce unequivocal policy objectives and to control the implementation stage. To succeed, the top-down approach requires the establishment of adequate bureaucratic procedures to ensure that policies are executed as accurately as possible. In addition, the implementing agencies should have sufficient resources at their disposal, and there needs to be a system of clear responsibility and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers. Effective top-down implementation becomes increasingly difficult if a program/policy has to pass through a multitude of "clearance points."[14] Research further suggests that successful top-down implementation is only possible if goal consensus among key actors is high,[15] and if policy makers succeed in structuring the "implementation games" thoughtfully.[16]

9 *Pülzl & Treib, 2007*

10 *Khan, 2016*

11 *Stewart et al., 2008*

12 *Pulzl & Treib, 2007*

13 *de Leon, 2002; Suggett, 2011*

14 *Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973*

15 *Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975*

16 *Bardach (1977) pictures the people concerned with implementation of a policy as playing separate games, including the "budget game" played by bureaucrats (to attract bigger budgets), the "easy life" game of career civil servants who do things in their own established way and within their own self-sufficient order of priority. He classifies other games that bureaucrats play as "Diversion of Resources," "Deflections of Policy Goals," "Resistance," and "Dissipation of Personal and Political Energies." One cannot help but wonder whether Bardach's catalog of games might not be as effective in teaching bureaucrats how to frustrate program development as it is to help programmers to identify and understand the causes of delay.*

Top-down approaches to implementation work only when six criteria are satisfied: (1) policy objectives are clear and consistent, (2) the program is based on a valid causal theory, (3) the implementation process is structured adequately, (4) implementing officials are committed to the program's goals, (5) interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are supportive, and (6) there are no detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions.[17]

On the other hand, the bottom-up approach emphasises implementation through the everyday problem-solving strategies of what Lipsky (1980) calls "street-level bureaucrats". In this case, successful implementation starts from the "bottom" by identifying the networks of actors involved in actual policy delivery. This approach faults the idea that policies are defined at the central level and that implementers need to stick to the objectives defined by the centre as neatly as possible. Street-level bureaucrats are seen to be much closer to the real problems than central policy makers. Proponents of the bottom-up approach suggest that successful implementation starts with identifying networks of actors from all relevant agencies collaborating in the implementation and then examining their roles in solving their problems. Rather than considering implementation an apolitical process of following orders "from above," bottom-uppers hold that the implementation process is eminently political, and thus must offer implementers a large amount of discretionary power.[18]

The hybrid approach to implementation combines elements of both top-down and bottom-up, in order to avoid the conceptual weaknesses associated with each approach.[19] It is more focused on empirical and pragmatic ways of blending central steering and local autonomy. Proponents of the hybrid approach suggest that more weight to implementation should be given to coordination and collaboration among separate but mutually dependent actors, as well as to the type of policy to be implemented.[20] Interview responses from a cross-section of senior officials and political leaders involved in the implementation process in Uganda suggest that the country does not have a distinctive approach to implementation. A clear example is that although Uganda adopted a decentralisation policy in the mid 1990s (which presupposed the introduction of a bottom-up approach to implementation), over the years, a top-down approach to implementation has re-emerged. However, this was done without putting in place the prerequisites for effective top-down implementation, such as establishing adequate bureaucratic procedures, ensuring sufficient resources are at the disposal of implementers, and properly defining responsibilities and hierarchical control to supervise the actions of implementers. In addition, officials interviewed revealed that goal consensus among key actors in Uganda's implementation MDAs is low.

3.1.2 Drivers of successful implementation

We embarked on the literature review by asking: what is successful implementation? Should success be measured in terms of specific outputs and outcomes tied directly to the statutes that were the source of a program, or to a much broader evaluation of the 'positive effects' of a program? Ingram and Schneider (1990) cite several plausible definitions of successful implementation. Among these are: agencies comply with the directives of the statutes; agencies are held accountable for reaching specific indicators of success; goals of the statute are achieved; local goals are achieved; and there is an improvement in the political climate around the program. Matland (1995) sums it up that the correct standard of implementation success is

17 Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975

18 Pülzl & Treib, 2007

19 Ibid

20 Ripley & Franklin, 1982

loyalty to the prescribed goals. When a policy does not have explicitly stated goals, the choice of a standard becomes more difficult, and more general societal norms and values come into play. With this in mind, a synthesis across the implementation literature provides critical drivers of successful implementation as follows:[21]

Clarity of goals and objectives of the policy/plan as well as the means of delivering them to all implementing personnel and interest groups: Ambiguity of goals affects bureaucratic behaviour and organisational performance since it leaves implementers with the responsibility of interpreting them; and ambiguity of means gives rise to conflict.[22] To avoid these, the policy maker must be clear about the problem and the outcomes that matter most. However, some researchers have found that the clearer goals are, the more likely they will lead to conflict. Regan (1984), for example, argues that as personnel information policy in the UK became more explicit, existing actors became aware of threats to their turf and acted to limit the scope and range of proposed policy changes to maintain existing patterns of bureaucratic power and structure. This, however, generally happens to broader reform policies and not results-oriented policies such as industrial policy.

Staff recruitment, training and supervision: Research shows that beyond academic qualifications or experience factors, certain practitioner characteristics are essential for carrying out successful implementation. These may be addressed through training, on-the-job learning and coaching to ensure that staff members have a comprehensive understanding of the practices being implemented. But learning and improvement does not just happen; at a granular level, learning occurs by convening teams regularly (at least fortnightly) to share their insights and experiences. This requires conditions in which they can be open about failure, and challenge each other to explain or justify a particular course of action. The "train and hope" approach, without providing follow-up coaching on the job, is ineffective in achieving effective implementation. Indeed, key informant interviewees agreed that in the few Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) in Uganda where staff recruitment, training and supervision followed this practice, such as the military (Uganda Peoples Defence Forces - UPDF) and URA, implementation has been relatively more effective.

Internal management support: For effective implementation to take place, effective structures and processes that facilitate it must be established to provide leadership and keep staff focused on desired outcomes. This entails appointing strong leaders for implementing agencies and being clear about where and how decisions are made to keep the staff focused on desired outcomes. Research shows that although Ministers must be ultimately accountable for the conduct of policy and must take the highest-level decisions, they cannot and should not be the arbiter of all issues once a policy hits the ground. Instead, they should establish who has authority to take which decisions. If this framework is unclear, even small decisions will often default to the centre.[23]

Defined roles and responsibilities: For implementation to succeed, there should be clear-cut task responsibilities (and KPIs – key performance indicators) about the concerned actors involved in the implementation process. This helps to guard against what Bardach (1979) calls the "not our problem syndrome".

21 *For example, see Signe 2017; Norris et al. 2014; Peters et al. 2013; NAO 2013; Metz et al. 2007; Sabatier 1986*

22 *Signe, 2017*

23 *Norris et al., 2014*

Evidence-based decision making: Literature shows that it is nearly impossible to make good decisions without sufficient objective, accurate and timely data on costs, timescales, benefits and risks. Over-optimism persists where little effort is made to either develop robust estimates or be honest and transparent about the assumptions made on limited data. Evidence gathered shows that the GoU tends to be over-optimistic about its ability to align the different views and the amount of time it will take to have sufficient engagement, particularly where a project is complex or involves new ways of working. Further, the GoU has a tendency of making simplistic assumptions about the behaviour of groups over whom it has no direct control (see Section 4.3). The pressures of short-term political and budgetary cycles have also increased the risk of over-optimism. Very few projects are conceived after proper weighting of gains, losses, and probabilities; and the organisational culture leads staff to hide bad news and makes them reluctant to challenge senior views.

Stakeholders: Successful implementation is driven by the effective interaction between organisations and people who often have widely varying interests and power. The GoU's most common delivery partners are contractors, consultants and agencies/authorities, local governments, the private sector and media. Other groups such as citizens, special interest groups, academic think-tanks and end users also often have a significant impact on the delivery and delay of projects. Understanding the motivations and level of influence of these groups is crucial to the successful delivery of a project. It has empirically been established that "a lack of stakeholder participation in 'rulemaking' creates implementation difficulties."[24]

Accountability: Implementation is effective where decision-makers take personal accountability for the decisions they make, and they can be independently challenged on these decisions. There must be a clear and transparent "reward and punishment" mechanism for all frontline implementers. This helps to perform tasks in accordance with standard procedure and stimulate implementation discipline. Literature shows that decision-makers in public sector tend to seek short-term recognition and rewards, and are often not in the same role when a project is under way and issues emerge. Organisations that actively invite external scrutiny and learn and apply the lessons learned demonstrate higher levels of implementation success.

Proper investment in routines: Given that implementation typically takes place over long periods, to keep implementation on track, it is important that routine is established. This involves conducting regular check-in meetings between officials and delivery partners. It also calls for the avoidance of excessive turnover of officials. Evidence shows that using junior Ministers to drive progress guarantees success. Cabinet Ministers provide high-level sponsorship and direction for flagship policies, but given the number of calls on their time, a clear conclusion from research is that policy areas where junior Ministers were closely involved had the best prospects for delivering.[25]

Proper coordination of implementing authorities: Complexity in implementation in the form of co-ordination, negotiation and trade-offs is needed for decision making, managing communication and unpredictability in highly complex networks, and handling increasing community demands. Scholars provide a set of prescriptions about ways to strengthen implementation prospects through the creation of simple implementation structures and improved intra-governmental communication and coordination.[26] Some actually posit that more weight in the implementation process should be given to coordination and

24 *West, 2005*

25 *Norris et al., 2014*

26 *For example, see Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Goggin et al, 1990; Stoker, 1991; and May, 2012*

collaboration among separate but mutually dependent actors.[27] Evidence from key informant interviews shows that one of the main challenges to implementation in Uganda is that MDAs are operating in silos without coordinating their planning, resources and execution. Although it has been politically more feasible to create new structures rather than overhaul older ones, this practice, according to KIIs, has failed to work. Instead, the creation of new structures has prevented the coordination and collaboration necessary to ensure effective implementation (see Section 4.1.2).

Effective monitoring and checks on discretionary power: Literature shows that implementation cannot be done in isolation. Putting in place mechanisms for monitoring the implementation process by internal and external authorities enhances implementation performance. This calls for active leadership. The monitoring reports must be acted on to elicit improvement. Frontline implementers must enjoy sufficient discretion in discharging their responsibilities, but there should also be checks and balances to prevent excessive or lack of discretionary power. Checks and balances in controlling the behaviour of front-line implementers will guard against all sorts of intentional non-compliance.[28]

In summary, literature shows that effective implementation is driven by sufficiency of resources (Lipsky, 2010), including professional and technical resources (Goggin et al. 1990); incentives (Meter & Horn, 1975) and the presence of competent staff working as implementers (Meter & Horn, 1975); inter-organisational communication (Bridgman & Davis, 2004) and conflict management (Stoker, 1991); official commitment to statutory objectives (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983); delegation of authority and flexibility (Fox et al, 2006); sufficient autonomy (Wali, 2010); and the availability of specific technical know-how or administrative capabilities.

3.2 What does literature say about implementation in Uganda?

In 2008, the GoU hired Oxford Policy Management Limited – a UK based firm – to conduct an independent evaluation of the PEAP in order to draw lessons for the development of the processes for the then planned NDP. The evaluators stated that "the effectiveness of the PEAP was impeded by poor implementation."[29] They attributed the poor implementation in Uganda to a number of deficiencies, as summarised in Box 1. Most importantly, they concluded thus: "These are not problems of the PEAP process per se. They exist independently of the PEAP system and if they are not addressed when the NDP system comes into being they will have the same adverse impact on that process as they have had on the PEAP."

27 *Ripley & Franklin, 1982*

28 *Khan, 2016*

29 *OPM, 2008*

Box 1:
Impediments to implementation in Uganda

Weak collective decision-making and oversight: Particularly around the functioning of the cabinet system, which contributes to problems of policy incoherence at the national level.

Decentralisation: Districts in Uganda operate under delegated rather than devolved authority from central government. They have very limited local revenue and the creation of central government-appointed chief accounting officers (CAOs) represents a significant recentralisation of decision-making. The risk of these arrangements is a weakened sense of responsibility and accountability for good service delivery of local government officials towards their constituents.

Compliance and accountability: There are serious deficiencies in compliance and accountability systems in Uganda's public service and these contribute to inefficiency and corruption. The sectors where these problems are most evident are also the sectors most central to implementing strategic policies/plans.
Budgeting and planning: The budgeting processes in Uganda work more strongly than the planning processes, and this weakens the capacity of planning to combat the natural tendency of budgets towards incrementalism.

Government performance management: There is no organised process amongst the central control agencies for ensuring that national policy objectives are properly financed and implemented and that problems in policy and delivery are identified and fixed. The Results Oriented Management (ROM) initiative is unlikely to succeed in strengthening the results orientation of the public service because it should have been sequenced after rather than before better compliance and control is established.

The political-administrative interface: Under multi-party politics it is important for the civil service to ensure that major strategies have the support of the elected government, and to ensure that all MDAs are fully responsive to the lawful policy directions of the government. It is important to ensure that the main policies are implemented through the public service. Direct involvement by politicians in public administration opens government to the charge of party political bias. FES (2017) found that Uganda's political leaders—and interestingly even some senior civil servants—hold the view that most public servants are no longer interested in the pursuit of the national interest. On the other hand, public servants feel that politicians are much more interested in the implementation of the policies in their electoral manifestos, and issuing unilateral political directives than implementing the NDP and the industrial policy.

Source: OPM (2008) & FES (2017)

4.0 MAJOR FINDINGS

4.1 Implementation of Uganda's industrialisation agenda

This section presents the findings from the interviews conducted at the different MDAs involved in the implementation process of Uganda's industrialisation agenda, as well as with other actors in the private sector, development agencies and CSOs. Interviewees included representatives from the following MDAs and other organisations: the Office of the President; Office of the Prime Minister; Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives; Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Bank of Uganda; Uganda Investment Authority; Uganda National Roads Authority; National Planning Authority; Operation Wealth Creation; Uganda Manufacturers Association; Uganda Export Promotions Board; Uganda National Bureau of Standards; Uganda Development Corporation; the Committee on Tourism, Trade and Industry; and the Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation. Interviews were also conducted with key development partners of Uganda such as: the International Monetary Fund; United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; and United Nations Development Programme. Other interviewees included independent manufacturers as well as senior journalists (see Annex 1).

These were interviewed on a cross-section of issues related to three key areas: (1) Uganda's industrialisation strategy; (2) implementation of the ongoing industrialisation agenda and implementation performance in general; and (3) strategies/recommendations to improve implementation.

4.1.1 Clarity of Uganda's industrialisation strategy

Almost all of the respondents interviewed indicated that the industrialisation strategy that Uganda is pursuing is not clear. The general consensus is that although at political level, the intent is clear—i.e. building industries to add value to agricultural raw materials and minerals, and substitution of imports that are substitutable—the strategy is not clear at the technical and planning level. Because of the lack of clarity, each MDA is implementing the industrialisation agenda in the way they understand it. Several MDAs are constructing factories, most of which are not based on any technical or business thinking. Figure 1 summarises the key weaknesses raised by the respondents as far as Uganda's industrialisation strategy is concerned.

The key informant interviewees – comprising key actors in the industrialisation agenda drawn from the GoU MDAs responsible for implementing the industrialisation agenda, heads of development agencies, representatives of the private sector and the civil society – were asked what Uganda's industrialisation strategy was and whether they were satisfied with the way this agenda has been planned and articulated. The list of issues in Figure 1 corresponds to the responses while the figures indicate the weighted ranking of the responses according to the frequency with which each factor/issue was mentioned. The weighted ranking adds up to 100 percent. Twenty-five interviews were conducted.

FIGURE 1: KEY WEAKNESSES WITH UGANDA'S INDUSTRIALISATION STRATEGY



Source: Key Informant Interviews

Respondents raised the issue that although everyone is talking about industrialisation, there is no clear and agreed upon plan, strategy, focus, or policy framework to guide the implementation of the agenda. The NDP II's (2015/16 – 2019/20) strategic direction identifies "promotion of value addition through agro-processing and mineral beneficiation as well as light manufacturing."[30] However, respondents argue that the strategic intent has not been translated into clear plans and strategies at the technical and planning levels. There is no shared vision on the strategic direction. Instead, piecemeal interventions that are not based on any business model or scientific thinking have been the order of the day. Each MDA seems to have its own understanding of the industrialisation agenda. The terms "value addition", "agro-processing", and "manufacturing" have been confused. In addition, the GoU has also been pursuing an import substitution strategy, including on items such as road vehicles, medical and pharmaceutical products, electrical machinery, and textiles and footwear, among others.[31] In all these attempts, efficiency type issues have not been catered for.

> *We are not focused at all. We have not structured the policy to inform the industrialisation process. It is not clear what we want to do and how, whom we want to back and who we should not. If someone comes and says I want to make cars, we jump in, even where value addition is zero. We need to go back and agree on the items where we have a comparative advantage or where we may gain comparative advantage.*
>
> ***Head of one of the GoU MDAs implementing the industrialisation agenda***

Although an implementation plan for the expired National Industrial Policy (2008) existed, respondents concurred that it was not clear on how it should be implemented or who should do what. MDAs in Uganda prefer to concentrate strictly on their mandates as defined in laws, which may not be very helpful. Thus, the

30 *The Republic of Uganda, 2015*

31 *There is a total of 65 items proposed for import substitution under NDP III's Strategic Direction*

implementation plan for the 2008 NIP was never followed, and priorities of the GoU changed. An official working with a development agency said, "The policy making processes in Uganda are not informed by evidence, but individual opinions and politics. Development partners try to help, but people in this country do not pay attention to issues where they do not individually benefit."

In addition, it is not clear how Uganda ended up adopting the Industrial Park model. The model was adopted as a directive by the President, although no study on the appropriateness of the model vis-à-vis other industrialisation models was done. Neither were any feasibility studies conducted to inform the location of the parks. In a February 2007 letter to the then Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, President Museveni directed MoFPED to "develop an Industrial Park for the following towns: Arua, Lira, Gulu, Soroti, Moroto, Mbale, Tororo, Iganga, Jinja, Masaka, Luwero-Nakaseke, Nakasongola, Mbarara, Bushenyi, Kabale, Kasese, Fort Portal, Hoima, Rakai and Mubende." He went ahead and defined what an industrial park was, how many factories each should accommodate, how the factories should be clustered, and the enterprises that should be located in each of the parks. The eight-page letter is, in effect, the plan that has guided the development of industrial parks in Uganda. The UIA is currently focusing on the development of Kampala-based parks. It has so far established nine parks.[32] The plan is to build 22 parks as per the directive. According to the UIA, another Presidential directive requires them to deliver three industrial parks per year. In addition, the UIA Board in 2017 approved an additional park in Buliisa and four additional regional science and technology industrial parks, amounting to a total of 27 industrial parks.
Literature shows that proper development of industrial parks should include strategic environmental assessments, environmental impact statements, life cycle cost analysis, land use planning, and risk management tools. A study by the Office of the Auditor General (2015) found no evidence of a comprehensive long-term strategy or plan to develop the parks "despite the substantial investment by government."[33] The study also revealed that only one feasibility study had been undertaken – in Namanve. But even in this case, land allocation was made without a proper long-term strategy or standardised criteria.[34] Although advocates of industrial parks consider them as a pragmatic way of overcoming the inefficient bureaucracy and coordination issues in a developing country with poor infrastructure, and as a means to reduce operational and transactional costs,[35] research shows that many countries have created parks that have not produced the expected benefits.[36]

More importantly, research shows that industrial parks have failed to work where they were not planned in line with: (i) the national development strategy (macro-economic policies; power and transport infrastructure; science, technology and innovation, and linkage with universities and research centres), (ii) clusters; and (iii) good location, taking into consideration the size of the plots, cost, availability and access to raw materials, accessibility to bulk transport, market needs and expectations, human resources at a reasonable cost, and personal/cultural services.[37] Several respondents identified the absence of most of the above-mentioned criteria as some of the inadequacies of the industrial parks being developed in Uganda.

32 *The nine industrial parks currently prioritised by UIA are: Kampala Industrial and Business Park (KIBP) a.k.a Namanve Industrial Park; Luzira Industrial and Business Park; Bweyogerere Industrial Estate; Jinja Industrial and Business Park; Sino Uganda Mbale Industrial Park; Soroti Industrial and Business Park; Karamoja Industrial and Business Park; Kasese Industrial and Business Park; and Mbarara SME Park.*

33 *OAG 2015*

34 *Ibid*

35 *Lin & Xu, 2016; World Bank 2015; Festel & Wurmseher 2013*

36 *UNIDO, 2012*

37 *UNIDO, 2012*

A few years ago, the UNDP brought Prof. Justin Lin (one of the chief promoters of the industrial park model) to Uganda, and took him to the Kampala Industrial and Business Park (KIBP) (popularly known as Namanve Industrial Park) to assess its progress. Reports indicate that on reaching Namanve, Lin simply laughed and commented that the KIBP was not an industrial park. An industrial park must be well-planned and fully serviced. Information from the UIA indicates that currently there is no industrial parks policy. However, in 2019, the UIA developed a National Industrial and Business Parks Development Strategy.

The strategy is not guided by any policy since, as indicated, there is no industrial park development policy in Uganda. Although it outlines a "criteria for locating of industrial parks"—stating that they "should be located across the country on suitable land in or near urban centers such as Towns, Municipalities or Cities as specified in the Local Government Act"—it does not adhere to best practices of strategic planning for industrial parks. Experts advise that instead of developing general guidelines on how to develop industrial parks, it is important to conduct specific needs-assessments and adapt each industrial park to the social, economic, cultural and environmental characteristics of each region and community, taking into consideration local governance competences and capabilities (e.g. see UNIDO 2012).

The National Industrial and Business Parks Development Strategy does not address this particular best practice, among others. Instead, it dedicates more than three quarters of its pages to reporting on the status of the industrial parks in Uganda (as of June 2019) and their expected benefits.

It does not address the financing, the type of companies and sectors that each park would attract, and the range of services to be supplied to the tenants. The clustering is not linked on a systematic grouping of interlinked companies, suppliers and associated institutions providing related products and/or services in a specific geographic region. There are no innovation linkages. And it does not prioritise and focus resources in a phased manner to particular parks as recommended by the OAG (2015).

Other weaknesses in Uganda's industrialisation strategy that impede effective implementation are highlighted in Figure 1.

4.1.2 Quality of implementation plan for the industrialisation agenda

Respondents were also asked about the presence and quality of the implementation plan being followed to turn Uganda's industrialisation intentions into results. Their responses are highlighted in the list of issues captured in Figure 2. The figures indicate the weighted ranking of the responses according to the frequency with which each factor/issue was mentioned. The weighted ranking adds to 100 percent.

FIGURE 2:
KEY ISSUES ABOUT THE QUALITY OF UGANDA'S INDUSTRIALISATION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN



Source: Key Informant Interviews

Asked if they were privy to the implementation plan of Uganda's industrialisation agenda, and, if so, whether they were satisfied with the quality of the plan, a big majority of the respondents (86.4%) said there was no valid implementation plan. Although the expired NIP (2008) had an implementation plan, respondents were not satisfied with its quality.

A) No one is actively in charge of industrial policy

The top problematic issue raised was the fact that no one or formal authority is actively in charge of the implementation of Uganda's industrial policy. All interviewees said the Ministry responsible for industry (MoTIC) is the weakest MDA among the institutions that are supposed to implement the industrial policy. This is mainly due to MoTIC's formal authority (derived from its position as described in law and policy) being diluted by duplicated mandates (a glowing example being MoFPED being tasked with the development of industrial parks), as well as limited financial and human resources (see Section 4.2.1).

> *There is a huge technical capacity deficiency at the MoTIC. Its technical leadership is disillusioned, demotivated and thin on the ground. They are paid poorly and do not have any power. There is no leadership at MoTIC and thus needs total overhaul, as well as technical and financial empowerment if we need it to play its role…*
>
> ***Head of one of the agencies implementing the industrialisation agenda***

Over the years, MoTIC and MoFPED have been involved in mandate wars concerning the development and running of industry-related projects. In 2005, for example, when a lucrative Presidential Initiative on Banana Industrial Development (PIBID) was set up, it was implemented by the MoFPED – just like the ongoing building of the industrial parks. Uganda has a Minister of State for Investment (under MoFPED) and a Minister of State for Industry (under MoTIC); a Commissioner in Charge of Investment (at MoFPED) and Commissioner of Industry (at MoTIC). UIA, the agency responsible for developing the industrial parks, is domiciled in MoFPED. Officials at UIA say they are confused on roles and reporting, while the wider public is also confused about where to go for what service. A new investment policy has been developed by MoFPED, while MoTIC is yet to finalise the national industrial development policy. The investment law came before the policy and the NDP III. The officials at MoTIC are no longer enthusiastic. They do not see value in what they do, since they believe no one is interested in their work.

Some officials and members of the private sector interviewed said the correct arrangement should be for MoTIC to be fully in charge of Industrial Policy, including development of Industrial Parks, while MoFPED concentrates on its core duty of raising funds to finance the policy. Others suggested that a separate Ministry for Industry and Investment (MII) be created, since both these critical drivers of economic transformation are being made second fiddle in the priority lists of the sectors in which they fall. Experts interviewed concur that this will help to strengthen the mobilisation and coordination of other actors in the industrialisation agenda. At the Office of the President (OP), there is an effort to create an Apex Platform to monitor and evaluate, coordinate and supervise implementation.[38]

B) Weak monitoring and coordination of the implementing actors

The general view among the respondents is that the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Office of the President (OP) have failed to play the roles of chief coordinator and monitor of government agencies, and that of chief supervisor respectively. Both are preoccupied with implementation. As a result, Uganda does not have any institution or authority that monitors and supervises the delivery of services, let alone the implementation of the industrialisation agenda. Ministries and agencies are competing with their leader of Government Business (OPM). In the OP, there are offices that mirror the Ministries they are supposed to supervise, respondents said.

> *The challenge with the current monitoring system is that the monitors are part of the implementation. Their well-being depends on the very projects they are supposed to monitor. So they are direct beneficiaries leading to "regulatory capture". The Minister, Permanent Secretary and Commissioners of a Ministry, who are supposed to monitor the agencies, are dependent upon the very agencies they are supposed to police. They are facilitated to travel in and out of the country, paid per diem by the managers of agency. So, nobody is anymore finding out whether what was intended has been or is being achieved.*
>
> ***Senior leader heading one of GoU's MDAs***

One respondent who works closely with the Presidency revealed that when the President faced the challenge of proliferation of agencies (also known as 'agencification') and 'projectisation,' he also decided to go into 'Presidentialisation' of government out of frustration with poor service delivery. (i.e. The President decided to create parallel units in State House and the OP to do some of the work meant for established

38 *The Apex Platform is being proposed as a forum where the big four entities – the Office of the President (OP), Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), National Planning Authority, and Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development – carry out oversight of government program performance. It is still being conceived and structured.*

agencies, since the latter had failed to deliver.) However, one respondent said this intervention, too, has not only failed to improve implementation performance, but could actually have worsened the situation, as it has duplicated resources and bred conflicts/disenchantment. Another respondent stated that everyone in GoU is now chasing a project. As a result, the strategic plans lack political leadership to turn them into implementation plans. Although monitors at different levels compile reports on these projects, there is no leadership to take action on the recommendations of the reports. The OPM simply compiles the reports into one big book called the Government Annual Performance Report (GAPR), which respondents say is a big joke since it does not influence decisions, and there is no mechanism in place to ensure that recommendations are implemented. There are no sanctions for accounting officers who perform poorly, and no rewards for good performance. Whether one performs or not, their contract is renewed and some even get promoted. Moreover, the tenure for civil servants is permanent and pensionable. There is no incentive for efficiency or accountability.

> *The people chosen to lead must take the lead. OPM has failed to do their role. It is not felt at MDAs. The OP behaves like a powerless entity. Ministers are not leading. Everybody is running to the President. We need to amend the Constitution and create an OPM with sanctioning and coordinating powers.*
>
> ***Senior leader in the GoU***

However, another school of thought emerged during the interviews: The OPM does not have sanctioning powers, and therefore does not hold significant power in holding MDAs accountable for implementation. Given that the Prime Minister does not appoint anyone, he does not have formal powers – unless he is empowered by the President – to sanction public servants. Thus, the OPM's role needs to be re-examined. A stakeholder mapping and analysis intended to identify all persons, institutions and other actors involved in the implementation process of a public policy, in addition to the target group and the implementing agency (see Section 4.2), shows that the real power in Uganda lies with the President and the MoFPED.

C) Each MDA has its own plan

Due to the lack of coordination leadership at MDA level, each agency has its own plan implemented in silos and in a laissez faire manner. Agencies are devoting a lot of resources to generic planning, and spending a lot of money on workshops, conferences and benchmarking trips, but no one uses the information generated. Roles have been duplicated, with the UIA, UFZA, UEPB, UDC, NAADS, MAAIF, MoFPED, MoSTI all building factories. "What are institutions such as MAAIF, NAADS and Local Governments doing constructing factories, most of which are not based on any technical or business thinking?" asked one interviewee. Uganda has factories littered around the country, standing simply as white elephants.

D) No quality control

There is a lot of laissez faire in Uganda's bureaucracy and even in private sector. Issues such as personnel integrity, competence tests, and the management of processes are not taken seriously. The implementation plan does not address the issue of the right manpower (right skills and professional training).

E) Implementation plan is not informing the budget

The financing availed for implementation does not match the ambitions of the industrial policy. An official at OP said the national budget dictates what planning should do, instead of the other way around. Without a proper implementation plan, resources will always be a problem. The challenges that the MDAs tasked with the delivery of industrialisation are facing, particularly in the form of budget gaps, are a result of weaknesses in implementation planning. For example, one respondent wondered why the GoU did not concentrate first on facilitating and fully developing the Namanve Industrial Park, and then move to another one in a phased approach. Officials at UIA revealed that although they planned UGX 500 billion as the capital investment to complete the Namanve Park, the GoU has been giving them UGX 5 billion per year, implying it will take 100 years to complete the Park. Since FY2017/18, the releases have dropped to UGX 1 billion per year. According to the officials, this is the main reason infrastructure development at the Namanve Park has been slow. Officials at MoFPED noted that in the absence of prioritisation, the budget has become overwhelmed.

Some respondents argued that Uganda's national budget has turned into a wish-list. The budget is allocated without a scientific formula. There is a lot of tokenism where projects cannot be delivered on time and on budget. Some respondents cited the challenge of supplementary budgets.[39] However, officials at MoFPED said that budgetary issues have now been largely solved, arguing that accounting officers of MDAs who are supposed to implement should no longer complain that their approved budgets were cut. Releases also now take place on time—by the 10th of the month at the beginning of each quarter—according to a schedule of quarterly releases at MoFPED. There is a need to learn to follow plans, policies and budgets while executing projects.

F) Serious capacity issue in MDAs to plan implementation

As indicated above, capacity in implementing agencies is very low. There are critical personnel and skill gaps at institutions such as UDC, UIA and MoTIC. GoU is dragging their feet when it comes to building the necessary capacity, yet we all expect the institutions to deliver. Management skills for industry are badly lacking in the country. Ugandans, both in public and private sectors, need specialized training and targeted Business, Technical, Vocational Education and Training (BTVET).

> *The President has over the years concentrated on strengthening the Ministry of Finance and URA, as well as the UPDF, and left others to decay. Now that we have become a country of surpluses (in agricultural commodities and some manufactures such as steel, plastics, etc.). We need to prioritise trade and industry issues to ensure we can create capacity to produce and market the surpluses. MoTIC, UDC, UIA all need strong leadership and technical personnel…*
>
> ***Senior servant in the GoU***

39 *Supplementary budgets are provided for under the Public Finance Management Act (2015), Section 25, where if it is found that the amount appropriated to an MDA was insufficient, or that a need has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount was appropriated, the Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic and Parliament may approve a supplementary budget of up to 10% of the Contingencies Fund. However, the law requires that the supplementary must be for "unabsorbable" (cannot be funded through virement), "unavoidable" and "unforeseeable" expenditures only.*

G) Data quality to guide implementation planning

There is no data of reliable quality on all parameters to facilitate proper implementation planning and analysis. One cannot make adequate projections on employment to be created, livelihoods and so on without good quality data. UBOS does not have adequate data on industry, apart from the index of industrial production, which provides growth trends and variations across sub-sectors. However, respondents said data should be client driven, and not simply what UBOS decides to gather. For example, stakeholders interviewed said that they would like to have regular and disaggregated manufacturing output data, as well as data on industrial production costs, on manufactured exports by export market of destination etc. Respondents said little can be inferred from the available index of industrial production data, given their lack of representativeness of the wider Ugandan manufacturing sector. Due to the paucity of data, NPA and other MDAs often come up with plans and/or interventions without reliable baseline data. Administrative data would also help, but Uganda lacks an integrated ICT system to capture such data.

H) Issues affecting private sector are talked about but not planned for

Respondents indicated that the GoU policies seek to address complicated issues, but leave out the issues that limit private sector's capacity to build and profitably run industrial and other types of businesses. Some of the issues that need to be addressed include: high cost of conversion in terms of electricity, logistics, tax administration system, standards formulations and administration. These issues are affecting manufacturers' competitiveness at the continental level. In addition, there is no competition law to manage the trading environment and industrial synergy at different levels. The challenge of bureaucracies in implementation also derail activities. Industrialists need predictability in taxes, interest rates and exchange rates. They need well-planned and well-serviced industrial parks and export processing zones: the small enclaves that the GoU is busy declaring as industrial parks and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) do not meet the required standards.

I) The tragedy of executive directives

Almost all respondents working in the public sector decried the often strongly-worded Presidential Directives that force them to divert resources (human and financial) away from their planned priorities. The directives often bring in emerging priorities that end up substituting priorities for which planning and budgeting have already been done. Sometimes the Presidential directives disorient decision making, facilitate corruption, and fuel conflicts since they often contradict the planned, lawful procedures. Respondents indicated that these executive directives have increased in the recent past and contributed to the wiping away of the discretionary powers of implementers.

> *We spend a lot of time in meetings planning and discussing issues and all of a sudden a strongly worded letter comes directing us to take a different direction altogether, often not the right one since it is not based on systematic study…*
>
> ***Head of one of the agencies in GoU***

Other issues raised by respondents included the fact that implementation planning in Uganda is biased towards hardware infrastructure (roads, electricity, and industrial parks). There is no focus on software infrastructure such as land and company registry, patent systems, national identification, work permits, passports and efficiency of government offices. These are factors that interest industrialists, but they have been given more lip-service than action. These services should be in one office (one-stop-centre) that offers them quickly and cheaply.

Respondents also reported that there was no stakeholders mapping and analysis that was carried out to inform the implementation plan for the expired NIP 2008 (only stakeholder identification was done). The plan did not indicate current and needed levels of commitment by each MDA to deliver on the industrialisation mandate. The stakeholders that were uniquely positioned to help or hinder implementation of the agenda and their potential reasons for resistance were not identified. Currently, there are still no action plans aimed at reducing or eliminating resistance to industrial development by particular stakeholders, among other issues.

4.2 Where does power in implementation lie in Uganda?

We conducted a stakeholder analysis that sought to identify the institutions and other actors involved in the implementation process of Uganda's industrial policy. This analysis was done to establish how power levels, interests and expectations of persons and groups may be influencing implementation of the industrialisation agenda in the country. Although there are various ways of interpreting power (e.g. see Healy, 2003), in this analysis, power was understood as the ability to influence actions of others with respect to getting the desired outcomes of industrial policy realised.[40]

4.2.1 Level of power in implementing industrial policy

Benchmarking Reed et al. (2009), we considered the following power resources relevant in the implementation of public policies such as the industrial policy: (1) formal authority or position power, derived from the position one holds as described in law or policy which qualifies a particular actor to take decisions with respect to other actors; (2) possession of (financial) resources, where those with a more direct access and control of the national treasury as well as other stakeholders' budgets/resources possess more power; and (3) relationships with other actors, where power is related to an actor's position in the network (especially one's relationship with other actors who have access to certain power resources, and the possibility to form partnerships). The possession of these power resources enables actors to exert influence on the implementation process and guide it in certain desired directions. It is important to note that during implementation, other subtle means of power are exerted, such as the use of one's reputation or charisma, possession of specific professional knowledge and skills, the use of certain languages and the formation of certain discourses.

In assessing the level of power (and interest) of the stakeholders in the industrialisation agenda in Uganda, we mapped out 65 clusters of primary actors, as summarised in Table 1 (details in Annex 3A). Unsurprisingly, most implementing power lies with the top: the Office of the President and Cabinet, the Office of the Prime Minister, State House, Parliament, and Operation Wealth Creation, which together possess average power level of 6.34 out of 10. These are followed by the semi-autonomous agencies/authorities whose power level is 6.1. The least powerful actors, expectedly, are the local leaders and average Ugandans whose power level is as low as 2.5 out of 10. They possess neither formal authority nor resources. The only power they own is relational, derived from their constitutionally enshrined electoral duty, itself debilitated by the fact

40 *In line with Kotter J. (1985). Power and Influence, New York City, NY: Free Press.*

that Uganda follows a plurality electoral system[41], except for Presidential elections, where a majoritarian system is used to determine the winner. The Ministry responsible for industry (MoTIC) is very weak with a power level of 4.5 out of 10. This implies that it cannot effectively influence implementation.

TABLE 1: KEY ACTORS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF UGANDA'S INDUSTRIALISATION AGENDA

S/N	TYPE OF ACTORS	NO. OF ACTORS	ACTORS	AVERAGE LEVEL OF POWER (/10)	AVERAGE LEVEL OF INTEREST (/5)
1	Overall	5	OP/Cabinet, OPM, SH, PA, OWC	6.34	3.20
2	Ministries	9	MAAIF, MoEMD, MoES, MoFPED, MoGLSD, MoLHUD, MoTIC, MoWE, MoWT	5.48	2.81
3	Agencies/ Authorities	20	DDA, MTAC, NAADS, NARO, NEMA, NPA, PAU, REA, UCDA, UCDO, UCIC, UEPB, UIA, UIRI, ULC, UNBS, UNRA, UPF, URA, URSB	6.10	3.20
4	Parastatals	14	NEC, NOCU, NWSC, PBU, PM, UACC, UDB, UDC, UEDCL, UEGCL, UETCL, UFZA, UNCST, URC	5.46	3.36
5	Private Sector	5	CBs, Manufacturers, Suppliers, Demanders, Traders	4.52	2.40
6	Development Partners	10	AfDB, DFID, EADB, EU, IMF, JICA, UNDP, UNIDO, USAID, WB	5.79	2.70
7	Others	2	Local leaders, People	2.5	2.50

Source: Author's compilation using survey data

4.2.2 Level of interest in industrial policy

We also attempted to assess the level and type of interest of stakeholders in industrialisation. This was done by assigning relative values to the level of interest; that is, the level of interest of a stakeholder relative to others. The level and type of interest in the industrialisation agenda may depend on several factors. Although there are often several stakeholders that will claim interest in the agenda, the types of interest of these stakeholders can differ. Possible types of interest are, for example, strategic interest (e.g. achievement of a particular mission, mandate, goal, or objective, as well as things like prestige, power or influence) or economic interest (e.g. being able to attract a big budget by an MDA, getting contract renewal, or – for the private sector – making money/profit). The importance of each type of interest highly depends on the specific circumstances. We determined the level of interest by rating each actor on the five possible types of interest; that is, (1) achieving a mission or mandate or goals; (2) prestige or power or influence; (3) attracting budget; (4) making money; and (5) getting a (job or financial) contract (see Annex 3B). This method does not concern how the actors themselves would rate their interest.

4.2.3 Power-interest matrix

After rating the estimated power and interest of each stakeholder, they were placed in a matrix of the two dimensions, thus developing a power-interest matrix. This, based on their level of interest and power, enabled us to divide the stakeholders into four groups: key players, context setters, subjects and the crowd (in line with Eden and Ackermann, 1998). The key players are the most powerful and with the highest level of interest in the industrialisation agenda. The context setters have high power but low interest. The subjects have high interest but low power to influence anything, while the crowd have neither the power nor the interest in industrialisation. This may sound strange—how anyone may not be interested in industrialisation—but it is plausible when considering the types of interest described in Section 4.2.2 above.

41 *Where the candidate(s) with the highest number of votes wins, with no requirement to get a majority of votes.*

FIGURE 3:
POWER-INTEREST MATRIX OF STAKEHOLDERS IN UGANDA'S INDUSTRIALISATION AGENDA



1	OP/Cabinet	16	MTAC	31	UNRA	46	UFZA	61	UNIDO
2	OPM	17	NAADS	32	UPF	47	UNCST	62	USAID
3	OWC	18	NARO	33	URA	48	URC	63	WB
4	PA	19	NEMA	34	URSB	49	CBs	64	Local Leaders
5	SH	20	NPA	35	NEC	50	IPMs	65	People
6	MAAIF	21	PAU	36	NOCU	51	Suppliers		
7	MOEMD	22	REA	37	NWSC	52	Demanders		
8	MOES	23	UCDA	38	PBU	53	Traders		
9	MoFPED	24	UCDO	39	PM	54	AfDB		
10	MoGLSD	25	UCIC	40	UACC	55	DFID		
11	MOLHUD	26	UEPB	41	UDB	56	EADB		
12	MOTIC	27	UIA	42	UDC	57	EU		
13	MOWE	28	UIRI	43	UEDCL	58	IMF		
14	MOWT	29	ULC	44	UEGCL	59	JICA		
15	DDA	30	UNBS	45	UETCL	60	UNDP		

From the analysis, some of the key players – those with high levels of power and interest – in the implementation of Uganda's industrialisation agenda include: those with overall authority, resources and influence over other actors, such as State House, the Office of the President, and Parliament. The Ministries include those of Energy and Mineral Development; Finance, Planning and Economic Development; and Works and Transport. The key agencies include: NAADS, NPA, REA, UCDA, UCDO, UIA, URI, UNBS, UNRA, and URA, while key parastatals include: NEC, NOCU, UDB, UDC, UEDCL, UEGCL, UETCL, and UFZA. Independent manufacturers are the only key private sector actors, while African Development Bank, UNIDO, and the World Bank are the key development partners.

The context setters—those that are powerful but less interested in the agenda, perhaps because they are more preoccupied with their core mandates and/or objectives—include: the Ministries of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, and Lands, Housing & Urban Development; and agencies such as DDA, NARO, NEMA, UCIC, Uganda Police and URSB. Among parastatals, NWSC is one with power but less interest in industrialisation. Relatedly, commercial banks are powerful, but are less interested in industrialisation, which may explain their low interest in lending to manufacturers. DFID, EU, UNDP, and USAID are the context setters among the development partners.

Interestingly, the subjects of implementation of industrialisation – those that are highly interested but powerless to influence the process – include the Ministry responsible for industrialisation (MoTIC) and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. This is the quadrant where Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) also lies. The main constraint to their power is lack of resources. Others include agencies such as Management Training and Advisory Centre (MTAC) and the Uganda Export Promotions Board. Among the parastatals, the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology (UNCST) and Uganda Railways Corporation (URC), are highly interested but powerless, just like local suppliers and local government leaders. This is the group that must be empowered to galvanize the implementation of the industrialisation agenda.

The crowd, with neither the power nor the interest in industrialisation, include the OPM, MoES, and MoWE, PAU, ULC, government owned banks (Post Bank and Pride Microfinance) and UACC. Others include demanders of manufactured goods, traders, the average Ugandans, and the IMF. These are actors who either do not possess formal authority to influence others, or whose resources are prioritised in such a way that they hardly impact industrialisation directly. Their level of interest is low mainly because either their core business/mandate is specific, or industrialisation would actually jeopardize those mandates/ interests.

To sum it up, the industrialisation intentions of Uganda will be turned into results if, and only if, the key players in the quadrant marked "highly interested and powerful" are mobilized to lead the agenda, and those in the "highly interested but powerless" quadrant are empowered by giving them more formal authority and resources. Some of the resources may be moved from those in the quadrant occupied by subjects – marked "less interested but powerful".

There are some key actors in Uganda's industrialisation arena who were not featured in this study, most notably foreign direct investors such as the Chinese and Indian industrialists, among others. Due to time constraints, we were unable to interview them. They will perhaps be a subject for a follow-up study.

4.3 Factors that delay or fail implementation in Uganda

One of the objectives of this study is to examine the factors behind implementation failure in Uganda in general, beyond industrial policy. Respondents were asked, first of all, to express their opinion on implementation performance in Uganda, and then to explain what informed their verdict. Over 98.6% of the respondents said the level of implementation in the country is poor. They said even for the few public projects and programs that get executed, often they cause no significant impact on people's wellbeing.

> *Development should be for the people and by the people. Projects in Uganda are poorly appraised. They are for project managers; not for the people.*
>
> ***Senior leader heading a GoU MDA***

There was, however, consensus among most of the respondents that in the last five to seven years, there has been notable improvement in implementation. They cited the new infrastructure projects (roads and bridges, new electricity dams and transmission lines) that have been built under NDP II.

FIGURE 4: FACTORS THAT DELAY OR FAIL IMPLEMENTATION IN UGANDA



Source: Key Informant Interviews

Figure 4 contains the responses from key informant interviewees whose ranking was weighted according to the frequency with which each factor was mentioned. The weighted ranking adds to 100 percent.

A) Weak leadership and low motivation

Respondents ranked weak leadership as the top reason for government's delay or outright failure to implement. Respondents noted that leadership is the art of influencing people to achieve results. However, in Uganda, most people fear to lead. They prefer to manage because they fear the risks associated with leadership, and want to be safe. According to interviews conducted with top leaders of the MDAs responsible for implementing Uganda's industrial policy, many implementers in Uganda are scared to make decisions. "They consult a lot." Even supervisors cannot take decisions; they also have to consult.

> *There are very few people in this country that do not fear to make decisions. We fear to make decisions mainly for political reasons. We have the power derived from the laws, but such power is not enough; we do not want to take risks. Sometimes the Presidential directives disorient decision making.*
>
> ***Head of one of the agencies implementing the industrialisation agenda***

Respondents said for fear of "call of duty," most people holding key positions in the GoU retreat to serving their own interests (unregulated self-interest). Many implementers of the strategic vision have turned into operators. Some blamed this on "too much interference from the top leadership", while others attributed it to wrong choice of leaders in critical offices on the basis of connectivity, "local content" (picking leaders from one's home area), regional balance and political correctness.

Asked about how factors such as low pay demotivate implementers, most of the respondents said although to some extent this may be a factor, the correlation between implementation and motivation in Uganda has been mixed. They said that most of the project managers of the very projects that are being poorly implemented are highly paid people. They blamed poor implementation more on a weak leadership that fails to supervise the process. The challenge is not necessarily at the lower level. The challenge is mainly at the middle management level (Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners in Ministries). A common response from interviewees was that civil servants are not committed; they are more focused on trivial things such as travel, per diem, and holding meetings and workshops as an end in themselves. "We have idle civil servants with project teams that are remunerated using the non-wage budget meant to facilitate the civil servants to deliver."42

B) Poor planning and budget indiscipline

According to respondents, most plans in Uganda do not have the required detail. The implementation plans are developed without critical path analyses clearly showing the vision, mission, goals, objectives, targets, tasks & roles, responsible parties, budgets & resources, timeframes & schedules, outputs and outcomes, monitoring tools, and risks and contingencies of Uganda's industrialisation intent. It is that detail that is often missing in Uganda's policies and plans to make them effectively implementable and monitorable. The devil in implementation is in the detail. Most projects do not have a Gantt chart and where one exists, the people tasked with implementation do not effectively follow it. One head of an MDA said, "What we have are good pronouncements but not implementable plans. Following through the pronouncements to outputs and outcomes is Uganda's biggest weakness."

42 Interview

In Uganda we love to say resources are inadequate. With all the planning, policy and strategy inadequacies, we want more resources to do what?

Senior Official in GoU

Some respondents felt that the NPA and other planning units have trivialised planning of the public sector, which, by its very nature, is complex. The NPA did not fit the first two plans under the Vision 2040 (NDP I and II) into the planned resource envelope. They ended up pouring a lot of projects into the plans that excited politicians, yet the resource envelopes for each financial year were not adequate to finance all the projects. This was the genesis of 'budget tokenism' – prevalent in Uganda as politicians tried to do everything in order to increase the budget allocation to their MDAs. A senior official at the MoFPED said they have exceeded the resources in the NPA's macroeconomic framework, but that this has not helped to achieve the plan. This is because the planners made a lot of simplistic assumptions and ignored emerging issues. Projects originate from cabinet and get pushed through the budget. Politics keeps bringing new projects that end up claiming the money that would have delivered previously planned projects on time.

Respondents, including those working in MoFPED, pointed out that Uganda's budget has become increasingly unpredictable. MDAs have no guarantee that they will get the money that is planned in the Budget Framework Paper (BFP). Therefore, they wait until the budget is approved before they start to plan, inevitably leading to delayed implementation.

We have come to the level of bargaining budgets. It is no longer clear what guides the budget. It is incremental and not informed by the NDP, mainly because the NDP itself was not prioritised. It included everything and thus spread the budget so thinly.

Senior Official in GoU

Parliament has also added another layer of distortion. MPs have turned themselves into budgeting experts. They demand kickbacks from accounting officers in order to approve their budgets or to save them from audit queries. Add to this the tragedy of supplementary budgets caused by the prevailing political economy. The GoU has failed to consolidate budgets to ensure that projects are adequately funded. It allocates a lot of money to one agency to implement a priority project, yet other MDAs with which that agency must work to deliver the project are not funded for the activities they are expected to perform.

We have to facilitate NEMA to do environmental studies, because if we don't the NEMA officials will be unable due to the low budget they receive, yet we cannot move without their clearance. We also have to facilitate the Chief Government Valuer at MoLHUD who is poorly funded yet he is expected to value all government projects. On those, add the Solicitor General who has to approve all contracts in the country. We do facilitate all these people using money that is not in our budget. If we don't, we cannot move.

Head of one of the agencies implementing the industrialisation agenda

C) Corruption

Corruption is so rife, that it is no longer news in Uganda. However, according to respondents—among them heads of critical agencies that are tasked to implement priority projects—there is a lobbyist group that has emerged, in the form of commission agents, that has taken corruption to another level. This group is made up of well-connected and powerful individuals who influence big-money contracts on the basis of their direct connections with the top political leadership. This is part of the reason that nowadays, we have more directives coupled with poor contract/project performance. This group colludes with some accounting officers to get money from government. Respondents pointed out that there is now a new and more dangerous type of corruption: one that fights good people, particularly those who attempt to get things done or those who decline the invitation to join the corrupt cartel.

According to a senior official at the MoFPED, accounting officers are very crafty in the execution of the budget. They used to hold on to funds until the final days of the financial year to commit and then divert the funds. In 2017, MoFPED instituted a reform that caught them off-guard: sweeping all the unutilized funds off the accounts and returning it to the consolidated fund on the last day of the financial year under the so-called 'zero balance accounts reform'. These reforms are contained in the "Treasury Instructions" issued in August 2017 by the Accountant General of GoU. Respondents said the problem today is that when the front-line implementers do not eat, they do not move. Moreover, they prefer GoU money to donor funds because the latter are very strict on accountability and closely monitor the spending process, unlike the GoU, which waits for paper accountability of the funds.

> *The main reason we are still struggling with implementation is our inability to punish wrongdoers, thieves and inefficient people. We have failed to hold people who are given the responsibility and resources to deliver results accountable. Accountability in Uganda must be based on outcomes, themselves based on credible data, and not paper accountability. There is a lot of laissez-faire in this country.*
>
> ***Senior Official in GoU***

There is also the issue of speculators who tend to be fast first-movers in acquiring GoU land in the industrial parks, and hold on it as they look for buyers, often resulting in project delays.

D) Implementers without decision-making power

Interviews show that there is a political class without implementing powers that dominates decision making in Uganda. Parliament also behaves like an executive board, giving implementers orders on how they should do their work, instead of performing its oversight and legislative functions. Some respondents were of the view that the leadership has been over-politicised and centralised. Discretionary power is no longer possessed by those who are supposed to make decisions. The powers of the head of public service, for example, have been watered down to the extent that he can no longer transfer a Permanent Secretary. A cross section of interviewees said the President has been "captured" by rent-seekers who have forced him to issue directives that are not well researched, rendering implementers powerless and hesitant to take decisions.

E) Conflict and poor conflict management

Interviews show that because most of the conflicts/disagreements in Uganda are based not on fundamentals but rather survival wars, they suffocate implementation. Visions are not shared broadly because people prefer to work in silos. Most bureaucrats, especially those with big budgets, want to manage public agencies as if they are their own small "kingdoms". As some respondents noted, they act as if an MDA budget is "my budget". Conflicting directives issued by top leadership have also fuelled conflicts. Respondents said the biggest source of conflict is corruption. Everyone wants to play a role even where they are not supposed to. Interviews indicate that conflicts are highest in procurement where the CEO of an agency, the Board, and political leaders all want to play a role. Public arguments are often about mandates, but the root cause of these disagreements is self-interest (corruption). There is no mechanism for internal conflict resolution, which is why everyone runs to the President for conflict resolution. Uganda has a very strong Presidency without a supporting mechanism.

F) Long, bureaucratic and corrupt procurement cycle

Respondents said the PPDA Act (2003) is slowing down implementation due to a number of factors: mainly due to the late initiation of procurements, contract committees do not sit in time; multiple-year planning is not done; and counterpart funding is not included in the procurement cycle. Although the Act was introduced to prevent incidences of corruption, there have been several reports of corrupt dealings in the procurement system. Most of the respondents argued that the procurement law needs realignment in order to deliver an implementation agenda. However, some of the respondents argued that since the challenges in the procurement laws are created by people, changing the law will not help. Instead, they argue, what is required is strong leadership to make leaders accountable. Nearly all interviewees concur that the industrialisation agenda should be taken out of the PPDA Act, since business does not work under the state bureaucracy.

G) Weak oversight

Respondents say most interest groups in Uganda are weak and self-serving, and academic think-tanks are dead. Policy making and budgeting processes in the country are not informed by research. Uganda's academics are engrossed in publishing theoretical academic research that has no policy relevance to get promoted. On the upside, interviews also revealed that in the recent past, there has been increased capacity of CSOs and that they are helping the improvement in implementation performance. In addition, interest groups such as UMA have become more effective. It has, for example, won tax breaks and local content protection for manufacturers.

H) Inadequate human resources

The interviews conducted indicate that Uganda does not have the skills necessary for industrialisation. Even the few people who get trained end up leaving the country after staying idle for years. There are wide knowledge and skills gaps in agencies that are supposed to implement industrial policy.

Another issue raised mainly by private sector interviewees included the slow speed at which deterrents to industrialisation are addressed by the state. For example, respondents indicated that in comparison to other trading partners, Uganda's conversion costs are relatively higher and often render Ugandan manufacturers uncompetitive both in the local and global markets. They cited the cost of electricity for the extra-large category of manufacturers, which is still as high as US$0.08/KwH, as well as the high costs of logistics, given the reliance on road transport. Interviewees also cited the tax administration system for VAT refunds, which favours importers. The process for claiming refunds is lengthy and exposes manufacturing to high costs of working capital and reduces the country's potential to grow exports.

Respondents also said that some products - such as steel products - are in the market, yet they do not comply with the requirements set out in relevant standards. This exposes manufacturers to unfair competition as a result of non-uniformity with respect to the standards being benchmarked on. Respondents also noted that permit renewal for expatriate workers in the manufacturing sector is also lengthy and costly.

4.4 The main successes of the industrialisation drive in Uganda

Respondents were asked whether there have been any key achievements of the industrialisation drive, and how we should measure those successes. Figure 5 illustrates the responses from key informant interviewees whose ranking was weighted according to the frequency with which each success was mentioned. The weighted ranking adds to 100 percent.

FIGURE 5: RANK OF THE MAIN SUCCESSES OF THE INDUSTRIALISATION DRIVE IN UGANDA



Source: Key Informant Interviews

The respondents cited the return of an industrial policy on GoU's development agenda as the greatest success achieved so far in the country's industrialisation drive. They justified this verdict by citing the increased prioritisation of industrialisation and the general understanding that industrialisation is one of the key solutions to Uganda's challenges. They also said the strategic direction is now clear with emphasis being placed on closing the infrastructural gap to spur industrial development. In addition, there seems to be a realisation that Uganda's private sector is too weak to spur industrialisation, thus necessitating that the state get back into industrialisation through its investment arm, the Uganda Development Corporation (UDC). The emphasis put on promoting sciences in the education system is also worth noting.

The improved infrastructure (especially electricity, roads and optic fibre backbone for internet) was also ranked highly among the successes. Ranked third was the rapid emergence of SME industries along the Kampala-Jinja and Kampala-Gulu roads, and other parts of the country. The challenge is that most factories are unplanned, without much to show in terms of outcomes.

The private sector has embraced the industrial park model. New industrial parks are being developed, including privately owned parks such as Liao Shen Industrial Park in Kapeeka, Nakaseke District. According to its proprietors and the UIA, the park is the fastest growing in the country. The established parks such as Kampala Industrial and Business Park (KIBP) in Namanve are scaling up in capacity.

There has also been growth in the number of companies in the manufacturing sector, such as Roofings Group, Mukwano Industries, Nice House of Plastics and Diary industries (Mulwana), Steel Rolling Mills, Mbarara Milk, and Kalangala Palm Oil, among others. Roofings alone now consumes 40 MW of electricity and it is one of the top exporters and revenue generators for the economy. As a result of this growth, some jobs have been created. Data from UIA shows that about 50,000 industrial jobs have been created since 2008. They have also substituted some imports. For example, transformers that were previously imported are now assembled in Uganda.
Respondents also cited BUBU as a big success that has supported industrial policy and industrial development. As a result of BUBU, launched in March 2019, local providers including manufacturers have been awarded contracts worth UGX 890 billion to supply road projects (with steel, cement and other materials), UGX 156 billion in medical supplies, and UGX 2.2 billion in electrical supplies.

Another success has been continued commitment of the private sector to the manufacturing business, despite the numerous challenges private firms face. As a result, there has been increased export of manufactured goods to over $1 billion, according to data from UEPB. The GoU also continues to involve the manufacturers in policy making, through their umbrella organization – the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) as well as the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU). This, according to private sector players, has ensured transparency and given investors certainty about government policy.

Respondents, particularly those from the private sector also mentioned the relatively stable political environment that has enabled them to do business. Officials from MoFPED cited improved absorption of funds by MDAs involved in implementation of the industrial policy, particularly during the period after FY 2016/17 to date. For example, absorption of external funding for projects related to industrial policy has increased from 27% in FY 2016/17 to 60% in FY 2018/19.[43]

43 *MoFPED (2019), Industrialization Sub-Sector Semi-Annual Budget Monitoring Report Financial Year 2018/19. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, April 2019*

5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

Although the popular view is that Uganda is good at making policies/plans but poor at implementing them, this study has found that, actually, policy/plan making processes in Uganda are not as good as many think. The reason for this is that most of Uganda's policies/plans are not informed by evidence, but by individual opinions and politics. In the case of the on-going industrialisation drive, there is no clear and agreed upon plan, strategy, focus, or policy framework to guide its implementation. The different agencies involved work in silos to implement their respective plans, and approach implementation in a laissez faire manner. The national budget dictates what planning should do, instead of the other way round. Presidential directives are disorienting decision making and fuelling conflicts since they often contradict the planned lawful procedures.

Challenges aside, industrial policy is back on the GoU's development agenda. Infrastructure – especially electricity, roads and optic fibre backbone for internet – has tremendously improved to support industrialisation; and there has been a marked growth in manufacturing companies, albeit operating in an unplanned, unregulated and somewhat chaotic manner. To turn the industrialisation intentions of Uganda into results, the key players who are highly interested and powerful should be mobilised to lead the agenda, while those who are highly interested but powerless should be empowered by giving them more formal authority and resources. The specific recommendations are summarised below.

5.2 Recommendations

In line with the above-mentioned findings, the following recommendations – drawn from both the interviews and literature review – seek to improve Uganda's implementation performance, and, most importantly, to ensure that its industrialisation intentions are turned into results.

S/N	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
1	Draft a clear policy and strategy for the industrialisation agenda, and ensure that the GoU is speaking with one voice. Currently, people have different understandings of the same intent. Gather all stakeholders in one room for a couple of weeks to agree on the intent and draw up a practical implementation plan.	NPA, OP, MoTIC
2	Uganda's industrialisation agenda needs a champion and a leader. The President of Uganda, through his Office, should champion this agenda. A separate Ministry for Industry and Investment (MoII) should be created to lead the agenda. This will serve to end, or at least reduce, the mandate wars between MoTIC and MoFPED, and provide effective leadership to a technical working group representing all relevant sectors.	OP
3	To strengthen monitoring and coordination of the implementing actors, the Office of the Prime Minister should stop engaging in implementation and concentrate on its Constitutional duty of being "the Leader of Government Business in Parliament and responsible for the coordination of implementation of Government policies across Ministries, departments and other public institutions" [Article 108A(2)(a)]. All Ministries under OPM should be transferred to other domiciles to free the office of distractions.	OP, Parliament

S/N	RECOMMENDATIONS	RESPONSIBLE PARTY
4	Revise and implement the Cabinet-approved proposal of rationalisation of government Ministries, Departments and Agencies.[44] There is a need to revamp all Ministries from the colonial bureaucratic set up and restructure them to start running efficiently and effectively, and pay the civil servants well. There is also a need to strengthen their legal frameworks and define clear responsibilities to ensure roles do not depend on interpretation and to avoid duplication.	OP, MoPS Parliament
5	As was done for infrastructure, the GoU should prioritise, enhance, consolidate, ring-fence and mainstream the budgets for industrial development. The MDAs meant to implement industrialisation should be adequately funded and coordinated by the liberated OPM and the newly created MoII.	OP, OPM MoFPED,
6	Take the industrialisation agenda out of the PPDA Act (2003). Not even accreditation for alternative procurement systems (Sec.40A) will save the agenda - which should run on business principles - from bureaucracy. In addition, enact the competition law to manage industrial synergy at different levels as well as the trading environment.	Parliament, MoFPED
7	Carry out a needs assessment exercise to inform human resource training by identifying the skills needed for industrialisation and make the training focused, targeted and practical.	MoES, NPA, MoGLSD, MoSTI, UIRI, Private Sector
8	Although it is important to attract foreign capital into the country, there is a need to focus the industrialisation strategy on mobilising domestic capital from groups such as KACITA and Kwagalana, and to develop the capital markets. Some of the capital being pumped into the construction of shopping malls and import trade should be incentivised into factories by turning the terms of trade in favour of manufacturing.	MoFPED, UDC, UIA, CMA
9	In order to facilitate proper implementation planning, analysis and good decision-making, it is critical to invest in client-driven, objective, accurate and timely data.	UBOS, MDAs
10	There is a need to create and effectively enforce a performance rewards and sanctions mechanism for all public servants to ensure that they are accountable. This will guarantee high levels of staff motivation, encourage excellence and meritocracy, and address poor performance. The framework should be designed to link rewards and sanctions to measurable performance. Poor performers should be punished; good performers rewarded.	OPM, MoPS,
11	Kindly act on the recommendations 1 to 10.	All

44 In September 2018, Cabinet of GoU approved a plan to rationalise agencies, commissions, and authorities as a way of aligning their functions, structures and budgets; eliminating ambiguities, duplications, overlaps, and wasteful expenditure; harmonising wages between employees of agencies and traditional public service; as well as streamlining legal and institutional framework to make the agencies accountable to the citizens and the mainstream Government. A number of the agencies were to be retained, some merged, and others mainstreamed back into Ministries, while a few were to be abolished. However, since then, nothing has been done to implement the Cabinet directive.

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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: PERSONS/ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

S/N	PERSON INTERVIEWED	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1.	Mr. Keith Muhakanizi, Permanent Secretary MoFPED and Secretary to the Treasury for the Republic of Uganda	October 7, 2019
2.	Ms. Allen Kagina, Executive Director Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)	October 8, 2019
3.	Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho Salim Saleh (rtd), Chief Coordinator Operation Wealth creation (OWC)	October 14, 2019
4.	Mr. Kenneth Mugambe, Director Budget MoFPED	October 10, 2019
5.	Dr. Elly Twineyo, Executive Director Uganda Export Promotions Board (UEPB)	October 10, 2019
6.	Mr. Hamza Galiwango, Director Industrial Park Development, UIA Mr. Godfrey Semakula, Deputy Director Industrial Park Development, UIA	October 10, 2019
7.	Dr. Louis Kasekende, Deputy Governor Bank of Uganda	October 10, 2019
8.	Brig. David Kasura Kyomukama, Director National Leadership Institute Kyankwanzi	October 13, 2019
9.	Dr. Patrick Birungi, Executive Director, Uganda Development Corporation	October 14, 2019
10.	Ms. Margret Kakande, Head of Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit (BMAU), MoFPED Ms. Rosetti Nabbumba Nayenga, Deputy Head BMAU in charge of Agriculture Monitoring Mr. Mathew Lubulwa, In charge of Industry Monitoring	October 14, 2019
11.	Dr. Joseph Muvawala, Executive Director National Planning Authority (NPA)	October 15, 2019
12.	Dr. Wilberforce Kisamba Mugerwa, Chairman Microfinace Support Centre, for Chairman NPA	October 17, 2019
13.	Mr. Bemanya Twebaze, Registrar General, Uganda Registration Services Bureau	October 17, 2019
14.	Prof. Ezra Suruma, Head of Delivery Unit, Office of the Prime Minister	October 17, 2019
15.	Hon Maj. Fred Bwino Kyakulaga, Chairperson Parliamentary Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation	October 17, 2019
16.	Ms. Barbara Mulwana, Executive Director Nice House of Plastics, Chairperson Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA)	October 18, 2019

17.	Dr. Ben Manyindo, Executive Director Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS)	October 21, 2019
18	Mr. Denis Ainebyoona, Ag. Commissioner Industry/ Principal Industrial Officer, MoTIC	October 21, 2019
19	Ms. Clara Mira, Country Representative, International Monetary Fund (IMF)	October 22, 2019
20	Mr. Vincent Tumusiime, Director, Directorate of Social - Economic Monitoring and Research, Office of the President	October 22, 2019
21	Mr. Simon Peter Nsereko, Economic Analyst UNDP	October 23, 2019
22	Mr. Bruno Otto, Country Representative UNIDO	October 23, 2019
23	Hon. America Kyambadde, Minister of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MoTIC)	October 23, 2019
24	Mr. Robert Kabushenga, CEO New Vision Group	October 24, 2019
25	Dr. Martin Kyeyune, Finance & Economic Advisor Roofing Group Mr. Robert Lukyamuzi Luwogo, Business Intelligence Manager, Roofings Group	October 29, 2019

ANNEX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE USED TO CAPTURE RESPONSES FROM KIIS

GENERIC GUIDE FOR INTERVIEWS OF KEY INFORMANTS

TOPIC OF STUDY

From Paper to Practice: Implementation of Uganda's Industrialisation Agenda

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

To interrogate the poor implementation performance, explore approaches to successful industrial policy implementation and guide the implementers of Uganda's industrialisation agenda to achieve sustainable results.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

1 To establish how the Government of Uganda is and should approach the implementation phase of its industrialisation agenda.

2. To examine the factors behind implementation failure in Uganda.

3. To document recommendations to ensure that the industrialisation intentions of Uganda are turned into results.

GENERAL INFORMATION ON UGANDA'S INDUSTRIALISATION AGENDA

1. Are you familiar and satisfied with Uganda's industrialisation strategy?
2. Are you satisfied with the way this agenda has been planned and articulated?

HINT:

A) Is there clarity of the goals, targets and objectives of the industrialisation agenda?

B) Are the task assignments clear and detailed?

3. There is a popular saying that Uganda is good at making good policies but poor at implementation. What's your view?

INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE (IN GENERAL) IN UGANDA

1. What is your view on implementation performance in Uganda? What informs your verdict?
2. There is a popular saying that Uganda is good at making policies but poor at implementation. What's your view?
3. What are the actual factors that typically cause delays or failures in implementation in Uganda?
4. Comment on the organisational structure of government as a precondition for successful implementation – does it allow/impede effective coordination and cooperation?
5. Comment on effectiveness involvement of people in the planning and implementation
6. Comment on the level of leadership and motivation of front-line implementers
7. Comment on the discretionary power of front-line implementers – their competencies and commitment - vis-à-vis those of the political leaders
8. Comment on the degree of conflict and the efficiency of conflict management
9. Comment on how the following major agencies performed in the implementation process in Uganda: Parliament, Judiciary, the bureaucracy/executive, political parties, interest groups (UMA, trade unions etc.), and academic think tanks.

INFORMATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDUSTRIALISATION AGENDA

1. Can you cite any main achievements for the industrialisation drive in Uganda so far?
2. What are the main factors behind these successes?
3. Can you cite any main failures as far as industrialisation of Uganda is concerned?
4. What are the key factors behind implementation failure in Uganda?
5. How should we measure success or failure of implementation of industrialisation in Uganda?
6. How does the quality of data look like?
7. Comment on the adequacy and appropriateness of technology and human resources to industrialise Uganda?
8. Uganda is a private sector-led economy; what is GoU doing well and where they need to improve to facilitate private industrialists in Uganda?

INFORMATION ON STRATEGIES/RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION

1. Is there a chance of achieving the goals/targets of the current industrialisation agenda?
2. What should be done to ensure that the industrialisation intentions of the government of Uganda are turned into results?
3. In particular, what are the strategies to close implementation gaps?
4. Do you have any lessons on implementation that you've learned elsewhere?

ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDER MAPPING AND ANALYSIS MATRIX

ANNEX 3B:
ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF INTEREST OF STAKEHOLDERS IN INDUSTRIALISATION

		POWER SOURCES			
		FORMAL AUTHORITY	POSSESSION OF RESOURCES	RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS	LEVEL OF POWER
		0-4	0-4	0-2	/10
	ACTORS				
OVERALL	OP/Cabinet	4	3.5	1.5	9
	OPM	2	1	1.5	4.5
	OWC	0	0	1.5	1.5
	Parliament	3.2	2	1.5	6.7
	SH	4	4	2	10
MINISTRIES	MAAIF	2	2.5	1.2	5.7
	MOEMD	2.4	3	1.5	6.9
	MOES	1.2	2	1	4.2
	MoFPED	4	4	2	10
	MoGLSD	1.5	1	1	3.5
	MOLHUD	2	2	1.5	5.5
	MOTIC	2.5	1	1	4.5
	MOWE	1	2	1	4
	MOWT	2	2	1	5
AGENCIES/ AUTHORITIES	DDA	3	2	1	6
	MTAC	1	0.5	0	1.5
	NAADS	2.5	2	1	5.5
	NARO	2	2.7	1.5	6.2
	NEMA	2.2	1	2	5.2
	NPA	3	2	2	7
	PAU	1.8	2	1	4.8
	REA	2	2	1.5	5.5

		POWER SOURCES			
		FORMAL AUTHORITY	POSSESSION OF RESOURCES	RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS	LEVEL OF POWER
		0-4	0-4	0-2	/10
	ACTORS				
AGENCIES/ AUTHORITIES	UCDA	3	3	1	7
	UCDO	3	2	1	6
	UCIC	3	2.8	1.5	7.3
	UEPB	2	1	1	4
	UIA	2	2	1	5
	UIRI	2	2	1	5
	ULC	1.5	1	1	3.5
	UNBS	4	1.5	2	7.5
	UNRA	3	4	2	9
	UPF	4	3	2	9
	URA	4	4	2	10
	URSB	2.5	3	1.5	7
PARASTATALS	NEC	1	3	0	4
	NOCU	2	3	0	5
	NWSC	3	4	1.8	8.8
	PBU	1	3.5	0	4.5
	PM	1	3.5	0	4.5
	UACC	1	2.2	0	3.2
	UDB	2.5	3	1.7	7.2
	UDC	4	2	1.8	7.8
	UEDCL	3	3	1.5	7.5
	UEGCL	3	3	1.5	7.5
	UETCL	3	3	1.5	7.5

		POWER SOURCES			
		FORMAL AUTHORITY	POSSESSION OF RESOURCES	RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER ACTORS	LEVEL OF POWER
		0-4	0-4	0-2	/10
	ACTORS				
PARASTATALS	UFZA	1	1	0	2
	UNCST	1	1	1	3
	URC	2	1	1	4
PRIVATE SECTOR	CBs	0	4	1.5	5.5
	Manufacturers	0	4	1.5	5.5
PRIVATE SECTOR	Suppliers	0	1	2	3
	Demanders	0	3	2	5
	Traders	0	2	1.6	3.6
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS	AfDB	1	4	1.5	6.5
	DFID	1	4	1	6
	EADB	1	2	1	4
	EU	2	4	1.2	7.2
	IMF	3	0	1.5	4.5
	JICA	1	3	1	5
	UNDP	1	4	1	6
	UNIDO	2	2	1.5	5.5
	USAID	1	4	1.2	6.2
	WB	1	4	2	7
OTHERS	Local Leaders	1	0	1	2
	People	1	1	1	3

	ACTORS	TYPE OF INTEREST	LEVEL OF INTEREST *(SCALE OF 0 - 5)*
OVERALL	OP/Cabinet	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	OPM	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.2
	OWC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	Parliament	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.3
	SH	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
MINISTRIES	MAAIF	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.5
	MOEMD	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	MOES	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	MoFPED	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	MoGLSD	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.3
	MOLHUD	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.2
	MOTIC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4
	MOWE	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1.5
	MOWT	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.8
AGENCIES/ AUTHORITIES	DDA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	MTAC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	NAADS	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.2
	NARO	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	NEMA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	NPA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4
	PAU	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.5
	REA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4

	ACTORS	TYPE OF INTEREST	LEVEL OF INTEREST *(SCALE OF 0 - 5)*
AGENCIES/ AUTHORITIES	UCDA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	UCDO	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	UCIC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.4
	UEPB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UIA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UIRI	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	ULC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.1
	UNBS	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UNRA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.2
	UPF	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1.5
	URA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.1
	URSB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.5
PARASTATALS	NEC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	NOCU	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.8
	NWSC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	PBU	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	PM	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	UACC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.6
	UDB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UDC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UEDCL	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4

	ACTORS	TYPE OF INTEREST	LEVEL OF INTEREST *(SCALE OF 0 - 5)*
PARASTATALS	UEGCL	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4
	UETCL	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4
	UFZA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, presitige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	UNCST	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.4
	URC	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.2
PRIVATE SECTOR	CBs	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	Manufac-turers	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	5
	Suppliers	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3
	Demanders	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	1
	Traders	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
DEVELOP-MENT PARTNERS	AfDB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	DFID	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.5
	EADB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	EU	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	IMF	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	JICA	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3.5
	UNDP	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2.5
	UNIDO	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3
	USAID	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2
	WB	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	4
OTHERS	Local Leaders	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	3
	People	Achieving mission/mandate/goals, prestige/power/influence, attracting budget, making money, contract	2

ISBN 978-9970-535-11-8